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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to understand the conjunction of faculty roles as teachers and as
researchers. This understanding is pursued through philosophical analysis. Discourse ethics, in
particular, is used as a framework by which to best understand the roles played by faculty and if
the roles of teacher and researcher are, in fact, commensurable. The purpose of the work is twofold: 1) to develop a construct that may be used by future researchers to better understand the
roles played by faculty, and 2) to suggest a best-construct that enables future researchers to
propose how actual lived roles should be instantiated in the world.
The dissertation reviews a series of university handbooks, professional association ethical
guidelines, and philosophical arguments to establish how the roles of faculty are best understood.
The investigation illuminates the tensions at the heart of faculty roles. This tension is not
definitionally embedded in the roles of faculty as teacher and researcher. Rather, the tension
emerges from the failure of institutions to fully actualize faculty roles as normatively grounded
in human communicative interaction. As a result, the work suggests that in order to best resolve
the cognitive dissonance that may be experienced as a result of role ambiguity, faculty should
engage in a process of self-reflection and community dialectic in order to best determine how
“faculty” can be actualized in a way that best benefits all stakeholders.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Chapter 1 lays out the motivation of the project as a means by which to understand that
shifting roles of faculty as teacher and researcher as a result of the pressures applied to those
roles by shift in the university paradigm to that of a “diploma market.” The chapter justifies the
project’s research questions through an investigation of research that suggests both: 1) The
university has already been radically redefined in its purpose; and 2) This redefinition is
potentially harmful to both students and faculty. In order to understand this redefinition and its
conceptual implication for faculty roles, two research questions presented later in the chapter
emerge. Those questions suggest that this project is meta-analytical, potentially challenging the
epistemology of educational research itself. In order to best answer these research questions in a
way that acknowledges the self-reflexive nature of the work within the educational research
paradigm, philosophical analysis, particularly discourse ethics, is an apt methodological
approach. As the work will seek to understand and examine the emergent norms that emerge
from the communicative actions of our conceptual role theoretical dialectic, it is the work of
philosopher Jurgen Habermas that is best suited for the analysis. Thus, the chapter will introduce
the project as both a descriptive and normative project that will use Habermas’ work as the
philosophical methodology.

Background and Contextualization of the Issue
The university, as an institution in the U.S., is crumbling, according to some observers
(Readings, 1996). This collapse of the institution, argued theorists like Readings (1996), Slevin
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(2001), and Carter (2004), is the result of a fundamental paradigm shift in the way society
engages education. The shift of which they spoke is the result of the corporatization of the
university (Carter, 2004; Readings, 1996). Noam Chomsky, in a 2013 lecture, argued that this
corporatization may result in “converting schools and universities into facilities that produce
commodities for the job market, abandoning the traditional ideal of the universities: fostering
creative and independent thought and inquiry, challenging perceived beliefs, exploring new
horizons and forgetting external constraints” (Chomsky, 2013). This privatization, which
Chomsky defined as “privatization for the rich [and a] lower level of mostly technical training
for the rest,” is something he argued is happening “across the country” (Chomsky, 2013). Given
the heavy emphasis on standardization, STEM, and assessment that seems ever increasing, there
is good reason to believe that Chomsky is right: public education in the United States is
becoming increasingly oriented towards the generation of “productive citizens.” Simply, it seems
that the goal is not the generation of those who, through participation in a “liberal” education—
as argued by Dewey (1900), Bialostosky (1991) and Nussbaum (1998)—are an informed
electorate, but, rather, the generation of workers who participate actively in the economy by both
providing goods for that economy and purchasing goods through that economy. It should be
noted that while the first notion of education requires that the electorate be well-informed
regarding its own welfare and best interest, the second does not.
The shift towards privatization as we see it today may well have its origins in the
economic troubles of the 1970s. A Carnegie Commission report, The New Depression in Higher
Education by Earl F. Cheit, reported numerous concerns regarding post-secondary education and
funding. According to Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney (2013),
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The basic problem was that the cost of educational production was rising faster than
institutional revenue, as the sharp funding increases of the 1960s began to slow, while the
growth and expansion of faculty, staff, and programs continued apace. At about this time,
the labor market for PhD’s, which had witnessed high demand relative to supply in the
1960s, suddenly had an excess supply in many fields. (p. 67)
As a result, the 1970s saw a great deal of argument regarding the question of, “To whom should
the cost and burden of education fall?” Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 saw a shift away from
the general paradigm that the fiscal involvement of the government helped to alleviate social ills.
The general notion that privatization can solve social problems became popular and remains
popular today. As a result, the school choice movement (Ravitch, 2010) has gained much
popularity, arguing that education best benefits from parents’ ability to choose to send their
children to schools that are “most successful.” This idea of success, of course, requires
assessment—an increasing concern since the publication of A Nation at Risk. Education as a
whole, therefore, has been under increasing pressure to demonstrate measurable value (St. John,
Daun-Barnett & Moronski-Chapman, 2012). Under the Obama administration it has become
clear that the belief that schools should be able to demonstrate accountability and gains (if not
gainful employment) is not limited to the K-12 public school system.
Numerous proposals have been forwarded to defund programs that are themselves
difficult to assess, do not produce an “employable skill,” or cost more than they produce
(Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney, 2013). To quote James Slevin (2001), speaking of the
university,
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If the spirit is anything other than collegial, in its exact sense, then it is not a college or
university. For the sake of having a name to name this thing that a college or university is
not, I will call it a diploma market, an institution trading in commodities, selling and
delivering instruction in order to sell and deliver the instructed. As it turns out, diploma
markets are what most of the 3000+ postsecondary institutions may be in the process of
becoming. (p.234)
Research in academia is, of course, one means by which to judge production. Those faculty
members who produce research—particularly research that, itself, can be capitalized upon (i.e.
garner respect for the university, enables profit through publication, or enables profit through
research and development)—are therefore highly desirable, as they produce something of
tangible value to the economy of the institution and society as a whole.
This shift towards production that Readings described has resulted in a perspective such
that, “Teaching, we are told, is undervalued in favor of research, while research is less and less in
touch with the demands of the real world, or with the comprehension of the ‘common reader’”
(Readings, 1996, p.1). Gerald Graff (2003), in his book Clueless in Academe: How Schooling
Obscures the Life of the Mind, argued that “academia reinforces cluelessness by making its ideas,
problems, and ways of thinking look more opaque, narrowly specialized, and beyond normal
learning capacities than they are or need to be” (p. 1) This is not to say that there is a necessary
divide between teaching and research, but rather that the history of academia has been to create
one. This generated division between teaching and research works in synonymy with the opacity
of the research produced by academics to those outside of the academy to produce division
between research and teaching. To Quote Graff (2003),
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The view that academic writing is necessarily insular and obscure props up the
overdrawn opposition between research and teaching. We are so used to opposing
research and teaching that we overlook the fact that good research is itself pedagogical,
often drawing on the skills of explanation, clarification, and problem-posing…central to
good teaching. (p. 10)
Thus, teaching is undervalued, perhaps, because it is seen as a proletariat labor-enterprise
performed by easily replaceable workers, while research is similarly demeaned for failing to
produce that which is “useful,” with immediacy, to the Gross National Product.
The shift to a production paradigm, in which true value of education is determined by the
generation of “useful” goods, therefore, causes a greater strain between teacher and researcher;
the teacher role, when seen as “productive,” avoids the supposedly opaque uselessness of
academic research, while academic research is also seen as a superior means by which to judge
the production capacity of faculty. Thusly, the production paradigm shift places both the role of
teacher and the role of researcher against the other, both of which must defend their usefulness in
the language of productive economy.
This shift has had numerous consequences: one specifically addressed by Readings is the
significant increase in the usage of adjuncts hired solely to teach. “The redistribution of roles
within units is already a reality: teaching is increasingly done by part-time and temporary fulltime faculty. The ‘units’ so ‘diversified’ have become incredibly ‘productive’ using this model,
and with more powerless teachers, there is a whole lot more ‘collaboration.’ But it is a model
based on an injustice and for that reason alone—though there are others— damages the quality
of education (Slevin, 2001, p. 242). The consequences of the production paradigm that has
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redistributed and diversified university roles such as teacher and researcher are grounded in the
expectation that the university should produce employable workers, who themselves can
“produce,” thusly maintaining the economy.
Another shift caused by the current focus on a production paradigm is the significant
pressure on faculty to produce research. The pressure has become so intense over recent years
that ethical questions and concerns are beginning to emerge. In the Journal of Clinical
Investigation, Neill (2008) reported a greater number of ethical violations seen by the journal.
Researchers, under the pressure to publish, are now engaging in “ethical gray areas.” When the
pressure to publish is sufficient, it is not unreasonable to worry that these “gray areas” may also
include the misuse of their own students.
Researchers who are under the pressure to publish are now turning to their own
classrooms as research laboratories, which can be used for publication in education journals
(Hutchings, 2002). An increasing number of teachers use their own students as research
participants as a means by which to evaluate their own teaching practices—and, of course,
simultaneously publish (Burns & McCarthy, 2010; Gan & Geral, 2010). Darling-Hammond
(2010) suggested that the “gaming” of the standardized testing system has increased dramatically
since the advent of “No Child Left Behind,” placing teacher’s careers and schools funding in
jeopardy if students do not perform satisfactorily on high-stakes tests. Similarly, one may reason
that the corporatization of the university has increased the amount of low-quality faculty research
and arguably unethical faculty research due to increased pressure to publish.
Thusly, the roles of faculty as teachers and as researchers are both in flux, potentially in
ways that conflict incommensurably. As the university enters into this revisioning of the
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capitalistic educational paradigm, the roles of faculty may change significantly, so it may well be
prudent to establish a clear understanding of how teacher and researcher in the university as
faculty should best be understood.
The University
It may come as no surprise to post-secondary faculty that a significant paradigm shift has
been taking place on the university level over the past two decades. Bill Readings (1996) wrote
ominously about the “University in Ruins,” describing the collapse of university structure as we
know it. Much of his text acts a revisioning of academic life, explicating what faculty should do
as they wander out into the desolate landscape of academia: “To dwell in the ruins of the
University is to try to do what we can, while leaving space for what we cannot envisage to
emerge” (Readings, 1996, p. 176). This fundamental paradigmatic shift, as Readings saw it, is in
large part due to the conceptualization of knowledge as a product to be bought and sold. As
Reading stated, “The University is on the way to becoming a corporation” (1996, p. 22). This
corporatization, suggested thinkers like Readings, Geoffrey Sirc, and Christopher Carter, is not
just an eventuality; it is an inevitability.
It is now common to hear politicians lament the uselessness of degrees in the humanities
and argue for an increase in cost of those degrees that do not produce something deemed to be of
sufficient worth by society. Interestingly, at the same time, a 2014 U.S. Department of Education
press release reveals that federal regulations will also demand that programs that produce poorly
balanced debt to income ratio over a series of years will be closed, encouraging what they term
“gainful employment.” Whilst it seems that both ideas have the best interest of students and their
financial futures in mind, they also are clear markers of what is most valued by our society—
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production of tangible things. Thusly, ideas, values, understanding, self-worth, reflection,
compassion, enlightenment, and knowledge are means to that end, and the worth of a college
education is now determined largely by the average income produced by a particular degree
(Carter 2004). To quote Kögler (2015), “Politicians too often fall prey to reducing college to the
production of job-conferring degrees, instead of seeing its function in the wider context of
producing agents capable of participating productively in society as such, including the
democratic political sphere” (para. 43). It is not a “liberal education” paradigm in which we now
dwell; rather, the university has become the servant to a capitalistic end.
Chomsky, (1995) wrote,
[T]he educational system is divided into fragments. The part that's directed toward
working people and the general population is indeed designed to impose obedience. But
the education for elites can’t quite do that. It has to allow creativity and independence.
Otherwise they won't be able to do their job of making money.
Presumably he is speaking of the K-12 system, as supposedly higher education must allow for
the creativity and independence of which he speaks. One comes to realize immediately, though,
that in the twenty years since Chomsky wrote the above, post-secondary education has
experienced greater and greater pressure to produce workers. It is difficult to express the
emphasis on STEM in any other way. As the United States has begun to move into the postindustrial “knowledge economy” described by Peter Drucker (1992), the idea of worker has
begun to include the notion of the knowledge worker. To quote Drucker,
Whereas the Grosstadt was founded on the industrial worker, the megalopolis is founded
on, and organized around, the knowledge worker, with information as its foremost output
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as well as its foremost need. The college campus rather than the factory chimney is likely
to be the distinctive feature of megalopolis, the college student rather than the
“proletarian’ its central political fact.” (p. 35)
Thus, Chomsky’s apparent distinction between k-12 and college institutions is becoming
increasingly irrelevant in our “knowledge economy;” there is a central worker to our economy
and she is produced by the university.
Readings (1996) noted that the U.S. University is becoming increasingly more proletariat
as its focus becomes that of production and “practicality.” We see, synonymous with this change,
a change in the way we think about faculty itself, as institutions rely more and more on part-time
faculty to fill specific “practical roles” in our institutions. This reliance on part-time faculty who
are employed only to teach to the specific bureaucratic needs of the institution and society
represents the fundamental way our understanding of both purpose and content of knowledge
have changed. The focus of post-secondary education—the modern public seems to demand—
should be on the production of citizens who have useful skills. Knowledge, at best, is now a
byproduct of the more pressing corporate need.
Corporatization
The corporatization to which Readings was referring is not just external, insofar as the
university is required to meet the demands of society, but internal as well. Christopher Carter
explicated the way disciplines themselves have become corporatized in the university. He
addressed composition specifically and the demands that have been placed upon composition by
this new paradigm. Carter wrote, “As composition departments encourage students’ immersion
in capitalist practice, they more openly and egregiously practice capitalist exploitation
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themselves” (2004, p.190). It seems as if the institution, by virtue of teaching towards the end,
must, by definition, become a tool of that end. Composition programs find themselves under
significant pressure to focus on writing for work and only for work.
Carter argued that as the institution orients itself towards the production of students who
themselves produce measurable results, the means of assessment and the practices of pedagogy
are becoming oriented toward those ends as well. This shift in understanding is similar to the
impact high stakes testing has had on the K-12 fine arts curriculum. Intense pressure to teach the
mandated curriculum hinders the inclusion of fine arts in classrooms (Oreck, 2004); according to
the American Evaluation Association, fine arts teachers find that the curriculum has been
narrowed to the tested subjects. Thus the institution of K-12 has molded itself to find the needs
and demands of high-stakes education policy, and the curriculum reflects and emphasizes the
culturally held belief that education is for jobs rather than for enlightenment. The result of such
shifts has been a change in the way we think of knowledge, which now may be best defined as,
“That which enables a student to find a lucrative job.” The institution as university, as a result,
has become at odds with itself as Readings (1996) argued.
Carter suggested that the most problematic result of this shift has been the emphasis on
the needs and authority of university bureaucracy. Students are taught to follow the “rules” of
composition in the same way that faculty are themselves taught to abide by the rules of the
hierarchy of the institution. “They attempt to fill their roles within an administrative hierarchy
while encouraging students to become suspicious of hierarchical structures. They attempt to
prepare their students for the working world while nevertheless objecting to that world's
exploitative practices” (2004, 186). The shift, then, to corporatization is in effect a kind of
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symbiosis produced by the demand for students who will follow intellectual rules and, thus, a
faculty that will do nothing more (so as to not waste the institution’s resources) than make sure
they learn those rules. Simultaneously, faculty are increasingly aware that their worth as
researchers is in question and they find themselves struggling to distinguish their roles from the
roles of those faculty who are hired only to meet the productive bureaucratic needs of the
institution.

Faculty as
part of
beaurocracy

Faculty as
researchers

Figure 1. The Precarious Balance Required of Modern Faculty

Carter chastised this victimized professoriate, though: “We do nothing to inhibit
academic corporatism if we construct ourselves as gentle managers bound by the constraints of
an unkind system” (2004, p.188). Simply, to educate students on the importance of free thought
and critical thinking while at the same time sheepishly passing out departmentally developed
rubrics, following state determined curriculum, and requiring that the students themselves
respect the hierarchy of which we are a part is contradictory. The professoriate seems to, on the
one hand, worry that students who do not acknowledge and respect the superior position of
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professors will be unteachable, while, on the other, hold on to the belief that the faculty
themselves should not have to bow to a social hierarchy as it is in the pursuit of a far greater
goal—knowledge.
The professoriate, then, is placed between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, it is
important to meet the financial needs of the students to help prepare them for the world of work,
yet, on the other, it is also fundamental to the core of a liberal education to recognize that work is
not the purpose of knowledge. To quote Geoffrey Sirc,
Of course I have students—many each quarter—who just want to know the tricks to
writing, how to psyche it out. Who want the grades and the jobs. I don’t want to deny
them that; I, after all, have a job. But there remains the way I choke on that system, the
way we all do, ultimately. There is a profound dissatisfaction many of us feel at having to
enable that system. (1995, p. 550).
For this reason, it seems impossible for professors to help students learn to navigate the rules of
the system without, at the same time helping to further instantiate a system that itself deems the
fundamental goal of the professoriate unnecessary.
The efficiently-functioning, productive university will turn students out as quickly as
possible who have taken nothing but the necessary coursework their degrees demand. Additional
knowledge, especially on the taxpayers’ expense, is deemed not just impractical, but immoral.
The university, therefore, is under constant pressure to further cut back on general education
programs, as coursework that seems unrelated to a specific major is a waste of both time and
money. Students who take the time to explore additional electives are in danger of losing their
funding and failing to earn a degree.
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Faculty are expected to mimic the no-frills model of the institution itself. The more
courses they teach, the more notoriety they gain for the university; the greater number of students
they pass, the better numbers they produce for the university. “Student success rates” have
become the new mantra of some institutions, suggesting that professors who fail too high a
percentage of their students are failing to produce a useful product, and—perhaps worse—
wasting the students’ and the taxpayers’ dollars. In order to meet this streamlined end, the
institution has sought an employee base that does the work that is required and only the work that
is required. However, institutions of learning need more than that from their faculty. To quote
Immanuel Kant,
The university would have a certain autonomy (since only scholars can pass judgment on
scholars as such), and accordingly it would be authorized to perform certain functions
through its faculties (smaller societies, each comprising the university specialists in one
main branch of learning): to admit to the university students seeking entrance from the
lower schools and, having conducted examinations, by its own authority to grant degrees
or confer the universally recognized status of “doctor” on free teachers (that is, teachers
who are not members of the university—in other words, to create doctors. (1993, p.23).
Our current demand for production, though, has left behind Kant’s notion that the university
exists to produce “free teachers” and scholars both inside and outside of the university who,
themselves, are capable of “passing judgment” on the effectiveness of the institution.
Again we note that as a result of this demand for production, institutions have relied more
and more on part-time faculty (June, 2014). These marginalized faculty members are generally
not treated as part of the “actual” faculty, insofar as they do not participate in curriculum
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development or faculty meetings and there is no research required of them. Often due to union
regulations, the adjuncts themselves must work at numerous universities in order to cobble
together fulltime work, for which they are significantly underpaid and, because none of their
assignments is full time, they receive no benefits. The shift, then, is from the idea that the
professoriate is an educated class that should add to the generated body of knowledge through
research and education to one in which the “professors” are a service class that teach toward the
end of helping students obtain degrees in profitable fields. The ranks of adjuncts are
continuously growing as institutions find them a far more financially palatable and
bureaucratically sound alternative. The fact, then, that these adjuncts rarely participate in any
form of institutional self-reflection through research and participatory self-governance that might
endanger the capitalistic ends of the institution is an added bonus. These adjuncts are far too
busy trying to survive financially and professionally to be any real danger to the corporatization
of the university, and they are largely ostracized by the shrinking professoriate that sees them as
an underclass threatening the prestige and quality of the professoriate itself.
The professoriate finds itself batting down the hatches against a world that is increasingly
unaware of its worth and increasingly incapable of understanding what it produces. The enemy is
found everywhere from those in society who lack the knowledge base necessary to understand
the opaque nature of their research to the part-time faculty, of which two could take on a single
professor’s course load without the costs of retirement plans, health benefits, and long-term
commitment. Students, the public, and politicians are disparaged, largely behind closed doors,
for not having the wisdom to know that what the professoriate produces within the ivory tower is
essential to human flourishing, while the adjunct faculty members are looked down upon as
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insufficient scholars and thinkers. The part-time employees have become the proletariat to the
professorial bourgeoisies.
As described by Audrey Williams June in the Chronicle of Higher Education, “Across
the nation, colleges have undergone similar shifts in whom they employ to teach students. About
70 percent of the instructional faculty at all colleges is off the tenure track, whether as parttimers or full-timers, a proportion that has crept higher over the past decade” (2014). Where
once, adjuncts were seen as experts in their field retired or employed full time elsewhere,
occasionally invited to teach due to their practical expertise, they now teach the majority of
general education courses at most universities and are often seen as a threat by the full-time
faculty. The adjuncts find themselves forced to fly below the radar out of fear of the
administration and, even, the students. (June, 2014)
The concern, then, becomes twofold when public perspective of academia is combined
with the professoriate’s own treatment of adjunct teachers: On one hand, teaching is seen as that
lowly tool that belongs to a proletariat class of academics, and on the other, research is demeaned
by the public at large to whom much of it—if not most—is unintelligible, as an unnecessary
waste of taxpayer funding. To quote, “teaching, we are told, is undervalued in favor of research,
while research is less and less in touch with the demands of the real world, or with the
comprehension of the ‘common reader.’” (Readings, 1996, p.1). Thusly, the professoriate must
be wary of the label teacher and convince itself that such an occurrence could not happen in the
university because professorial work is of such greater depth and breadth, as they watch the K-12
system lose self-governance, respect, and tenure.
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The Faculty
The professoriate has, at least, a vague awareness that both K-12 teachers and adjunct
faculty are in constant danger that their respective administrations will fire them as a result of
student complaints and a lack of student success. June reported in her chronicle article that many
adjuncts feel pressured to pass students, avoid contentious issues, and reduce the rigor of
coursework in order to avoid bad student evaluations that may result in termination (2014).
Simply, there is a growing awareness in the university that being a teacher hired by an institution
to produce a product means following a corporatized set of rules that do not engage the system
itself on any critical level. Teacher, as it has been redefined by the corporatization of education,
now means, “One who provides a degree in exchange for the money produced the consumer.”
Failure to provide that degree, if the student herself does not learn enough, is not, then, the fault
of the student, society, or the administrator, but the fault of the teacher who has not supplied the
fairly purchased product.
The faculty, as a result of these demands and demeaning definitions, has become divided
against itself, fundamentally contrary to the very notion of liberal education (Readings 1996). On
the one hand the professoriate has become wary of the label “teacher,” as it now carries,
connotatively, the weight of a public servant who is responsible only for the production of
degreed students, and on the other it must be wary of the part time faculty who fulfill the
institution’s bureaucratic ends without the annoying complications of having a body of
professors who, themselves, act as evaluative and guiding force of the university. The faculty,
thusly, is at odds with itself, seemingly directed towards contrary aims: the professoriate towards
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increasing the general body of knowledge and the teachers towards the production of profitable
degrees (Readings and Carter 1996).
Readings’ claim in The University in Ruins certainly seems to suggest that the battle has
been lost and the divided house collapsed. “Institutional pragmatism thus means, for me,
recognizing the university today for what it is: an institution that is losing its need to make
transcendental claims for its function. The university is no longer simply modern, insofar as it no
longer needs a grand narrative of culture in order to work” (1995, p.168). Certainly, faculty
members find themselves trying to construct a grand narrative that will continue to justify their
existence as academics.
Readings, though, suggested that this action is hopeless. The world has fundamentally
changed in regards to what—and who—it values. Whereas a “renaissance man” would once have
been considered the pinnacle of societal achievement, now, it is a man who makes a tremendous
amount of money doing almost anything. Academia, without having realized it, has already
accepted society’s rejection of knowledge and culture as valuable for its own sake. It has locked
itself behind closed doors and now fights against itself, arguing that one form of knowledge is
more “true” than another. Moreover, an internal conflict has arisen between “teacher” and
“professor.” The faculty now find themselves crushed between the notions, if not the human
embodiments, that teaching is inferior intellectually to research and that research is inferior
practically to teaching.
Teachers and Professors
Not long ago, the researcher, himself, experienced an instance of this tension. In writing a
paper for publication in the field of post-secondary education, the researcher was required to
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change the usage of “teacher” to “faculty.” He was told that the term “teacher” would insult
faculty in “higher education.” Consider the terminology we use to demarcate teachers and
professors. Firstly, we use the misnomer—a rather insulting one at that—to discriminate between
k-12 and post-secondary by referring to one as “higher.” More to the core of the definitional
distinction is the realization of what the term “Professor” connotes. “Professor” means “to
profess.” This is not an impressive thing, or something of which we should be proud. “To
profess” simply means “to tell.” It means “to tell at.” In other words, we profess beliefs. Anyone
can do that; this speaks nothing to either 1) the content of those beliefs or 2) the effectiveness
with which one professes them. Being a professor, at its heart, suggests that one tell others what
to believe in an authoritarian tone while they passively receive that knowledge from “on
high(er).” Our very terminology smacks of an epistemology of divine revelation. Viewing this in
conjunction with the perception of teachers as servants to a social and corporate machine makes
it clear why the professoriate is insulted by the label teacher; the term professor suggests that
one is free to profess without having to engage the machinery because one is, by default, worth
listening to.
Now, more than ever, it is imperative that we come to understand the integration of
teaching and research in the professoriate. The role of professors as both teacher and researcher
is simultaneously opaque and at odds with itself. As the professoriate seeks to distance itself
from what is quickly becoming a service industry of teaching, with all of the indignities of the
service industry, it relies on research as a means by which to demonstrate that the professoriate is
producing something of worth that is not reducible to teaching only. There is danger, though, in a
focus on research as a means by which to distance the professoriate from the corporatization of
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the university. –Namely, the fact that the corporatization of the university, itself, encourages
researchers to use students as the means of production. Hence, the students may find themselves
the dialogical object.
Publication
In part, this change in understanding of the university is addressed through publication.
Publication is a means by which the institution can demonstrate “production” and assess the
productiveness of its faculty. As a result, many faculty working at post-secondary university
institutions in the United States are under significant pressure to publish (Gad-elHak, 2004;
Crane & Pearson, 2011). The pressure has become so intense over recent years that ethical
questions and concerns are beginning to emerge. For example, in a 2008 editorial for the Journal
of Clinical Investigation, executive editor Ushma S. Neill wrote, “The academic scientific
enterprise rewards those with the longest CVs and the most publications. Under pressure to
generate voluminous output, scientists often fall prey to double publishing, self-plagiarism, and
submitting the ‘minimal publishable unit’” (p. 2368). She reported a greater number of ethical
violations seen by the journal. Neill suggested that these “ethical gray areas” may easily become
significant and clear ethical transgressions. Researchers who are under the pressure to publish are
now turning to their own classrooms as research laboratories, which can be used for publication
in education journals (Hutchings, 2002). Students are now being asked by their teachers to
participate in research not just outside of the classroom, but inside of the classroom; an
increasing number of teachers use their own students as research participants as a means by
which to evaluate their own teaching practices—and, of course, simultaneously publish (Burns
& McCarthy, 2010; Gan & Geral, 2010). This research, in which faculty publish findings for the
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purpose of improving classroom practice (often using their own classes as research populations)
is known as the “Scholarship of Teaching and Learning” (SoTL).
The potential harms to students are significant, and there is a growing body of research
supporting the claim that students can be and are occasionally harmed when used as research
participants. The potential to benefit students is also significant (Gordon & Edwards, 2012). The
depth of the research thus far on harm done to student participants is rather shallow, and the
breadth of the literature is largely focused on students in medical fields such as psychology or
nursing. There is a growing body of research that suggests that participatory research, such as
action research, can benefit students and is, itself, effective pedagogy (Burke & Cummins, 2002;
Elmes-Crahall, 1992; Holly, Ahar & Kasten, 2005). In fact, Roberts and Allen (2013) conducted
a qualitative study that suggests that the potential educational gains from using undergraduate
student participants (such as understanding researcher behavior, increased content knowledge,
increased understanding of being a research participant) outweighed potential costs such as
emotional drawbacks. The fact, therefore, that faculty, being under significant pressure to
publish, often turn to their students as a body of readily available participants and eager
researchers is no surprise.
Potential Harms
What remains unclear is the best way to conjoin the role of teacher with the role of
researcher in post-secondary education. Few researchers have specifically asked the question,
“How does the conjunction of faculty as teachers, researchers, and servants affect students?”
However, the body of research that suggests that students may be harmed when faculty think of
themselves primarily as researchers is growing. Pat Hutchings (2002), generally considered one
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of the foremost scholars in SoTL, conducted seven case studies in order to better understand the
implications of SoTL research on student participants. She concluded that faculty and institutions
must think carefully about the ethical dimensions of conducting research using one’s students.
Daugherty and Lawrence (1996) conducted a survey study of 96 male college students in a social
science course at The Citadel. The students were asked to complete a questionnaire that would
evaluate their appropriateness for selection for further research. Based on their study, Daugherty
and Lawrence concluded,
We agree with those (e.g., McCord, 1991; Sieber & Saks, 1989) who have asserted the
importance of continually reevaluating the ethics of research practices, and we believe
that our study underscores the importance of considering the impact of participation on
individuals. In addition to familiarizing themselves with the American Psychological
Association's ethical principles (American Psychological Association, 1992) and with
Korn’s (1988) statement of participant rights, researchers may be well served by having a
collaborative model of research. As Gillis (1976) suggested, researchers may need to see
students as unique collaborators in the research process rather than as subjects to be
manipulated. (p.76)
Clark and McCann (2005) considered these ethical implications through a double-blind peerreviewed investigation of research conducted in the field of psychology. They conclude after
their review of 23 recent articles and studies that,
Good research must be based on sound ethical practices, and the obligations researchers
have are greater if they share other relationships with their subjects. In recent years the
ethics of research have come under increasing public scrutiny, yet documents such as

34
Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care (DH 2001) or National
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (National Health and
Medical Research Council 2001), do not explicitly refer to the issues surrounding
lecturers researching students, or students researching each other. It may be timely for
regulatory bodies to consider whether these research relationships need greater scrutiny,
or governance. In the absence of guidelines, institutional ethics committees are left to
ensure the integrity of such research. (p.50)
Comer (2009) further buttressed Clark and McCann’s conclusions with an examination of
student participants in nursing programs as a vulnerable population. Pecorino, Kincaid, and
Gironda (2008) similarly conducted a literature review discussing the potential pitfalls of using
one’s own students as research participants, specifically examining Institutional Review Board
(IRB) policy and the protections provided by IRBs to students. The research suggests that
without a set of best practices that are well grounded in ethical standards, well-evidenced by
current research, and well-argued utilizing sound logic, the harm to students is likely to increase.
Dangerously, questionably ethical use of students as research participants may become an
established norm amongst educational institutions as the pressure to publish increases.
Pecorino, Kincaid, and Gironda (2008) described the following potential harms of using
students as research participants:


Academic: decline in completion and retention rates, decline in success
rates/GPA, inability to perform at the next level of study, inability to develop and
use skills that are needed beyond the classroom.
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Intellectual: failure to develop critical thinking skills, failure to develop
information-processing skills, failure to acquire new knowledge.



Social: inability to function as a fully educated member of a democratic society,
inability to realize socio-economic goals (career).



Psychological: decrease in self-esteem, increase in hostility towards the
educator/institution, negative impact on future educational success (self-efficacy)



Economic: loss of time, loss of tuition, student loans.

Consider the following hypothetical cases:
1) A professor at a university that requires both teaching and scholarship on the part of
the professoriate has had some difficulty publishing recently in her field of
philosophy. Out of concern for promotion and tenure, she begins to consider other
avenues of peer-reviewed publication. She discovers the growing field of SoTL
research and realizes that some of her classroom activities may be publicationworthy. In fact, last semester she introduced a change in course method, requiring that
students now keep self-reflective journals. This is rather unusual for a philosophy
class, but she found that it was effective. She decides, now, after the fact, that this is
worthy of publication and begins reviewing the students’ journals for useful data.
However, the students were not notified at the time of their writing that their work
might be used for purposes other than their own educational growth. Perhaps more
concernedly, the professor decides to quote portions of some of the journals to
demonstrate how powerful journaling in a philosophy course can be.
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One of the excerpts quoted, although names were changed, included some
graphic, powerful details of the personal tragedies experienced by one of the students
who described how philosophical reflection has helped her overcome that difficulty.
In fact, a few years later, that same student decides to become a philosophy teacher.
During her graduate course work she conducts research on philosophy teaching
methodologies, only to realize that her own personal story has been published, though
without her name.
Of concern, here, is the realization that student artifacts, while useful for research, are often
personal to each student. Students do not turn in their work under the assumption that it might
become public knowledge or that it might be used to forward the professor’s research agenda. In
fact, such work is often turned in as a matter of trust. I recall, anecdotally, a professor violating
that trust by commenting in front of a doctoral class about the content of one of the cohort’s
personal reflections. The class was horrified, and the student in question reported never trusting
that teacher again.
Trust requires that we place ourselves in vulnerable positions such that we choose to
“take an ambiguous path that can lead to a beneficial event or a harmful event depending upon
the behavior of the other person” (Swinth, 335, 1967). This “ambiguous path” is a vulnerable
state such that the trusted individual’s capacity to do harm is increased. As such, maintaining a
trust relationship requires that the potential harm is not actualized. For example, consider two
persons: “Person A” and “Person B.” Person B trusts Person A. If Person A speaks poorly of the
trusting Person B when B is absent, B’s vulnerability results in a violation of the trust she put in
A—greater harm is done because of the greater vulnerability caused by the trust relationship. In
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so doing, the integrity of the trust relationship is compromised. Thus, “One of the most important
ways to manifest integrity is to be loyal to those who are not present”—an idea popularized by
Stephen Covey (2005). Even if students are not present to defend themselves, they exist in a trust
relationship with their teacher, and, as such, the trusting students are placed in a position of
greater potential harm. Thusly, even if—as in the case above—the student is not aware how her
work is being used, potential violations of the trust relationship remain possible.
If anything, because the student is not present, the demands of the trust relationship are
even more stringent because the teacher can engage in behavior that may harm the student
without the student having any ability to prepare herself for that harm. The professor, therefore,
cannot violate that trust, even after the fact (the student’s graduation, for example), without
endangering the integrity of the teaching profession itself, as it is grounded in the trust
relationship between student and teacher (Noddings, 1988).
2) A professor of foundations of education also regularly publishes textbooks on
educational psychology. His successful textbook publications include DVD’s that
demonstrate effective and ineffective teaching techniques. In order to make these
DVD’s more effective, rather than contrived, he video records teachers in actual
elementary school classrooms. Each DVD includes discussions of each lesson’s
strengths and weaknesses. One such lesson includes student manipulation of a
balance. Students are challenged to understand the way weight at either end of the
fulcrum changes the balance. Some of the students, as one can see on the video,
almost immediately grasp the mathematics behind the balance. A few students,
though—little Timmy in particular—struggle with the concept and do not seem to
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master it before the end of the lesson. The DVD commentary discusses this fact, and
notes that some students like Timmy may just not be cognitively developed enough to
understand those concepts. In fact, education students watching the DVD often
cannot help but laugh at how cute and futile Timmy’s attempts to understand the
concept are. Problematically, though, 10 years later, Timmy, who has struggled
mightily to become an academic success, has now enrolled in college as an education
major. The required textbook that he has purchased, now revised over a series of
editions, still includes the fulcrum and balance video, which, without his realizing it,
Timmy is about to watch with his education class while his cute antics are laughed at.
This outcome seems unlikely. Nevertheless, one wonders if the researching professor was
thinking about the welfare of the videoed students as well as his own publication success. It
could do serious harm to a young person to realize that he or she is used as the example of a lowachieving or challenged learner.
3) A sociology teacher now regularly publishes her findings in the SoTL field. She
believes this is an important field and that her findings benefit other sociology
teachers who would like to avoid her mistakes. As in the first case, this professor
began publishing in this field by reflecting on previous artifacts produced by her
students. Now, however, she has come to realize that an experimental approach is far
more convincing. Specifically, if she wishes to show that a particular assignment,
methodology, or treatment is more effective than other options, she must have a
control group. As a result, she purposefully divides up her class sections by treatment
and control.
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The professor’s article will explore the powerful technique of having students
teach each other the material before the exam. In fact, she knows this technique is
effective, because last semester she tried it for the first time and she noticed what
seem to be significant results. She thinks her findings will be more persuasive,
though, if she can show that two content identical classes taught in the same semester
differ only in the treatment. As a result, her 9am MW class will be required to go
through a rigorous collaborative process of teaching each other the material before
each exam. Her 9am TR class, however, will not be required to do so, and they will
study as they see fit. As the professor predicted, at the end of the semester there is a
statistically significant correlation between the treatment and students’ grades on the
mid-term and on the final. In fact, the professor notes, with some pleasure, the power
of her new methodology as she reports her findings: the TR class included two
students who failed the class, while the MW course had nothing lower than a “D.”
At issue here is the realization that the researcher has purposefully withheld a treatment
that she believes, and has good evidence to believe, will help students succeed. In the medical
profession this is clearly unethical. Medical researchers cannot withhold a known effective
treatment just to observe the outcome. This fact makes demonstrating efficacy much more
difficult, but for good reason: at the hearts of both medicine and education is the notion of
“beneficence.” Note that if education is to be treated as a profession not dissimilar from the law
or the medical field, then it must hold itself to similar rigorous ethical standards. Allowing two
students to fail and potentially drop out of college in order to generate a more persuasive paper
does not demonstrate much concern for the welfare of the students. This is why Peter Markie
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argued that “a class must be a classroom first and a research laboratory second” (Hutchings,
2003, p. 29).
Some may argue that these questions can and should be resolved by the IRB, but consider
the fact that outsourcing our ethical responsibilities to others does at least two harms: 1) The IRB
process becomes far more tedious and complex. As the IRB must act both as an ethical and a
legal agent, those ethical virtues which should be internal to researchers must be accounted for
by the IRB. Thusly, the IRB is placed in the position of having to do the additional work of
addressing what are likely obvious ethical problems and contradictions within the researcher’s
proposal—problems that she should have, in fact, caught herself. 2) The IRB cannot be held
responsible for the actual implementation and results of every act of research. Things can go
wrong. Unexpected variables may appear. Once having gained permission to proceed from the
IRB, numerous opportunities to do harm remain available. The IRB, the institution, the
participants, the students, and the community all should be able to trust that even when leaving
with IRB approval, researchers will still hold themselves to the highest ethical standards
possible.
Simply, one must wonder if the IRB acts as a means by which to alleviate professors of
the cumbersome burden of having to be ethical. To some degree, it seems as if the IRB may well
act as a means by which to outsource virtue. Lynn Sharp Paine (2000), in her article “Does
Ethics Pay?” noted that corporations, when required to meet a minimum standard of ethical
action, meet the minimum standard imposed on them; however, her research found that
corporations, when required to develop their own standards developed more exacting ethical
standards and were more likely to meet them. One wonders if, similarly, a problem arises within
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the professoriate such that researchers will meet a minimum standard imposed on them, but
would meet a higher standard if they were placed at the locus of moral responsibility for the
ethical standards of their research.

Figure 2. Ethical Research Behavior at External and Internal Locus of Responsibility
There is an ever-growing body of research that suggests that university IRBs are
insufficient for ethical research. Researcher complaints that the IRB hinders research are
common, and, as a result, the tensions between researchers and their IRBs are increasing
(Klitzman 2012). Moreover, Melissa Swauger (2009) suggested that IRBs may hinder ethical
research. She argued that requirements such as anonymity are not “necessary assurance of
comfort for participants. Some participants may want their voices to be heard” (p. 78). The
implication is simple: The IRB exists as a means by which to protect the institution from
litigation as a result of unethical practice, not as evidence that the goal of the institution is to be
ethical. Research practices that exist for the facilitation of voice as a means by which to combat
marginalization are, arguably, undermined by restrictions required by institutional IRBs
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primarily focused on preventing lawsuits. All of this makes it obvious that, with or without an
IRB, unethical actions can be conducted by researchers, so the question how to develop, foster,
and promote virtue in a professoriate that will—even if given carte blanche by the IRB—refuse
to act unethically, remains pertinent and pressing.
This conclusion is further supported by Miller, Birch, Mauthner, and Jessop (2012), who
argued that ethical oversight by researchers themselves is preferable to that of IRBs, especially in
the case of qualitative research. Swauger (2009) similarly argued that qualitative research, in
particular, could be hindered by IRBs. It is important to note that in both cases the researchers
argue from a feminist perspective somewhat grounded in the work of Carol Gilligan (1982),
arguing for the importance of “voice.” McCarron (2013), however, argued that because, “Even
with the noblest of intentions, researchers may do something that is ethically problematic, either
through ignorance or unacknowledged bias,” review boards such as IRBs are necessary for the
effective oversight of researchers who, intentionally or unintentionally, might do harm (p. 3).
Note that even McCarron’s criticism self-reflectively notes that ethical agents must populate
such boards. Thusly, it seems reasonable to conclude that the problem of ethical action remains
one that cannot be solved by the appointment of a board; it remains a problem of identifying
ethical individuals who then can act ethically as professors or as members of oversight
committees and boards.
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Contextualization and Definition of Foundational Assumptions, Axioms, and Concepts
Roles in the New Paradigm
The question, now, is this: Given the corporatization of the university, the pressures to
publish, and the shift in faculty roles for production, can the distinct roles of “teacher” and
“researcher” as instantiated through the U.S. University be collectively instantiated as a coherent
“faculty”? As a qualitative research project, the goal is understanding of the roles. First, those
roles must be defined, and “role” itself must be understood as a construct. For that reason, Bruce
J. Biddle’s construction of role theory will be used to set the foundation for understanding and
distinguishing the different categories of roles. Into this construct, “faculty,” “teacher” and
“researcher” can all be understood in relationship to each other and to society as a whole. Thusly
discriminated, those roles then can be defined and then placed in juxtoposition for examination.
The definition of the roles requires extensive examination of the literature in order to
understand those roles as defined by philosophers, educators, researchers, professional
institutions, the process of tenure and promotion, and professional journals. The argument will
then be built by developing and defining both sets of roles and then placing them in conjunction
in order to observe their logical, philosophical, and ethical results. These will be used to develop
a construct that can then be applied to actual practice in order to best understand how the
conjunction of the roles is best enacted.
Thusly, a Gertzian “thickly descriptive” account of the roles can be provided as
conceptual constructs. With those constructs in hand, the task of shaping a coherent whole that
itself best defines “faculty” as a conjunction of teacher and researcher may be possible. If those
roles are, in fact, commensurable, a coherent construct can be formed using a discourse ethical
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methodology that can be used as a means by which to understand the actual instantiation of
“faculty” in the world. The construct, then, that emerges from the theoretical conjunction of
these roles provides a theoretical and normative framework that informs how these roles should
be enacted in practice.
Problem Statement
Given the corporatization of the university, as a device for the production of subjects
useful to the work force, there is good reason to believe that the educational paradigm is
experiencing a significant shift. As it does so, it may be the case that the roles of faculty also
shift, perhaps in ways that are a detriment to student welfare, perhaps in ways that are a
detriment to the general body of knowledge, or perhaps both. In order to best understand these
changes, prepare for them, and perhaps even affect them, a clear understanding of the nature of
these roles and their conjunction is needed.
Purpose Statement
The hope is to provide much-needed material to fill a gap in the current understanding of
the student-teacher relationship when reconstructed as participant-researcher and the potential
harms that may occur as a result of that relationship. The construct that may be produced through
this philosophical analysis may help us deploy empirical strategies to better understand both the
nature of the teacher-researcher relationship and what shape the incarnation the role conjunction
should take. Step one, then, is to determine what shape the conjunction of the roles can take and
then step two is to determine, if possible, what shape the conjunction of the roles should take.
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Research Questions
1) What coherent construct can be used to best understand the conjoined roles of teacher and
research within the current educational context?
2) What form should a construct conjoining teacher and researcher roles take?
Overview of Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework used in this dissertation will emerge from the conceptual
framework developed by Bruce J. Biddle—role theory. Two particular understandings of role
theory symbolic-interactionist and organizational role theory are especially appropriate for
exploring faculty roles. Those two roles, when conjoined will act as the theoretical framework—
that actors perform roles established by organizations through both codified and non-codified
scripts and actor roles are generated through interaction in a symbolic communicative medium
constructed through discourse. That framework in conjunction with discourse ethics as
developed by Jurgen Habermas will generate the construct needed to develop understanding of
the conjunction of faculty roles.
Significance of the Research
This construct (of determining what shape the conjunction of the roles can and should
take) would provide a cogent argument, grounded in ethical standards, that suggests a series of
best practices for faculty who are expected to simultaneously teach, conduct research, and
perform service. The construct developed through this dissertation may assist faculty and
institutions in their endeavor to minimize harm and maximize benefit to students by virtue of
producing a mechanism by which the conjunction of faculty roles can be better understood and
through which, if the best practices are followed, students are less likely to be placed at risk. If
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faculty, themselves, do not want to be understood as “teachers” because their work includes the
role of “researcher,” then we must understand how these roles integrate, if one should have
primacy over the other, and the potential benefits and harms that face students when educated by
individuals who instantiate both roles.
Delimitations and Limitations of the Study
Of particular import, here, is the fact that criticisms of role theory include the tendency of
role theory to take a seemingly conformative and normative stance regarding social roles
(Jackson 1998). That is to say, one might argue that role theory engages and endorses social
imperatives such that a role occupant should “endorse normative behavioral expectations for
oneself” as well as hold “expectations for those individuals occupying counter-positions”
(Jackson 14). While evaluating this criticism is beyond the scope of this work, the tendency of
role theory to act as a normative construct will prove useful. This work, as it is undergirded by
role theory—which itself tends toward normativity—will not only provide a description of roles
as found in the literature, but will suggest that there is a normative component to that role
construction—simply, that there is an kind of “best practice” when generating and playing the
role faculty.
This work is both descriptive and normative, but like all normative work, it must be
revisable. One cannot simply avoid the traps of misunderstanding by making reference to
previous research and the thoughts of others in the past tense when discussing what others should
do. An imperative carries with it a force that requires of researchers the willingness to constantly
revise and analyze their work. Thus, the very methodology of this work will require active
discovery and revision through the development of the literature review. There will be no
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standard “data collection” through empirical observation of the external world. Rather, this work
will analyze and consider theories and definitions in order to gain greater understanding and in
order to generate a useful construct. This fact, then, results in a constant act of addendum to the
literature review as additional language is both discovered and generated that informs, changes,
and develops the definitions and constructs analyzed. As noted by Michael Scriven (1997), when
we conduct philosophical analysis, “We are not only analyzing the concept of definition, itself,
which is a key tool in any kind of research and, hence, in educational research, but also looking
into the nature of language” (137). It is not unreasonable to suggest, as the work turns now to the
literature review, that the literature could—if the author had limitless time—continue its
development and investigation ad infinitum as the roles of faculty are redefined continuously into
the future.
Organization of the Study
This work makes no claim to being merely descriptive. Rather, it seeks to determine the
basic axioms central to the roles under discussion. Thus, some assumptions must be taken, and
those assumptions are normative. Once accepted, a device that can be used objectively can be
developed and applied. This work, therefore, does not simply examine the roles as constructed
by society; it is not a work of sociology. Rather, it is, to an extent, critical theoretical—it seeks to
suggest a best construct that is justifiable both in the construct's empirical grounding in the social
structure that defines faculty roles and in the construct's normative grounding in theories that
suggest the best possible structuring of that construct. Thus, application of the developed
construct does more than suggest that the subject does or does not conform to the described
roles, but also suggests whether they should conform to that role as established by society.
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Chapter Summary/ Conclusion
There are significant changes taking place in universities. These changes are in many
ways the result of the corporatization of the university. This corporatization, for the purpose of
producing degrees, has placed the professoriate in an untenable position. They must on one end
meet the goal of doing what is in the best interest of the students’ knowledge while at the same
time producing as much research and as many diplomas as they can. For this reason, some
thinkers like Readings (1996) have argued that the university is in “ruins.” Others, like Slevin
(2001) argued that universities are quickly becoming “diploma markets” no longer invested in
student best interest or learning.
Regardless of if Slevin and Readings are correct, there is considerable, and increasing,
pressure on the professoriate to publish. These publications help strengthen a university’s
reputation and add to its prestige. Those who do not publish sufficiently, and in the right ways,
will find themselves out of a job. This increasing pressure as led to an increase in unethical
actions by some faculty (Neill, 2008). This is particularly concerning when the increase in
pressure to publish has also led to an increase in SoTL research that uses one’s one students as
the research population (Hutchings, 2002).
Students used by their teachers are at considerable risk as discussed by Pecorino,
Kincaid, and Gironda (2008). These risks include academic as well as intellectual and emotional
harm. Immediately one wonders if faculty can both meet the need to do research while at the
same time teaching to the best of their ability. On one hand it would seem that research can
buttress and inform one’s teaching (Burke & Cummins, 2002; Elms-Cranhall, 1992; Holly, Ahar
& Kasten, 2005). On the other hand, it seems as if the pressure to complete research, particularly
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using control groups and experimental groups, could place students in harm’s way or at least
place students in a situation in which they are receiving less than the teacher’s best in order to act
as a control group (Clark & McCann, 2005).
The fundamental question then becomes, “Are the faculty roles of ‘teacher’ and
‘researcher’ commensurable?” One wonders, moreover, if there are some ways in which those
roles can be constructed to be more consistent while also meeting the demands of the
fundamental definitions of “teacher” and “researcher” particularly as understood by the domains
themselves? These questions, particularly pressing as the university continues to become more
corporatized and both faculty and students are increasingly used for monetary ends, should be
answered so that those universities which seek to best instantiate faculty as a coherent, and
ethical, conjunction of teacher and researcher can do so in an informed way. The purpose of this
dissertation, then, is to ascertain if those roles are commensurable, if they are coherent, and what
construction of those roles would be most effective both ontologically and ethically. To do so
will require a philosophical examination of definition through the application of role theory and
discourse analysis and an ethical construction using the work of Habermas.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The purpose of this work is to generate a construct that can be used to better understand
and analyze faculty roles in post-secondary institutions. Thus, the first step is to define those
roles. In many ways, the act of definition will be the primary objective of this dissertation. Those
role definitions, however, will not be generated ex nihilo—they will not simply spring, like
Athena, fully mature from Zeus’s head. Rather, we will investigate the work of preeminent
theorists, seminal literature, and institutional documents in order to form those roles. Note that
“form” rather than “understand” is the operative verb. Although understanding those roles is
fundamental to this project, the roles must first be in existence to do so. Thusly, we must have in
hand, metaphorically speaking, the roles which we seek to understand in order to turn them
about, take them apart, and experiment upon them.
In order to address the research question, this literature review will address the basic
question of “What is a role?” as understood in the context of institutions and organizations. Role
theory is currently the prevailing means by which to understand roles as social constructs. Thus,
the first step in this review is the establishment and definition of roles as social constructs
through the literature. Once having established an understanding of roles as social constructs, the
review will then consider the major historical developments in role theory and examine, briefly,
the different kinds of role theory in order to best understand what form of role theory best applies
to the research question. To further understand and establish role theory as an appropriate
theoretical framework for this dissertation, the dissertation will then consider contemporary
forms of role theory and their applications to institutions. Such contemporary application of role
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theory will demonstrate the appropriateness of the application of role theory to the question of
faculty roles and the research question.
Theoretical Framework
Social Constructs
Roles, although already in existence, maintain the odd ontological status of both being a
thing-in-the-world and, yet, not a physical thing. We cannot simply go out into the world and
physically pick up faculty roles. We cannot, however, simply define those roles as we please,
either. The roles exist as constructs, specifically sociocultural constructs. Social construct, itself,
must be defined before we can proceed further. Ian Hacking (1999), in his book The Social
Construct of What?, provided a useful function for determining if something is a social construct.
If “x” stands for a social construct, then
(0) In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable (P.
12).
(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not
determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. (p. 6).
Hacking noted that “2” and “3” are often the case, though “social construction” does not
necessarily include them.
(2) X is quite bad as it is.
(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically
transformed (p. 6).
Hacking then suggested that this function demonstrates that “gender” is a social
construct. (0) it often appears, in the present state of affairs given the development of society,
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that gender appears to be an inevitable fact about human beings. However (1) gender need not
have existed; it is not a biological necessity. Thus, it is a social construct. Moreover, the use of
gender as it is used is “bad” for many individuals who do not view themselves as “male” or
“female.” Therefore it may be the case that (3), We would be much better off if gender were
done away with. He writes,
Undoubtedly, the most influential social construction doctrines have had to do with
gender. That was to be expected. The canonical text, Simone de Beauvior’s The Second
Sex, had as its most famous line… ‘One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman’ (de
Beauvior 1049, II 1; 1953, 267)... Previous toilers in the women’s movements knew that
power relations needed reform, but many differences between the sexes had a feeling of
inevitability about them… One core idea of early gender theorists was that biological
differences between the sexes do not determine gender, gender attributes, or gender
relations. (p. 7)
In other words, “What is socially constructed is not...the individual people… It is the
classification” (p. 10). The social construct is not the agent in the world. Instead, it is a kind of
classification. Note, however, that a social construct, as in the case of gender, is not just a
classification; it is more than a label. The construct has a thing-in-the-world like quality to it, so
much so that many people today still find gender confusable with biological sex. Certainly,
feminist theorists would not think of woman as just a label; it is, as a social construct, the way we
create, interact with, and understand woman. Thus, social constructs take on a life on their own
through social interaction. Once labeled, we are no longer only interacting with “Jane”; we are
now interacting with “a woman,” and in so doing we create what it means to be “woman.”
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Faculty and its subset roles, teacher and researcher, seem to be the necessary result of
the development of our society (0). Nevertheless, there is no physical fact or biological necessity
for the existence of faculty, teacher, or researcher. Therefore, it may be concluded that faculty,
teacher, and researcher are social constructs. Moreover, I am willing to venture that whether or
not (2) and (3) hold in regards to the existence of faculty depends a great deal on not just how
individual faculty members choose to act but, specifically, on the way society constructs that
roll, in essence “writes the script.” This conclusion seems so obvious as to be teleological. Yet, it
merits noting if Sirc, Readings, Carter and other like-minded theorists are correct and the
university, as an institution, is undergoing significant changes, perhaps for the worse. If the
social construct faculty is in the process of being significantly redefined, then, given the
vulnerable nature of the population which it serves, we have good reason to concern ourselves
with the potential harms of that redefinition.
Hacking’s work does seem to effectively apply to faculty and its constituent roles: they
are socially constructed and not biologically or physically inevitable. Thusly, these roles are
themselves are not physical. Further insight into their ontological status is warranted, as
Hacking’s definition does not seem to account for the fact that social constructs are so easily
confusable with physical facts in the world (as is the case with gender). There are things which
seem to be supervenient upon the physical world, impact the physical world, and are perhaps
confusable with “things in the world” and, yet, themselves lack the physical necessity to be
considered physical objects—thus passing Hacking’s test. What then is the ontological status of a
role?
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What is brought to mind is Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) discussion of mental constructs in his
work, The Concept of Mind. In it, he describes the fundamental problem of identifying a mind as
a Cartesian substance. The tendency, of course, is to treat the mind-object as a physical thing in
the world, but one that is just of a different substance kind than the substance constituting the
body. This Cartesian dualism, though, leads of course to numerous problems that need not be
explicated here. It suffices to say that Ryle identifies a “category mistake” on the part of
Descartes in his treatment of the mind as substance as opposed to what can be thought of as a
construct of the brain. Simply, it is the same mistake one might make in trying to identify a
university as a conglomeration of buildings because the university is thought of as a physical
thing (as it has physical effects and we can interact with it physically). Ryle wrote,
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of
colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative
offices. He then asks, `But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the
Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest.
But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your
University.' It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral
institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he
has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized.
When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the University has been
seen. (p. 6)
What one comes to realize, upon reflection, is that universities are not physical things, despite
the buildings. Indeed, we can burn the buildings to the ground and yet the University still exists.

55
This, though, is not reason to assert that the University is a spiritual thing, either. As the
University can be killed by ceasing the interaction of its most fundamental components through
the exchange of money and knowledge by students and professors, faculty roles are generated by
the interaction of faculty, universities, and professional institutions, making them interactions
generated themselves by sociocultural constructs that also exist as interactions (universities and
institutions specifically).
What this means, then, is that the analysis and understanding of these roles that this work
seeks cannot be conducted by simply defining the roles as we see fit, nor is it a simple matter of
observing the constructs out in the world. It is not illicit, therefore, for the researcher to consult
the literature and theorists in order to conceptualize the roles. The roles are conceptual things,
and thusly, it is through conceptualizing that the roles will be found. The roles, although enacted
out in the world, are not observable things in the world. We can observe people teaching and
researching, we can observe the buildings of the university, but we cannot see the roles. Rather,
we must conceptualize the roles from the interactions of those things. As this work seeks to
understand those roles at the earliest possible stage, we cannot begin with the inference of the
roles from the observation of people acting out those roles, as we don’t know how to identify
them yet as participants in those roles. Simply, we must avoid begging the question. One must
ask, “How do I know that the subject is, in fact, fulfilling the role of teacher?” To say,
“…Because she is a teacher,” begs the question and assumes that we already have access to and
understanding of the role, allowing us to apply that role to subjects in the world. Firstly,
therefore, we must understand what roles are, and then ascertain what the roles specific to this
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inquiry are, then seek to understand those roles, and then that understanding can be applied to the
world for further research purposes.
One might ask if we are, though this process, begging the question by virtue of seeking to
tease the roles out from the literature and theorists themselves. This is not the case, however.
Because the roles, themselves, are sociocultural constructs rather than physical ones, finding
them is a matter of finding out how they are defined. Their ontological status is one of definition
rather than physical instantiation. The roles exist as they are defined (perhaps loosely, perhaps
inconsistently, perhaps unclearly) by society and by culture, so they are therefore best
understood through those definitions generated by the culture that instantiates the roles. The
question, then, “Where can these roles be found?” is in the literature that defines the constructs
lived by society. The question, “Where are these roles lived?” is best answered, “Out in the
world.” Thus, we begin with examination of those thoughts that construct the roles lived by
others so that future researchers may examine those lived roles with a construct in hand rather
than armed only with the assumption that because the subject is labeled as such, that she is such.
The construct developed here, then, will enable researchers to not only understand the
roles better but also to identify if those roles are in fact not being instantiated by an agent,
regardless of the label. Note that sociocultural constructs are more than labels and are more than
ideas. Simply to say, “I have an idea of the Roman Empire” does not instantiate the Roman
Empire as it once was in the world. The Roman Empire is more than idea, though it is not
reducible to a physical thing. It was the interaction of agents in the world in a particular way; that
interaction has ceased, thusly the Roman Empire has also ceased to be. If, then, society has
generated the roles under discussion here, then there are those who live it and those who do not.
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Some agents may even be under the impression that they instantiate a role, due to a label or
simply a misguided belief, but by virtue of the fact that they do not actually interact in such a
way as to generate the role, they do not actually fulfill that role. This is not to say that society
cannot simply change what definitions are and how roles are best defined. This can be and is
done. One must keep in mind, though, that such deep social constructs do not simply turn on a
dime. They are thick and rich, and though they may be ever-changing, understanding such
constructs requires the understanding the narrative arc of definition and construction that has
lead up to the present moment.
What has been established here so far, through examination of the literature, is that “role”
is a sociocultural construct. Hacking’s (1999) work presents social constructs as categories that
need not exist and are generated by society and culture—they are not physical facts in the world.
Faculty roles are sociocultural constructs in the same way that gender is a sociocultural
construct. Those roles need not exist; they are not physical nor inevitable. His work also reminds
us that sociocultural constructs often can be “bad” insofar as those labels can do harm to their
occupants (as in the case with gender). We come to realize, then, that if it is the aim of this
dissertation to better understand faculty roles, we must consider the possibility that faculty roles
may be similarly harmful.
One then also understands, through the work of Ryle (1949), that social constructs are not
just “ideas.” This is an essential realization because it is often our social tendency to ignore
social constructs as less important than “physical facts in the world.” Our somewhat positivistic
preference for empirical observation and “hard science” can easily lead to the dismissal of social
cultural constructs as less powerful or less important. Anecdotally, one might note that recent
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acceptance of “gender” as a social construct has resulted, largely, in greater focus on “sex” as a
category, as if gender is now less important. The work of theorists like Bordo (1993) and
Cixcous (1976) suggests that the converse is true. Gender, as a social construct, has great power
and impact on society and the humans that live in and are defined by that society. As Ryle’s
work demonstrates, our understanding of “university” as a kind of function does not make the
university any less powerful. If anything, the fact that the university is not reducible to its
physical parts grants it greater power, ensuring that it will continue to exist even after the current
agents who comprise it die off.
Moving forward, then, the understanding and formation of faculty roles, here, requires a
better understanding of roles as social construct. These particular kinds of social constructs must
be defined before an understanding of those roles can be generated. In this way, the theoretical
framework of the dissertation is developed—through the establishment and understanding of role
theory. It is upon role theory that the definitions established by this dissertation will rest. The
conceptual framework that then will emerge, primarily through the development of the
methodology, is grounded in this dissertation’s research paradigm. That paradigm rests on the
fundamental assumptions of role theory: there are roles, and those roles are occupied by human
agents.
Review of Relevant Research
Origins of Role Theory
To quote Peter Markie (1990), “To be a professor is to occupy a particular institutional
role, and that role may be defined by certain duties so that claims attributing those duties to
professors are analytic” (134). This definitional-tautological relationship between roles and
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duties has its grounding in a sociological theoretical framework known as role theory. That there
are persons (actors) who, as a result of the scripted expectations of their duties, perform certain
roles is a theatrical metaphor that we may now take for granted, but we must remember that it is
a metaphor for understanding human behavior and that the metaphor has its origins somewhere.
According to Bruce J. Biddle (1986), discussion of roles began to gain prominence in
sociological circles with the work of George Herbert Mead, Ralph Linton, and Jacob Moreno
early in the 20th century. Since their work it has been thinkers like Biddle himself who have
made role theory a mainstay of sociological research, and contemporary conversation regarding
human interaction in society. The assumption that we inhabit roles or play roles is, in fact,
relatively new. As Biddle argued, the advent of our understanding of roles as essential to human
interaction has its grounding in the developments of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and
psychology.
George Herbert Mead is, perhaps, best known as a philosopher. In addition to his
philosophical work, though, he had a profound impact on sociology in the early 20th century
(Biddle 1986). Mead’s students collected their class notes and conversations with Mead and
published them as Mind, Self, and Society in 1934. The work lays out the foundation for the
notion of symbolic interactionism in which reality is understood as a product of social
interaction. Through this interaction, reality is constructed by virtue of various social constructs
formed by participation in society that produces a construct holism. One can see that the
importance of roles emerges out of Mead’s metaphysic as it is the way an agent interacts with
others—the role she plays—that generates reality. Even if one is wary of taking on Mead’s
metaphysical baggage, the proposition that our social reality, the only world to which we have
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epistemic access, is constructed through our interaction with others, seems cogent and
descriptive of human engagement with the world.
Ralph Linton was a particularly influential anthropologist who taught at Yale University.
In his 1936 work, The Study of Man, Linton engaged the distinctions between status and role. A
role, according to Linton, is understood as a set of behaviors that are associated with one’s status.
Thusly, one performs a role by virtue of exhibiting the behaviors correlated to its status. Status
itself can be divided, though somewhat loosely, between ascribed status and achieved status. The
former being that status that is assigned regardless of one's characteristics or actions and the
latter as the result of one’s effort. Roles, then, are understood by virtue of interaction, if one
conceives as behaviors as one’s interaction with others, the world, or oneself. Thusly, Mead’s
notion and Linton’s notion both locate human interaction with the world as defining of the self.
Jacob Moreno’s work was influential in both psychiatry and in sociology. His
introduction of the treatment technique psychodrama has had a significant impact on
contemporary role theory (Biddle, 1986). The psychodrama requires that clients, as if in theater,
play roles, often spontaneously. Moreno reasoned that through the playing of different roles
while having to improvise within those roles spontaneously, the client may learn how she can
inhabit new and different roles in her life. This understanding of role, as something one plays and
inhabits, once again underscores the concept of role as defining selfhood. Note that psychodrama
is conducted in a group context as playing a role requires interaction with others. Thusly, we see
again the understanding of a role as that which requires interaction with others for instantiation.
Without others to whom one may be some-thing, one cannot inhabit a role. That “being” requires
action and interaction with others in order to both earn status and be ascribed status. The role,
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then, is an interactive phenomena generated by agents within a social context that acts as a
defining and selfhood-generating device. To quote Biddle (1986),
“Roles” are conceived as the shared, normative expectations that prescribe and explain
these behaviors. Actors in the social system have presumably been taught these norms
and may be counted upon to conform to norms for their own conduct and to sanction
other for conformity to norms applying to the latter. (p. 70)
Thus, role theory has emerged over the last century as a way of understanding human
performance through the metaphor of theater. Roles, then, are part of a dialectic—an exchange
between actor and actor, actor and script, as well as actor and self.
Perhaps because of its philosophical, psychological, sociological, and anthropological
backgrounds, role theory has enjoyed little consensus. Biddle (1986) stated, “Confusion entered
role theory because its basic theatrical metaphor was applied only loosely and because its earliest
proponents [were]… different in the ways they used role terms” (p. 68). By 1986, Biddle came to
describe role theory, in which he played an essential part in developing, as being sufficiently
developed, yet, so convoluted that five different perspectives could be discriminated: Functional,
Symbolic Interactionist, Structural, Organizational, and Cognitive. Although the differences
between perspectives appear substantial, Biddle argued that “the problem is more terminological
than substantive” (p. 68). He also argued that although theorists differ in the “assumptions they
build into basic concepts, they are largely similar in philosophic orientation and in methods used
for research” (p. 69). Specifically, Biddle held that it was expectation, more than anything else,
that undergirds role theory: “Most versions of role theory presume that expectations are the
major generators of roles, that expectations are learned through experiences, and that persons are
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aware of the expectations they hold” (69). As such, the presumption is that humans are socially
engaged reflectively and thoughtfully.
Expectations
In his earlier text Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors, Biddle (1979)
explained expectations as relevant to his concept of role theory. He argued that expectations
were a means by which to explain why roles persist even if the role isn’t “facilitated, rewarded,
or reinforced in any obvious way” (p. 115). The role theorists, argued Biddle, suggest that the
agent acts as she does because of “shared expectations:”
Thus, family members “expect” the father to work in an office and the mother to cook
meals and succor children, whereas both spectators and players “expect” the audience to
cheer at a football match and would be surprised if they did so in church. (p. 115)
These expectations form over time due to prior experience and represent, suggested Biddle, the
meaningful whole constructed by the agent in order to make sense of those experiences.
Therefore, “expectation connotes awareness, thus suggesting that persons are phenomenally alive
and rational in their orientations to events” (p. 116). It is important to note that Biddle was not
clear by what he means when he wrote, “rational.” I suggest that this rationality cannot mean that
the agent is logical and consistent in her engagement with role expectations; otherwise, the
notion of role conflict would be largely meaningless. Rather, rational means that the agent is
engaged in the world cognitively, not just physically, as a behaviorist or a functionalist may
explain human action (Biddle, 1979, p. 120).
Biddle (1979) argued that the understanding of expectations emerges from the
dramaturgical notion in three stages. Firstly, there are the analogous scripts, those written forms
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of rules. These occur in literate societies in the form of codebooks, laws, and rules of conduct.
Secondly, spoken injunctions emerge as models for behavior. Ceremonial occasions in which
rules are memorized and repeated en masse exemplify this stage. The Catholic tradition of
reciting as a community the Profession of Faith is an example of spoken injunctions. Finally,
there is the notion of “expectation in the mind of the performer. The journeyman carpenter builds
a beautiful cabinet not because written instructions have been given him (or her) nor because of
injunctions spoken by others, but rather because of his own internalized standards” (p. 117).
From these stages much of the rest of our understanding of expectations can be derived.
Biddle (1979) noted that a series of assumptions emerge from the stages above that
themselves must be teased out and examined. One recognizes that we have assumed that
expectations are sanctioned, or approved of by others. We also assume that there is
correspondence, insofar as the injunctions themselves match. Therefore, to make sense of role
theory there must be phenomenal equivalence—the correspondence of the written or spoken
injunction must also be equivalent to a phenomenally similar experience by the objects of
expectations—thus generating the assumption that those who experience those expectations
conform. Through all of this one can also infer that expectations are formed simply; the process is
one of experience of assimilation to internalized shared expectation.
Expectations, then, can be further categorized. There are overt expectations. Those
expectations are enunciated, so Biddle (1979) referred to them as enunciations. Enunciations are
so sufficiently clear and understood that they can be stated. This does not mean that they are
stated or written down. For example, in the discussion in chapter 4 there will be both discussion
of enunciated expectations as made clear by faculty handbooks. Some expectations are written
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down and are clearly inscribed as clear requirements for professorship. One must, for example,
take attendance in class. That expectation, though is inscribed as well as enunciated. Others,
however are only enunciated. The handbook may require that teachers show respect for students.
The action actions though involved in “showing respect” are too numerous to list. Thus the
inscribed expectation of “show respect” also includes the enunciated expectation (one so clear
that it could be said) “do not slap your student’s in the face with old fish.” Covert expectations,
however, either are unknown or we refrain from enunciating for some reason. Biddle (1979)
wrote,
Our personal experience suggests that sometimes we hold an expectation but do not utter
it. Moreover, it appears likely to us that others also hold expectations covertly. Consider
the mother who threatens and then later punishes her children for not cleaning their plates
at dinner time. We may also observe that she rewards her children when they do clean
their plates, is careful to clean her own plate, avoids serving foods that seem to cause
difficulty, discusses the matter with her husband, or is observed to consult a book on
child psychology for advice. These several actions become explicable when we assume
that the mother thinks her children should clean their plates. In short, we posit the
existence of a covert expectation in her mind in terms of which she takes action. (p. 120)
It is for this reason that behaviorism and role theory are largely incompatible. Covert
expectations cannot be observed and they assume a reasoning consciousness behind the eyes of
the actor. Moreover, one need not assume that even the actor herself is aware of her covert
expectations as contemporary psychoanalysis would suggest. One may find oneself disappointed
that a date does not offer to pay his or her portion of a dinner check, only to realize after the fact,

65
that this expectation was harbored—indeed, it may well be that the actor does not realize the
expectation is harbored until it is unveiled during conversation with friends or a counselor. Thus,
in order to make sense of our application of role theory we must assume that others have internal
states that are not observable, and, as such, we can then infer that everything we observe in terms
of roles (such as written codes, behaviors, and enunciations) may be insufficient for explaining
human behavior. Simply, we may find that there are tensions between roles: though no clear
contradiction is enunciated, it may be inferred, implied, and covertly harbored.
There are, of course, also written expectations. Biddle (1979) distinguished between these
and enunciations because spoken injunctions are fleeting and “have only a transitory effect on
the environment” (p. 121). However, inscriptions—written expectations—in effect “bind time,
and the person who inscribes his or her thoughts in the public record has earned a form of
immortality impossible in the preliterate society” (p. 121). For numerous reasons, Biddle’s
conclusion, here, seems hasty. Certainly the arguments forwarded in Plato’s Phaedrus suggest
that writing does not necessarily capture the truth of the author’s intent for posterity—rather,
writing enables others to subsume and adjust the thoughts of others as they see fit. Further, I
suggest that the power of dialectic is unintentionally underestimated by Biddle’s statements
above. The reverberatory power of spoken word, whether passed on through Homeric repetition
or as an ocean current through a gathered crowd, the transitory effect of the spoken word through
dialectic is also its force. Thus, an analysis of roles would be sorely under evidenced if it only
examined the written expectations and ignored those enunciations articulated between subjects,
behind closed doors, and through implication.
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For the purpose of further clarity, Biddle distinguished between “subject persons” and
“object persons” (1979, p. 122). Subject persons are those who enunciate or hold an expectation
of another (including oneself). Object persons are those “whose characteristics are at issue in the
expectation” (p. 122). Biddle went on to clarify,
The subject person is a real, observable human being. The object person appears only as a
referenced identity and may not be present, may have lived only in the past (or will live
in the future), or may even be fictitious—from our viewpoint as social analysts. (p. 122123)
Biddle gave no reason for the requirement that the subject person must be a human rather than an
institution. This is one reason why Wickham and Parker (2007) went through pains to
conceptualize role theory for contemporary role contexts. The comedy that is contemporary
politics aside, there is certainly a current trend toward the understanding of institutions such as
corporations as “persons.” The world of Peter French (1995) suggests this understanding may
not be wholly insane if corporations are understood as actors that can self-reflectively consider
their wellbeing into the future and, moreover, act to pursue that wellbeing. Thus, given the
contemporary understanding of corporations, it may well be that “subject person” may be a term
applicable to institutions, or perhaps even societies, that themselves hold expectations of others.
Biddle (1979) went on to discriminate between individual and shared expectations.
“Those expectations that are held uniquely by a single subject person are individual
expectations, whereas those that correspond among subjects are termed shared expectations”
(p. 123). The application of these two notions helps explain human behaviors when there is a
disagreement between the individual expectation maintained by a subject person and the shared
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expectations held, for example, by a family unit. Tension can be generated by the limits of the
social system, which do not allow for the sharing of expectations across boundaries.
Of particular importance when engaging the roles generated by societies and institutions
is the distinction between personal expectations and positional expectations. Personal
expectations are held for specific object persons such as Nicolas Michaud. Positional
expectations are held for object person positions such as graduate students. Thus Biddle argued
that there are three distinctions commonly made for types of expectations: individual versus
shared, personal versus positional, and expectations for self versus expectations for other.
Expectations as understood in role theory are modal. They can, argued Biddle (1979),
take on the quality of expressing a prescription, cathexis, or a description. Those expectations
that take on the prescriptive mode are normative and express how the subject should or should
not react—“Suzie should or should not…”. Expectations are in the cathexis mode if they express
the feeling about a characteristic—“I do not like it when Suzie…” Those that seem to offer an
objective statement about the characteristic are descriptive—“Suzie did her job.” The descriptive
mode can also take on the quality of past, present or future. Biddle, then, uses those modes to
generate a chart into which different expressions of an expectation can be depicted:
Table 1
Prescriptions
I should
I should not
She should

Cathexis

Past

Descriptions
Present

I like
I have
I am
I dislike
I like her action
She did
She does
I dislike her
She should not
action
Modes of Personal Expectation Adapted from Biddle, 1979, p. 125

Future
I will
She will
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Different implications result from the different modes of expectations. Statements of prescription
may indicate consequentiality, so one may infer that the object understands what may occur if a
certain action is taken. Cathexis may imply that certain rewards or punishments have been
experienced in conjunction with particular characteristics, while present-tense descriptions
suggest a stability over time. Biddle, though, did not generate such a chart for positional
expectations.
Biddle (1979) did confirm that the above modes are entirely arbitrary and that
expectations could be classified under different sets of modes. He wrote,
In the long run, however, the discrimination of three modes appears to be based on
semantic features that occur frequently in Western languages. When we speak of the
characteristics of others or ourselves, we often discriminate those things we believe in
from those we advocate and those that would please us. There is no intrinsic reason why
additional modes should not be discriminated. (p. 130)
In addition to underscoring the way language generates the world and our ability to understand it,
Biddle’s assertion above suggests that it may be possible to generate a similar chart for positional
expectations by considering the modes that are emphasized in English when discussing what
might be considered the expectations of institutional persons. In fact, a similar chart of modes
may then be developed that diverges little from Biddle’s own, as exemplified below:
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Table 2
Prescriptions

Consequentiality

We should
We are rewarded
We should not
We are punished
They should
We reward when
They should not We punish when
Modes of Positional Expectation

Past

Descriptions
Present

Future

We have

We are

We will

They did

They do

They will

In the chart above, the only difference from Biddle’s original depiction is the replacement of
singular pronouns with plural to either indicate the community of subjects that constitute an
institution (We) or the community of objects that constitute the positional role (They) and the
replacement of consequentiality for cathexis. Consequentiality is a mode that Biddle (1979)
himself notes is a potential expectation mode. In order to avoid concerns that institutions cannot
themselves experience like or dislike, the emphasis, rather, is on behavioristic reward and
punishment. A philosopher such as Peter French may then infer something similar to affective
states on the part of an institution from behaviors that seem to demonstrate cathexis, but
consequentiality meets many of the same categorical needs without engaging metaphysical
debate on the ontological statues of an institution’s feelings.
Contemporary Work in Role Theory
As previously mentioned, according to Biddle (1986), five perspectives have emerged as
role theory has developed. Although these five perspectives are understood by Biddle as largely
differing only terminologically, understanding the fundamental differences between them proves
useful. Although they are all grounded in expectation, as stated above, they may be said to differ
in a philosophical sense in the way they use roles to explain human behavior.
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Functional Role Theory
Functional role theory emerges from Lindon’s work. Focusing on the “characteristic
behaviors of persons who occupy social positions within a stable social system,” roles are
understood as a shared and normative experience (Biddle, 1986, p. 70). Thus the functional
perspective is particularly useful when addressing questions of positional roles. Bates and
Harvey described social structures as “collections of designate social positions, the shared norms
which govern differentiated behaviors” (Biddle, 1986, p. 70). Thus one might argue, from a
functionalist perspective, that universities are essentially their collection of faculty, student, and
administrator roles and the shared norms that govern the behavior of those positions. Functional
role theory, however, is not as popular as it once was due to its emphasis on positions, as many
roles do not have a position with which they are associated (Biddle, 1986, p. 70).
Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory
The symbolic interactionist perspective can been seen in direct connection to Mead’s
work. It emphasizes individual agents who, through social interaction, interpret their own and
others’ behaviors (Biddle, 1986, p. 71). “Actual roles, then, are thought to reflect norms,
attitudes, contextual demands, negotiation, and the evolving definition of the situation as
understood by the actors” (Biddle, 1986, p. 71). This places symbolic interactionist role theory in
a far better position to understand roles that themselves are not positional, and, rather seems to
understand roles as part of a social dialectic. The difficulty, suggested Biddle (1986), is that the
symbolic interactionist is often guilty of using “fuzzy and inapplicable definitions” as well as
ignoring empirical research findings (p. 72). This same fuzziness, though, enables the symbolic
interactionist to continue to understand roles of actors in positions beyond the expectations
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expressed by an institution by considering the role as a construct produced by a manifold and
constantly evolving organism.
Structural Role Theory
Conversely, another perspective that has its genesis in Linton’s work is Structural Role
Theory, which rejects the amorphous quality of symbolic interactionist role theory. Structural
role theory is a mathematically expressed, axiomatic theory that focuses on structured role
relationships. The structuralist seeks to identify patterned behaviors that are directed toward
persons or sets of persons (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). Sympathetic to the structured nature of explicit
logic, structural role theory avoids many of the fuzzy pitfalls of role theory in general. This
avoidance of vagueness, though, tends to cause the structuralism to avoid investigation and
discussion of phenomenal experience, which is, argued Biddle, (1986) part of the broad appeal of
role theory.
Organizational Role Theory
Most empirical research utilizing role theory has taken place from the perspective of
organizational role theory (Biddle, 1986). The organizational role theorist is particularly
interested in the development and structure of organizations. “Roles in such organizations are
assumed to be associated with identified social positions and to be generated by normative
expectations” (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). Because organizational roles, though, are generated by
numerous groups (formal associations, informal groups, society at large) and by multiple role
participation, organizational role theory understands agents as often subjected to role conflicts.
Biddle notes that organizational role theory “implies that organizations are rational, stable
entities, that all conflicts within them are merely role conflicts, and that the participant will
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inevitably be happy and productive once role conflict is resolved” (1986, p. 74). As the focus of
this dissertation is on the university as an organization, organizational role theory seems apropos.
Biddle’s criticism, though, must be kept in mind. The roles played by actors are not reducible to
constructs developed by institutions; the roles themselves are occupied by reflective agents who
may experience and express expectations in a multitude of ways.
Cognitive Role Theory
Cognitive role theory, like organizational role theory, is also a perspective taken in much
empirical research (Biddle, 1986). Of particular interest is the development of techniques for
measuring expectations, and measurement of the impact of those expectations on social conduct.
Cognitive role theory has within it numerous subfields, including studies addressing the
effectiveness of role playing in psychotherapy, understanding the behavior of group norms and
the roles of leaders and followers, and research on role taking based on the work of Mead and
Piaget (Biddle, 1986). Interpretations of role taking have included the assumption that “this term
refers to the degree to which persons attribute sophisticated thoughts to others” (p. 75). Cognitive
role theory, however, is criticized for failing to take into account the importance of social
positioning in favor of focus on the individual.
Biddle’s work tends to lend itself to empirical study. Despite numerous criticisms, role
theory remains useful as a means by which to generate a narrative of interaction through the
metaphor of the theatrical stage. Biddle, himself, noted that role theory, thus far, has failed to
generate a set of propositions regarding human behavior about which there is consensus amongst
role theorists (1986, p. 86). This potential weakness of the system is also a potential strength. As
long as one does not posit some sort of ontological Truth about role theory, role theory remains a
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useful means by which to understand why actors act as they do. The review of Biddle’s work
suggests that role theory is a useful narrative. The weakness that there are numerous perspectives
is, in fact, again a potential strength. One must posit different perspectives in order to engage a
fruitful dialogue. Thus, consideration of numerous narrative perspectives which all ground their
understanding in their narrative that human agents are participants in social context that, as a
result of experience, produce expectations, produces a broad dialectic.
Role Conflict
Expectations, though constitutive of roles, can be contradictory. This fact is of particular
interest to this dissertation. A role, such as faculty, may be comprised of other roles, such as
teacher and researcher. These sub-roles, though, exist as constituted by sets of expectations.
Reason suggests that these expectations cannot be identical sets—otherwise there would be no
need to differentiate the roles. It may be, though, that the expectation sets comprising
constitutive sub-roles themselves may be consistent with each other—none of them negate any
of the others. If they are consistent it may also be that they are coherent, if by coherent we mean
they are consistent and they imply each other, support each other, or are intuitively constructive
in conjunction with each other. Conversely, the sets of roles may conflict with each other. The
sets may be internally inconsistent by virtue of negating each other definitionally, or externally
inconsistent through an implied consequence that is, itself, incommensurable with expectations
within a constitutive set. Similarly, constitutive role expectation sets may be internally
incoherent by virtue of being consistent, and, yet, having no connection to each other or by virtue
of being externally incoherent by producing an agent whose behaviors are consistent, yet have no
relationship to each other. Internal and external inconsistency of expectations are called role

74
conflict defined by Biddle (1979): “Role conflict is said to occur when someone is subjected to
two or more contradictory expectations whose stipulations the person cannot simultaneously
meet in behavior” (p. 160).
James Montgomery (2005) attempted to logicize problems of role conflict. His work
specifically focuses on problems of contradiction in self-concept. His system falls into the
category of structural role theory as he sought to formulize roles and actor behavior. He wrote,
“[B]ecause it cannot admit logical contradictions, standard logic is an inappropriate model of
human reasoning in real-world social systems where individuals experience role conflict as a
consequence of inconsistent roles, norms, and constraints” (p. 34). Thus, Montgomery used nonmonotonic logic to generate a model of actor behavior that allows for change as a result of
contradiction. Simply, rather than a collapse of the system due to the introduction of a
contradiction, non-monotonic logic mimics common-sense reasoning and allows “tentative
derivations that may be retracted in light of new information” (p. 34). This suggests that role
conflict experienced by human agents does not result in a collapse of their rational system—
rather those contradictions may result only in a shift of behavior or may go unnoticed until the
contradiction itself is articulated coming into the focus of an agent’s practical reason.
Montgomery’s (2005) work suggests that that agent’s very self-concept is constantly
revised as the result of interaction with contradiction. Individuals, due to self-concepts and
norms, choose actions that observers use to make attributions about the individual (p. 34). Thus,
a feedback loop of self-absorption is generated, in which the agent assimilates the attributions of
others into the self-concept, revises, and then takes further actions that produce observer
attribution that themselves are then assimilated (pp. 46-50). Thus, the experience of role-conflict
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propels the agent forward through a series of behavior corrections aimed at a consistent selfconcept. He wrote,
My analysis has focused on the long-run ‘absorbing selves’ generated by the social
system. The central result is that absorbing selves exist only when norms are logically
consistent. Intuitively, logical inconsistencies in the normative system permit multiple
attributions, undermining the stability of the self. (p. 67)
A balance is achieved by the absorbing self that adjusts to new attributions and changes in norms
as long as they remain consistent. Inconsistency, however, produces an instability that does not
result, necessarily, in the explosion of irrationality described by formal logic, but rather in a lack
of balance in the self-concept.
Montgomery (2005) did not address the psychological implications of an imbalanced
self-concept. As is the case with much structural role theory and formulized logical exploration
in general, focus is given largely to syntactic issues, leaving the semantics for others to engage.
His work suggests, though, that while a Charles Taylor-esque broken personhood may not result
from the introduction of inconsistent norms into the framework of an agent’s self-concept, an
unstable personhood may. Instability, in this case, seems to mean the state of seeking
consistency. The imbalanced self seeks balance, likely through an attempt to identify those
norms which must be ignored, changed, or eliminated.
Further, although understated by Montgomery (2005), I suggest that the unstable self may
experience a great deal of psychological turmoil. If Montgomery is correct and the absorbing-self
is one who exists in a kind of norm-action equilibrium with her environment, then the unstable
self does not experience such equilibrium. Moreover, if the stable self is an absorbing self,
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capable of assimilating attributions in a way that makes sense to her and producing actions that
themselves result in attribution that she can consistently assimilate, then the unstable self may
exist in a state of impermeability. Simply, she cannot assimilate the attributions of others without
conflict with the norms that comprise her self-concept, and, thereby, cannot interact with the
world in a way that allows forward movement of her self-concept. Montgomery’s work seems to
suggest that the unstable self becomes a stagnant agent, unable to effectively engage the
environment until a consistent input-output balance is achieved. The person may not be broken,
but she is immobilized.
Role theory, then, provides a means by which to understand relationships between human
actors and the world in which they live. Role theory provides an understanding of the social
forces that direct human action and expectations. One can, for instance, hypothesize that
particular actions by an actor are the result of “role conflict.” Moreover, one may use role theory
in a predictive way, hypothesizing that unless such conflict is resolved, broken personhood may
result. Role theory, by no means, provides exhaustive accounts, nor necessarily, given the many
forms of role theory, consistent accounts of human action. It does provide, however, multivariant ways of understanding human actions that are useful as analog devices. If one can access
the script and the actor’s understanding of the script, one may generate an analogous
understanding of why the actor acts as she does. For this reason, role theory has proven useful in
examinations of the interactions of actors within institutions, particularly when there is conflict.
Applications in Role Theory
In order to better understand role theory and the ways in which it may or may not apply
to the university paradigm, current examples of role theory as used in research are warranted.
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Two particular cases will be explicated here, one in which role theory is applied to a care
oriented profession, healthcare, and one in which it is applied to a corporation. Not only does this
research then provide us with an understanding of the ways in which role theory can be used as a
conceptual framework for research and analysis; additionally, these two studies fit two prevailing
paradigms in universities: that of care and that of business. Given the research (Readings 1996;
Carter 2004) that suggests that universities are becoming increasingly businesslike, we cannot
reasonably only consider role theory as it applies to educational expectations and other care
oriented paradigms. In order to understand the role of faculty, one must also consider the way
role theory helps develop understanding of those who work in business, as the university is also a
business enterprise.
In “Role theory: A framework to investigate the community nurse role in contemporary
health care systems” (2007), Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb investigated nurses’
perceptions of their roles. They define role theory as “a conceptual framework that defines how
individuals behave in social situations and how these behaviors are perceived by external
observers” (p. 146). The aim of Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb’s research was to
establish whether role theory is an effective means by which to understand nurses’ roles in
contemporary health care. They hinged their research on the work of Schuler, Aldag, and Brief
(1977), arguing that “role theory can also serve as a conceptual framework in which to relate the
properties of the organizations and the individual.” In this way, their research serves an excellent
example of contemporary application, rather than theorization, of role theory.
Through their application of role theory as a conceptual framework, Brookes, Davison,
Daly, and Halcomb (2007) first established that the “nursing role” can encapsulate several
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discrete tasks: personal caretaker, clinician, educator, manager, administrator, and researcher (p.
147). Note that these tasks, themselves, may be understood as sub roles within the “nursing
role.” The application of role theory is used by the researchers specifically to establish how the
nursing role is established. They came to understand it through a “role episode” (Thomas &
Biddle, 1966): “A role episode is a cycle of role sending, a response by the focal person, and the
effects of that response on the role senders” (Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb, 2007, p. 149).
Nurses, then, are understood by the researchers as role occupants who receive a sent role.
Role senders have particular expectations and anticipations of the role occupant’s
response to the role expectations, in the case of Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007),
such a role sender may be a community nurse overseeing the role occupant. That supervisor has
particular expectations of the role occupant that themselves comprise the “sent role.” Having
received the “sent role,” the nurse/role occupant performs the role as enacted through behavior.
That performance is judged by social norms, rules, demands, and the expectations of the role
sender as well as society at large (p. 150). “In essence, this ‘role episode’ or ‘role negotiation’ is
real-life behavior with all the complexities of genuine social situations” (p. 150). Simply, they
argue that the role occupant does not just enact the role set, but, rather, participates with the other
actors in creating a dynamic and ever shifting role interaction. In this way, the definition of a
“mutually satisfactory definition of the role” is collaborative (p. 150).
Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) focused particularly on role conflict to help
further develop understanding of nurse actors. They suggested that role conflict emerges when
incompatible roles are required of the actor: “In meeting one set of expectations, the role
occupant is unable to meet the expectations of another group” (p. 150). Further, the researchers
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focused on a specific form of role conflict defined by Burke, et al. (1991). “Role overload” exists
when the demands of a particular role exceed the individual’s capacity to undertake the given
role” (Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb, 2007, p. 150). The role occupant understands what
is required but lacks the ability to perform the role due to limitations on time, skill level,
education or other such factors. In application to nurses, the researchers wrote,
This might occur when a newly graduated nurse is allocated a clinical case with a level of
complexity beyond their clinical competence or when an experienced nurse with a
complex clinical case load is given additional administrative duties and is unable to
complete both aspects of the role. (p. 150)
Note, then, that role theory goes beyond a prima facie assumption that an agent simply cannot
perform a particular task. The role itself and one’s ability to perform the role, both in the eyes of
the occupant and sender, are both placed in jeopardy. The actor is not simply being asked to do
more than she can do. She is being required to perform a role that she cannot. Thus, her own
understanding of the situation may not be reduced to “I cannot perform this task.” It may, rather,
be understood as “I cannot succeed as a nurse.”
Role problems can also arise, argued Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb (2007), when
a role is ambiguous. Role ambiguity is understood as a lack of clarity regarding projected roles
and expectations (Major, 2003; Schuler et al. 2007). Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb
(2007) provided the following example of such role conflict caused by role ambiguity: “the
traditional role and scope of practice of community nurses has become threatened by the
increasing numbers of specialist services and there is an increasing potential for service
duplication and conflict (p. 151). Simply, nurses may not understand what their expectations are.
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It seems, in their example, that role ambiguity arises not just because of a lack of clarity on the
part of the role sender, but because there may be a lack of clarity regarding the role sender itself.
One may be unsure who the role sender actually is. In this way, role conflict and ambiguity may
find themselves intertwined. The role occupant may be unsure as to which set of expectations to
follow and conflict arises when those expectations are inconsistent with each other.
Both of these notions—role conflict and role ambiguity—may provide greater
understanding of faculty roles as well. Understanding that role conflict may exist if the faculty
roles of teacher and researcher require inconsistent acts would be revealing and concerning. It
may also be the case that there is ambiguity regarding role expectations or role senders. Should
occupant of the “teacher” role focus primarily on the expectations sent by students and
professional associations, but researchers focus primarily on the expectations of the public at
large and the institution? It may well be that such ambiguity leads to role conflict as well. If
students send the expectation that faculty place their welfare first, but the institution expects that
faculty will fail, regardless of pedagogical intervention, a certain percentage of students, then
role conflict arises. Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Holcomb (2007) described the result of such
conflicts and ambiguity in health care as “role stress and role strain” (p. 152).
According to Hardy and Conway (1998), role stress is a social condition in which the
obligations of the role are poorly defined, conflicting, or impossible to meet. “Role stress
precipitates role strain that manifests itself in frustration, tension or anxiety” (Brookes, Davison,
Daly, and Holcomb, 2007, p. 152). Such role stress and strain may result in severe problems for
an institution. “When role strain is prevalent, dissatisfied tension-ridden healthcare workers may
be drained of energy and commitment to both the organization and their professional values” (p.
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152). Certainly, then one may be concerned that potential role conflict between “teacher” and
“researcher” leads to the above described problems. If it is the case that such role strain exists
among faculty, perhaps by the very nature of the roles defined for them, then role theory
provides a potential explanatory device for faculty actions. If, for example, there is an increase in
unethical activity among faculty, role theory may suggest that it is due to the decrease in the
commitment to organizational and professional values described above. Note that, as discussed
in chapter 1, such an increase has been observed.
As a result of both the understanding developed of nurse roles through the application of
role theory and the predictive power of role theory (particularly through the notions of role
conflict and role stress) Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) argued that role theory is
an effective means by which to understand nurse behavior. Moreover, role theory provides a
means by which to understand role changes. To quote, “From a structuralist perspective, the role
of the community nurse in Australia has evolved significantly over the last fifty years” (p. 153).
That structuralist perspective enables researchers to make claims regarding why the role has
changed: “The community nurse role has responded to social, political and economic
perspectives together with changes in both global and national healthcare management” (p. 153).
Moreover, they can make claims as to how such role changes explain changes in actor behavior:
“An understanding of role perceptions and interactions can assist in the advancement of
professional issues decreasing role conflict and role burden” (p. 153). As a result, the researchers
suggested the need for further exploration and testing of models based on role theory in order to
better “facilitate the professional development of community nurses” (p. 153). Such exploration
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and conceptual testing of faculty models is the primary goal of this dissertation in order to better
understand the best means by which to instantiate the role “faculty.”
Marginson and Bui (2009), in their “Examining the human cost of multiple expectations,”
used a survey of middle-level managers to show that role conflict can lead to a decrease in
performance. They considered, through field research, a series of coping strategies that may help
alleviate the stress of such role conflict. In their analysis they suggest that “positive outcomes
may result from establishing forces for ‘creative innovation’ alongside ‘predictable goal
attainment’” (p. 59). It is important to note that these positive outcomes only resulted in cases in
which the manager was able to “cope with multiple, conflicting role expectations” (p. 59). Their
research, thus, to some degree suggests that the best way of alleviating the stress of role conflict
is to hire managers who are good at dealing with role conflict.
Margison and Bui (2009) argued that managers often confront multiple, often conflicting,
role expectations. Moreover, they noted that managers are often expected to react positively to
multiple, yet contrasting, role expectations. Such conflicts, the prevailing paradigm of business
suggests, lead to “creative innovations” and “fruitful dynamic tensions” (p. 60). A manager may
be required, for example, to acquire material that is unavailable through normal channels while at
the same time being prohibited from using anything other than normal channels (Kahn et al.,
1964, p. 20). Thus, the manager may find a way to acquire the material, but her stress results
from the fact that said acquisition may be either dubbed “innovative” or “illegal” depending on
the judgment of the role sender.
It is important to note, here, that the role stress experienced by the role occupant is in part
the result of the inability to predict the response of the role sender in the role cycle. Because
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there is a contradiction inherent to the expectations themselves, any response may result. In a
philosophical sense this is known as “explosion.” Contractions, propositions such that both “A”
and “Not A” are held to be true result in an infinite number of possible responses. To place the
problem in ordinary language, if I am told to both write my dissertation in its entirety and not to
write it at all, my response becomes difficult to predict because any response is warranted. I
cannot tell if the expectation requires that I do or do not write my dissertation.1 In the case of a
manager who is required to take on conflicting roles, she cannot predict with any certainty the
response of the role sender. The manager may examine the role of the sender and attempt to best
articulate which expectations are associated with that role (Is my supervisor occupying a role that
is more rule based or “innovative”?) but she cannot be sure. Either action may result in either
dire consequence or significant reward, hence the role stress.
Such role conflict, argued Margison and Bui (2009), begins as objective role conflict but
becomes psychological role conflict. “Psychological role conflict arises when the manager
perceives objective role conflict and assesses that failure to comply with conflicting expectations
may have potential negative consequences” (p. 61). Margison and Bui argued that psychological
role conflict can lead to significantly diminished performance on the part of the individual actor.
Resultant effects may include “job dissatisfaction, a perceived inability to influence decisionmaking, an unfavorable attitude toward the superior, and lower levels of reported performance”
(p. 62). Khan (1974) argued that such psychological role conflict can harm one’s health.
Moreover, as argued above in the discussion of Montgomery (2005), it can lead to a sense of
broken personhood.

1

See the work of Graham Priest for more detailed analysis on the problem of “explosion” and potential solutions
to violations of the law of non-contradiction.
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Margison and Bui (2009) collected data from a survey of managers of a major
telecommunications corporation. In so doing they tested two hypothesis:
H1: Combining expectations of innovation with expectations of budget-goal attainment increases
psychological role conflict, leading to a decrease in performance.
And
H2: Combining expectations of empowerment with expectations of budget-goal attainment
increases psychological role conflict, leading to a decrease in performance. (p. 63)
Additionally, the researchers engaged in field study in order to better understand the
organizational structure and hierarchy. The survey results were measured using qualitative
analysis techniques in addition to the inclusion of in-person interviews with managers and
narrative analysis. Kahn et al’s (1964) instrument to measure role conflict was used to access the
results of the survey for correlation at a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.71. The result of their factor
analysis and SEM results present “significant path coefficients” suggesting modestly high
reliability and internal consistency (p. 71). The survey then suggests a significant interactive
effect on role conflict and an indirect negative effect on performance. The results also suggest
that, aside from budget-goal attainment, expectations alone have no statistically significant
impact on levels of role conflict. Thus, hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported.
The results of the interviews also supported the above conclusion, according to Margison
and Bui (2009). Managers reported making budget “trade-offs” in order to meet the need for
innovation. Those managers who were capable of making such tradeoffs described themselves as
having low levels of psychological conflict. Those who were capable and willing to make such
tradeoffs were also the ones who reported and were shown to be the highest performing
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managers. The researchers reported, “Our study contributes evidence to suggest that… high
performing managers may be better able to cope with multiple, conflicting role expectations
involving budget-goal attainment” (p. 75). At no point in their research did Margison and Bui
suggest that a potential solution to such objective role conflict and psychological role conflict
may be generating consistent expectations of managers. Thus, their research supports that role
conflict can lead to low performance, but also supports the best means by which to improve
performance is to hire managers who demonstrate the ability to cope with conflicting role
expectations.
One wonders, though, if such recommendations address the heart of the problem. Is the
best means by which to deal with role stress hiring people who are good at dealing with that
stress. If anything, this seems to suggest a kind of social comfort with the idea that agents should
act in inconsistent ways. Such comfort is especially disconcerting in care professions, such as
healthcare and teaching. I remain unconvinced that the best solution to the potential conflicts
generated by inconsistent researcher and faculty roles is hiring faculty who are comfortable with
harming students when the institution demands it while at the same time occupying a role in
which the students as role sender expect to be treated benevolently. It would seem that such
solutions, if anything, are likely to encourage deception and duplicity.
Biddle’s (1997) work seems to demonstrate that it is best if institutions provide consistent
roles. Recall that Khan (1974) argued that such role conflicts can lead to health problems. It is of
importance to note, then, the significant difference between the ways of dealing with role conflict
between the healthcare paradigm and the management paradigm. In their 2007 research,
Brookes, Davidson, Daly, and Holcomb suggested that the role sender should address the
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concern of conflicting expectations. There is no discussion of hiring those nurses who are better
able to deal with inconsistent expectations. In the corporate paradigm, however, Marginson and
Bui (2007) made no mention of role senders assessing their inconsistent expectations and instead
suggest that higher performance is correlated to the ability of managers to cope with differing
expectations.
French’s (1995) discussion of Corporate Internal Decision (CID) structures illuminates
the way differing institutions may address questions of inconsistency in role expectations. The
CID structure is the summation of corporate policy, stated objectives, unstated objectives, and
other such rules that comprise the decision making process of the corporation. Although new
agents may enter and exit the corporation, the CID structure largely stays the same, as it is the
foundational organizational belief set that governs the behavior of the institution. If the CID
structure requires that its managers be both willing to be innovative and yet follow the rules, then
the inconsistency is at the very heart of the corporation itself. If, on the other hand, the CID
structure is care-centered and places the welfare of individuals as a primary concern of the
institution, then such inconsistencies are undesirable if they lead to psychological role conflict as
described by Khan (1974).
Note that while community nursing is not a corporation, it is an institution, which may
also have a CID structure. Social institutions and vocations may not often be as explicitly defined
by a written CID, yet they are governed by a series of norms and rules both explicit and implicit
to the institution. It seems that Brookes, Davidson, Daly, and Halcomb’s (2007) research
indicates that the flexibility of such institutional CID structures might be at the heart of the
emerging role conflicts. Unlike a business CID structure, which may be more explicitly stated, a
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community CID structure may change with the personalities that instantiate it, as it is not as
clearly defined through written pronouncements, goals, and corporate philosophies. Thus, as the
institution changes, new personalities occupy supervisory roles, new expectations may arise that
conflict with old expectations or current expectations. The ideas put forth by Brookes, Davison,
Daly, and Halcomb (2007) seem to suggest that such ambiguity is potentially harmful and the
institution would do well to clarify its expectations.
Perhaps a bit disconcertingly, corporate CID structures may well be built with an
assumed inconsistency. Whereas the more flexible CID structures of community organizations
may result in greater numbers of role conflicts, the notion that inconsistency, particularly when it
may bring harm to others, is undesirable provides industries such as health care with imperatives
to remove the inconsistency. Conversely, the nature of corporations to embrace inconsistency in
order to maximize profit while simultaneously maximizing efficiency and benefit does not result
in an initial inclination to address the inconsistency at the heart of conflicting roles. Rather, the
solution becomes to hire those who can deal with such conflict. Note, however, that Margison
and Bui’s (2009) research suggests that managers who are most capable of coping with such role
conflict know when to make tradeoffs. Simply, they know that they cannot meet both sets of
expectations fully and are capable of—perhaps comfortable with—failing to meet those
expectations. Certainly, this kind of risk-taking behavior is at the core of business and profit
making, and may not be inherently harmful.
We must consider, though, in the context of this dissertation, if such tradeoffs are
desirable if the roles of teacher and researcher lead to role conflict. Is the best solution one that
matches the paradigm of health care, thusly suggesting that we change the institutional
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requirements, or one that matches the paradigm of business, suggesting that we hire those who
are comfortable making tradeoffs? The obvious concern is how often such tradeoffs can lead to
unethical behavior. In the context of Margison and Bui’s (2009) research, such tradeoffs were
often in terms of budget. The manager was willing to risk lower profit in order to meet a longterm goal or expectation. Making such tradeoff making may not always necessarily be so
innocuous. Consider the case of the Ford Pinto. The trade off in that case came at the cost of
human lives. Ford, once having conducted a cost/benefit analysis, determined that the tradeoff
should be paying lawsuit damages rather than recalling the explosive automobile. From the
perspective of the corporation, the tradeoff was entirely a financial one: should one take the cost
of refitting the bumpers or should one take the cost of paying lawsuits of families who lose loved
ones? That financial cost, though less in the case of the lawsuits, is not necessarily justifiable
ethically; moreover, it was likely inconsistent with the corporate philosophies espoused by the
corporation CID structure.
Consider recent allegations against General Motors (GM). With little difficulty, a brief
online web search locates numerous community initiative pages from 2001-2010, a time in
which the company repeatedly asserts its vested interest in the welfare of its consumers. Yet, at
the same time, the corporation was knowingly producing cars that did not meet safety
standards—resulting in numerous deaths. Such violation of their own claims to beneficence seem
only possible if their CID structure itself allows for contradiction, hence the danger of
contradiction in a CID structure. We must consider, therefore, the possibility that even if many
educational intuitions allow for inconsistency and role conflict in their role sending, such
inconsistency may be undesirable ethically. One would be especially cautious to embrace
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inconsistency, as Margison and Bui (2009) seem to have done, when taking into consideration
the health of the role takers (Kahn, 1974). Can we delineate when faculty should make ethical
tradeoffs for the sake of research, pedagogy, or their careers? The research above seems to
suggest that the answer itself will emerge, definitional, from the paradigm of the institution and
its CID structure. If it is a care-oriented institution, unlike many corporations, then the structure
may demand that such tradeoffs minimize harm to individuals. It is noteworthy, however, that
educational institutions may be at a crossroads—as both Readings (1996) and Carter (2004)
argued—as universities take on greater and greater business-like roles.
Suggested Improvements to Role Theory for Contemporary Application.
One may criticize role theory when it is used to understand organizations. For example,
there is a lack of clarity or agreement regarding whether role conflict, role ambiguity, and role
overload are separate constructs or if they exist as components of each other (King & King,
1990). Wickham and Parker (2006) concluded that organizational role theory (ORT), in
particular, suffered from numerous difficulties. For example, ORT is currently insufficient for
explaining the behavior of agents within organizations and must be buttressed with the inclusion
of notions of multifaceted employees, employer recognition/facilitation, and
compartmentalization. Perhaps most generally, role theory suffers from its status as an analog
device. It is a means by which to make an analogy between agents in the world and theater, and,
as such, is always subject to myriad interpretations and the danger of verification bias.
This work accepts the suggestion made by Marginson and Bui (2009): role conflict, role
ambiguity, and role overload will be considered separate constructs that may exist in a subset
relationship. Understanding them as distinct, though, provides the opportunity for greater clarity.
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Thus, it may well be the case that role ambiguity is a form of role conflict, but in the discussion
here clarity is facilitated by noting that a particular role ambiguity within the university creates
role conflict that may lead to role overload rather than simply that, “there is role conflict.” This
seems reasonable in light of the fact that role conflict need not be caused by ambiguity, but may
be caused by conflicting expectations about which there is nothing ambiguous. In the parlance of
logic, this is the distinction between problems of contradiction and problems of vagueness. The
logical intuition that we should avoid contradiction is not endangered by our willingness to
embrace the possibility that some of our ideas are vague. We should assume, then, that because
an institution is vague regarding its expectations, the faculty are encouraged to act inconsistently.
Similarly, if we discover that our expectations of teachers and researchers are inconsistent, we
may not want to absolve universities for such inconsistency by attributing it to a “vagueness”
problem.
In “Reconceptualising organizational role theory for contemporary organizational
contexts,” Wikham and Parker (2006) argued that organizational role theory as it is currently
understood is inadequate for application to contemporary organizations. They stated, “The
source of the controversy stems from the observed difficulty firms have with integrating the
work-role demands they place on their employees with the increasingly complex array of nonwork roles employees enact for their overall well-being” (p. 441). Simply, Wikham and Parker
contend that changes in the way we think about work and organizations make ORT outdated.
Classical ORT, for example, cannot adequately address concerns regarding the integration of
work life and home life due to technology. Many professionals—if not most—are now
considered “on-call” at all times because we have email. An employee who neglects to answer
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her email over the weekend, although she is not officially scheduled to work on those days, will
likely find herself facing ridicule or discipline for her “oversight.” Members of organizations are
multifaceted in ways that were not the case during the development of ORT.
As stated earlier in this chapter, ORT focuses on the roles that individuals enact in
systems that are pre-planned, task-oriented, and hierarchical (Biddle, 1986). Work roles
prescribe the behavior that employees are expected to enact effectively (Katz & Kahn, 1966). As
a result, argued Wickham and Parker (2006), ORT implies two essential points: 1) each
individual confers and accepts a “role” that is reflective of the organization’s CID structure and
2) in order for the organization to function efficiently the roles must be effectively
communicated and understood (p. 443).
According to Biddle (1986), Organizational Role Theory hinges on four assumptions:
1) That an employee “take” a role given to them by members of the organization.
2) There is consensus regarding the expectations of the roles.
3) Role takers comply to the behavior expected of them.
4) Role-conflict will arise if expectations are not consensual.
The first assumption is that employees “take” a role conferred upon them by the organization.
Wickham and Parker (2006) argued that this assumption is insufficiently robust argued because
employees are now often required to take on multiple roles in the workplace. Those roles may
not have been made clear, nor “taken” by the employee; they are simply expectations that the
employee take both the explicit roles and the implicit roles in their multiplicity. Employees now
multi-task in a way that requires that they enact multiple roles (Lindbeck & Snower, 2001). As a
result, employees may take the following actions to address the conflicting demands: 1) choosing
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between roles, 2) compromising the behavior expected in the role, or 3) withdrawing from the
situation entirely. What was referred to by Marginson and Bui (2009) as a “trade-off” is a
significant concern to theorists such as Wickham and Parker (2009), Lindbeck and Snower
(2001), and Vliert, (1981). The assumption that employees take on a singular role given to them
by an employer is too simple for contemporary work life. Thus, Wickham and Parker (2009)
argue that ORT must now take into account the notion of a “multi-faceted” employee.
Wickham and Parker (2009) also took exception to the classical ORT assumption that
employees and employers share the same understanding of role expectations. The idea that there
is a pre-defined, agreed-upon consensus on role expectations does not take into account “the
complexity of the array of non-work roles enacted by employees that impact at the workplace,
and the fact that these roles necessarily change over time” (p. 446). The work-life balance as
shifted and continues to shift as a result of technology that enables employers to contact
employees at any time and any place, but also enables the employer to request that work be done
at any time and any place. Long gone are the days where a boss was unable to reach an employee
on vacation. Moreover, the employee would no longer have to leave the vacation in order to
return to the workplace to complete some piece of emergency business. Now, one need not have
one’s laptop to bring work on vacation, simply having a smart phone makes it not unreasonable
for an employer to request that a vacationing employee answer a set of pressing emails or other
such work. Thus, the classical ORT assumption that there is a pre-defined and static set of
expectations for employees is insufficient. ORT must be updated in order to allow for a new
understanding that employees upon entering employment will likely be asked to fulfill many
different roles and meet many different expectations over time (Wickham & Parker, 2009).
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Finally, Wickham and Parker (2009) took objection to the role-conflict assumption of
ORT. To be clear, this is not to say that they argue against role conflict. They do argue that role
conflict is the result of conflicting role expectations. However, they argue that those conflicting
role expectations are insufficiently explicated in classical ORT. “An increasing body of
research…indicates that role-conflict in the work place can actually result from conflict between
work-roles and non-work roles” (p. 446). Thus, role conflict in ORT is not only the result of
inconsistent roles or role ambiguity in the work place. One may find that one’s roles as father
and as employee conflict, and as a result suffer great job dissatisfaction. One may also find that
one’s roles as father and as employee cause role overload. Although this addendum to classical
ORT seems obvious and intuitive, it is important to note that due to the shift in work and home
life balance, the potential for such role conflicts has become even more prevalent.
The understanding of classical ORT as revised to integrate multifaceted roletaking
situates ORT as perhaps the best means by which to understand the role of faculty. Initially, one
may be concerned that ORT does not take into account the many obligations of teachers and
researchers outside of the institution. ORT, though, that considers role taking as multifaceted is
well suited to the consideration of faculty beyond just as described by the institution. This
analysis, then, will rest heavily on organizational role theory, but as revised to understand faculty
as multifaceted and engaged in a role that is constantly in flux, and defined by expectations that
originate both from the university and outside of it.
The final concern mentioned at the beginning of this section is of role theory as
particularly subject to confirmation bias as a result of its existence as a kind of analog tool. Like
the face of a clock, role theory does not provide a direct and exact description of the state of
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affairs; it provides an analogy through which to understand the current state of affairs. We
understand role takers like actors who accept scripts that, as discussed above, are ever changing.
We must therefore be careful to not simply use role theory as a way to explain behavior however
we see fit. The best means by which to avoid the problem of confirmation bias in this case is to
avoid the misuse of analogy in the first place. As discussed by Eisner (1991), the goal of
qualitative research is not digits or facts about the world, but understanding. Analogies, as
metaphorical devices, enable understanding rather than knowledge in the positivistic sense. For
example, understanding that his “anger is a towering inferno” also requires the understanding
that “his anger was not a towering inferno.” The metaphor clarifies the intensity of the anger
while at the same time obfuscating the fact in the world.
When applying role theory to the world, one must keep in mind that one is applying a
metaphor to the world in order to draw an analogous relationship. Those explanations that help
generate more understanding are preferable, but not necessarily “right” in a factual sense. Rather,
they simply help us better make sense of the world. Thus, I suggest a kind of coherentist picture
of role theory rather than a correspondent one. Conclusions derived using role theory should not
be judged based on their “correspondence” to reality, but rather by their coherence to the rest of
what we know—how much sense they make when considered with the rest of our body of
knowledge.
A final concern, previously unmentioned but of particular relevance to faculty roles, was
examined by Jiao, Richards, and Hackett (2013). In their “Organizational citizenship behavior
and role breadth: A meta-analyitic and cross-cultural analysis” Jiao, Richards, and Hackett used
role theory to analyze organizational citizenship—the importance placed on courtesy, initiative,
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leadership and other behaviors for the good of the organization. Their research was a metaanalysis of thirty one studies in order to ascertain the perspectives of employees regarding the
importance of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) to their jobs. In this analysis, the
researchers determine that, to the detriment of our organizations, employees do consider OCB
part of their job, but employers tend to narrow job expectations in regards to those behaviors.
“Organizations relying heavily on OCB for their success may need to adopt HR practices that
convey broader role expectations” (708). Jiao, Richards, and Hackett’s findings seem to echo the
argument made by Wickham and Parker (2009) that classical organizational role theory needs to
be adjusted to take into account the multi-faceted nature of contemporary work-life.
The meta-analysis suggests that role theory and those who apply it need to take more into
account than only the requirements delineated by employers, again emphasizing that a
dissertation such as this needs to take more into account than the expectations of employers as
explained in handbooks or written job expectations. In fact, the actual roles of teachers and
researchers may have very little in common with the roles as explicated by institutions. This
project is not simply descriptive, but normative. Philosophical analysis, as will be discussed in
depth in chapter three is not restrained to analysis of what the state of affairs is, but can consider
both logically and ethically what the state of affairs should be. Thus, the analysis of faculty roles
will take into account university documents, but will not be constrained by them as both Jaio,
Richards, and Hackett (2013) and Wikham and Parker’s (2009) research suggests. Importantly,
the research of Jaio, Richards, and Hackett (2013) also reminds us that faculty roles are not
constrained to “teacher” and “researcher.” Faculty, at least so many institutions claim, are
required to participate in “service.” Although interviews regarding whether or not faculty believe
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they are required to place much importance on service and whether or not they do so falls
beyond the scope of this project, it may well be that service will play an important role in
understanding not “how” teaching and research are conjoined but “how should” they be so.
Organizational Role Theory Revised
Given the review of the literature, it is likely the case that organizational role theory
provides the best theoretical framework upon which to ground the conceptual framework of this
dissertation. ORT, though, as discussed above, is somewhat inadequate for understanding
contemporary organizational relationships. Yes, organizational role theory is the most often
applied theory and the one for which there is the most support in the literature. Additionally,
ORT is, indeed, the best suited to discussions of organizational relationships, as it hinges on the
relationships between role senders and role takers as understood in organizational paradigms. As
discussed by Wickham and Parker (2009) and Jaio, Richards, and Hackett (2013), to be
applicable to contemporary organizations, ORT must be adjusted for an understanding of
multifaceted role takers who experience significant shifts in role expectations over time as well
as a concept of ORT that encompasses those expectations and roles that are not clearly defined
and, yet, are essential, such as organizational citizenship behaviors.
It is important to note that this dissertation is not focusing on universities, but rather on
the roles of faculty, and, thus, ORT is not necessarily perfectly applicable to our analysis. In
some ways the symbolic interactionist theory might be best suited for an understanding of roles
that are developed through dialectic, interaction and interpretation. Thus, I propose that this work
utilize role theory as “community-dialectical role theory.” To say that understanding faculty
roles, here, uses organizational role theory is a bit disingenuous, as the revisions necessary to
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generate a robust understanding change it significantly; moreover, the focus is not on the
organization, but on the instantiated roles and how they should be instantiated. Roles, however,
are not just individual instantiations. As discussed above, roles are social constructs—they are
community constructs as developed through dialectic and symbolic interaction. Thus, this
dissertation is using organizational role theory, but one heavily altered so as to not give primacy
to the expectations as generated by the organization itself and the purpose of the work goes
beyond understanding how members are situated, but how should they be situated and why.
Thus, the idea of community-dialectical role theory as the burgeoning conceptual
framework emergent from the theoretical frame of role theory is one that can be used to
understand organizations primarily as communities of dialectical agents that create their roles
through symbolic interaction. This construct, then, is not reducible to symbolic interactionist role
theory because the focus is not just on individual interpretation and understanding, but communal
interpretation and understanding.
McKnight and Block (2010), in The Abundant Community, generated an effective means
by which to ground such a conceptual framework. The understanding of “community” as “that
which is constitutive of identity” is a communitarian notion well explicated by Charles Taylor
(1989). As argued by Readings (1996), the university is quickly becoming a business-model
enterprise. Understanding, though, the interaction of its faculty cannot, yet, be reduced to that
simple classical ORT model. Faculty members remain dynamic participants in the university and
as such, remain citizens of the university. Citizenship, as understood by McKnight and Block
(2010), is the participation in a democracy. As long as some free voice is maintained by
university faculty, they remain, at least to some degree, active participants in their institution as
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citizens; thus, their roles cannot be reduced to purely organizational models. The faculty engage
in dialectic with each other and the institution itself to develop a constantly shifting CID
structure, the very self of the university. In this way, the faculty continue to participate in the
definition of their own roles and the construction of their own identity through dialectic as
described by Taylor (1989).
As discussed in chapter one, though, the shift in the university is a shift from a citizenship
to a consumer model (McKnight & Block, 2010). This shift can be understood on both an
individual level as discussed by McKnight and Block or on the university level as discussed by
Readings (1996) and Carter (2004). To focus solely on ORT would be to focus on a “system life”
–“a managed life, a life organized around products, services, and beliefs of systems” (McKnight
& Block, 2010). However, the university is not yet completely understood in terms of a
consumer society, though this trend towards a demand that our educational institutions
“produce” something seems ever-increasing. As such, organizational role theory is not wholly
incompatible with understanding faculty roles either and the roles cannot be best understood
solely through symbolic interactionist role theory.
Organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory parallel concepts used
by the discoursed ethical frame that will be explicated in detail in chapter 3. This parallel
suggests that organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory are not separate
and distinct, but, rather, that there is a supervenient relationship. The discourse ethical frame
describes a systemsworld and a lifeworld that are used to understand human agency and society.
The systemsworld is the world of organizational structure and bureaucracy and the lifeworld is
the world engaged on the “human” level—the world of purposes, hopes, and emotional states.
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Thus, one sees a clear parallel between forms of role theory and discourse ethical frames.
Organizational role theory is a role theory that articulates understanding from the positioning of
the systemsworld. It understands human agency as something participated in by members of
bureaucratic, structured, and machine-like organizations. Symbolic interactionist role theory
understands agents as embedded in language. Humans play the roles defined for them by others
through communicative action. Thus, symbolic interactionist role theory is embedded in an
understanding of human agency in the lifeworld of qualitative communicative states.
The relationship, though, between the systemsworld and the lifeworld is one of
supervenience between them. The lifeworld and the systemsworld depend upon each other, but
the lifeworld provides the more basic structures. From the lifeworld emerges the structures and
organizations that seek to meet human purposes. The interactions of agents in the lifeworld give
rise to those bureaucracies that seek to meet human ends. Thus the systemsworld is supervenient
upon the lifeworld. Similarly, organizational role theory is supervenient upon symbolic
interactionist role theory. While it may seem, prima facie, that organizational role theory would
be the more basic, upon which symbolic interactionist role theory would rest, the realization is
that symbolic interactionist role theory, while more complex, frames the more basic human
interactions that result in the generation of organization. It is through communicative action that
organizations are developed. Thus, organizations emerge as means by which to meet the
symbolically communicated ends produced by humans. Due to the complexities of human
symbolic exchange, its ever-shifting quality, and the opacity of human internality, understanding
of human interaction as reduced to movement within organizational structures becomes a
reductionist heuristic for understanding human interaction. Thus, the ability to understand human
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action through organization emerges from the symbolic interactions that produce those
organizations, and maintain them, in the first place. To understand human interaction in its
fullness, then, as paralleled by the supervenient relationship of the systemsworld and lifeworld
requires that one engage a conjunction of organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist
role theory as similarly supervenient.
As this project began in chapter 1 with the discussion of the shift taking place in the
university, it seems reasonable that the conceptual framework used to understand faculty roles
can also describe that shift, leaving both organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist
role theory insufficient. Community-dialectic role theory, as I have defined it, focuses on the
shifts in dialogue that produce community and community change. That community can be
understood as an institution, country, or university.
This project, then, will seek to understand faculty roles through dialectic, change and
normativity. In order to do that, to first establish what faculty roles should look like, a
methodology that both acts a means by which to examine and define constructs (rather than
measure them) as well as develop them (rather than report perspectives on them) is necessary.
For this reason philosophical analysis is the best means by which to conduct this research
project. The goal is not to measure a construct, nor is it to simply to describe it. The goal is to
create a construct by which such measurements can take place. Thusly, a conceptual framework
such as community-dialectic role theory is necessary in order to understand faculty as more than
that defined by the given and accepted roles of organizations, but as active dialectical citizens in
the generation of their own multifaceted roles as faculty. The first step, then, is to establish
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through dialectic with the literature what the conjoined teacher-faculty role should look like
given the demands of logical consistency, ethics, and selfhood as a community construction.
Explication of Theoretical Concepts
Developments in Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory
In order to best apply the conceptual framework of “community dialectical role theory,”
the components that comprise it should be well understood. The literature above demonstrates
that Organizational Role Theory is perhaps the most commonly used form of role theory.
Meade’s work, which is the heart of symbolic interactionist role theory, the other essential part to
community dialectical role theory, has received less attention as Meade described it. Instead, the
development and application of his intuitions was brought to its culmination in the work of
Jurgen Habermas. Thus, it is here that one finds a clear path from the role theoretical grounding
of this work to a methodology of discourse ethics as developed by Habermas and applied in this
dissertation. Habermas, a renowned sociologist and philosopher, developed a means by which to
understand agents’ actions in the world as both constructing and constructed by assumed norms
embedded in language. In his seminal text, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
(1990), Habermas elaborated on his conception of discourse ethics and constructed a framework
by which moral norms can be impartially judged. He connected the idea of ethics through
discourse, as communicative ethics, to the theory of social action drawing much of the latter
from Meade’s work. The idea that world-making is the result of an intersubjective dialectic or
interaction is a philosophical refinement of role theory by Habermas. Herbert Blumer (1969)
coined the term “symbolic interactionism” when analyzing and applying Mead’s work. Blumer’s
interpretation of Mead continues to inform sociology and the social interactionist school of
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thought. That perspective, that Agents are understand as active participants in the symbol making
and symbol using that construct the roles that construct their identities and their institutions, is
understood, in part because of Blumer as an interpretive act. Agents share and perceive symbols
that they interpret in order to construct the roles they believe to be expected of them. That
interpretive step is what connects discourse ethics to role theory. Habermas, in his own
sociological work, understood dialectic to be an interpretive act of world making—an act so
powerful that Habermas made a significant shift from description to proscription. In
understanding the way one makes the world through the interpretation of others, and understands
the roles instantiated by agents to be intersubjective construction through dialectic, one comes to
realize the importance, if not primacy, of discourse in effective world-making.
Thus, it is through the work of Habermas that one sees role-theory cease to be only one of
many ways to understand the grand sociological actions of humanity but as a means by which to
understand how agents create not only their world, but the world for each other. As such, one
comes to understand the normative import of discourse ethics. As symbolic interactionism is not
just a means by which an agent comes to construct her role for herself, but constructs roles for
others, there is normative implication as we are no longer simply suggesting that others play a
role or instantiate an identity, but we are creating, with them, the identity of the other.
Habermas, in his text, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two Lifeworld and
system: A Critique of functionalist Reason, said of communicative action:
Communicative action relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in which
participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the social, and the
subjective worlds, even when they thematically stress only one of the three components
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in their utterances. Speaker and hearer use the reference system of the three worlds as an
interpretive framework within which they work out their common situation definitions.
(1987, p. 120)
In the above quotation, one can see the influence of Meade’s symbolic interactionist intuitions as
understanding actors as interpreters of symbolic action developed to a far greater degree.
Habermas showed that our moral intuitions are not simply embedded in tradition or inscribed
expectations, but rather are embedded in the presupposition of social interaction that are
necessitated by the rules of discourse necessary for any society—thusly they have a universal
quality. Discourse ethics, thus, aims to provide a means by which moral questions can be
answered through engagement in authentic dialogue with other agents. This system of both
understanding and normative application will be explicated in greater depth in chapter three
through examination of the works of Amy Allen (2009) and Hans-Herbert Kögler (2012).
Habermas’ work provides a robust means, if not a full metaphysic, for understanding why actors
play particular roles and the embeddedness of their scripts in communicative action.
Both the normative framework of discourse ethics and the social theories developed by
Habermas have found consistent application in the philosophy of education. Notably, Thomas J.
Sergiovanni applied Habermas’ understanding of social systems to the development and analysis
of the educational system in his text, The Lifeworld of Leadership: Creating Culture,
Community, and Personal Meaning in Our Schools (2000). The text rests heavily on Habermas’
distinction between “the lifeworld” and “the systemsworld.” Sergiovanni says of the lifeworld
and the systemsworld:
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Habermas uses the language “systemsworld” and “lifeworld” to describe two mutually
exclusive yet ideally interdependent domains of all of society’s enterprises from the
family to the complex formal organization… When we talk about the stuff of culture, the
essence of values and beliefs, the expression of needs, purposes, and desires of people,
and about the sources of deep satisfaction in the form of meaning and significance, we
are talking about the lifeworld… The systemsworld, by contrast, is a world of
instrumentalities, of efficient means designed to achieve ends. (2000, p. 5)
It is through these social domains that interpretation occurs. One’s understanding of one’s
situation within society, one’s very identity, is both understood through and constructed by the
lifeworld and systemsworld. Thus, these domains are both constructive and normative.
Habermas, in The Lifeworld of Leadership: Creating Culture, Community, and Personal
Meaning in Our Schools, said of the lifeworld and interpretation:
Every new situation appears in a lifeworld composed of a cultural stock of knowledge
that is “always already” familiar. Communicative actors can no more take up an
extramundane position in relation to their lifeworld than they can in relation to language
as the medium for the processes of reaching understanding through which their lifeworld
maintains itself. In drawing upon a cultural tradition, they also continue it…
Communicative actors are always moving within the horizon of their lifeworld; they
cannot step outside of it. As interpreters, they themselves belong to the lifeworld, along
with their speech acts, but they cannot refer to “something in the lifeworld” in the same
way as they can to facts, norms, or experiences. The structures of the lifeworld lay down
the forms of the intersubjectivity of possible understanding. (1987, pp. 125-126)
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The systemsworld, conversely, is the foundation for the development of those things that are
perhaps most commonly discussed in the context of educational leadership: management,
organizational structure, allocation of capital, and systematization. To quote Sergiovanni, “the
former [the lifeworld] is a world of purposes, norms, growth, and development, and the later [the
systems world] is a world of efficiency, outcomes, and productivity” (2000. p. 5). It is therefore
the lifeworld that should drive the systemsworld, as it is in the lifeworld that our norms are
grounded.
The inclination to assume that one or the other is more or less valuable should be
avoided. Perhaps one who is sympathetic to understanding the world as interpretive,
intersubjective, and agent-driven would believe in the superiority of the lifeworld while,
conversely, one who believes the world is best understood through the movement of capital
through the systemization of organizational processes would argue for the primacy of the
systemsworld. Both, however, are necessary for understanding the roles played by agents in
society by virtue of the fact that agents do engage through the interpretive act of communicative
action while also existing in a world that is determined and driven by systems and organizational
frameworks that guide their actions. Thus we conjoin of organizational role theory and symbolicinteractionist role theory into “community dialectical role theory.”
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Figure 3. Lifeworld and Systemsworld’s Symbiosis in Community Dialectical Role Theory
The result of the realization that both components are necessary for understanding agents’
actions in an educational institution was the development of Sergiovanni’s text. Although neither
domain is valueless, Sergiovanni argued that the lifeworld must be generative; it should be the
force that drives the systemsworld (2000, p. 6). He argued that when organizations are
functioning properly the lifeworld is at the center of the organization. “When a school makes
decision about means, structures, and policies designed to servce its purposes and values, the life
world is at the center (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 6). He argued the balance of a well-functioning
organization is thrown off, however, if the school’s decision are about the school, rather than
about the purposes and values of the school (p. 6).
Further clarification of Habermas’ notions were made when Sergiovanni demarcated
within schools the Habermasian distinction between “expressive and normative action” and
“teleological and strategic action” (2000, p. 6). Sergiovanni wrote,
Schools grow and maintain their lifeworlds by taking “expressive” and “normative”
action.” Expressive action is when parents, teachers, and students express their individual
needs, visions, values, and beliefs within the cultural context of the school. Normative
action occurs when they seek to act in ways that embody the school’s shared values,
visions, and beliefs. Schools grow and maintain their systemsworld by taking
“teleological” action and “strategic” action. Teleological action involves the setting of
objectives and the creation of systems necessary to achieve them. And strategic action
involves making appropriate choices among alternative courses of action with the intent
of maximizing value. (2000, pp. 6-7)
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Consideration of the examples above suggests that when a school places the systemsworld as
generative of the lifeworld, the norms and purposes of the school become to maintain the
bureaucratic existence of the school rather than the bureaucracy existing for the flourishing of the
students and agents that comprise the organization. The system becomes such that it seeks to
maintain itself as a primary good and those agents that comprise the system become component
parts to the systemworld. Habermas (1987) discussed the problem of the overtaking of the
lifeworld by the systems world as the “colonization of the lifeworld” (pp. 173, 335-336). Both
Habermas and Sergiovanni held that either the lifeworld or the systemsworld must be generative.
“Either the lifeworld determines what the systemsworld will be like or the systemsworld will
determine what the lifeworld will be like” (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 7).
In a rather intuitive example, Sergiovanni discussed testing as an example of the
colonization of the lifeworld by the systems world. “When the lifeworld dominates, testing
reflects local passions, needs, values, and beliefs. Standards can remain rigorous and true but are
not presumed to be standardized, universal, or all-encompassing” (2000, p. 8). Fourteen years
later, as U.S. educational system moves into the “common core,” Sergiovanni’s concerns seem
realized. Teachers are now provided with “curriculum maps” that determine, precisely, day-byday, not only what standard students must master, but what objective must be completed.
Regardless of individual student difference or need, the system presumes that good teachers will
successfully move students through the objectively important mastery of standards. “As the
systemsworld dominates, however, what counts is determined more narrowly by bureaucratic
mandates, politics, and other outside forces” (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 8). As the standards and

108
testing movements have gained greater purchase, one can see the colonization of the lifeworld by
the systemsworld.
It is no longer the norms and purposes of the lifeworld, the flourishing of students for
their own benefit and the benefit of the agents comprising the greater social scheme that drives
education. Rather, students are now educated to benefit the system itself… as a commodity that
needs certain skills in order to maintain the economic system that generates the school system.
Thus, one can now determine the success of a school by virtue of its ability to produce students
who can function as a component of the system itself, specifically as workers within a great
economic device. Whether other lifeworld norms are achieved becomes unimportant; students
need not be creative, critical, or healthy so long as they can, in a standardized fashion,
demonstrate the skills necessary to work in the system and demonstrate only those values—such
as patriotism, work ethic, and belief in the superiority of capitalism—necessary to maintain the
system.

Figure 4. Systemsworld Eventually Sublimates Lifeworld
Other theorists have also argued for the importance of Habermas for the understanding of
and development of educational systems. Interestingly, the focus, is not always on Habermas’
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notions of lifeworld and systemsworld. Habermas’ concepts are so intricate and well-developed
that one can read an entire text dedication to one application of Habermas’ ethics without
encountering an essential aspect of that theory. Perhaps the best explanation for this phenomena
is the fact that Habermas did not simply develop an applied ethic, nor did he only develop the
normative framework upon which that applied ethic emerges. He developed, as well, the
ontological grounding in language of ethics and a metaphysic of human social and psychological
interaction that inform his normative ethic and its applications.
Patrick Jenlink (2004), for example, rested his work heavily on Habermas’ notions of
dialectic and discourse ethics without reference to the lifeworld systems world approach. In his
article, “Discourse ethics in the design of educational system: Considerations for design praxis,”
Jenlink argued for the importance of the application of discourse ethics to the design of
educational systems. His work suggests that without such grounding in discourse, educational
systems are likely to fail ethically because educational systems are dialogical by nature (2004, 0.
237).
Praxis is of special importance to Jenlink. “Praxis is a state in which one engages
critically, reflectively, and intentionally in an inquiry that belongs intrinsically to a project of
self-understanding (Jenlink, 2004, p. 238). Education—an endeavor dedicated to the
development of human beings—must engage praxis as the intersection of theory and practice
requiring self-reflexivity. That reflexivity required by those systems are inherently based on the
development of agents. Note, then, that without mention of it, Jenlink grounded his work in the
social metaphysic of Habermas—systems must be grounded in the norms of the lifeworld in
order to be ethical.
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Jenlink was particularly motivated by the importance of democratic discourse explicated
by Habermas. Jenlink wrote,
The ethical consequences of systems design rests in large part with whether or not the
design process provided opportunity for authentic participation and was socially and
culturally inclusive—active participation by all including marginalized populations and
socially and politically disadvantages publics. (2004, p. 239)
Simply, design discourse is teleologically framed towards the inclusion of numerous
perspectives, thus it is democratic in nature. This discourse, though, must be understood as
praxis—as self-reflective through the dialogical process. “Design discourse seeks to ensure
inclusive participation of those who are the benefactors and beneficiaries [of the system]” (2004,
p. 239). All stakeholders must not only be taken into account, but must be able to participate in
the dialogue in order to design the system ethically. Thus, it is essential to hear all voices—to
care for all populations—in order to sustain the educational lifeworld, and the responsibility falls
on the university to instantiate faculty roles in a way that incorporate the essentiality of the
lifeworld.
Discourse ethics, therefore, particularly in the case of education, is well suited to the
democratic teleological end of full inclusion in dialogue, and, thus, an effective means to both
understand as well as construct faculty roles.
Discourse ethics realize the limits of an individual stance. The systems designer as moral
agent will never truly be able to determine if moral actions are justifiable or not. In this
sense, discourse ethics is an answer to designing systems in a pluralistic society where
many diverse perspectives of what is ‘good’ exist… (Jenlink, 2004, p. 243-244)
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Discourse ethics requires that we step outside of the boundaries of our solipsistic self and engage
the Other in discourse for the purpose of generating understanding and meaningful ethical
consensus. This process will be detailed further in the methodology. For the purposes of this
chapter, however, one notes that Jenlink proceeds to engage a discourse between numerous
ethical positions held by different theorists in order to mediate them through discourse ethics for
the purpose of demonstrating the importance of discourse ethics in the development an ethical
educational system in a pluralistic society.
The importance of Habermas for social justice, as a means by which to include even
marginalized voices, including the marginalized is furthered by the world of Rauno Huttunen and
Mark Murhy (2012). In their “Discourse and recognition as normative ground for radical
pedagogy: Habermasian and Honnethian ethics in the context of education,” Huttunen and
Murphy argued for the importance of Habermas in grounding the work of Paolo Freire. Freire
(1970), in his famous Pedagogy of the Oppressed, forwarded his thesis of “radical pedagogy,”
both indicting and inciting the educational establishment. Freire argued that education acts as a
means of oppression and must, instead, act as a means by which to producing flourishing in all
students. Huttunen and Murphy, however, noted that Freire’s work—while normative—lacked
grounding for that imperative. Habermas’ work, however, demonstrates the social necessity of
the inclusion of all voices in ethical discourse. Thus, they argued that Habermas’ work functions
as a solid foundation for radical pedagogy.
The details of Habermas’ discourse ethics will be developed further in chapter three.
What is essential to Huttunen and Murphy’s work (2012) is the united effort of moral discourse
that engages the voice of all participants. Habermas, through his process of immanent criticism,
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provides a means by which to investigate the validity of morality claims based on those norms
forwarded by the system itself. If dialectic with that system (from those who make up the system
and propose its norms) demonstrates incoherence, then something is amiss. What Habermas’
work forces one to recognize is that a system may seem coherent if it omits some stakeholders
from the dialectic. Hence Huttunen and Murphy’s (2012) argument that Habermas’ work helps to
ground radical pedagogy: simply, one may come to recognize that once all stakeholder voices are
engaged in the dialectic a seemingly coherent system is demonstrated to undermine the very
values and norms the system seeks to support—discourse ethics requires that one not only
engage the seeming objectivity of the systems world but also include the voices that make up the
lifeworld. Thus, if the roles of faculty as teachers and as researchers are in tension, it may
because of the sublimation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld resulting in the silencing of both
students and faculty voicing.
Importantly, Huttunen and Murphy (2012) did not think that Habermas’ work was
sufficient to support radical pedagogy in its fullness. They included the further development of
Habermas’ work by his student Axel Honneth. Honneth’s work enables those who investigate
educational systems to move beyond immanent criticism to a question of “recognition.” This
move on the part of Huttunen and Murphy enables them to avoid the possible criticism that an
internally coherent system that specifically excludes certain voices—not through incoherent
error, but intentionally—remains incoherent externally. An institution, universities, for example,
may then generate the roles of employees in an internally consistent way, while at the same time
excluding some student voices (failing students for example), yet, remain externally inconsistent
with the lifeworld praxis that teachers should seek to benefit all students.
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Honneth (2007) developed a “theory of recognition” in which the recognition of oneself
is dependent on recognition by the other. Kögler (2012) further expands on and addresses issues
that arise from this notion of selfhood and will be explicated in chapter three. The notion, then,
that selfhood requires not just the recognition of the self, but requires that one be recognized by
others then further justifies the inclusion of other voices in ethical dialogue. Honneth’s (2007)
work details the deep social embeddedness and dependence on the recognition of oneself by
society in order to engage both oneself and society.
“To achieve a productive relationship toward oneself, human requires recognition of her
ability and achievements. Indeed we can view the entire human life as a long struggle for
recognition. That is why friendship, care and love constitute the basic level of
recognition. That is why friendship, care, and love are the most importance forms for
recognition in Honneth’s practical philosophy” (Huttunen & Murphy, 2007, p. 145).
In this way the application of Honneth to Habermas creates a kind of positive right teleology for
the importance of care in normativity. It is insufficient to include all stakeholders; one must
recognize the need for recognition, for care, as fundamental to human identity.
With Honneth’s addendum to Habermas in mind, and the grounding of radical pedagogy
in a rational social metaphysic of care, one can now engage the process of developing a
methodology for the philosophical investigation of educational systems. If Honneth is correct,
then care will play an essential role in understanding education as a system that engages agent
identity. As such, one can apply discourse ethics as a means by which to investigate the
conceptual systemsworld and lifeworld of education in order to develop both an understanding
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and a normative framework for a coherent paradigm grounded in care as essential to the identity
of stakeholders in education.
Conceptual Framework
Applying Habermas
One comes to understand if any of the roles are what Bruce Biddle (1979) described
interdependent—“the degree to which roles are mutually facilitative” (p. 78). If these roles are
beyond commensurable, beyond coherent (insofar as they are consistent and can be shown to
work together), and, in fact, depend on each other, conceptually, then the project of determining
their interrelation is well-grounded. It may well be the case that the roles as we come to define
them are inconsistent, or incoherent, but this would not imply that there is no normative result. If
the role of teacher and the role of researcher are themselves inconsistent, then one should not, if
one seeks to generate coherent notions of faculty that can be effectively applied in the real world,
require that faculty occupy both roles. However, if one role—teacher, for example—is best
situated in the lifeworld and the other—researcher—is best understood as part of the
systemsworld then Habermas’ system provides an effective means by which to mediate those.
They are interdependent, as Biddle uses the term. In either case, or any case that then lay
between the ends of inconsistency and interdependence, then discourse regarding the best means
by which to understand those who occupy those roles and generate expectations for them is
necessary. Thus, Habermas’ discourse ethics, as a means by which to both understand and
generate dialectical interdependence, should be explicated further.
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Habermas and Kant
Habermas argued that morality exists in a community of selves. His work forwards the
work of Immanuel Kant while at the same time boldly defying it. Kant argued that there can be
reasoned to be a Categorical Imperative. Kant’s notion of this universal rule rested heavily on
the importance of reason and the ability of one to logically develop moral rules. This imperative
itself states, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it
should become a universal law” (1785/1993, p. 30). Simply, “ought implies can.” If one cannot
apply the rule without the rule collapsing on itself, then it is an irrational rule and must be
discarded. It is important to understand that the Kantian notion does not hinge on the importance
that everyone understand the rule or dialogue about the rule, rather Kant is arguing that any rule,
by virtue of being an imperative cannot be biased to one person or perspective. Thus, if I were to
say, “I want to murder,” then I must assent to the proposition that “murder is right,” as
suggesting that “murder is right only for me” is simply an irrational bias for oneself. Therefore,
the rule must be applicable to everyone. The logical result of the application of such an
imperative universally, though, is that it becomes impossible to murder because everyone is
dead. Similarly, lying, stealing, and breaking contracts all result in the inability to follow the rule
because universal application of the rule defeats the purpose of the rule, and, therefore, the rule is
inconsistent with itself and is irrational.
Interestingly, the Categorical Imperative does not just apply to those things that we
should not do. If one were to apply the question, “Should I use others only as means to my
ends?” one quickly comes to realize that this is an impossible rule to universalize without
making it impossible to get what one wants—which is not to be treated only as a means to
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others’ ends. Thus, Kant was able to forward the second form of the Categorical Imperative,
known as the principle of respect, which he believed to be equivalent to the first form: “Act in
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another,
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (p. 30). Thus, the Categorical
Imperative denies one the ability to do certain things while also requiring that one must also
concern oneself with the welfare of the Other.
Habermas, though, noted that there were some significant problems with Kant’s
formulations—notably, the lack of discourse. The Kantian rule system is one that is engaged
from an armchair. This problem is similar to the problems Carol Gilligan (1982), author of In a
Different Voice, noted in stage six—abstract moral reasoning—of Kohlberg’s system of moral
development. Morality is discursive; one cannot simply ask the question, “How should I live?”
That is not, despite common misconception, the central question of morality, which is, “How
should I live with others?” Without others, the question of morality is moot and the answer is,
simply, “However I want.” Habermas’ ideas require, therefore, that we take into account the
viewpoints of everyone who could be affected by the adoption of an imperative. Kant’s system,
one realizes, is deeply embedded in the systemsworld, ignoring the implicit norms and
assumptions generated through the communicative action of the lifeworld. Note, however, that
Kant’s system has an appealing cognitivism—it rests on the notion that there are moral truths.
Habermas is able to maintain that cognitivism without appealing to abstract moral truths, but,
rather, moral truths embedded in the rules of rational discourse.
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Habermas and Rawls
In contrast to the way that John Rawls (1971) required that one imagine that one does not
have any affiliations with the world, Habermas required that one consider the perspective of
others. Habermas was critical of Rawls, noting that one should not simply stand behind the veil
of ignorance and imagine oneself without any affiliation, but, rather that one should actually
engage the perspective of others. Again, once considering the essential question of morality,
Habermas was well grounded—to imagine that one is in no position, as Rawl’s suggested we
should, is much like asking “How should I live?” but what Rawls neglected was that the power
of his system requires discourse in his second step. One must imagine what it would like to
occupy the position of the other. For example, realizing, “If I come into the world as x, I will be
marginalized because of the social system, so we then should make a world in which being x is
not marginalized, because I would not want to be marginalized.” This is not to say that Rawls did
not point out that one must consider entering the world as other agents, it is that his system
requires no discourse with them. Simply, how can one, from one’s armchair, engage the position
of the Other? One is likely to think that the Other is fine as she is, and see no reason to make
change.
Thus, a Habermasian perspective requires that we lift the veil and engage the position of
the other through dialogue so that we can ask ourselves, “How will the application of this
universal moral rule affect all agents?” One then can develop moral rules, rights, and duties
based not just on what one imagines the effects to be based on a universal rule, but one that
actually takes into the account the will of the Other as articulated through discourse. It is
noteworthy that Kant’s system, itself, generates Habermas’ own system if Kant’s system is
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applied without bias (which Kant failed to do). If one were to ask oneself what the implication,
logically, of the rule, “I should make rules without considering the perspectives of others” would
be, one would quickly realize this is impossible to do. To suggest the above as a universal rule
makes the very notion of universal rules inconsistent. Everyone would then be required,
logically, to begin making universally applied rules that cannot be actuated because they do not
have sufficient understanding of those agents who are required to participate in the rules. Thus,
the rule defeats itself and collapses. For that reason, it can be asserted that even Kant himself
must acquiesce to Habermas’ thesis; universality requires discourse. We must tear down the veil
and converse.
Habermas’ propositions
Habermas forwarded a series of propositions based on the realization that discourse is
necessary for genuine engagement in moral reasoning and that there are rules that are implicit in
the act of discourse itself. One realizes, quickly, that investigation of rational discourse reveals
that there are imbedded assumptions in that discourse. One cannot have rational discourse
without, for example, attending to the thesis of the Other. To ignore it is to not engage in rational
discourse both by definition and by the implicit norms and values of discourse itself. Thus
Habermas, when analyzing moral discourse, realized the following:
1) A universal rule that sets the conditions for impartial judgment must constrain “all
affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balancing of inters” so that, “All affected
can accept the consequences and the side effects [that] its [of a rule’s] general observance can be
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are
preferred to those of known alternatives possibilities for regulation)” (p. 65).
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2) “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of
all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse” (p. 66).
3) All affected must be able to participate freely; we cannot expect their consent “unless
all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of
a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each
individual” (p. 93).
Thus, given Habermas’ principles, one must take the perspective of everyone else,
especially when generating moral imperatives. If one wishes to avoid the issue of 1) failing to
take the perspectives of others and 2) engaging unbridled and unwarranted hubris, one must
actually discourse with others in order to understand their perspective. The methodology of this
philosophical analysis then, will apply Habermas’ discourse ethical position to the question of
the normative framing of the roles teacher and researcher, however they are best defined and
conjoined (or fail to conjoin). To ignore the propositions presented by Habermas is to not engage
in rational discourse.
Performativity
Habermas also developed fully the means by which to critique a system or set of
propositions through the application of immanent critique. This form of analysis, which focuses
on the coherence or lack thereof of propositions that are proposed to constitute an epistemology,
itself generates the need for discourse in order to best understand the actuation of the definition,
particularly if those terms defined identify rational agents. Habermas’ work relies on and further
justifies the work of Karl-Otto Apel, who explained the logical grounding of rational discourse
and rule making. Much in the same way that Kant’s system explains that one cannot be expected
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to follow rule (x) if rule (x) makes it impossible to follow rule (x), Apel argued that there are
rules of discourse by virtue of the impossibility of engaging discourse without those rules.
Habermas explained Apel’s notion of a performative contradiction—a notion alluded to
earlier in this chapter. The rules of dialogue suggest that performative contradictions can occur
by virtue of our participation in dialogue. For example, as Habermas explained, I may argue that
I do not currently exist. However, by virtue of uttering the statement, “I believe I do not exist,” I
also assert my own existence. Thus, I am guilty of a performative contradiction and should not
make the statement. In much the same way that Descartes’ Cogito cannot be syllogized without
engaging contradiction (by virtue of a priori logic knowledge as already proven to be doubtable
by the methodological skepticism, thus the Cogito is better understood as a meditation), one
cannot assert one’s lack of existence in dialogue without performing one’s own existence. Thus,
the rules of dialogue emerge from one’s performative contradiction.
Interestingly, a defense of dialetheism (that there can be true contradictions) articulated
by Graham Priest (1998) in his, “What’s so bad about contradictions?” hinges on avoidance of
performative contradiction. Of course for the dialethesist to avoid contradiction plays
immediately into Habermas’ hands, even while demonstrating the possibility that true
contradiction may exist. Priest notes that a fundamental argument against his proposition is the
realization that if there can be true contradictions, then it may be argued that anything a
dialetheist (one who believes in true contradictions) may say may itself be a contradiction and,
therefore, this includes the statement “I am a dialetheist.” In other words, might we accuse the
dialetheist when she says “I am a dialetheist” of potentially meaning, “I am a dialetheist, and I
am not a dialetheist” if true contradictions exit? One might argue, then, that nothing that the
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dialetheist says can be trusted. Priest argued, similarly to Apel, that one would not assume this of
the dialetheist because of the rules of ordinary language. One would not state only a conjunct
(truncate the full statement by saying “I am a dialetheist”) when the conjunct and its negation (I
am a dialetheist, and I am not a dialetheist) are known to be both true. I would not, in ordinary
language, say, “It is raining” if I also know “it is not raining.”
Similarly, I would not state a disjunction if I know which disjunction of an exclusive
disjunction is true. I would not say “It is raining or it is sunny outside,” if I know “it is raining” is
true. (Thus, I need not worry about the logical rule “add” resulting in nonsensical statements.) In
the same way, I would not state only part of a true contradiction either. It seems that both Priest
and Apel hinged their arguments on the embedded rules and norms of discourse as articulated by
Habermas. Importantly, those actions which generate lack of understanding by violation of those
norms, values, and rules do not generally thrive in language (if only because they themselves fail
to be understood). Thus, emergent from ordinary language, one finds logical and normative
rules—Habermas’ cognitivism, in other words.
Habermas and Honneth
Habermas’ work is further applied and developed by Axel Honneth. Two of Honneth’s
seminal texts, The fragmented world of the social: Essays in social and political philosophy
(1995) and The Critique of power: Reflective stages in a critical social theory (1991) explicate
the development of social philosophy as it culminates in Habermas. Particularly, Honneth’s work
develops and further justifies the critical theory developed by Habermas and the Frankfurt
School.
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Critical theory, of course, is known and appealing to educational circles. It can be
understood as a rejection of the systematized and positivistic paradigm of sociology as an
attempt to generate an objective “hard science” for the analysis of human interaction. Rather,
critical theory, as explained by Max Horkheimer (1972) is oriented to both understanding and
changing human interaction. Critical theory recognizes that objective observation is impossible.
No observation of social interaction can take place without 1) impacting the social world and 2)
being experienced and understood through the subjectivity of the agent observers. Horkheimer
held that critical theory was at its best when it met three criteria: 1) it explains the problems in
our current social paradigm 2) it identifies practical means by which to fix those problems and 3)
it justifies why those problems are in fact problems and why they should be resolved. One comes
to realize, then, that this dissertation itself is at least playing at critical theory. The work seeks to
explain and identify faculty roles, identify if those roles are in fact commensurable, and seeks to
identify the best possible constructions of those roles. One notes, however, that the dissertation
may not meet Horkheimer’s criteria insofar as it may not address the practical means by which to
fix the problem. If faculty roles are, in fact, incommensurable, there may be no way to mediate
between them as constructed by our current social reality.
Honneth’s work develops the Habermasian approach to critical theory and situates it in a
historical framework. Honneth (1995) wrote:
The idea of making the struggle for recognition into prescientific point of reference for
critical social theory requires, namely, not only reflection in social theory and a diagnosis
of the present era, but also a concept of the person that is capable of explaining how the
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claim upon the recognition of one’s own identity is anchored within the particular subject
(1995, p. xxii).
This notion of the recognition of one’s own identity is grounded by Honneth in Habermas and
George Herbert Mead. What Honneth recognized is that the critique of society, particularly in the
paradigm of critical theory, requires an understanding of the actor within society. The formation
of identity, then, as introduced by Mead and developed by Habermas, understands actors as
generated by intersubjective communicative activity. The roles are not simply played; they are,
as my own community-dialectical role theory suggests, constitutive of identity. Much in the way
that Charles Taylor (1989) developed his thesis of community as constitutive of identity,
community-dialectical role theory, and more importantly Habermas, understands the actor as
entirely a linguistic construction—a construction of intersubjective symbolic action.
The agent in the world exists as created not just by symbols, but by language. Her
ontology is grounded in the social world. Whatever her “physical” instantiation may be, it cannot
be understood, discussed, or perhaps even perceived without its creation (not merely description)
in language. Thus, understanding roles, as they are linguistically inscribed, mediated, and
generated, for Habermas and Honneth, would be to understand the very identity of the agent
comprised of those roles. Honneth (1995) argued “In positivism, empirical knowledge of reality
is reduced to a mere search for facts, since such knowledge is separated from any philosophical
self-confirmation” (p. 64). Thus one comes to understand that our preconception of actors as
separate “things” from their social world is an assumption grounded in positivism. The
positivistic thesis, though, is one that is grounded in the assumptions and demands of societal
labor: “the production of theoretical statements subserves the same interest of a mastery of
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physical nature by which the activity of labour is already guided on a pre-scientific level”
(Honneth, 2005, p. 64). What positivism, then, does is “cut them [the sciences] off both from the
consciousness of their own societal roots and from the knowledge of their practical objectives”
(p. 65). Honneth’s argument, then, suggests that understanding human interaction is undermined
when attempting to use a tool that believes itself to be objectively separate without assumptions
that both limit and define it—assumptions that will, particularly in the case of positivism, blind
researchers as to their impact on and intersubjective connection to that being observed.
Habermas’ thesis, though, avoids many of the positivistic pitfalls that attempt to create
separate and objective observes (both of external social environs and of the self):
Nevertheless, a theory has gradually emerged from Habermas’ works which is so clearly
motivated by the original objectives of critical theory that it may be accepted as the only
serious new approach within this tradition today; the anti-functionalist impulses detected
in the thinking of the marginal members of the institute have reached theoretical selfawareness in this theory and hence have become the frame of references for a different
conception of society. (Honneth, 1995, p. 86)
Linguistic understanding becomes necessary, both normatively and epistemically, for human
interaction: “The life-form of human beings distinguishes itself by an intersubjectivity anchored
in the structures of language; therefore, for the reproduction of social life, linguistic
understanding between subjects represents a fundamental, indeed the most basic, presupposition”
(p. 86). Thus one comes to recognize that any endeavor that seeks to understand the human actor
either as a 1) means by which to represent (reproduce) the engagement of actors in the world or
as 2) a means by which to change the engagement of actors in the world, must recognize the
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fundamental import of symbolic (linguistic) interaction as the grounding and generator of human
interaction as actors.
Moreover, the creation of identity itself, the generation of the actor herself, is a
linguistically mediated event.
Because human beings by nature are only able to form a personal identity as long as they
can grow and move within the intersubjectively shared world of a social group the
interruption of the process of communicative understanding would violate a
presupposition of human survival which is just as fundamental as that of the collective
appropriation of nature. (Honneth, 1995, p. 87)
If one wishes to understand faculty not simply as a denotatively defined construct that can be
objectively manipulated, one must engage the linguistic and symbolically mediated act of role
creation through intersubjective dialectic. Roles are not simply defined in a positivistic and
objective “faculty handbook” way, no matter how appealing that may be. Roles are generated,
maintained, and reproduced through intersubjective role-formation with other actors and
institutional entities that construct the social world. Thus, “culturally invariant validity claims are
stored in the communicative speech acts through which individual actions are coordinated, and
that these are historically differentiated gradually in the course of a process of cognitive
rationalization” (p. 89). Understanding an agent’s role requires investigation, and, thus,
participation, in the communicative speech acts that define that identity.
The importance of Horkheimer’s three criteria for effective critical theory becomes
immediately clear when considering Honneth’s and Habbemas’s construction of identity. To
understand the role, one must participate in the intersubjective creation of the role, and to
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participate in the intersubjective creation of the role is to participate, oneself, in the act of
generating the social construct. Simply, one cannot observe the role and actually understand it
without participating in the speech acts and commutative actions that themselves construct the
role. To do so, though, then means that the “observer” is an active participant not just in
“understanding” but in “generating” and, thus, helping to produce and maintain the
role/construct. As such, the researcher cannot be morally distant from the social construct. The
researcher is not simply observing; she is now generating, and, thus, if that role does harm, she is
helping to perpetuate a role that itself does harm. For this reason, critical theory is normative: it
notes the problems of constructs and seeks, through its own generativity, means by which to fix
those problems.
The Habermasian argument, as explained by Honneth, is intuitively appealing to
educational researchers. Consider a researcher who wishes to understand the interactions of
students in Taiwan with their teacher.2 The researcher observes the teacher show the students
how to draw a particular figure on the board. The teacher then asks the students to draw the
figure on their own paper on their desks. Once having completed this assignment, the teacher
then calls on the student who she observes cannot draw the figure to show everyone else how to
draw the figure on the board. The student attempts to draw the figure, the teacher asks the class if
the figure is correct, and the question is met with a resounding “No!” Of course, at this moment,
the researcher may assume that this child will be in deep need of therapy for life, having been
humiliated by her peers.

2

This example is developed based on the following article: Li, J., Fung, H., Bakeman, R., Rae, K., & Wei, W.-C. (in
press). How European American and Taiwanese mothers talk to their children about learning. Child Development.
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What the researcher, though, as a “separate and objective” observer does not understand
is the symbolic interactions of the class. She does not know that “intellectual struggle,” rather
than “intellectual giftedness,” is how “intelligence” and “worth” is defined in the language and
communicative actions of the Taiwanese. Thus, she does not understand the events that have
unfolded before her. Had she known and observed further, she would have realized that the
students value greatly the ability of their peers to come to knowledge rather than, as in the States,
to be gifted with ability. The researcher would observe that the student stays in the front of the
classroom, attempting to draw the figure correctly, until she does and is met with applause and
accolades from her classmates. The child does not feel as if she is the “last one” to learn
something, rather she feels that she has accomplished something fantastic in front of her peers
and has been lauded appropriately for it having demonstrated her willingness to engage
intellectual struggle.
Thus, one realizes that without embeddedness in the communicative actions that
construct social environs, one does not actually understand what is observed. Moreover, once the
researcher realizes that she has observed a radically different way of understanding intellectual
struggle, is she not under the moral obligation to share this knowledge as a participant in
education? Simply, critical theory as described by Horkheimer, would require that if students are
in fact better off in educational environments that laud intellectual struggle rather than giftedness
by birth, researchers are obligated to share that knowledge and help develop that understanding
here in the States. Thus, it seems that Habermas and Honneth were correct: embeddedness in
linguistic frames is required understanding, and that understanding necessitates normativity.
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Habermas, therefore, identified a “pathology” in the paradigm in the development of
“civilization” and social interaction.
Just as the aim of psychoanalysis in the theoretically guided interpretation of a life history
is to liberate the individual from an unperceived pathology, critical social theory, along
the way toward an enlightened interpretation of the history of civilization, is supposed to
liberate the species from a disturbance, a “pathology” in its process of self-formation.
(Honneth, 1991)
The separation between the “lifeworld” and “systemsworld” is this pathology as a result of the
attempt to separate agents from the lifeworld whether for scientific, capitalistic, academic, or
perhaps even research ends. Engagement with the world, if it accrues significant ontological and
moral baggage, is energy-demanding. One comes to realize that a philosophy, an economy, a
research paradigm, or any system that does not acquiesce to the demands of both understanding
and normative obligation will have to do far less. This describes a pathology as developed in
human life: our systems seek separation from their embeddedness in identity formation and from
moral obligation. Habermas, himself, largely focuses on the seeming automaticity that develops
as the separation and differentiation of the systemsworld and lifeworld allows for an assemblyline approach to social life in which only that which is necessary is engaged, as if the
systemsworld can be engaged without impact on the lifeworld. Moreover, “The rationalization of
the lifeworld makes possible an increase in systems complexity which enlarges to such an extent
that the released systemic imperatives outstrip the comprehensive ability of the lifeworld which
is instrumentalized by them (Habermas, 1987, p. 232). One wonders: can critical theory provide
the necessary resolution to the problem of the subjugation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld?
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Honneth further argued that the distinction of systemsworld and lifeworld is now meeting
with opposition. The university system and its increasing systemsworld approach to education
seems to suggest that Honneth and Habermas are correct, the systemsworld/lifeworld distinction
is collapsing in such a way as to give primacy to the systemsworld. Simply, the very academic
tools that we use to identify the problems themselves are becoming lost to systemsworld
necessities and demands. The systemsworld becomes the entirety of social life and agents can
only be understood as participants in that system. Thus, the collapse of the humanities becomes
inevitable and, now, understandable.
The humanities lack the language necessary to justify their world in the systemsworld.
They are not valuable to the systemsworld; rather, the humanities generate, evaluate, and
investigate the norms, values, and products of the lifeworld. The attempt to find systemsworld
justification of the humanities results in their collapse into systemsworld, commodities-driven
“systmanities.” A clear example of this event is the attempt of music teachers to justify the world
of music courses to the system by arguing that music courses help increase math scores and thus
are valuable in the paradigm of STEM. There is no language of value that music can speak that
can be understood in the systemsworld without appealing to systems-norms. The end result is the
sublimation (which I will take to mean both “redirection” and “subjugation”) of music to STEM
ends. Music courses are canceled in favor of more math courses, their teachers are coopted for
math tutoring, and their students are only valuable insofar as they can produce justifying STEM
test scores.
This, then, requires that one consider perhaps the most common criticism of Habermas, a
criticism explicated by Daniel Vokey (2008) in his “No remedy for cultural conflict: The
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Inability of discourse ethics to resolve substantive moral disagreement.” Vokey’s concerns were
primarily that 1) self-defeating relativist conclusions follow if Habermas collapses the distinction
between what is justified and what is true and 2) that what should “count” are those arguments
left to those who can engage in actual discourse. These concerns, though warranted, are not
decimating to Habermas’ case.
Vokey (2008) acknowledged that moral reasoning seeks to be, and is best when it is,
impartial. –Thus his concerns for relativistic contradictions. Honest and open consideration of all
viewpoints seems to smack of relativism, potentially leaving open not just counter-intuitive
moral permissibilities such as beating problematic students, but contradictory rules such as “do
not beat students (in these cultures)” and “do beat students (in those cultures).” Ethical relativism
would be especially problematic for a system like Habermas’, which is cognitivistic and holds
that there are universal moral truths.
The cultural relativistic concern, however, is not a pressing one. Habermas’ system does
include all voices. However, those voices must engage in rational discourse. Those belief sets
that cannot justify themselves without appeal to dogmatism or tautology would not survive the
discursive process. Thus, Habermas need not capitulate to relativistic demands. Yes, all voices
should be heard. No, not all voices are rational. Powerfully, this suggests that Habermasian
discourse ethics acknowledges the value and import of every voice in the dialogue, while
allowing for the possibility that some voices allow that their own arguments are irrational, if only
based on their own internal inconsistencies.
More pressing is Vokey’s second concern—that there are those whose voices are given
more value because of their ability to participate in dialogue. This problem may be exacerbated
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by Habermas’ formation of identity thesis. Simply, one wonders if Habermas and Honneth—
through their arguments for the formation of identity through interaction with the Other in the
symbolic medium of dialogue—deny all entities who do not participate in dialogue identity.
Thus, an odd result may be reached: those who cannot participate in dialogue are not even the
Other, and, thus, merit no concern whatsoever. To be an Other is to have an identity, but to not
have identity is simply to ____ . …There is no term for lack of identity that would not instantiate
Otherness, so that we remain unable to articulate. This problem, however, is remedied through
two potential answers: 1) bite the bullet ask assert that there is indeed no reason to concern
oneself with those who lack identities, i.e. chairs, fetuses, and non-human animals, or 2) remind
oneself that language and identity formation is not a Cartesian single-subject action. Rather it is
an intersubjective action. As such, to engage any object in language is to begin to generate,
within oneself, identity for that object. Thus, we have the ability to voice others, if we deem it
rational to consider the genuine possibility that they are agents in the world. I suggest, through
the investigation of Kögler’s (2012) work in chapter three, that this voicing will enable one to
enlist the agreeance of the most obdurate solipsist through rational discourse.

Summary and Imperative
Organizational Role Theory and Symbolic-Interactionist Role Theory are, by themselves,
insufficient for developing a robust understanding of faculty roles. In conjunction, however, as
community-dialectical role theory mediated by the world of Habermas, role theory presents a
viable option for developing understanding of faculty roles through engagement with the
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linguistic, symbolic, and communicative actions that generate those roles. Such engagement
requires discourse, as explicated through Habermasian discourse ethics.
Discourse ethics has a significant history in educational analysis in order to both
understand changes that take place in education and to make suggestions regarding the form by
which such changes should take place. Perhaps most notably, Sergiovanni’s (2008) analysis of
the U.S. educational system applies Habermas’ understanding of the systemsworld and lifeworld
in order to identity the pathology disturbing the equilibrium of our collective educational
cognitive paradigm and its physical instantiation in the world. The systemsworld Sergiovanni
notes has come to dominate the lifeworld of education, thus causing many of its problems—most
pressingly, subjecting learners to the systemsworld, insidiously through the “beneficent” guise of
education. True engagement in moral discourse would require, as Habermas explicated, the
inclusion of the needs and voices of all stakeholders in education, especially the students, in the
development of educational policy.
Honneth’s explication of Habermas suggests that the sublimation of the lifeworld by the
systemsworld may take place without notice. The ever pressing redirection of social energy to
that which bears the most fruit with the least effort seems to lead inexorably to greater
systemification. Thus, in the context of this dissertation one wonders if the systemification,
commodification, and commercialization of the university is similarly inexorable and the result
of a larger sublimation of the lifeworld by the systemsworld. Understanding this phenomena
requires a discourse-ethical investigation of faculty roles. One must engage the philosophical
enterprise of deconstruction, immanent critique, definition, and normative evaluation through
investigation of the communicative action that produces faculty roles. What the above research
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makes clear is that the application of community-dialectical role theory cannot be done without
the uncovering of norms embedded in our communicative action through cognitive dialectic with
the symbolically expressed and norms (expectations) that construct faculty roles. Moreover, the
research project itself must admit that in order to understand the roles it must participate in the
generative linguistic process that produces the roles, and, thus, the moral imperative to change
society for the better remains looming.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The analysis of institutional roles requires that there be a means by which to uncover the
norms assumed and, perhaps, inscribed, by our communicative action. Community-dialectical
role theory suggests that roles are generated, explicitly and implicitly, through verbal interaction
between agents as understood through symbolic-interactionist role theory and through the
inscribed roles generated by institutions as understood through organizational role theory. Thus a
means by which to uncover not only the inscribed roles, but the implicit norms governing those
roles is necessitated. This dissertation itself seeks not only to understand the conjunction of
faculty roles, but to develop a normative construct conjoining those roles rationally. Discourse
ethics, I contend, is the best means by which to understand and uncover faculty roles as well as
develop a normative framework for them.
In a philosophy dissertation, the next step would likely be to begin the analysis of faculty
roles through discourse analysis. The paradigm of educational research, however, does not
normally include philosophical analysis as a form of research in and of itself. Thusly, before
moving forward into a deeper explication of Habermas whose work was introduced in chapter 2,
one first must justify the application of philosophical analysis to the research questions
established earlier.
Therefore, chapter three begins with a discussion of qualitative research and the ways in
which philosophical analysis is always present in such research. Explication of philosophical
analysis in educational research is developed beginning with Scriven, Flew, and Soltis, while at
the same time reminding the reader that this chapter is both explication and an example of
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philosophical analysis.
This chapter will then justify why discourse ethics, in particular, is so very applicable
given the theoretical framework of role theory and the conceptual framework of communitydialectical role theory. This shift away from Scriven to Habermas is justified by noting that
despite Scriven’s claims, the distinction between different forms of philosophy is nonsensical.
Particularly of import is to note that in defining philosophy (in order to justify the move into
philosophical analysis), philosophy itself is a “lived” science that requires holistic inquiry into
various epistemologies. Thus, this work challenges the epistemological biases of educational
research—particularly when solely positivistic. In this way, numerous epistemic inquiry methods
are justifiable for the production of understanding, including narrative (though not used in this
particular dissertation), narrative analysis, and dialogue form. In this way, the essential question,
“What is the difference between conceptual analysis and philosophical analysis?” is answered by
noting philosophy as lived, dialogue-based, and holistic in its epistemology.
I will suggest that a deconstruction of the term philosophy suggests a fundamental lived
experience. I will then argue that review of our own underlying assumptions of the terms
“philosophy” and “philosopher” suggest that philosophy is a lived experience and is best
understood as part of the lifeworld rather than the systemsworld.3 Conversely, conceptual
analysis is more a part of the systemsworld in which dialogue is subservient to the needs of the
paradigm governing the analysis. Philosophy, I will argue, requires constant application through
dialogue with the world, revision, and authenticity—particularly insofar as it requires that one

3

The use of the term “systemsworld” emerges in this dissertation from Sergiovanni’s (2000) work The Lifeworld of
Leadership. His own understanding of Habermas was of systems that themselves, like the lifeworld, cannot escape
from their worldly embeddedness. The systemsworld is the world of instrumentalities that often emerge as
management systems (p. 5).
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participate in the world dialectic rather than coldly analyze the concepts as if one can separate
oneself from their embeddedness in the lifeworld. I will do this to unveil the fact that the above
meets the promise at the beginning that this chapter acts not just as an explication of
philosophical analysis, but as a participatory demonstration of it, both deconstructing the terms
and uncovering the norms governing our conventions when we even say “philosophy,” thus
engaging Habermas.
The details of the methodological approach will then be elucidated. This elucidation
expounds on the ways that the project will use role theory as a means by which to deconstruct the
roles as we understand them and then use discourse ethics as a means by which to make sense of
and uncover the norms and expectations of role theory with the intention of producing a
normative construct. Essential literature is explored in order to unpack Habermas’ discourse
ethics and consider not only its particular appropriateness to the project, but also potential
criticisms to the methodology (paying special attention to Amy Allen’s work). Solipsistic
concerns (to which the author is sympathetic) are addressed and set to rest noting (by a series of
philosophical moves inspired by Allen, but also moving beyond them) that the solipsist has
excellent reason to use discourse ethics, even if she refuses to reject solipsism. Having satisfied
the skeptic, the chapter proceeds to consider researcher positionality, limitations of the
dissertation, credibility, and warrant. The end game will note that philosophical analysis, in
particular discourse ethics, is self-reflexive commentary, and, thus, that form of “rigor” is met to
the highest degree by virtue of the methodology itself, given that the author remain transparent in
his reasoning.

137
The Qualitative Paradigm
What is Philosophical in Qualitative Research?
This research project hinges on the development of definitions that, once clarified, can
then be investigated for consistency and coherence when conjoined. Thus, it is philosophical
analysis that best meets the needs of the research question. The project remains qualitative, as it
is an understanding of those definitions and the ways in which they interact that is sought, but it
will also engage the normative frame that is also a hallmark of philosophical inquiry. This is not
to imply that qualitative research and philosophy are somehow exclusive, but, instead, to
acknowledge that there is a paradigm of social science qualitative research and a paradigm of
philosophical inquiry that are often treated as different disciplines. Research suggests that
philosophical analysis is of particular use for a research project such as this one, and it is of
particular importance to all research—particularly in education, as discussed by Michael Scriven
(1997) and Jonas Soltis (1968).
To begin, there is little discussion of “philosophical analysis” as a research methodology
in qualitative research in academic journals. Moreover, a quick review of the textbooks in
qualitative research does not even suggest that philosophical analysis as a methodology exists.
Patton’s (2001) Qualitative research & evaluation methods, Creswell’s (2012) Qualitative
Inquiry & research design and Tracy’s (2013) Qualitative research methods: Collecting
evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact consider potential methodologies such as
narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study without any
mention of philosophical analysis. Interestingly, as the literature review demonstrates, it is not
unusual for educational researchers to use Habermas or other philosophers, notably Dewey and
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Noddings, as conceptual grounding for their work and as a means by which to generate a
framework for teleological normativity. Despite the abundance of philosophy used by
researchers, philosophical analysis itself is generally relegated to course-specific “Philosophy of
Education” titles as if qualitative and quantitative analysis are themselves fundamentally distinct
from philosophical analysis.
Interestingly, however, these texts do often use philosophy and analysis as part of their
discussion of qualitative research. Philosophy and analysis are terms used by the textbooks to
describe the way a methodology will be applied and conclusions drawn or, as in the case of the
following quote, indicate a distinction between research and the abstract world of philosophy:
Exhibit 1.3 provides a sampling of contrasts between traditional tribe-centered initiations
and modern youth-centered coming-of-age celebrations. These kinds of polar contrasts
can sometimes set up a Hegelian dialectic of thesis and antithesis that leads to a new
synthesis. In philosophy such contrasts derive from the ruminations of philosophers; in
qualitative research such thematic contrasts emanate from and are grounded in fieldwork.
(Patton, 2001, p. 7)
Patton’s claim above, though, could not be made without a philosophical framework, nor could
the fieldwork—that presumably cannot include document analysis and theoretical analysis—be
examined without philosophical analysis. Patton cannot derive “such contrast” without the
Hegelian dialectic to which he alludes as a framework through which to make sense of the data
from the field research. Moreover, it cannot be said that the contrasts emanate from the fieldwork
without an agent through which the data from the fieldwork are transposed and organized. This is
all work of philosophical analysis. Qualitative researchers know, as argued by Eisner (1991) in
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The Enlightened Eye, that in the case of qualitative research, “The self is the instrument that
engages the situation and makes sense of it” (p. 34). Patterns do not exist out in the world; the
researcher generates them through communicative action.
The interpretive act of seeing the data as patterned is a philosophical endeavor; it takes
place in field of the mind. It is philosophical analysis. Thusly, the distinction that Patton drew
between philosophy and qualitative research immediately collapses when considering two points:
1) the frameworks applied to data used in qualitative research (and perhaps all research) are
themselves philosophically defined constructs (gender, coming-of-age, celebration, role) and 2)
the data also are interpreted by the qualitative research instrument—the self. Here we see Mead’s
(1934) symbolic-interactionistic approach to selfhood and agency is both assumed by and
evidenced by the qualitative research paradigm. The construction of actors as mediated by their
social communicative understanding of “self” as that which is created by interaction with the
Other is reflected in the qualitative paradigm. The data that one interprets are not solely
interpreted by a separate and distinct “mind,” but by a self that is generated by what one
perceives as the self-construct and as perceived by others. That self, then, in conjunction with
other selves, develops through symbolic interaction the symbols themselves that are used to
communicate and act as the very grounding for communicative action—namely, social
constructs. One notes, therefore, that the very assumption that there are constructs that can be
analyzed is a philosophical assumption, and the belief that it is through agents that these
constructs are measured and understood is a philosophical thesis.
While it may be the case that quantitative researchers can argue that they do not need
philosophical analysis in order to make sense of their data because they have statistical tools for
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analysis, qualitative researchers do not use mathematical systems to make sense of the data.
Rather, they, using reason and logic, organize the data in such a way that they find makes sense
by generating patterns they consider meaningful… All of which is philosophical analysis. As
argued by Stubley (1992),
Herein lies the value of philosophy as a method of inquiry. Placing understanding as the
ultimate end, philosophy works in the realm of ‘lenses.’ Whether the particular
methodology is that of analytic or linguistic philosophy, process philosophy,
experimentalism, or phenomenology, philosophy seeks to identify and evaluate the lenses
through which we construct experience. (p. 44)
Thus, Patton and other textbook authors and researchers are on much more stable ground when
they do not eliminate philosophical analysis from the research milieu and, rather, as they often
do, engage it tacitly as the fundamental device used to analyze, interpret, and conclude. As
Habermas would likely contend, examination of these texts would reveal a series of implicit
assumptions about the most effective ways to analyze data meaningfully. Those assumptions,
however, hinge on philo-logical axioms. What one comes to realize is that philosophical analysis
is not absent from qualitative research, it is fundamental—so fundamental that it is often
overlooked.
They are philosophers like Habermas who provide tools to engage, particularly, such
overlooked embedded values and norms. Habermas, particularly, is noted for his “immanent
critique” (also found in the work of Marx). Habermas’ refinement of that tool of analysis is a
philosophical device wherein one uncovers assumed social norms and beliefs that themselves
may be revealed to be incoherent or inconsistent when considered from the perspective of the
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social frame that embeds those norms. For example, a society may claim to be altruistic and
invested in the best interest of others, but one may realize that in that same society it would be
considered inappropriate to bring a child to a mall Santa Claus to tell the jolly old saint what she
will give rather than what she will get. Thus, one comes to realize that there are shared
assumptions about appropriate action that need not be inscribed, and, yet, they reveal our shared
social norms. An immanent critique would suggest that there is a clear inconsistency from the
socially voiced claim that a society is altruistic while at the same time harboring the embedded
assumption that children should tell Santa what they want rather than what they will give.
Justifying Philosophical Analysis
Jonas F. Soltis’s 1968 text, An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts,
evidences the essential role philosophical analysis plays in educational research. His work is not
just a justification of philosophical analysis, but it is also a model of the analytic techniques used
by philosophers as applied to educational concepts. It can be difficult to explain analytical
techniques, and, thus, Soltis aimed to participate with the reader in applying analytic techniques
“to take advantage of the opportunity to view and evaluate the perspective on education offered
by the application of the techniques of contemporary analytic philosophy” (p. xi). Similarly, in
his argument for the importance of conceptual/philosophical analysis in his chapter in
Complementary Methods,” Michael Scriven (1997) stated,
Before I discuss these two interpretations let me call your attention once more to the fact
that we are now doing conceptual analysis. This chapter is not a long-winded historical
introduction to some examples; it is an example. And we are not only analyzing the
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concept of definition itself, which is a key tool in any kind of research and, hence, in
educational research, but also looking into the nature of language. (p. 137)
It may well be that qualitative inquiry often follows in that spirit—demonstrating rather than
explicating philosophical analysis. Thus, in that spirit, this chapter on methodology will not
simply act as a historical account of philosophical analysis, but will also act as an example of
philosophical analysis by virtue of considering, comparing, and generating definitions,
examining counter-examples, and grounding claims in evidence that has been structured to
produce a coherent framework for understanding.
All qualitative analysis, if it engages in philosophical analysis to clarify, investigate, and
examine concepts, terms and definitions, is an act of philosophical analysis. Michael Scriven
(1997) stated, “Many researchers have thought that the first part of their job—analysis of the
concepts that are going to be studied—could be done, or could be done better without any help
from philosophers (p. 132). What is key here is the realization that the first part of the job is
analysis. Perhaps because researchers often analyze information after they are collected, it can be
easy to take for granted that the concepts to be researched must be analyzed first. One must
clarify the constructs measured, explicate the nature of the constructs, and justify why such
measurement will do something of interest and use. All of this, by Scriven’s definition of
conceptual analysis, indicates that “one crucial part of philosophical expertise,” is a means by
which to develop a “sound understanding and definition” of the concept in question (p. 132).
Simply, one may inherit the construct to be researched from others and, thereby, assume that no
analysis of the concept is necessary, yet it was that previous analysis that developed and defined
that construct for use.
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Consider, though, Anthony Flew’s (1960) discussion of supposedly intractable
philosophical problems and the means by which they may be solved. In his edited volume,
Essays in Conceptual Analysis, his paper “Philosophy and language” discusses the importance of
clarifying terms:
For in elucidating the ordinary uses (as opposed to philosophers’ suspected misuses) of
some of the rather limited range of words around which our controversies tend to cluster,
it has been noticed that the conceptual equipment provided by ordinary (here opposed
particularly to technical) language is amazingly rich and subtle; and that even the
classical puzzles cannot be fully resolved without elucidating not merely the formerly
fashionable elite of notions but also all their neglected logical hangers-on.” (p.34)
Simply, the problems that arise between notions may be resolved by the examination and
clarification of those terms that are assumed and, yes, support the notions in question. If there is
a tension between teacher and researcher as chapter one suggests that there is, examination of
the terms and notions that support those terms may suggest a resolution to the problem. Through
examination of their use in ordinary language one may come to reveal that conceptual tensions
are created by their misuse rather than any intrinsic meanings. This approach is, at its heart, both
Derridian and Habermasian. The immanent critique of Habermas is perhaps one of the most
obvious means by which to examine the use of ordinary language as a means by which to
uncover the underlying norms and assumptions that govern our actions, as well as a means by
which to identify contradiction and incoherence in those underlying assumptions.
Scriven warned that “lack of conceptual analysis may result in definitions that include
many things [the researchers] wanted to exclude, and exclude things they wanted to include” (p.
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132). Simply, how can one measure or apply a construct without first knowing what the
construct is or is not, or at least positing its definition for the purpose of challenging that
definition? Thus, it is philosophical analysis that undergirds every dissertation by virtue of, at
least, providing the definitions of the constructs to be used and by providing the tools necessary
to develop understanding or draw conclusions from the data that, itself, is presumed to be
reflective of those constructs.
Philosophical analysis is a method. According to Stubley (1992),
At the core of almost all of the different approaches [to the philosophical method] is an
analytical process, commonly described as conceptual analysis, which uses paradigmatic
examples to define and clarify the meanings of particular terms and concepts. Consistent
with the definition of philosophy as a method of inquiry which seeks understanding
through the juxtapositioning or challenging of ideas, examples which illustrate the core
meaning or most typical usage of a term are thrust against counter-examples that
illustrate what the term is not. (p. 45)
Stubley’s worry suggests that philosophical analysis is a means by which to apply tools such as
juxtaposition, presentation of counter-examples, and reduction ad absurdum to concepts,
constructs, ideas, and definitions in order to develop understanding. The data used, then, rather
than being interviews or documents, are concepts, ideas, and notions. (Arguably, so a
philosopher of language might suggest, all data whether transcribed interviews or even videos of
events are all actually concepts, ideas, and notions). The data, then, are concepts, and the tool is
analysis—examination, definition, and systematic investigation of those concepts’ meanings and
implications.
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The result of the analysis is not just a breaking down, it is a development. To clarify a
notion and identify what it is and is not is to unveil a construct—a concept or idea defined in a
context that provides meaning when applied and investigated. As defined by SAGE publications
in order to help define their engagement with quantitative research, “a construct is that abstract
idea, underlying theme, or subject matter that one wishes to measure.” To measure a construct,
however, one must have the construct—it does not appear ex nihilo. It falls under the purview of
philosophical analysis to generate that construct, which itself the analysis must be able to justify.
Therefore, it is philosophical analysis that produces the constructs investigated and used
by research. Moreover, philosophical analysis is a method that extrapolates data in the form of
concepts and interprets that data using the tools of philosophy—definition, logic, narrative and
linguistic analysis, all of which can be understood as lenses of experience, ways to construct
understanding. Lens examination hinges on the examination of definition, as meaning is a
fundamental way in which we construct our experience (Eisner, 1991). Thus, given the tools of
the philosophical methodology, Stubley (1992) concluded that philosophical inquiry is “a
reflective meditative activity which scrutinizes the lenses through which we construct
experience” (p. 49). The common error, I suggest, is the assumption that reflective and
meditative inquiry cannot scrutinize, that they must be so subjective as to lack rigor and access to
knowledge. Clearly, this is false: the very act of scrutiny requires that one know what one is
scrutinizing, which itself requires that one clarify one’s terms and categories and apply
interpretive devices in order to make meaning.
Philosophical Analysis and Definition
There is a joke about philosophers:
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Question: “How many philosophers does it take to change a light bulb?”
Answer: “Define change.”
This joke makes light of the philosopher’s need to define what one means before taking practical
action. This hesitation to act before definition may well be why Scriven’s (1997) writing is
preoccupied with justifying the importance of conceptual analysis. He argued that there is a lack
of conceptual-analytic training in “virtually all programs for educational researchers,” which has
doomed “conceptually incompetent researchers… to rush into building a lifetime of research on
a foundation of conceptual sand” (p. 136). It is this fear of building upon conceptual sand that
causes philosophers to hesitate to change the metaphorical light bulb.
Scriven wrote, revealingly,
Teaching is, in fact, a very difficult notion to define, and if you decide that you can define
it any way you like or if you think it is a very simple notion to analyze, you will finish up
doing a great deal of research on a process which is definitely not teaching, and is only
related to it in some obscure way. (p. 136)
Moreover, I am willing to suggest that this hesitation is warranted not just when a concept is
unclear, but especially when it is believed to be very clear.
Those concepts that we have trusted the longest are the ones that, by virtue of their
familiarity, are now most likely challenged the least, and thereby conceptually dangerous as they
may go unscrutinized when new knowledge, techniques, or minds enter the research arena.4 A

4

Again, Gettier’s (1963) work comes to mind; the notion he challenged was a definition, a long established
well respected definition in epistemology of knowledge as “justified, true belief.” It did not require the most
renowned mind of the last two thousand years to demonstrate the invalid nature of the definition of knowledge, just
a mind that was willing to ask a seemingly inane question that challenged the prevailing dogma. The result of
Gettier’s questioning has been a continued resonance on the field of epistemology as philosophers desperately
attempt to resolve what might be an intractable problem.
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more pressing example than light bulbs is the definition of another commonly assumed and
accepted construct…“man.” Many people assume that they can identify a man when they see
one. They assume that they can define man, and need spend no time analyzing the concept man.
One may then imagine that it is not unlikely that man and men are often constructs used in
dissertations to help measure some other construct wherein man itself is never analyzed or even
defined. This is exemplified in the case of measuring men’s preference for particular colors,
wherein preference is the operative construct that the research will clarify and define before
proceeding with the research. One is likely to assume that man need no definition, that the
construct is sufficiently well defined, and the researcher need not even provide the definition—
nonetheless justify the origin of the definition; it is simply an inherited and assumed cultural
construct.
It is not difficult to imagine, though, a research project such that the construct man
requires clarification and definition, if not justification. Consider a project that investigates the
experience that self-identified men have with sexism and discrimination. If the men are selfidentified men, there may be transgendered individuals who participate in the research who act
as undesirable outliers in terms of their responses. The researcher may seek to avoid such
problems by requiring that only “men” who were born genetically sexed as male can participate.
I suggest that a justification for such exclusion is necessary. To exclude transgendered men
without justification is to assume that they are not what they perceive themselves to be, which
certainly seems antithetical to qualitative research, which is so heavily reliant on perception.
Moreover, such exclusion, particularly if it is ad hoc, acts as a form of institutional genderism by
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reinforcing the conceptions and norms that exclude transgendered individuals from the
conversation by denying them voice.
One might argue that to engage such in depth definition analysis (particularly to the point
of turning an entire dissertation into philosophical analysis) is to slow down the research process
unnecessarily. One might argue that it would be far more expedient, and aesthetically simple, to
use “operational definitions,” definitions that can be understood as simplifications or
quantifications of what were once messy concepts, as is the case when describing someone as
five feet seven inches tall rather than as short. One might wish to avoid engaging in
philosophical argument pertaining to what short actually means, but measurement in feet and
inches is easy to use, state, define, and defend.
So why not simply redefine “short” as being five feet seven inches tall or less, and move
on? To quote Scriven (1997),
The people who favored the move towards operationalist redefinitions had virtually no
training in the capacity to analyze the prior concept, so they really had no way in which
to make the key test of the superiority of their prosed simplification. They just favored it
because it was new and simpler, and they felt that the messiness of the old concept was an
impediment to research (it was) and probably reflected many confusion of people with
unscientific training (it probably did) and hence had no redeeming feature—which is
where they made their mistake. For the messy concept contains all the subtlety that
experience has forced upon it; it reflects the real phenomena, perhaps not clearly but
usually rather comprehensively. Since the most important part of science is accurate
reflection of reality, this part of the matter cannot be dismissed lightly. So, although some
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limited trades of simplicity for accuracy are possible, you would have to do the
homework first—or be very lucky. (p. 140)
The replacement of concepts with operationalized definitions that seemingly require no
clarification or investigation does make research more expedient, but leaves open the possibility
that we are not measuring what we claim and leaves us far less capable of justifying why we
believe the measurement means something about the concept we have redefined in a positivistic
way (e.g., to say that my measurements in inches says something about shortness is tenuous if I
cannot explain the connection between a particular height in inches and shortness). It is for this
very reason that researchers concern themselves with construct validity—“construct validation is
the process of collecting evidence to support the assertion that a test measures the construct
claimed by the test developer” (Worthern, White, Fan, & Sudweeks, 1999, p. 141). A construct
is understood as that, “unobservable, postulated attribute of individuals that we create in our
minds to help us explain or theorize” (Worthern, White, Fan, & Sudweeks, 1999, p. 141). Thus,
as Scriven (1997) suggested, we cannot forget that the concepts, the constructs, we purport to
measure are, at their core, unobservable concepts generated by human minds for the purpose of
generating understanding.
It is important to note that Scriven argued that IQ and intelligence is one of the few cases
in which operational definitions work and thus the positivist’s project does not collapse entirely.
I remain unconvinced. He argued that the body of experts who judge intelligence will often fail
to as accurately describe the intelligence of an agent as an IQ test will. I believe this begs the
question. We have already assumed that IQ measures intelligence rather than being a measure
that reports and translates the answering of questions and solving of problems into the ability to
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answer questions and solve problems. While congruent, answering questions and the ability to
answer questions are not identical.
Perhaps even more importantly, intelligence, as operationally defined, fails to take into
account the arguments regarding the many kinds of intelligence, and thus, in a way best likened
to Michael Foucault’s (1964) explication of madness and reason, creates for itself a paradigm of
intelligence that is defined by the powerful (the definers of knowledge) who happen to be,
coincidentally, those who are identified by the test as intelligent. To say that one is intelligent is
deeply connected to what one knows and what one can do with knowledge, and knowledge is not
best understood as a thing in the world, but rather, as a construct defined by those with the power
to do so. Consider, for example, the definition of mental illness. Those with the power to define
it do so. Thus, what we know about transgendered individuals is determined by the operational
definitions generated by the medical community and their definition of transgender as a kind of
mental disease.
The Positivist Critique of Philosophical Definition.
This is all to say that, as Scriven (1997) noted, the issue hinges on positivism. It would
likely be the positivist who has the most to criticize about philosophical analysis as a
methodology. Positivism has proved useful. It is a scientifically-minded, Occam’s razor-oriented
tool that suggests the world can be understood in machine-like ways. Specifically, logical
positivism holds that metaphysical problems can be ignored. The positivist suggests this not out
of flippance but due to the philosophically developed thesis proposed by the Vienna Circle of the
1920’s, comprised of such eminent members as Moritz Schlick, A.J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, and
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who argued that only that which can be observed need be treated as true.
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This observation thesis is generally known as the “principle of verification.” Unfortunately,
though perhaps comically, the principle of verification cannot itself be verified, and, thus,
positivism falls on its own sword and was criticized heavily, to the point of utter refutation, by
Willard Van Quine (1951) in his Two dogmas of empiricism. That is not to say that there is no
neo-positivistic philosophical revolution or that positivism is a dead theory. Rather, I suggest that
positivism, thus far, has failed to eliminate the need for “messy definitions” of the world because
it has failed yet to provide understanding.
Rather, as Quine suggested, there is good reason to believe that science—and,
therefore—research is verified as a holism rather than through individual propositions. We
cannot reduce our statements of truth to immediate empirical experience. Those statements only
can be meaningful in a context of other statements regarding truth. Rather, understanding of
given statements is generated through the connection one makes with other such statements
within the domain. In a way reminiscent of Piaget’s learning theory, the field of research cannot
be said to be one that exists in direct correspondence to empirical observation; rather, our beliefs
are verified by virtue of their connection, or lack thereof to other beliefs—thus, they are judged
not solely based in immediate experience, but on the holism of understanding generated by one’s
experience schema.
Understanding and clarifying concepts, therefore, cannot be done in a vacuum. It cannot
be done without language, without connection to other terms, and without definitions of those
connecting terms. We verify the truth and falsity of new propositions by judging it against the
whole of our belief schema. It may be argued that we generate a narrative of our
experience/belief schema—an overarching arc of understanding that explains, justifies, and
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clarifies the summation of our belief set. We do not just verify new information, as Piaget
suggested, by comparison to particular beliefs, rather, as Quine implied, we verify them by virtue
of ascertaining whether that information makes sense under that arc narrative. It is through
narrative—the connection of events and facts—that we make sense of experience, not through
individual events (which cannot even be called facts without context) of experience. The
definition of a term is meaningless to us outside of the context of other terms and beliefs. The
definition of teacher, without the context of education, student, and knowledge, will not make
sense to us. Moreover, if we attempt to define a term and that definition does not make sense
within the context of our arc narrative, we fail to understand it and may reject it rather than
rewriting the story.
To say that gravity is caused by the exchange of gravitons is accurate and all that is
necessary for us to understand gravity from a positivistic standpoint. Why, and how attraction is
caused by the exchange of tiny particles, though, is hard to make sense of. In a Humean way, one
fails to see how the conjunction of the events “a graviton is exchanged between particle A and
particle B” and the event “the apple fell” equates with the causal story. The narrative is missing,
and, thus, even if the positivist is right and the definition of gravity is accurate, without an
understanding of the causal story it is a vacuous definition. Conversely, to define gravity as the
warping of space such that objects make metaphorical dimples in space-time, and, thus, objects,
much like marbles, roll into those dimples, seems to make much more sense—but it is a messier,
more complex, and metaphorical definition. This sense making of messy definitions evidences
Quine’s argument that the holism of context is necessary for understanding singular terms. As
the purpose of this work is to understand the conjunction of faculty roles, we need more than
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posited, operationalized definitions; we need definitions that connect to other terms that we can
define, use metaphors that help makes sense, and, when conjoined, generate a narrative that
makes sense. We can be assured, then, that this project will be messy, thick and rich.
Definition Ad Infinitum
One might find that, very quickly, that one cannot act at all if one must define all terms
used in one’s research as well as justify them before conducting research. As each concept itself
is reliant on others, perhaps ad infinitum, one would find oneself unable to change what is now
the proverbial light bulb. Scriven’s argument for the importance of conceptual analysis is not
intended to prevent research, nor should it. Rather, the concepts used themselves to support our
research are often ceteris paribus concepts—all things being equal, their definition is generally
accepted and understood (Dancy, 1993). Thus, one is freed to examine, in detail, one concept
without having to define all ceteris paribus concepts. One must also accept, though, the very real
possibility that the constructs that support one’s research are themselves always revisable and
may require redefinition. Moreover, as in the case with constructs such as men, as the earlier
example demonstrated, the researcher would be wise to consider carefully that which (or who)
she eliminates from a classification—particularly without explaining why. It behooves the
researcher, therefore, to make certain, at the very least, that the constructs measured and used for
measurement are themselves well defined, if one does not have an eternity to define all of the
ceteris paribus concepts.
Avoiding the trap of building one’s research on a grounding of sand, then, at least
Scriven (1997) and Soltis (1968) suggested, requires that one begin with definitions. Soltis wrote
of educational concepts,
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The ideas to be dealt with are quite ordinary and central to the educational enterprise. As
such, they provide a basic point of departure for anyone concerned with education, from
the layman and neophyte to the accomplished educational practitioner and scholar. Yet
they quickly become puzzling ideas, which on careful examination lead to a chain of
questions and answers in which the last link is more frequently another frustrating
question than a pacifying answer. (1968, p. x)
Simply, as Soltis noted, there are many definitions of educational concepts; there is no shortage
among politicians, the general populace, and even educators of conflicting ideas about what
education is and what it should do. As a result, educational institutions, like the university, find
themselves not only in flux but in contradiction with each other and themselves. Thus, to best
understand where the institution should go—to engage the departure to which Soltis referred—
requires not just that we know we are here, but to know how we should define “here.”
It is for this reason that I suggest that this work does not begin with definitions simply
because Scriven and Soltis argue that this is what philosophical analysis does; rather, I suggest
that the work should begin with definitions because it is, in this particular case, the best place to
start. We understand that the university is changing; we also understand that education has
tremendous power to do harm as well as benefit both learners and the society in which they
participate. We understand that the role faculty play, as defined by society, as well as their lived
instantiation of those roles as communicative action, has the potential to do the aforementioned
harm and good. If we wish, then, to suggest that the roles should take a particular form, then we
must, as we have done, define those roles and provide justification for that justification. This act,
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the act of definition, deconstruction, and normative construction, is the heart of philosophical
analysis.
Defining Definition
Ironically enough, the term definition itself is one that can mean many things. It would be
useful to consider the field of semiotics—the study of signs and symbols and how they are used
in communicative efforts—in order to provide a working definition for what we mean when we
define a term. To take a discourse-ethical perspective, we need to review the way in which we
use definition in order to begin to ascertain the underline assumptions that accompany our
communication of the idea “definition.” To ask someone for a definition too often results in her
proving a “dictionary” or denotative definition. Such denotations are often our first resort when
asked to define a term. Further analysis, however, of our conversational conventions reveals that
such Webster-eque definitions are often insufficient to capture the holism of meanings that
accompany a term: there are, of course, many connotations that construct the meaning of a term
as well. If, in our conversation, we still find that we cannot grasp what the Other means when she
says a thing, we may resort to ostension as a means by which to provide a direct example. Thus,
a definition is constructed through a symbolic communicative process with the other by
forwarding a series of denotative, connotative, and ostensive meanings that, in conjunction,
define the term in our social framework.
As definition analysis and construction is essential to much philosophical inquiry, further
clarification regarding the tools of definition is warranted. According to Nöth’s (1995)
Handbook of Semiotics “denotation,” in traditional semiotics, indicates a primary meaning,
whereas connotation indicates the secondary meanings. Nöth explained ostention in terms of
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literally pointing to a thing. The three of these notions together provide a robust definition of a
term by virtue of providing the primary meaning, the secondary meanings, and indicating an
actual instance of that thing. Thus it can be suggested that one understands a term if one can
provide all three definitions of that term.
For example, to provide a definition of “Earth” would likely require that one identify a
dictionary definition which may inform one that “Earth is the 3rd celestial body orbiting the sun,
Sol, at an approximate distance of 93 million miles.” The connotation, however, would allow for
the implications, assumptions, and associations the term may inspire, such as “soil, Gaia, life,
and home.” Finally, ostension requires that one actually indicate the thing—in essence to give an
example. An example of “Earth” would not include a “globe, a map, or a picture” as these all are
models or representations. To provide an example of the Earth, which of itself there is only one,
would require that one point at the Earth. It is important to note that constructs, unlike proper
nouns indicating singular subjects, can have many examples as the construct: it, in some sense,
exists as a set of which there can be many members, as is the case with teacher. It seems that
there is not much else that one could do to define a term. Moreover, when we, in our ordinary
interaction with other humans, observe an agent engage all three forms of definition when
explaining a concept, we assume that the agent understands the term. I suggest that is because
the ability to provide those three definitions acts as evidence of understanding, perhaps even
challenging Nöth’s (1995) suggestion that there is a kind of primacy to denotation. Given our
communicative social frame, it may well be connotations that support the bulk of our meaning.
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Definition, Intention, and Dialogue
There is something to be said, here, about the problem of intention and John Searle.
Searle (1983) would likely argue that my above assertion is patently false by virtue of arguing
that intention is essential for understanding and intention is not demonstrated by my above
proposition. Intention in this case—not to be confused with purposefulness—refers to the idea
that our thoughts are about something. In rebuttal, I suggest that there is no means by which to
access intention inside the mind of another (certainly not “scientifically”) and that it is only
through the rich connection of dialectical experience that one can presume intention on the part
of an Other. As Derrida (1977) noted in his reply to Searle in his afterward to Limited Inc,
“Toward an ethic of discussion,”
If by pragmatic concept you mean one that is empirical and approximative, I have trouble
seeing how it would be able to found, theoretically, seriously, a theory (Searle’s, which is
intentionalist through and through, treating intention as the founding principle of all
speech acts that are serious, literal, and meaningful). Nonplentitude will be treated as
though it were an extrinsic accident, even if it in fact occurs frequently, even if it takes
place everywhere. This I call “fundamental intentionalism” –Searle’s. In this case, I do
not believe that the concept of “intention” can be treated as “pragmatic concept,” not at
least if by that you mean a concept that is empirically useful, provisionally convenient,
constructed without great rigor. (p. 128)
Derrida (1977) suggested that one cannot simply divorce intention from its metaphysical
plenitude, as it is metaphysical in its very teleology.
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Perhaps a clever constructed machine could fool us into believing it understands
definitions with one act of denotation, connotation, and ostension, as Searle suggested in
refutation of Alan Turing. Turing, though, had a point if we interpret him as underscoring the
centrality of dialogue to the mind. In the case of humans, we assume that repeated linguistic
interaction, the robust dialectic itself of numerous cases of such definitions, that demonstrate the
potentiality of a coherent belief-set constructed by such definitions held by the agent, is evidence
of understanding. I suggest, therefore, that the ability to provide a denotative, connotative, and
ostensive definition is the core evidence of understanding substantiated by a robust dialectic that
continues to confirm the original proposition of understanding. Thus, it is in the context of
dialectic (not humanness, English, or logic) that intention is evidenced.
Thus, if understanding is demonstrated, at least at the burgeoning fundamental degree
necessary for engagement in full dialectic, by providing denotative, connotative, and ostensive
definition, then the methodology of this philosophical analysis requires that we do so with the
terms I will presume to define. Much of this has already been accomplished through the literature
review and the development of the conceptual framework. Role, faculty, teacher, and researcher
have all been defined through examination of documents, institutions, and theories that generate
those roles. It will be the work of chapter four, though, to continue that process by synthesizing
those definitions, examining them, ostensively pointing to them by virtue of examples, and
justifying them. This final action of justification is a normative process. As such, philosophical
analysis is not normative by virtue of arbitrarily asserting the value of one definition over the
other, but rather by virtue of justifying the construct as valid through universally applicable
logical and dialectical principles.
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Normativity and Definition
Note that Scriven (1997), Soltis (1968), and Stubley (1992) did not spend time with the
normative work of philosophical inquiry. Their work largely hinges on the philosophic tradition
of parsing out concepts. Construction of concepts and normativity is just as central to the
philosophical enterprise. Moreover, in his 1960 text, The Language of Education, Israel Scheffler
argued that three types of definition are particularly useful when engaging educational concepts:
stipulative, descriptive, and programmatic. Stipulative definitions are those that are suggested for
use in a particular work, largely to avoid confusion. If one writes, “For the purposes of this work,
term x will refer to instances of y,” then one is proposing a stipulative definition. Presumably,
stipulative definitions are synonomous with Scriven’s operational definitions. Descriptive
definitions are those that purport to describe the term in question. These definitions are
commonly understood as the previously discussed denotative and connotative definitions, for
which a given term may have a series of descriptive definitions due to common usage.
Programmatic definitions are those that entail a normative value; they suggest that x should be
the case. To say that “education is that endeavor that benefits students through learning,” is both
descriptive and, implicitly, normative as it is suggesting that there is a certain rightness of or
obligation of the educational enterprise to benefit learners.
Solits (1968) suggested that Scheffler’s above demarcations are particularly useful when
engaging philosophical analysis in education specifically because of the importance of the
programmatic notion of definition. He wrote,
[T]his is the intended upshot of this discussion: a search for the definition of education is
most probably a quest for a statement of the right or the best program for education, and

160
as such is a prescription for certain valued means or ends to be sought in education (p.
11).
Such programmatic definitions may also be considered axiomatic: from them, by the rules of
implication, other propositions can be derived, in this case as directives. Such programmatic
definitions prove profoundly useful in drawing conclusions that are justified tautologically. If
education is best understood, for example, as a social institution that exists for the benefit of
agents through learning, then one can conclude, through the rules of equivalence, that education
should benefit learners and should promote learning, by definition. Similarly, Peter Markie
(1990) wrote, “to be a professor is to occupy a particular institutional role, and that role may be
defined by certain duties so that claims attributing those duties are analytic (p. 134). By analytic,
Markie was referencing the notion of knowledge gained by definition. Thus, we can say we
know what duties are attributed to professors, by definition, and those duties are synonymous
with the expectations of the role, thus, analytically speaking, to know the duties is to define the
role explicated by Biddle’s explanation of organization role theory.
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Researchers might immediately balk and forward Moore’s (1903) argument regarding the
naturalistic fallacy: “is does not imply ought.” Moore is correct about the category of “is” he
discusses. One cannot rationally say, for instance, that because rape does exist it should exist.
One can say, though, that a light bulb is an instrument that gives off light; therefore, that light
bulb should give off light by virtue of the definition of light bulb. In this way, one should not
equivocate between the kinds of shoulds involved in these two different instances.
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The naturalistic fallacy is best understood in terms clarifying the distinction between
existent phenomena and moral imperative, whereas programmatic definition is better understood
in terms of conditionals generated by definitions: if x is defined as (equivalent to) y, then y
should be equivalent to x. The should does not emerge out of moral force somehow manifested
by virtue of the existence of empirical truths; rather it emerges categorically from the form of
definition itself—a definition grounded in our symbolic action. By this, I mean that
programmatic definitions of the kind I am describing all share the same should—x should be an
instance of y because x is defined as y as generated by our linguistic-social constructs. We may
call these tautological programmatic definitions.
Sheffler’s (1960) definition, though, of programmatic definitions does not necessarily
hinge on such tautological equivalencies. As demonstrated above, he is suggesting that certain
endeavors, as is the case of defining education, hinge on certain moral imperatives, which
themselves guide the construct (defining) process as the norms that undergird our
communicative action. If I am a chef, for example, my search for the definition of chocolate may
hinge on the implied fact that I want the best possible tasting chocolate. Thus, the definition of
chocolate that I produce may suggest that certain objects in the world normally classified as
chocolate (Hershey’s Kisses, for example) should not be called chocolate because they do not
meet the implicit criteria of “exemplary taste sensation.”
Consider, as a further example, my own original misunderstanding of the definition of
critical theory when entering the doctoral program. Originally, upon reading the textbook
definition of critical theory, I believed critical theory to be that educational research that seeks to
benefit learners. Thus, I was able to define critical theory as having normative content and,
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therefore, different from all other forms of educational methodologies that do not. I was
immediately corrected, however, and informed that all educational research has, at its core, the
goal of benefiting learners, by definition (simply because it is educational research) and,
therefore, all of it is normative in that way. Thus there is a tautological programmatic definition
imbedded in “education” and assumption of beneficence. Critical theory was not different
because it was normative, I was told, but because of its focus on voice, hermeneutics, and focus
on the marginalized; thus the whole of education research engages a tautological programmatic
definition.
Moreover, further examination of the definition reveals that the implicit assumptions of
critical theory are grounded in the philosophical and sociological works of Axel Honneth,
Habermas, and Horkheimer. Thus, one comes to recognize the entire enterprise of education as
supervening upon critical theory. Thus, Sheffler’s (1960) notion of programmatic definition
gives way to Habermas’ unveiling of the fundamental grounding assumptions that mediate
language and discourse. To say this, however, is not just to say that intersubjective linguistic
events with external agents are mediated by logical rules, but even internal linguistic events,
which themselves cannot happen without the symbolically mediated interpretation of language,
necessitate and assume specific rules of dialogue and understanding. What Habermasian
reasoning reveals when applied to Sheffler is that programmatic definitions are themselves
programmatic because of their embeddedness in intersubjectivity. Thus, all definitions exist not
in a vacuum, but carry with them normative force and the assumption that their definitions are
understood. My realization regarding critical theory was that all education could only make
sense in our symbolic framework if it was in its essence critical theoretical—a sociological
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enterprise that is defined by the communicative action of explication, intersubjectivity, and social
improvement.
Normativity, therefore, arises from the very defining process in many ways. The
programmatic definitions, as Sheffler described them, are those that occur when our analysis
leads us to say, “We should define teaching as x.” Moreover, tautological programmatic
definitions emerge as we come to realize that there are hypothetical imperatives we can infer
from the definition based in the definition—“If we define teaching as x then we should…” As I
will be giving arguments for why particular roles should be defined in particular ways and
considering the implications and imperatives that arise from those roles, this is a normative
project. The largest normative force, though, will come from the construct developed by this
project, from the holism of definitions and roles in conjunction that will suggest that
understanding of roles as instantiated is best achieved through the lens of this construct and thus,
by definition, the best way to instantiate those roles is described by the construct. This
normative quality must itself be defensible and logically grounded. In fact, it may need to be best
understood as a kind of moral fact, qua Habermas.
Error in Exclusion
One may have noted early on in this chapter that Soltis (1968) made reference to his
placement in “analytic philosophy,” as if the act of analysis and rigorous concept analysis is
specific to a particular field in philosophy. His work seems to further reject the idea that
philosophy may have aesthetic or narrative qualities. To quote Soltis, “To make language of
education work, we must be clear about its intent and meaning and not be swayed only by its
imagery and poetry. The analytic temperament and techniques should prove most useful to any
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practicing educator in getting him to think through with care…” (p. 74). It would seem, prima
facie, that this preference for “the analytic temperament” over the imagery and poetry makes
definitional sense. If the analytic tradition is dedicated to the rigorous, objective, and systematic
parsing of terms as they can logically be related to each other, then analysis is an apt description
of what analytics do. However, this distinction is simply outmoded and outdated. The
philosophies of language to which Soltis may have been referring in this rather broad stroke do
not assume poetic philosophical meandering; they are, themselves, conceptually rigorous.
It is immediately clear from a reading of Habermas and Honneth—both of whom will be
explicated in more detail shortly—that there is little reason to concern oneself with a lack of
rigor on their part. I suggest, however, for the purposes of this work, and out of the philosophical
principle of charity, to consider Soltis’s criticism of poetic language, which may be understood
as a rejection of anything considered “unnecessary” to the rhetorical process. Clearly, we lose the
power of dialectical narratives such as Plato, and the importance of even those narratives
generated by Einstein when he asked himself, “What would it be like to travel on a beam of
light?” Human understanding seems to ground itself in analogy. Such analysis is found in
narrative and figurative device. To assert that truth is only accessible through the parsing of
concepts that themselves are symbolic and mediated through communicative action is an
irrational bias.
This bias might find itself grounding the belief that the world can only be understood
mathematically or through symbolic logic. It is difficult to suggest, though, that the semantic
content generated by mathematical or physics-oriented descriptions of the world is itself not a
kind of narrative framing of the world (as neither mathematics nor physics have been
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demonstrated to be the fundamental truth of the world). Rather, they are narratives that help
human agents make sense of the world—they assist in the production and justification of an
agent’s narrative schema. For philosophy to ignore any tool that may generate understanding is
incoherent with the very enterprise of philosophy, as a Habermasian immanent critique of the
philosophical enterprise suggests.
Narrative, metaphor, and analysis
I do not say this to suggest the primacy or supremacy of narrative, only to suggest that it
is, at the very least, essential to our understanding and our ability to comprehend. The emphasis
placed on understanding the world through a logically grounded frame requires resting our
discourse upon the idea that our beliefs should not be paradoxical or self-refuting (known as the
law of non-contradiction) is overwhelmingly productive and useful. Thus, we see the usefulness
and inclusion of Habermas’ ideas; it is in them that we see an in-depth explication of the inability
to engage dialogue and discourse without the assumption of logical and rational rules of
discourse.
To quote Habermas,
Just as someone interested in a theory of knowledge cannot adopt a standpoint outside his
own cognitive acts (and thus remains caught in the self-referentiality of the subject of
cognition), so too a person engaged in developing a theory of moral argumentation
cannot adopt a standpoint outside the situation defined by the fact that he is taking part in
a process of argumentation… For him, the situation of argumentation is just as
inescapable as the process of cognition is for the transcendental philosopher. (1991, p.
81)
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Having engaged the process of term clarification, the self-referentiality of that act (that there are
terms, those terms have meanings, those terms should not self-negate), that meaning is shared
through language, narrative produces understanding, discourse produces both rules and
understanding, are all assumed. They were assumed as soon as I wrote down a sentence that I
believed would communicate meaning to a potential reader. Thus, we are not simply examining
Habermas’ notion of dialectic, nor are we only using his notion of dialectic: we are currently
performing his dialectic.
Finally, I suggest that the bias shown by Soltis (1968) against figurative language is a
hindrance to philosophical analysis and, unlike the rest of his thesis, should be discarded as a
simple but harmful bias. Understanding language without figurativeness is impossible. To
engage in philosophical analysis of the kind described here is to investigate definitions, to
attempt to connect terms to meanings. Terms, though—as Saussure (1972), Derrida (1977), and
Scriven (1997) pointed out—do not have a metaphysical connection to the objects they identify.
Those connections are arbitrary, though not meaningless or weak. According to Scriven (1997),
So there is some sense in which the world does not define what language has to be used
in describing it; we do that defining; we create those languages. Moreover, these
languages emerge in their respective cultures entirely as a result of the language building
and language learning activities of those societies and individuals, not as a result of some
law connecting the local climate or crops or social structure with language forms.
Languages are obviously arbitrary in the sense of being conventions rather than laws of
nature. All that, however, is not to say that these languages are now arbitrary. They now
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have very strict rules, and if you take any one term from any one of them and give it a
new definition, you will not be speaking that language. (p. 138)
Thus, as Nietzsche wrote in “On truth and lie in an extra-moral sense,” all language hinges on
metaphor—connections between terms and ideas that themselves have no intrinsic connection,
but once juxtaposed are now connected and produce meaning. All language, not just the
commonly understood metaphor, requires the connection between two unlike things, and thus,
engaging figurative language is essential to understanding. I should think this would be of
special importance in qualitative research—as the claim is that understanding is the primary goal
of such research.
It is common that one does not understand a term or a concept until provided with a
metaphor. One might say, “I don’t understand what you mean when you say teachers, in the end,
cannot be held responsible for what learners choose to learn.” In reply, one might provide the
metaphor, “What I mean is—teaching is like being a salesman. In the end, the car salesperson
cannot force the customer to buy the car; the final decision, no matter how good the salesperson
is, is up to the customer. Just like the teacher cannot force the learner to buy the idea.” The light
bulb might then go off, and we hear, “Oh. I understand!” The irony is, of course, that
“salesmanship” is not what the explicator “meant,” even if she suggests, “what I mean is.”
Literally speaking, what she means is her first statement: teachers cannot be held responsible for
what learners learn. Teachers are not salespersons, and the connection between the two is purely
metaphorical.
Researchers might reply, “But I can give definitions by ostention, thereby ignoring the
need for narrative and metaphor.” Ostension will not suffice, however. Consider asking for

168
clarification for the word chair. I might then point to a particular object and say, “That is a
chair.” What I have done is generate a performative metaphor. Literally, the word chair can only
connote the word chair: a symbol, a series of squiggles. Figuratively, through the arbitrary
connection between that sign and a concept, we then connect the concept to a particular object in
the world. The object and the concept, though, are also not literally the same thing. So to say,
“That is a chair” is inaccurate on every level except the metaphorical… the word that is not the
word a chair; the object is not the word chair, and the word chair is not the concept chair, nor is
the object. What we mean when we say, “That is a chair,” is none of those things listed above.
We mean only, “That is a chair,” and understanding—through the metaphor—is generated, while
literal analysis of the event leads only to confusion.
Context of Methodology and Theoretical Framework
Given the above, I suggest that Soltis did, in fact, more accurately make a distinction
between conceptual analysis and philosophical analysis. Consider immanent and etymological
critique of the term “philosophy.” The perhaps cliché definition of philosophy as philia sophia
grounds the etymology in the ancient Greek “love of wisdom.” While over-quoted, the fact
remains that the etymology of the term philosophy is useful. The definition reveals a grounding
of philosophy in lived experience. Philosophy was not originally defined as a “study of.” While
it may not be uncommon to encounter a “PHI 101” definition of philosophy such as “the study of
the deepest questions humans can ask,” we realize that philosophy is not simply a domain of
inquiry that remains separate and distinct from lived human experience. While current trends in
academia seem to suggest that each mode of inquiry—physics, mathematics, social sciences,
linguistics, and the like—are in fact separate studies of different phenomena, philosophy reminds

169
us that there is a binding drive behind inquiry: the search for understanding, and, thus,
“wisdom.”
I suggest that philosophy is therefore not best defined as a kind of “Ivory Tower”
enterprise where the philosopher locks herself away amongst her tomes never to be seen again.
Rather, I suggest that even if locked away, the philosopher engages a constant life of inquiry. To
seek wisdom would not be a nine-to-five job. Rather, seeking wisdom is a lifetime endeavor that
results in the questioning of all assumptions and the investigation of all events. Simply, unless
the philosopher is having her meals delivered to her and sleeps in the philosophy department, she
must exit into a world that will present to her new questions and problems ad infinitum. If to be
an artist is to live a life of art—to consume, produce, and live art, then a philosopher, by analogy,
consumes, produces, and lives philosophy. The philosopher would not be simply satisfied with
the parsing of definitions during work hours and then tunelessly whistle on her way home—each
moment presents a new moment of artistic inquiry that requires engagement if one truly “loves
wisdom.” Philosophers, like children, are likely to hear often from their friends, “Do you have to
question everything?” to which the answer is, “Yes, of course, because I love to understand.”
Our immanent critique additionally reveals that our concept of philosophy may well be
infected by the primacy of the systemsworld in contemporary western society.
Commercialization places the value of the system before the value of the norms and agents who
comprise the system. The world of academia, as chapter one has argued, is under tremendous
pressure to capitulate to the demands of the commercialized systemsworld. Philosophy, as a
lived experience that requires consistent dialectic with the world, is in direct opposition to the
sublimation of the lifeworld by the systemsworld. If the goal of philosophy is one that is
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inherently based on the value of wisdom then philosophy is, by definition, a lifeworld enterprise.
Wisdom is not valued for its usefulness to the system, but, rather, for its intrinsic intersubjective
worth.
Thus, it may be reasoned that “conceptual analysis” falls under the category of a tool that
can be used from either a systemsworld or a lifeworld approach. It may either be the
deconstruction of terms and concepts for the purpose of forwarding instrumental aims or as a
tool for understanding the norms, values, and constructs created through our linguistic
framework. Philosophy, then, often uses conceptual analysis as a means by which to engage the
world more authentically. If the purpose of philosophy is to understand the world in order to
more fully participate in and know it, then, as a lifeworld endeavor, it will have at its ready
numerous epistemologies that enrich our understanding of existence. Similarly, the conceptual
analysis of Soltis (1968), is one tool of many accessible to philosophy (including deconstruction,
symbolic logic, hermeneutics, ethics and so on). I say this not only to justify moving beyond
Soltis and Scriven so that we may engage normative philosophy, immanent critique, and
deconstruction, but also to suggest that future dissertations even in the paradigm of education
might consider using narrative frames to produce understanding. Although this work will stay
fundamentally in the discourse-ethical frame, there are numerous tools available to philosophers
of education in future dissertations and no tool should be excluded ad hoc if the aim is wisdom
rather than confirmation of one’s bias.
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Clarification of Discourse Ethics and Explication of Seminal Literature
Habermas and the Paradigm of Education

The work of Habermas is discussed in chapter 2. To clarify further, however, one must
understand that the work generates discourse ethics through the recognition that dialogue itself
requires certain shared presuppositions. To engage in discourse is to assume of series of
grounding axioms that, while on one hand may seem obvious, are, on the other, often taken so
for granted as to be forgotten or ignored. We assume, for example, that in reading this work that
we are capable of understanding each other, exist, and can generate arguments that will or will
not prevail depending on the strength of the evidence. Thus, unique to discourse there are
underline presuppositions that structure our communication.
These assumptions, however, are also continent on objective rationality. A discourseethical presupposition for rational discourse is that everyone capable of engaging in the dialogue
is equality entitled to participation in that dialogue. This is a rational presupposition hinging on
the presupposition that we engage in discourse because we want to come to understanding or
truth. Thus, Habermasian ideas may be understood as an immanent critique of dialectic itself. To
investigate any particular instance of discourse is to begin revealing a series of assumptions that
themselves are grounded in presuppositions that, while unstated, are necessary for rational
discourse. Thus, we, by virtue of participating in the discussion tacitly agree to those
presuppositions. This does not mean, that once faced with the presupposition we will agree, only
that, according to Habermas, if we are engaging in open and rational discourse we will consent to
the truth of the proposition by virtue of the fact that we have been accepting it, albeit tacitly, all
along.
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To engage in rational discourse, then is to assume that we are using language in the same
or a similar way, to assume that we are unwilling to ignore any relevant argument, to assume that
we will accent to the force of a better argument, but not to any other force, and, importantly, that
we are motivated to dialogue in the first place because we wish to develop a better argument.
Notice, that these presuppositions run afield of both Michel Foucault and what seems to be actual
practical engagement in argument. The notion of force and power, of great importance to
Foucault’s work, would be one he would take special issue with insofar as he argued it was
power that generated “rationality” in the first place. In other words, Habermas’ ideas may have
difficulty justifying what rationality is without begging the question or appealing to some
authority.
Secondly, actual human engagement in argumentation seems to include often a great deal
of ignoring other arguments and acceding to worse arguments for some invalid reason. In other
words, humans seem to be rather irrational. It is important to realize, however, that both of these
concerns ignore the crux of Habermas’ argument which is a hypothetical imperative… if we
wish to engage in rational discourse… then we should. The concern of begging the question is
alleviated through the recognition that it is our own embedded norms of communication that
generate the defining characteristics of rational discourse in the first place for practical reason.
Simply, we would not engage in discourse if we did not believe it was possible for a better
argument to prevail. While it may be true that we engage in such discourse with great
irrationality, we also must assent to the fact that we are, contradictorily, presupposing that the
discourse can lead to the elevation of a better argument. As such, we are bound, by our own
presuppositions to put aside our biases and irrationality in order to engage in the discourse that
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we have, by virtue of engaging in discourse, of which we have already accepted the rational
precepts.
Such thinking lead Habermas to fundamental conclusions regarding not just dialectic, but
normativity. To engage in rational discourse is to accept that the consequences of the discourse
must be to the satisfactions of everyone’s interests. The dialectic must include everyone who has
an interest in the discourse, and it may not exclude any relevant argument. Thus, this
cognitivism, this foundational moral truth, is one of inclusiveness. We find at the heart of our
intersubjectivity the assumption that others should be included, otherwise dialectic would not be
rational. We know this, in part, because when our own interests are excluded from the dialectic,
we recognize both it as unfair and irrational. To ignore a relevant argument is not to engage in
rational discourse, if I have an interest affected by the discourse, to ignore me is to ignore my
relevant arguments, and thus engage in irrationality. Thus, Habermas’ principle may be
considered one of “universalization.” It is a universal principle of inclusion of everyone’s
interests.
The rational result of that principle is Habermas’ contention that norms can be considered
valid when they meet with the approval of all affected. Notice, then the grounding of morality in
rationality. The questions of “rightness” and “wrongness” can be understood in terms “validity.”
A norm is invalid, logically untenable if it does not meet with the approval of all affected for
rational reasons. To reject a norm because one wishes to engage in a way that excludes the
arguments of others or establishes a norm that is not to the satisfaction of others is to engage in
irrationality. Thus, we all must accept, argued Habermas, that to engage in ethical discourse is to
assent to the truth of the proposition that 1) we must consider the consequences of all affected,
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include all relevant arguments and voices and 2) the validity of norms are not determined by
moral intuition but instead its rational acceptability of all affected.
The work of Øjvind Larsen (2009) in his The Right to Dissent: The Critical Principle in
Discourse Ethics and Deliberative Democracy clearly illuminates the applicability of discourse
ethics to the educational paradigm. Of the many modes of philosophical analysis, Discourse
Ethics enables one to engage immanent critique, ontological grounding, and normativity, perhaps
most robustly. Larsen’s work applies discourse ethics to the general problems of modern society
in order to both better understand those problems and suggest resolutions to those problems,
much in the same way this dissertation proposes to do.
Larsen (2009) stated that his work, in fact, emerges from a problem similar to the one
described in this dissertation in chapter one. In much the same way as the roles of teaching and
research are finding themselves separated and “homeless,” he suggests that so does ethics in
regards to society:
My thesis is that this is because [ethics] does not have a natural place in the production of
modern society. To the contrary, the transformation of modern society results in ethical
relationships being limited to a particular circumstance that can only be integrated with
difficulty into modern social institutions. (p. 37)
One can see the similarity in projects, then. As the University continues to shift towards greater
and greater commercialization and commodification, care and invested teaching and research are
finding that they do not fit naturally into the social reality. “To the contrary,” the transformation
of the modern university results in invested teaching and research being limited to particular
circumstances that can only be integrated with difficulty into modern educational institutions.
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Larsen then applied discourse ethics to the problem of modernity in order to determine
both why ethics no longer fits in social reproduction and how its bifurcation from social norms is
best understood.
[Habermas’] discourse principle “D” assumes that norms for action must be deemed as
valid, something to which all possibly affected parties will be able to consent as
participants in a rational discourse… The discourse principle is a universal non-partisan
and neutral principle for argument, which can then be differentiated and operationalized
in a number of different discourses, including moral discourse and discourse on
democracy. (p.199)
Larsen was then, having distinguished between democracy and discourse ethics, able to apply
discourse ethics to modern society and democracy itself because rational discourse is not
synonymous with majority rule. Democracy seems to suggest that all voices can be heard and
heard just once (insofar as voting is concerned); rational discourse, however, suggests that all
voices should be heard and considered without bias.
One realizes, then, that the question of faculty roles is not just one of description nor is it
one of dictation or majority rule. Faculty roles should not just be determined by some seemingly
democratic process and they should not just be investigated; they should be formed through
rational discourse—thus the application of discourse ethics. “Moral problems touch on universal
problems that, in principle, concern all human beings” (Larsen, 2009, p. 204). If this is the case
then the question, “How should faculty roles be constructed?” is a moral problem that touches on
universal problems that, in principle, concern all human beings. Faculty as they educate
vulnerable populations and are the generators of our social epistemology have significant
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societal impact. Thus, the way their roles should be constructed touches on broad human
concerns, just as Larsen suggests and, “To these correspond moral discourse in which moral
problems are subject to a universal trial through rational discussion about the validity of the
moral statements and thereby whether they are right or wrong” (p. 204). Simply, Habermas
affords us the ability to 1) construct and reconstruct faculty roles in a way that make rational
sense given the rule of discourse itself and 2) include the import of all voices without bias in the
construction of those roles.
Finally, as Larsen’s (2009) text suggests through its application of Habermas, the right to
dissent is effectively empowered and respected through discourse ethics. “The right to dissent is
not only the critical principle of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy – it is the basis of
freedom in modern society” (italics my own, p. 9). This ability to include not only assenting
voices in deliberative practice, but dissenting voices is a power that is particularly useful when
considering normative assembly of constructs. When engaging the instantiation of roles as well
as the form those roles should take it is essential that the ethical perspective not just acknowledge
dissenting voices, but incorporate them fully into the deliberative process. Thus, as demonstrated
analogously through Larsen’s work, discourse ethics as engaging rational deliberative processes
in order to both understand and generate normative constructs is particularly apropos to a
process that is already hinged on Mead’s (1934) understanding of roles as generated through
symbolic (dialectical) interaction.
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Explication of Seminal Literature Justifying Discourse Ethics
The Application of Habermas
To apply Habermas will require that we engage three fundamental steps. 1) To engage in
immanent critique of the social construct as a means by which to reveal the norms and values
embedded through symbolic interaction 2) To consider the existence of the construct and its
components within the life and systemsworld and 3) To engage the process of discourse ethics as
a means by which to both evaluate and generate a normative framework through dialectic.
The first step will also take on a Derridian deconstructionistic methodology. Habermas’
immanent critique is powerful and revealing and will be made more so through the engagement
of etymology and investigation of narrative framing. The symbolically mediated framework of
Habermas’ construction of identity can be understood as the construction of self-narrative
through participation with others in dialectic. Thus, the Derridian perspective enables one to
further pars out the norms and concepts identified through Habermas through investigation of
their interaction with other terms and their own potentially contradictory self-reference. Simply,
The deconstructionistic addition to the Habermasian immanent critique will enable the
investigation of definitions within the domain as both socially mediated (in the search for
Habermasian coherence) and narratively consistent through their adherence to other terms. Note
that it is the Habermasian critique, however, that remains dominant as the adherence of terms,
their différance to each other, is the result of social interaction.
The second step requires that we consider the understanding of the definitions we have
developed as part of the lifeworld and systemsworld. The roles, as they are both inscribed and
symbolically mediated through discourse, must emanate from the lifeworld of subjects and
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intersubjectivity and/or the systemsworld of applications and instrumentality. Understanding
faculty roles, as well as how they will continue to develop, requires understanding the ways
those roles are expressed as components and generators of life- and systemsworld values. This
analysis, then, requires close consideration of the communicative actions that produce faculty
roles. Examination, as organizational role theory would have it, of the inscribed expectations of
faculty roles will be insufficient; consideration of the full dialectic, both external and internal,
that generates faculty roles is necessary. This dialectic includes those norms assumed by the
terms, the assumed as well as inscribed expectations in faculty handbooks, and the actual lived
experiences reported in research by faculty who are exploring the shifting paradigm of faculty
existence.
The third step requires the application of discourse ethics to the process of understanding
how faculty roles should be constructed. Analysis of faculty roles, as well as analysis of their
participation in the life- and systemsworld (as both generative of and generated by those worlds),
enables one to consider then how those roles should be constructed by agents in the world. Thus,
the analysis of faculty roles requires not only abstract reasoning regarding the most consistent
expression of faculty roles, but a dialectic that assumes Habermas’ cognitivist universalized
principles of dialectic. These assumptions not only provide rules for dialogue, but are likely to
act as norms that should be embedded in the expression of faculty roles as linguistically
mediated actions. Simply, to understand how faculty roles should be incorporated will require
not only that one voice all stakeholders in the university, but that one also construct faculty roles
as honest dialectical constructs supporting the lifeworld—in other words as constructs that
themselves promote the inclusion of all voices.
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Further analysis of the construct developed will consider, though perhaps briefly,
Honneth’s Theory of Recognition. This notion will be justified by the engagement with Amy
Allen (2009) and Hans-Herbert Kögler (2012) that will take place when considering the
problems of skepticism for Habermas. Honneth’s and Kögler’s concepts of identity formation act
as means by which to move beyond the immanent critique of Habermas into the ability to voice
the Other as a means by which to include the marginalized in normative dialectic. The Theory of
Recognition enables the development of a normative framework for faculty roles that include the
voices of those who are constitutive of the “I” yet remain voiceless in the systemsworld
development of faculty roles—despite both being generative of the university and being
participants in the lifeworld of the University. The recognition of these voiceless generators of
identity, as, for example, in the case of adjuncts, is a particular strength of Honneth’s Theory of
Recognition. Whilst the dialectical domain generated by the university permits the silencing of
adjunct voices, and thus, there is not internal inconsistency, as the very dialectic of the university
defines adjuncts as voiceless, Honneth’s system recognizes them, nonetheless.
Potential Problems
Some skeptics raise questions for Habermas. By this, I mean those who believe
knowledge to be fundamentally elusive. Foucault raised concerns that may be shared by
consistent skeptics regarding the ontological claims made by Habermas regarding the nature of
individual and societal identity. These are both concerns addressed by Amy Allen (2009) in her
“Discourse, power, and subjectivism: The Foucault/Habermas Debate.” The questions Allen
addressed are immediately relevant to Vokey’s (2008) concerns mentioned in the previous
chapter, specifically, the concern regarding solipsism and the ability to include the voiceless in
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the moral dialectic. The work of Hans-Herbert Kögler (2012) demonstrates, however, a means by
which to address the solipsist concerns, while maintaining the integrity of discourse ethics.
Allen constructs the tension between Foucault and Habermas in the following way:
…the entanglement of power and validity only poses a serious problem if one assumes
that there are only two possible ways of understanding the relationship between power
and validity: either validity is reduced to nothing more than power and autonomy to
nothing more than disciplinary subjection—a position that Habermas rightly sees as
normatively and politically disastrous but wrongly imputes to Foucault—or validity is
understood as wholly distinct from and unsullied by power relations—in which case the
purity of pure reason slips in through the back door, a position that Habermas himself
aims to avoid. (p.26)
Allen understood that Foucault’s thesis seems to require that all validity—truth—be reduced to
power relations, a thesis that seems to be anathema to Habermas. The Habermasian ontology
hinges itself on the cognitivist factualism of the existence of true moral statements. It would
seem, then, that Foucault and Habermas are incommensurable, as one asserts that truth is nothing
more than power relationships (those in power determine truth) and the other asserts that the
truth of moral statements is revealed in the embedded necessities of rational discourse.
Firstly, it should be noted, however, that Allen (2009) recognized that Foucaultian
understanding of power and power-relations as they construct society is a viable thesis. She
stated, “With respect to Habermas, overcoming the one-sided emphasis on communicative
rationality in his account of subjectiviation would require Habermas to confront more directly
the implications of the necessary and unavoidable role that power plays in subjectivation
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processes” (2009, p. 25). She also, notes, however, that Foucault’s own understanding and
discussion of communicative rationality and its import for power relations is heavily
underdeveloped:
In order to overcome the one-sided emphasis on power in his account of subjectivation,
Foucaultians would need to develop some of the very underdeveloped ideas about
communication, reciprocity, and the distinction between power and domination that are
mentioned in Foucault’s late work and to think through how these ideas bear on the issue
of subjectivation. (p. 24)
This is all to say that Allen noted a significant missing component in Foucault’s power thesis that
can be made more sense of when understood within the dynamics of communicative rationality.
Habermas’ own thesis, however, is buttressed by an acceptance and consideration of the
importance of power relations in the construction of dialectic. Simply, what is considered
“rational” may as Foucault stated, be determined by those in power. Habermas need not concede
that this power-defining of “rational” be epistemically true, only that it acts as a communicative
barrier to genuine rational discourse.
Allen was, however, able to (interestingly, through rational discourse) bring together
Habermas and Foucault, despite their apparently significant differences. “There is a third, and
better, possibility: to give up on the demand for purity altogether. Doing so would mean
acknowledging the unavoidable entanglement of validity and power, but without reducing the
former to the latter,” (Allen, 2009, p. 28). It is there, in her statement “without reducing the
former to the latter” that the tension between the two thinkers can be resolved. Allen suggested
that one can recognize the “entanglement” of validity and power without suggesting that power
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is validity. Allen recognized, however, that in so doing one must take a more pragmatic and
contextualist perspective of Habermas. I suggest that Allen’s shift enables a problematic
skeptical question: “How does one know that power and validity are not one and the same, if they
are so often “entangled?” Simply, there seems to be a problem of an epistemic gap. Allen
contended that validity is not reducible to power, yet one is hard-pressed to find any situation in
which validity is not determined (seemingly) by power relations. Thus, even if there is a
difference between the two, we seem to lack epistemic access to that difference.
The Habermasian response to the skeptical question is to note that the very asking of that
question requires the assumption of certain norms and conventions that assume rational discourse
is possible and is hinged upon the belief in truth external to power relations. Allen carefully
addressed each iteration of the skeptical argument, noting its failure, the details of which are
unnecessary here. What I will address is the one argument Allen noted may gain some traction,
but moves past quickly, noting that Habermas himself may address the entirety of the argument:
“It is not obvious that the skeptic could not opt out of argumentation without opting out of
communication action in general” (Allen, 2009, p. 13). Simply, the consistent skeptic who notes
the Habermasian critique of her performative contradiction in engaging the argument in the first
place may withdraw from the argument. Habermas suggests that this results in an impossible
withdraw from the totality of communicative action. Allen was not so sure, but she did not have
the time to exhaustively engage the details of the Habermasian reply to such an extreme claim
that “the Foucaultian skeptic would no doubt want to question” (p. 13). I suggest, however, that
there is another tactic that can be taken to answer all such skeptical concerns in a way that
satisfies both the intellectually honest skeptic and the Habermasian.
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I intend to prove that cognitivism is not necessary for the rational adoption and
application of discourse ethics. The reason I seek to do this is as a means by which to reach out
to those who may be fictionalists, anti-theorists, and skeptics. I do not want the application of my
own work to be limited to those who are willing to take on the commitments of cognitivism.
Rather, I suggest that a discourse ethic is so powerful, so rational, as to motivate the rational
skeptic to consider seriously its use in applied ethics, as we will engage in chapter four.
Consider the Habermasian account: “Indeed, Habermas maintains that we might ‘call
moral only those norms that are strictly universalizable, i.e., those that are invariable over
historical time and across social groups’” (Allen, 2009, p. 8). This notion is appealing, yet it
seems to rest on a strict cognitivism regarding moral truths. Habermas, however, suggests a
means by which to escape the problems of asserting that there are “moral truths” through
analogy:
Habermas notes a prima facie analogy between truth claims—claims about what the
objective world is like—and normative rightness claims—claims about how the
intersubjective world should be ordered: Truth claims are to facts as normative claims are
to legitimately ordered interpersonal relations. (p. 9)
Moreover, “… [Habermas] argued that cognitivism can be successfully defended if we give up
the strong claim that normative claims are truth candidates and instead adopt the weaker position
that normative claims are analogous to truth claims” (p. 9). Normative claims, then, act similarly
to truth claims. Normative claims’ connection to the structure of interpersonal relations is like the
relationships between facts and truth. I take this to mean that in a way similar to how our
“factual” statements’ validity are contingent upon their connection to the truth, normative
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claims’ validity rest upon the structure of interpersonal relations. I suggest, however, that
Habermas does not need this analogy. In fact, the analogy seems dangerously close to an
acceptance of positivism if we suggest that truth claims are made true by their correspondence to
the truth. Clearly, this is not what Habermas must mean. Rather, in his analogy he seems to
suggest that the truth coheres in the same way interpersonal norms cohere to each other through
relationships and symbolic interaction. –Thus Allen’s (2009) claim that acceptance of
Foucaultian power dynamics requires something of a pragmatic reading of Habermas. I suggest
that pragmatism is a more coherentist picture.
Simply, one of the skeptic’s major concerns is the ability to connect statements about
truth to truth. Habermas does not need this. Truth, instead, becomes a matter of interpersonal
relations, not so dissimilar from the way Foucault understood truth through power relations. If
the Habermasian argument is taken to mean that interpersonal relations generate truth (that
which we claim to be true) and is made understandable through the coherence of norms to each
other through symbolic interaction, there is no need for a cognitivism that the skeptic would find
problematic. Simply, our interpersonal relations do generate truth, insofar as they generate all of
the rules, norms, and even logical laws that we use to communicate and understand truth. Even
laws such as the “Law of Noncontradiction,” which may be considered laws of thought rather
than laws of nature, would be better understood as rules that emerge necessarily from dialectic—
understandable interaction between others is impossible without them. Truth, then, is reduced to
“necessary for understanding between agents.”
Both the Habermasian and the skeptic may take affront to the above. I suggest, however,
that both the Habermasian and the skeptic have good reason to engage the genuine possibility
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that the other is correct and consider a palatable middle ground. There is something of a subtle
and intuitive assumption in the criticism of the skeptic for being inconsistent. If she engages
argumentation, she is acknowledging that she can understand the other and that she is part of a
communicative web. This statement, though, assumes already an external point of view that the
skeptic cannot take—and if she does so, she is simply falling into the cognitivist’s trap. Rather,
the skeptic must maintain that she does not know that she is having the conversation, that she
does not know that what she is saying is understood, that in fact, she does not know that she is
saying. Rather, she engages a seemingly insane solipsistic positioning.
What if were to play the consistent skeptic and maintain that I do not know that what I
am writing is understood? I would recognize that others may claim that in my writing I
acknowledge their existence, yet, I do not. Rather, I maintain that I may be delusional in
believing that others are engaging my writing or even that I am writing at all. Moreover, I
recognize that in using the term “I” I am engaging in a communicative action. However, I also
recognize that this “I” is vacuous and theoretically could be used by any agent in order to
indicate her subjectivity. Thusly, that “I” does not belong to “me.” Saying “I” is, potentially, a
delusional act of self-voicing by an agent that does not genuinely exist. Surly, such statements
seem insane, but I suggest that they merit acknowledgement, if not consideration, for reasons
that should be listed shortly. Moreover, I maintain that the solipsist has good reason to adopt a
discourse ethics perspective, even without accepting Habermasian cognitivism.
Firstly, the skeptic’s insane position is one that enables learning. By this, I mean that
skeptical challenges, if they are honest rather than obdurate, require that we revisit and revise our
beliefs. This genuine praxis is one that is necessary to Habermasian dialectic. So, though one
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need not acknowledge that the skeptic is “right,” one should consider the possibility that,
insanely, the skeptic is presenting a belief that she believes could be right.
Secondly, the skeptic’s position is one that enables the rejection of assumed culturally
beloved beliefs. This is perhaps, in regards to the importance to Habermas of including all voices
in the generation of universal moral rules, the best reason for the Habermasian to engage the
skeptic. As stated by Allen (2009),
Foucault acknowledges that communicative relationships can and do play a role in
disciplinary institutions such as the educational system, but these relationships and their
connections to disciplinary power remain under developed. Moreover, the one-sidedness
of these account helps to explain certain persistent features of the critical reception of
their respective authors. Habermas’ relative inattention to the power-ladenness of
subjectivication arguably makes it difficult for him to offer a satisfactory criticaltheoretical account of some of the most pressing social problems of our time, including
sexism and racism, which are reproduced and maintained, in large part, through the
production of subordinating modes of identity. (p. 24)
Simply, skeptical positioning enables one to question beliefs that are deeply held or defined as
rational by a culture, as in the case with sexism and racism. Although Habermasian rationality
would seem to suggest that within even a biased domain, regardless of power imbalance, rational
agents could recognize the importance of including the marginalized in discourse, this is not
always the case. A skeptical position, while somewhat annoyingly willing to ignore that which
seems to be most rational, by its very nature, must question all beliefs, and, thus, positions one to
consider criticism of social inequity that is considered rationally grounded by an unjust society.
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In essence, the skeptical argument acts as a means by which to prepare the way for a
Habermasian immanent critique of such a society.
Finally, the skeptic, if Habermas is correct, should be included in the moral dialogue. It
would be fruitless to spend our time trying to prove Habermas incorrect in his dealing with the
skeptic, as Allen effectively reconciles Habermasian cognitivism and the Foucaultian skeptic.
Let us consider a different tact. Consider, instead, that the skeptic’s argument does gain traction
with Habermas. In fact, let us assume, just for the sake of devilish advocacy, that Habermas must
acknowledge that some solipsists will not be swayed by his arguments. What then?
Habermas argued that in order to engage in argumentation at all, speakers must
presuppose that all participants understand that argument to be a cooperative search for
that truth and are motivated to agree or disagree solely on the basis of the unforced force
of the better argument. (Allen, 2009, p. 11)
I suggest that the honest skeptic hopes that Habermas is correct. Though she may not engage the
discourse because she believes it is true, she may do so because she hopes it is true and that,
through dialogue, she is, in fact, talking with someone other than herself. Thus, given the
importance of inclusion of all voices in moral discourse by Habermas, even those skeptics who
remain consistent should be included in moral discourse. Those skeptics, however, are under the
onus to engage in intellectually honest discourse because it is in their communicative interest to
engage dialogue as if there is the hope that there are others and those others understand the
skeptic. The skeptic may put this in terms of a useful, though potentially fictional, narrative one
tells oneself—it may be delusional, yet, it produces understanding. Whether, through rational
discourse, the skeptic believes that she is coming to better understanding of externality or if she
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believes she is coming to better understanding of herself is irrelevant. Discourse ethics aims
towards inclusion and assumes a cooperative search for truth, and the honest skeptic must
genuinely consider the possibility (as she is a skeptic) that she is wrong about skepticism and is
rationally warranted in hoping she is wrong and, thus, is warranted in engaging in rational
discourse.
Thus the skeptic has good reason to engage discourse and engage it rationally, though she
may not accept the cognitive premise. She can recognize that the rules of communication,
whether rules of language, the mind, or of symbolic action, are rules that define her ability to
understand; thus, in her honest search for understanding (and potentially truth), she is rationally
motivated to engage in rational discourse as illuminated by Habermas. What, though, of the
problem of the elimination of those who do not have voices as discussed by Volkey (2008), who
argued that such exclusion is decimating to the discourse ethic, so decimating as to result in “no
remedy for cultural conflict”?
Volkey’s (2008) concern, which I believe is reduced to a solipsistic question, is best
answered in “Agency and the Other: On the intersubjective roots of self-identity” (Kögler, 2012).
Kögler returned us to the work of G.H. Mead, significantly developing it to the conclusion that
“the Other’s irreducible agency is constitutive of the self’s capacity to establish an identity”
(2009, p. 47). This identity was understood by Kögler as a “socially situated narrative selfinterpreting process” (p. 47). In this way Kögler’s work seeks to maintain an understanding of
human agency that 1) has the capacity to affect real change in the world 2) has the ability to
understand its own effects vis-à-vis the world and 3) and has the ability to differentiate between
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her or his causal powers by reconstructing the “intersubjective roots of self-identity” to help
“enhance and improve our understanding of reflexivity and self-identity” (p. 48).
Kögler’s work rests on Mead’s (1934) understanding of the self as its own object. Of
course, it is the ability to make sense of selfhood as such without the “objectification” of the self.
If the self holds itself as an object, how can it engage in reflexive self-understanding without
removing itself from the 1st person immediacy of experience? Intersubjectivity becomes the key
to selfhood, insofar as agents represent to themselves the Other that is expressed of themselves
by other agents. Selfhood emerges when one can recognize the Otherness inherent in the
experience of oneself by other Agents, understand that object as an Other represented by the
Other and thus can create a shared domain of perspective exchange. “This is so because each
agent is now, so to speak, able to leave their practically assigned role in the intersubjective
action-circle and switch, in an imaginary act, his or her perspective with that of the other”
(Kögler, 2012, p. 52). They become capable of sharing perspectives and understanding their own
Otherness as experienced by the Other. It is, in the context of role theory, “an explicit mode of
role-taking, such that ‘taking-the-attitude-of-the-other’ now becomes an explicit cognitive act for
the agent, another desideratum for a theory of self-consciousness can be provided” (p. 52).
Through this articulation, Kögler demonstrated the means by which agency is dependent on
intersubjective relation and perspective-taking. To exist is to be known by the Other.
The lynch-pin of Kögler’s argument is what presents the solution to the voiceless mind
problem brought to light by Volger (2008). Simply, there is an ethical debt that is created by the
self to the other because of the necessity of the other for the self.
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If the self thus understands her own full creative-reflexive agency as enabled by the
other, she now has to extend the very mode of recognition that makes her own existence
as agent possible to the other… ethical recognition demands in addition that the other is
always essentially projected as a reflexive agent who is capable to critically distance
herself from her own context, who is able to transcend and transform the given beliefs
and assumptions, and who is herself able to take the perspective of the other vis-à-vis
herself. (Kögler, 2012, p. 61)
Thus Kögler’s work requires that we do more than “voice” the other, it requires that we
recognize the agency of the other as it not just necessary but causally responsible for our own
agency through the exchanging of perspectives.
Volger’s (2008) concern, then, is addressed by arguing that those who cannot speak up
for themselves must be voiced, to the very best and most honest of our ability. While the concern
that this simply amounts to “speaking for” the marginalized could not be “spoken over” in this
way. Rather, they must be voiced, if they cannot speak for themselves in such a way that
acknowledges the ethical debt established by Kögler for agency itself. Thus, those who are less
rational or who cannot voice themselves, for whatever reason, remain part of the ethical dialectic
as voiced by those who have the ability to do so in such a way that recognizes their importance
for the existence of both 1) the self and 2) the dialectic.
I suggest, further, that this notion established by Kögler, while it may seem incompatible
with solipsism, is not. I suggest this by virtue of a “perspective taking” on the part of solipsism.
The solipsist who is skeptical about other minds would recognize that all conversations are acts
of “voicing.” The honest solipsist must acknowledge that she is at the very least generating all
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voices. Given the Habermasian realization of the essential characteristics of rational dialogue,
there is no reason to believe such rules simply disappear if one is only in dialectic with herself.
The rules that govern understanding remain embedded in dialectic regardless of one’s
engagement with others or with the self. Proper skeptical positioning would require that the
solipsist acknowledge that either her agency is generated by herself, and thus all voices are
generated by herself, and thus all voices are her own, and thus she has no rational reason to
choose some voices as having greater important than others (and in so doing accept the
Habermasian notion of discourse), or she must acknowledge, as Kögler contended, that her
agency is generated by others.
More importantly, the perspective-taking described by Kögler (2012) can be understood
through the perspective of Mead’s symbolic interactionism as a kind of an “imaginary game” in
which one imagines the perspective of the other. In so doing, the agent must acknowledge that
she does not know for sure what the thoughts, perspectives, and feelings are of the other and
always be prepared to revise her assumptions of those thoughts, perspectives and feelings. In this
way, the agent recognizes that she is voicing the other as the other is voicing her, and it is
through this exchange of voices and iteration of self-reflexivity that dialectic is created. One
accepts what the other has to say, and remains prepared to revise that perspective upon further
interaction with the voiced Other. As such, I see no reason to require that only those who can
speak or who seem sufficiently rational can be included in the dialectic, as Vokey’s argument
seems to suggest. Rather, honest self-reflexivity would require that one remain open to the
constant perspective making of the Other when generating the Other (namely the self). Thus,
when given sufficient reason, the rational self engages in the attempt to perspective-take with
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non-self others. This act of constant attempts to perspective-take mimics Mead’s developmental
account of childhood. Children attempt to generate selfhood through others and for others, often
finding that their attempt to perspective-take for chairs, teddy bears, and cartoon characters bears
no fruit. Yet, that honestly skeptical position that there may be others like myself who generate
myself, for whom I am an Other is a perspective we learn to distance ourselves from through
societal imperative, and, I argue, through a rejection of the rational and democratic inclusion
articulated by Habermas.
This is all to say that discourse ethics need not fall prey to skeptical or solipsistic claims.
Rather, a discourse ethic is one of few philosophies that allows for full engagement with such
skeptical positionings; it, through the primacy of the lifeworld, remains constantly prepared to
engage the perspective of others for the purpose of rational discourse. One must acknowledge
that rational discourse must be revisable as new perspectives are brought to bear. This
revisability is not in conflict with skepticism, but, rather, embraces the skeptical willingness to
consider that one’s perspective is not the sole perspective. Moreover, the ethical indebtedness
owed by the self to the other requires that the Habermasian acknowledge her own voicing of
others and consistently consider the perspective others who are not yet voiced, but yet may
generate through some unknown means one’s own selfhood. In so doing, the Habermasian
system does not just avoid Volkey’s concern for marginalization; Habermas actively combats
marginalization through an ever-present attempt to include all voices.

Thus, we have established not just the clear and logical link from the work of Soltis in
educational philosophy to the application of Habermas to educational philosophy; we have
effectively practiced the act of philosophical analysis. This chapter, thus far, has engaged the
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process of concept analysis as detailed through Scriven, Flew, and Soltis in order to understand
better what we mean when we say “definition.” Having accomplished this, we then
deconstructed terms such as “philosophy” in order to identify why philosophical analysis is not
simply a tool used by qualitative research, but is a lived experience that is practiced, as well, on
its own for the purpose of living a life of wisdom. Finally, the work deliberated on both the
strengths of Habermas as his work relates to this dissertation and those who might dissent such
as Foucault and the “consistent skeptic.” Having addressed the concerns of both Foucault and the
skeptic, discourse ethics demonstrates and ability not simply to deconstruct and eliminate those
concerns but rationally incorporate those concerns in the act of deliberative rationality. Thus, the
chapter mimics the process of self-reflexivity, acknowledging its “Otherness” in light of critical
works, and generating agency through the process of perspective sharing, rather than perspective
eliminating. In this way, the methodology has critically engaged the process of immanent
critique, engaged the situation of itself in the social schemes of life and systemsworld, and
engaged critical and rational discourse while voicing the dissent of the Other in order to produce
a consistent holism. As such, the work acts as not just an explication of, but an example of,
philosophical analysis.
Researcher Positionality
As has been discussed throughout the methodology, the researcher’s positionality is that
of skepticism. However, that position is also a one of prudence. Prudent skepticism suggests that
one need not be restricted in one’s dialectic by skepticism. One engages what may, or may not be
the world, not because has reason to believe in “Truth” but because one hopes that there is more
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to existence than solipsism, and, if there is a world, it is more prudent to attempt to engage it,
than to remain constrained by the epistemic void.
Ethically, the researcher is deeply sympathetic to care theory. He is especially motivated
by care theory when it is applied to education. The care theoretical perspective is one that he
believes is essential to an inclusive holism of dialectic that moves beyond world making into
worth making for the betterment of the community. It is his positioning that students, and there
welfare, should be always the primary directive of educational discourse.
The researcher has been a student at the University of North Florida for seventeen years,
most of those years as a full time graduate student. The impact of that time as a student has been
such that it is left the researcher often cynical regarding the intention of educational institutions
to benefit all students. While an institution may place before incoming students mottos and catch
phrases that suggest the importance of each individual student, he has found that there are
occasions in which educational institutions place their own welfare first.
Conversely, however, the researcher has also experienced the power of education and
elected to remain in an educational setting, as a college student for over 17 years. He has been
profoundly impacted by a few individual professors who demonstrate tremendous devotion to
their students and to the development of knowledge. It is because of his observation of
professorial care reason in conjunction with the observation of institutional harm and deception
that the researcher first noted that, for some professors, there is a tension in the academy. These
brilliant and dedicated educators seemed trapped between meeting institutional demands while
also meeting their own personal mandate to educate each student as if she is intrinsically
valuable as a learner.
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During his time as a student the researcher has also acted as a graduate teaching assistant,
adjunct instructor, and currently teaches high school English. Both teaching experiences, as well
as his long term engagement with the university as a student, inform his analysis in this
dissertation. It is important to note that the researcher has not been a professor. He has not been
expected to publish research nor engage in service. He has experienced the pressures associate
with attempting to work full time as an adjunct across multiple institutions, in some cases
teaching as many as nine classes a semester. His experience as an educator has informed the
analysis of his findings. He cannot understand the role tension experienced by the professoriate,
he does however have practical experience with learners. As such, he has discovered that the
most effective means by which to educate has been through creating a highly invested classroom
environment in which the students know that the instructor cares about them and the material.
Thus, as a student and as a teacher the researcher found the work of Habermas
particularly compelling as a means by which to generate understanding faculty roles. The
inclusive nature of discourse ethics fits neatly on the dialectical frame generate both inside the
classroom and throughout the collegial institution. The process of knowledge production through
constructive and intersubjective inquiry is a personal experience had by the researcher that he
found powerful and effective. Similarly, his personal experience with learners has led him to the
belief that care is a necessary condition for effective education. While his observation has been
that some institutions allow for the fact, and perhaps expect, that some students will fail, he
believes that, if the knowledge is truly important, the caring educator considers every failure, her
own. As such, the researcher’s analysis of the data incorporates the Care Ethics of Nel Noddings.
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Credibility and Ensuring Rigor
Credibility and Trustworthiness
To ensure the credibility and trustworthiness of this dissertation, a number of measures
have been taken. Firstly, the dissertation has adopted a series of well-established methods. As
evidenced here, in the methodology, philosophical analysis as a well-respected mode of inquiry.
The work of Anthony Scriven and Jonas Soltis both provide foundational groundwork not just in
the tradition of philosophy, but in the tradition of exploring education through the application of
philosophical analysis. Philosophical theory, particularly in conjunction with sociological theory
has a history of productive application in educational research. The work of Habermas, in
particular, has been demonstrated to have a productive history both in educational theory and
research as well as in organizational research.
To further ensure credibility, the researcher has had frequent debriefing sessions with his
dissertation chair and methodologist, both in person and via email. The researcher has met
regularly with the dissertation chair to ensure that the process of the dissertation, particularly the
development of the methodology, maintains a high level of rigor and quality. Dr. Kögler, both a
professional philosopher and a foremost expert on the work of Habermas, has been actively
engaged in every step of the dissertation to ensure that the process is philosophically sound and
that the researcher engages the application of Habermas accurately.
The dissertation endeavors to follow a clear line of reasoning. Often at the expense of
brevity, the researcher has taken great care to ensure trustworthiness by explaining each logical
inference. This step is taken not only to provide a clear line of reasoning, but because the
expectation of philosophical investigation is to provide the reader with the mean by which she
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both can follow the line of reasoning in order to come to the same conclusions and in order to
provide complete transparency to that every logical step can be questioned.
The final chapter will provide “reflective commentary.” This reflective commentary is
yet another means by which the dissertation seeks to provide trustworthiness as well as
transparency. Moreover, this this particular credibility tool is especially appropriate for
philosophy as such reflective commentary has a long history as an essential philosophical
component. To engage in reflective commentary will also be a moment of hermeneutic
participation with the reader. In so doing, the researcher will reach out to the reader with his own
internality articulated in prose in order to engage the heart of the discourse ethical enterprise.
Essential to this project is the realization that, to “apply discourse ethics” requires more than
following Habermasian principles of universalization, it requires engaging others in active
dialectic in order to produce the best possible argument. This dissertation will attempt to engage
other theorists and researchers dialectically through their presentation, here, but that does not
suffice. The reflective commentary is the moment when the reader becomes actively involved in
not just the theoretical dialectic, but the personal reflective reasoning presented by the researcher
through his reflective commentary.
The researcher’s background is particularly useful for this project. He has experience as
an educator both on the post-secondary level and as a high school teacher. The researcher also as
an MA in practical philosophy and applied ethics, and so he is particularly well suited for the
exploration of ethical concepts afforded by this investigation. As such, he is well positioned to
provide a thick description of the constructs investigated in this dissertation, and has attempted to
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demonstrate the process of thick description through the detailed analysis of philosophical
methodology presented here in chapter 3.
In order to provide a level of external examination of the credibility of this project the
work of Thomas Kuhn (1977) will be used in chapter 6 to help ensure the quality of the construct
developed in chapter 5. In his work “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” Kuhn
detailed 5 criteria for theory evaluation, particularly in science. Kuhn, whose work is seminal in
the philosophy of science, provides a well-recognized, well-grounded, means by which to
evaluate the quality of a theory. Although this work is not a scientific one, the criteria presented
by Kuhn remain applicable to any theory when attempting to gauge its usefulness as a theory.
Thus, to the degree it is applicable, Kuhn will be used here to evaluate the construct developed
through this dissertation.
Transferability
The data presented here are highly transferable. The questions explored here will lead to
numerous other questions for future research because of the highly transferable nature of the
project. Although the project focuses on the roles of faculty in post-secondary institutions, the
concepts and construct developed here are applicable to the entirety of the educational discipline.
This investigation, because it engages the nature of teaching, the nature of research, and the
nature of philosophical inquiry can be applied to any question regarding education, research, or
philosophical analysis. This work because of its engagement with role theory and development
of a role theoretical model that relies on discourse ethics, can be used to develop understanding
of roles in any organizational or social context.
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Dependability
The methodology discussed her in chapter 3 provides dependability in so far as there is
the employment of overlapping methods, such as role theory and philosophical inquiry, and
detailed description of the method employed so that this investigation can be repeated. The
documents analyzed here, in order to investigate the nature of our discourse regarding faculty
roles, are accessible to anyone who wishes to similarly review them, and the modes of
investigation are all richly detailed.
As mentioned previously, the researcher’s beliefs and assumptions are grounded in
Foucault and skepticism. His own intuitions are such that knowledge remains elusive and human
construction of knowledge is deeply embedded in power relations. As such, the potential
shortcoming of bias in this work is particularly concerning as the traditional empirical means
used in educational research to evaluate data are set aside in order to engage philosophical
analysis. However, this project seeks to provide a construct that itself can be evaluated through
empirical means.
The research here does not involve subjects of any kind, human or otherwise. All
investigation has been of documents and theories that are available to the general public either as
published online by institutional websites, published in academic journals, or published as texts.
The University of North Florida Institutional Review Board was consulted and they determined
that this research project was not subject to IRB review.
Chapter summary/conclusions
This chapter firstly sought to exemplify the practice of philosophical analysis. The
presentation of the work was such that it both detailed the arguments laid out by theorists who
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argue for the application of philosophy to education and acted, itself, as an example of
philosophical analysis. The arguments made by Scriven and Soltis were given special attention in
order to better understand how philosophers of education conceptualize the role of philosophy in
educational discourse. Their thinking, though, was largely focused on analytic definitions of
philosophy, but the philosophical analysis, here, demonstrated that philosophy is more robust
than analysis and is best understood as a “lived experience.” Thus, the analytic definition of
philosophical analysis may be best understood as “conceptual analysis” while philosophical
analysis, itself, includes the holism of lived discourse—it is a life of inquiry through dialectical
engagement. The questions posed in this dissertation are especially appropriate for a
philosophical methodology as they require, first, the establishment of clear constructs that
themselves can be investigated and examined. The research questions, however, also
demonstrate a need for normativity—for a theory of best understanding and practice. This
analysis, therefore, is one such that it requires a philosophical thesis such that one can both
develop a defined construct for the purposes of theoretical and empirical examination and such
that one can suggest a best framework for understanding the roles in question. Thus, this chapter
argued that it is discourse analysis that is best suited for the development of the construct, as
discourse analysis provides both an ontological and logical frame for understanding the way
social discourse produces phenomena and because the normative force of Habermas’ work
provides a grounding set of imperatives that guide the development of a construct that itself has
normative force.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the presentation of data. In the case of philosophical inquiry,
“data” often means “ideas.” Some of the material presented here may be considered data in the
more commonly-used qualitative sense. Specifically, some of the information here may
be0020considered similar to document analysis. The goal, however, has not been to create an
empirical study in which a selected sample of documents can be analyzed to generate
understanding of a certain construct as created through those documents. Rather, a larger scope
of documents will be analyzed for the purpose of generating the construct “faculty roles.”
Presented here will be the roles of faculty as inscribed by universities. Six
research/teaching university faculty handbooks have been examined for their inscription of
faculty roles and responsibly in terms of teaching and research. According to the Carnegie
Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, there are 99 institutions that are classified as
“high research activity” (RU/H). There are also those considered to be “very high research
activity” (RU/VH). For the purposes of this dissertation, those institutions were limited to those
that are considered to be “high research activity” that also have a strong teaching emphasis.
“Very high research activity” universities were omitted from examination due to the fact that the
potential unequal emphasis on research over teaching may create a skewed view of the general
inscription of faculty roles in favor of research. It should be noted, however, that there are
currently eight more universities classified as RU/VH, thus there may be reason to believe that
more faculty are required to engage in “very high” amounts of research as opposed to “high”
amounts of research.
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This dissertation, however, applies the philosophical Principle of Charity. The Principle
of Charity suggests that when engaging in analysis or discourse it is most logical to assume that
the ideas analyzed or one’s opponent is coming from the strongest and most rational positioning,
rather than from the most easily-refuted position. If part of the researcher’s assumption in this
work is that universities will be more research-driven more than teaching-driven (due to the
numerous articles reporting the intense pressure to publish), then it is important that when
collecting data the researcher does not seek out data to act as confirmation for his bias. Rather,
the Principle of Charity should be applied, and we will assume that universities do not emphasize
research over teaching.
Rather than analyze the handbooks of “RU/VH” research universities, we will analyze
the handbooks of those that are only “RU/H” universities under the assumption that those that
are only “highly” research-focused also focus heavily on teaching. In this way, the researcher
bias that universities focus more on research can be addressed, and, also, if those universities that
claim to also be teaching-focused show a tendency to prefer research over teaching, then one
may conclude that those universities deemed “very high” in research activity are even less
focused on teaching in preference for research. Thus, we will engage the generation of faculty
roles as if it is true that universities do engage in an honest attempt to require faculty be both
teachers and researchers to the best of their ability. The universities were chosen randomly, but
only those that had online handbooks freely available to the public were considered. Note that
the goal is not to understand how faculty handbooks at universities understand faculty roles;
rather, examination of these handbooks will assist the researcher in developing a broader picture
of faculty roles as inscribed by those institutions.
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A series of professional research associations’ ethical codes are also presented and
analyzed here. Again a broad spectrum of research associations have been included, including
the AERA, APA, and the MLA. In order to understand the role “researcher,” it is important to
understand how the professional associations of researchers inscribe researcher responsibilities.
As universities expect faculty to be active participants in research and in the professional
associations governing their particular disciplines, the examination of these documents emerges
from the roles of faculty as described by their institutions. To be researchers at the university
means to participate in professional associations, conduct their research in ways that are
approved by those professional associations, and publish in formats and journals associated with
those professional associations.
To uncover the culturally embedded assumptions that generate faculty roles, we must
move beyond organizational role theory and organizationally inscribed roles. Thus, we will also
consider the work of seminal theorists as they describe the ethical obligations of teachers and
professors. Effort has been made by the researcher to focus on ethical discussion particular to the
professoriate, but focus has not been limited to such discussions. Again, the social construct of
“teacher” must be considered in order to uncover the embedded assumptions that construct our
concept of teacher. The theorists who discuss this work play an important role in this work, as
we must acknowledge that what a teacher does and what she should do are two different things.
The first two categories of data examined here are inscribed roles that must be followed by
faculty and researchers in order to continue performing those roles. The ethical obligations
described by these theorists, however, are suggestions and arguments, enunciated expectations,
but they may not describe what we as a society actually inscribe and require of our teachers in a
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codified way. Thus, we may see a tension between the inscribed roles and the ethical obligations
required by ethical theory. Effort will be made, however, to analyze these works in a way to find
as much consistency and coherence as possible between the data sets. This final data set,
however, will provide the groundwork for developing the Habermasian analysis of the faculty
construct as a whole. As the work is developed, the researcher will note ways in which the ideas
presented can be understood as coherent. Preliminary analysis will be conducted as well in order
to provide the basic philosophical groundwork for chapter 5.
Particular attention will be given here in chapter 4 to the Habermasian notions of
lifeworld and systemsworld. The data will be considered from the lifeworld/ systemsworld
dichotomy, while at the same time remembering that this binary generates a whole construct.
However, as discussed by various theorists, understanding different roles and role
responsibilities as more or less focused on the lifeworld or the systemsworld will provide an
insight into potential conflicts between the roles. Moreover, as discussed by Habermas,
understanding of whether or not more primacy is given to those aspects of a role that are
associated with the systemsworld may provide insight into difficulties society has with
incorporating that role into the lifeworld. Full synthesis and generation of the most coherent
construct conjoining “teacher” and “researcher” is reserved for chapter 5.
Given the above, a hypothesis can be formulated about the data: as mentioned previously
in regards to concerns about bias, I suspect the definitions and inscriptions of faculty roles by
institutions in the handbooks and in research guidelines to be dominated by a systemsworld
epistemology. Thus, the researcher can further avoid concerns about bias, as that bias is now
formalized as a hypothesis as opposed to a general intuition that may consciously or

205
unconsciously guide the collection of data. Rather, I will seek evidence that disproves that
hypothesis. If, however, the evidence seems to support the hypothesis, then the normative shift
taken by this dissertation as the “ought” will bring back to mind—for faculty as well as for
administrators—the lifeworldly grounding or definitions of faculty roles, as this grounding is
what ultimately defines the educational process as a dialogical interaction focused on growth in
knowledge, skill, and character.
Faculty Roles as Inscribed in University Handbooks
In discussing the inscription of faculty roles, it is important to note that not all
universities make their faculty handbooks available to the general public. The documents
discussed here include only those universities that provide access to their faculty handbooks to
the general public through their .edu websites, for free. So we cannot say that the analysis is
comprehensive. Rather, in the case of discourse analysis, we can view it as an investigation into
a slice of the discourse. We will examine some of the dialectic and investigate the imbedded
assumptions of that dialectic. In some ways, the work here is akin to reconstructing a dialogue
when one only has a transcript of one of the two speakers. One can develop at least a limited
understanding of what both speakers are saying by using logic to infer from the responses of the
known speaker. In this way, we engage a discourse-ethical and hermeneutic move; we assume
that the documents are meant to be understood by a public that shares similar grounding
assumptions about discourse and ethics. In so doing, we can reconstruct the model of faculty
generated by these documents in such a way as to make a coherent picture.
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The University of Memphis
Of the university handbooks reviewed, The University of Memphis provides some of the
most detailed requirements of their faculty in its faculty handbook. The handbook clearly
discusses teaching and researching roles in its presentation of tenure and promotion guidelines.
The University of Memphis’ handbook also provides definitions of teaching and research as
applicable to the university. However, like most of the handbooks reviewed, The University of
Memphis emphasizes the fact that tenure and promotion also follow guidelines laid out by
particular departments. What counts as “good research” may differ from department to
department not because of quality, but because of medium. For example, journal publication may
be most appropriate for a philosophy department, while creative writing may require publication
of books, and the music department may prefer international concerts.
The University of Memphis, like all of the institutions whose handbooks were reviewed,
is largely focused on describing the hierarchy and structure of the university. It begins with a
brief history of the university and then details the committee structure, bureaucratic structure,
and academic organization. The handbook then addresses faculty roles. The role discussion,
however, does not include the roles of teacher and researcher. Rather, the roles discussed are
hierarchical: chairperson, administrators, ombudsperson, grievance committee, graduate faculty,
and faculty senate. Similarly, the handbook addresses issues of policy and procedure: how to file
grievances, language requirements, benefits, leaves of absence, compensation, and awards.
The handbook does spend some time addressing issues of instruction and research. In the
section titled “instruction,” the handbook details the requirements of faculty in the classroom.
Largely, this section addresses legal issues such as student confidentiality and academic
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dishonesty. The grading system is also explained, as are class rolls. It is explained that faculty
members must attend class and keep office hours. The rest of the section addresses how to deal
with inclement weather, faculty absences, and commencement. There is also brief mention of
services to which faculty can refer students who are in need of help.
The section titled “research and service” also does not clarify the roles of faculty
members as researchers. Rather, it provides the framework of bureaucracy for them in order to
assist them in navigating the research system of the university. Faculty members are provided
information regarding the hierarchy of the university in regards to research and details the
administration. Requirements regarding copyrights and patents are also addressed. The research
and service section closes by addressing regulatory issues, consulting, centers of excellence, and
the appropriate use of technology resources.
Most of the documents reviewed restrict their discussion of faculty and researcher roles
to their sections on promotion and tenure. There are some that also discuss faculty
responsibilities outside of tenure and promotion, and those will be discussed here. It is important
to note, however, that the focuses on promotion and tenure are likely the result of the fact that
promotion and tenure usually require that the faculty member excel in the two roles the
university requires them to play. To quote the University of Memphis handbook: “The quality of
the faculty of any university is maintained primarily through the appraisal, by competent faculty,
and administrative officers, of each candidate for tenure and promotion” (p. 57). Thus, as
promotion and tenure require that a faculty member has been both an effective teacher and
researcher, it is there that these documents most often discuss what is required of faculty in terms
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of teaching and research. Unlike the other faculty handbooks reviewed here, the University of
Memphis provides “definitions” of teaching and research. The handbook states of teaching:
Teaching is central to the purposes and objectives of the University of Memphis. It
encompasses classroom instruction, course development, mentoring students in academic
projects including dissertations, testing, grading, and the professional development of the
faculty member as a teacher. Mentoring students at all levels is an important aspect of
teaching; creative and effective use of innovative teaching methods and curricular
innovations is encouraged. (p. 59)
The document then goes on to remind the reader that the definition of teaching should be
“adapted to different disciplines” (p. 59). It appears, here, that mentorship is central to the
“definition” generated by the university. While this is not an actual definition, as it does not
identify denotatively, connotatively, or ostensively what a teacher is, the paragraph does explain
the expectations of a teacher, thus meeting some of the need to understand how faculty roles are
inscribed through faculty handbooks.
The embedded assumption in the description of the teaching role is the idea of
mentorship. The university assumes that one knows what mentorship means. “Mentoring
students at all levels” brings to mind an idea of a kind academic relationship in which the faculty
member guides the student through difficult work. Of the handbooks reviewed, it is the only one
that implies a kind of care on the part of the faculty member. To be a mentor suggests more than
a cold, distant grading relationship, and brings to mind an in-depth relationship in which the
faculty member is invested in the welfare of the student. The document does not state this
directly, however. The mention of mentorship is brief, and is couched in language that is far
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more systems-oriented, focusing on requirements that the faculty member hold class for the
entire class time, that she engage in professional development, and that she prove her
effectiveness through student success.
Similarly, the University of Memphis handbook defines scholarship by what it does
rather than what it is. Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the university, the handbook takes a
multi-disciplinary approach to the presentation of the different means by which faculty can meet
their research requirement.
Scholarship is a discipline-based, multidisciplinary activity that advances knowledge and
learning by producing new ideas and understanding. Scholarly contributions include
peer-evaluated, discipline-appropriate works such as books, articles, chapters, films,
paintings, performances, and choreographic or theatrical design. Scholarship can be
divided into five sub-categories: application, creative activity, inquiry, integration, and
the scholarship of teaching. Each department, considering its relevant discipline or
disciplines, may emphasize contributions in some subcategories more than others, as
described in its mission statement and other relevant departmental documents. Individual
faculty are not expected to contribute in all five subcategories of scholarship. Some
overlap in the meaning of the five subcategories is inevitable, and a particular scholarly
contribution may fall under more than one subcategory. These subcategories are:
• Creative activity should be fully accepted as scholarship in departments where such
work is appropriate to both professional specialization and teaching. It includes, but is not
limited to, choreography and dance performance; creative writing; direction and design of
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plays; exhibitions of visual arts such as paintings, sculpture, and photography; direction
of film and video; and musical composition and performance.
• Inquiry involves rigorous investigation aimed at the discovery of new knowledge
within one's own discipline or area of study; it often serves as the basis for other forms of
scholarship and may result in scholarly publications, funded research, and presentations
at professional meetings.
• Integration makes meaningful connections between previously unrelated topics, facts,
or observations, such as cross-disciplinary synthesis or an integrative framework within a
discipline that results in a publication or presentation in a suitable forum.
• The scholarship of teaching focuses on transforming and extending knowledge about
pedagogy, including appropriate textbooks or educational articles in one's own discipline.
Innovative contributions to teaching, if published or presented in a peer-reviewed forum,
also constitute scholarship of teaching. The "scholarship of teaching" is not equivalent to
teaching. Classroom teaching and staying current in one's field are not relevant criteria
for evaluating faculty on the "scholarship of teaching."
• Engaged scholarship now subsumes the scholarship of application. It adds to existing
knowledge in the process of applying intellectual expertise to collaborative problemsolving with urban, regional, state, national and/or global communities and results in a
written work shared with others in the discipline or field of study. Engaged scholarship
conceptualizes "community groups" as all those outside of academe and requires shared
authority at all stages of the research process from defining the research problem,
choosing theoretical and methodological approaches, conducting the research, developing
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the final product(s), to participating in peer evaluation. Departments should refine the
definition as appropriate for their disciplines and incorporate evaluation guidelines in
departmental tenure and promotion criteria. (p. 60)
Note that much more time is given to the discussion of scholarship by the handbook than of
research. This may be only due to the fact that the university seeks to clarify the numerous ways
faculty can meet their research obligations, while teaching can only be done as “teaching.” Just a
moment’s research into “teaching,” though, reveals that there are many different ways in which
teachers can engage their profession as educators. Thus, this suggests that the university is either
a) not concerned with or b) unaware of the many different modes of teaching. Regardless, what
emerges is a document that focuses more on the details of research than on the details of
teaching.
What remains unclear in reviewing the document is exactly how much research is
required of the professor. Specifics regarding whether the professor has contributed enough to
knowledge are left undiscussed, likely in order to allow the individual departments to make its
own determinations regarding scholarship. Similarly, what counts as a “good teacher” is not
discussed in the handbook. Promotion and tenure are granted to those faculty members who
demonstrate “good teaching” through student success, departmental evaluations, and student
evaluations. The exact requirements for teaching and research are left to the department.
Members of the faculty are required to conduct themselves ethically, particularly in terms of
research, by avoiding plagiarism, but the requirements for teaching roles and researching roles
remain unclear despite the driven definitions. The work is largely one that engages the
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systemsworld; it seeks to set down policies and address bureaucratic issues, and there is little
engagement with the lifeworld of leadership and learning.
Oklahoma State University
The other handbooks reviewed do not attempt to give definitions of teaching and
research. They are all similar to the University of Memphis faculty handbook in their discussion
of policy and administrative hierarchy, but the University of Memphis faculty handbook
provides the most information regarding how faculty should approach teaching and research in
order to gain promotion and tenure. The Oklahoma State University faculty handbook provides
no definitions of teaching or research. It also provides very little information regarding how the
faculty gains promotion and tenure. This is to say that despite the length of the appendix
dedicated to promotion and tenure, very little information is given regarding what faculty must
do to earn promotion or tenure. Rather, the section is dedicated to detailing the ways in which
committees are appointed, explaining the hierarchy of professors and promotion, and the benefits
of promotion and tenure. The expectations of faculty as teachers and researchers are
encapsulated in two paragraphs:
1. Effective classroom teaching and classroom related duties: Teaching is the primary
duty of instructional faculty. Faculty are charged with the responsibility to challenge and
motivate students, to maintain high academic standards, and to help students think
independently in order to understand concepts and solve problems. Faculty must also
work with a diverse student body and instill in them the confidence to be successful. To
accomplish these objectives, faculty must remain current in their respective fields, must
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continually improve their teaching methods, and must contribute to the development of
the curriculum.
2. Scholarship: Faculty are expected to remain current and active in their fields of study.
This may be accomplished by pursuing advanced courses or degrees, continuing
education, or obtaining special license of certification. Faculty are encouraged to attend
and make presentations at professional meetings. (p. 96)
The above two paragraphs seem to once again suggest that teaching is connected to the idea of
free and “independent” thought. Note that primacy appears to be given to teaching over research:
“Teaching is the primary duty of instructional faculty.” Scholarship also does not emphasize
publication, but rather continuing education and participation in professional meetings. The
document also does include the brief statement: “Faculty have the professional responsibility to
provide quality learning experiences for the student. Faculty are expected to meet their classes at
scheduled times. In cases of illness or any other emergency, the faculty will notify the
department head so that appropriate action may be taken” (p. 23). Thus, there is an expectation
of “quality teaching,” though what the phrase means, exactly, is never clarified. Additionally, no
mention is made of journal publication, unlike some of the other documents reviewed here.
Like the University of Memphis, faculty are encouraged to engage in a mentorship, as
seen in the selection from the handbook below:
Active participation in the OSU-Oklahoma City student experience: Faculty need to
be concerned with developing the whole potential in the students as future leaders.
Faculty must be willing to serve as role models, academic advisors, mentors, and
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sponsors of student organizations. Faculty should also take advantage of any
opportunities to recruit students and promote the institution. (p. 96)
We see, then, a repeated emphasis on the idea that faculty members should in some way
“mentor” students. It is important to note that this idea falls neatly into the lifeworld. The idea
that students should be addressed as whole people for the purpose of their personal betterment is
an idea that is not reducible to purely systemsworld organization. What is missing is detailed
discussion of mentorship and what it entails. Moreover, note the systemsworld commitment of
these handbooks: while they do take the time to explain how faculty will be evaluated, they do
not ever include how that evaluation will include mentorship. Rather, the evaluations are
restricted to student success ratings, student reported evaluations on surveys, and classroom
visits. So on the one hand, the handbooks seem to suggest the importance of the lifeworld; on the
other, they create a system of measurement that emphasizes the systemsworld and does not seem
to consider the lifeworld notions expounded as sufficiently essential to good teaching as to be
included in evaluation of faculty.
Interestingly, in the case of Oklahoma State University, the only evidence of the
importance of research and scholarship is mentioned briefly when discussing appointment of
instructors: “Individuals must present evidence of scholarship, teaching ability, and practical
experience” (p. 97). This requirement seems to carry over to the appointment of assistant,
associate, and full professors, but that implication is not stated directly. The handbook, however,
does state a professional ethic that reveals the university’s stance on scholarship far more than
the discussion of promotion and tenure: the fact that promotion and tenure are heavily influenced
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by individual departmental requirements and individual committee evaluations suggests that
although scholarship may seem under-emphasized, it may not be so.
The statement of ethics suggests that scholarship is rather important to the university:
The handbook claims that the faculty endorses the “American Association of University
Professors' 1966 statement on Professional Ethics” (p. 109). The Statement on Professional
Ethics is rich with information regarding perspectives on teaching and researching that are
omitted from the discussion of tenure and promotion. However, given that tenure and promotion
require that the faculty member be professionally ethical, it stands to reason that promotion and
tenure, in the case of Oklahoma State University, require that faculty display the qualities
expressed in the Statement. The statement is quoted below:
The following statement was drafted by the American Association of University
Professors and was edited by Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, to make it gender
neutral.
1. Professors, guided by a deep conviction of the worth and dignity of the advancement
of knowledge, recognize the special responsibilities placed upon them. Their primary
responsibility to their subject is to seek and to state the truth as they see it. To this end
they devote their energies to developing and improving their scholarly competence. They
accept the obligation to exercise critical self-discipline and judgment in using, extending,
and transmitting knowledge. They practice intellectual honesty. Although they may
follow subsidiary interests, these interests must never seriously hamper or compromise
their freedom of inquiry.
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2. As teachers, professors encourage the free pursuit of learning in their students. They
hold before them the best scholarly standards of their discipline. They demonstrate
respect for students as individuals, and adhere to the proper roles of intellectual guides
and counselors. They make every reasonable effort to foster honest academic conduct and
to assure that the evaluation of students reflects their true merit. They respect the
confidential nature of the relationship between professor and student. They avoid any
exploitation of students for their private advantage and acknowledge significant
assistance from them. They protect their academic freedom.
3. As colleagues, professors have obligations that derive from common membership in
the community of scholars. They respect and defend the free inquiry of their associates.
In the exchange of criticism and ideas, they show due respect for the opinions of others.
They acknowledge their academic debts and strive to be objective in their professional
judgment of colleagues. They accept their share of faculty responsibilities for the
governance of their institution.
4. As members of their institution, professors seek above all to be effective teachers and
scholars. Although they observe the stated regulations of the institution, provided they do
not contravene academic freedom, they maintain their right to criticize and seek revision.
When considering the interruption or termination of their service, they recognize the
effect of their decision upon the program of the institution and give due notice of their
intentions.
5. As members of their community, professors have the rights and obligations of any
citizen. They measure the urgency of these obligations in the light of their responsibilities
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to their subject, to their students, to their profession, and to their institution. When they
speak or act as private persons, they avoid creating the impression that they speak or act
for their college or University. As citizens engaged in a profession that depends upon
freedom for its health and integrity, professors have a particular obligation to promote
conditions of free inquiry and to further public understanding of academic freedom. (pp.
133-134)
Above, one sees a work rich with enunciated teacher and researcher roles. Note, firstly, that the
role of faculty as researcher is stated first. It is stated in paragraph four that “professors seek
above all to be effective teachers and scholars.” Thus, primacy is given to research as the first
stated responsibility of faculty members, but then placed second in primacy when document
articulates what faculty should “seek above all.” The statement on professional ethics therefore
seems to place equal emphasis on the importance of teaching and researcher.
There is no discussion in the statement on professional ethics of the ways research and
teaching should buttress each other. The connection between the two, however, is not difficult to
uncover. Faculty are required to develop and improve their “scholarly competence,” while at the
same time they are required to “encourage the free pursuit of learning” in their students. These
two imperatives are consistent. In order to most effectively encourage learning in her students,
the professor must herself be competent. Moreover, as the document suggests, she models
scholarly endeavor for her students, both through her teaching and in her professional endeavors.
One may assume that being “effective scholars” indicates that some level of publication
is required, as participation in and contribution to the body of knowledge is expected. One also
sees some of the implications of the mentorship roles expected of the faculty. To be a mentor, in
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this case, seems to mean that one guides students toward academic freedom. Moreover, the
document is a lifeworld document that includes the importance of community dialectic. The
emphasis is not on hierarchy, structure, or system evaluation, but, instead, on normative
performance—specifically the dialectical participation in a community that includes scholars,
students, and general stakeholders.
An important assumption also revealed through a Habermasian analysis of these
documents is the realization that faculty, according to the Statement on Professional Ethics to
which the university proscribes, are expected to pursue “truth as they see it,” yet, there is no
mention of “teaching” that truth. Rather, faculty members are encouraged to foster free learning,
and are, repeatedly, admonished to respect students. Thus, one realizes that the document
suggests that professors are obligated to become as knowledgeable as possible, and that one
should engage in the production of knowledge with her colleagues. Simultaneously, the faculty
member should not be indoctrinating students with what she “sees” as knowledge, but, instead,
through her teaching and through her example, should foster the same voracious pursuit of
knowledge exhibited by the professor herself. Teaching, thus, is not—at least suggests the
Statement on Professional ethics—a profession dedicated to enforcing knowledge, but, rather,
the action of helping others find it for themselves.
The Oklahoma State University handbook, thus, does present a picture of faculty in a
lifeworld way, albeit only in the appendix. The handbook itself is focused largely on the
systemsworld and the establishment of policy for the purposes of managing, organizing, and
structuring the university. The handbook seems to emphasize research less than the other
handbooks considered here, but, again, that focus shifts when considering the Statement on
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Professional Ethics included in the appendix. Without further research into actual departmental
policy, one cannot ascertain through the handbook if professors are simply not expected to
publish. However, the designation of the university as a high research university suggests that
this is not the case. Rather, the document may simply assume a synonymy between “scholarship”
and “publication.” That embedded synonymy, however, would suggest not just a systemsworld
perspective on teaching, but a systemsworld perspective on publication. Yet, to be a scholar must
mean more than to produce quantifiable articles and books that can be evaluated by the system.
To be a “scholar” connotes a broader holism of participation in knowledge through dialectic,
reading, discourse, presentation, teaching, and contribution to the world of knowledge. If the
university has created a synonomy between scholarship and publication, then much lifeworld
connotation of scholarship has been lost.

The University of Miami
The University of Miami provides a handbook that details a great deal of policy and
procedure. It is rather detailed in regards to the hierarchical nature of the university and in
regards to university policy on benefits, appointments, termination, administration, and so on.
Always, however, these issues are addressed from the perspective of a generalized procedure.
Details regarding what would cause termination are omitted in favor of discussion that only
details the procedure if one terminates her contract or it is terminated by the university. Due to its
detailed nature, the University of Miami handbook provides a useful definition of tenure for its
faculty that illuminates the systems nature of the university. Insofar as this is the case, the
handbook provides the “meaning” of tenure. To say that one will provide the “meaning” of a
term connotes a robust and rich description. However, one may, instead, infer that “meaning”
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may reflect, only, a legalized terminology restricting what a term means by virtue of indicating
“this term does not entitle you to anything beyond…” as a predicate. Interestingly, the definition
of tenure provided by the University of Miami seems to avoid providing meaning in any sense
other than in the most legalized and systematized way. It does, however, mention briefly the
expectation that faculty should participate in teaching and research:
Meaning of Tenure
(a) Faculty members having tenure shall have appointments continued from year to year
without necessity for annual or other renewal.
(b) Tenure implies that the faculty member shall accede to reasonable requests to
redistribute efforts among various duties including teaching, research, and clinical service
where appropriate, to accept classes assigned, whether in day or evening hours, and, in an
emergency and for the period thereof, to accept such other reasonable assignments as
may be deemed necessary by the University.
(c) Tenure does not imply any promise of promotion or any regular increase in salary, but
it does assure the faculty member of participation in any general change in the salary
scale. It also assures the faculty member of provisions for general working conditions on
the same basis as other faculty members in the same academic areas who have similar
professional activities and duties. (pp. 56-57)
The above says little about the connotations of tenure. It does not reflect on the importance of
tenure. Other handbooks, we have noted and will note again, connect tenure to freedom of
expression and inquiry. The University of Miami, however, is careful to understand tenure as
part of an organization, a way of providing benefits that must be clarified, defined, and limited.
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Similarly, the University of Miami also defines scholarship and tenure in terms of tenure
and promotion. Like the definition of “tenure,” the definitions are not robust in the sense of the
lifeworld. The definitions provided below are specifically intended to express what is expected
of faculty if they are to achieve promotion. In so doing, they effectively inscribe faculty roles as
scholars and teachers.
Scholarship
Scholarship embraces inquiry, research, and creative professional performance and
activity. Scholarship is required for effective teaching and is the obligation of all
members of the faculty. Scholarship may be judged by the character of the advanced
degree, by contributions to knowledge in the form of publication and instruction, by
reputation among other scholars and professionals, and by the performance of students.
The scholarly function of a university requires the appointment of faculty members
devoted to inquiry and research. Among the criteria for evaluating research are the
publication of books by nationally recognized presses and of articles and reviews of a
scholarly nature in books, periodicals, technical reports, and other forms of publication
nationally recognized in the profession; the direction of scholarly work by students
working on advanced degrees; professional awards and fellowships; membership on
boards and commissions devoted to inquiry; and the judgment of professional colleagues.
Scholarship may be demonstrated by significant achievement in an art related to a
faculty member's discipline, such as creative works, original designs, or original
procedures. National recognition of such activities is demonstrated by: commissions,
awards and prizes from nationally recognized bodies; performances with nationally
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recognized companies; invited presentations, exhibitions, lectures and performances
before nationally recognized bodies; invitations to teach master classes or lead intensive
workshops at nationally recognized institutions; and reviews of performance and creative
works in nationally recognized journals, magazines and newspapers.
Promotion, tenure, and merit salary increases should recognize these scholarly
achievements. Whenever possible, chairs shall reduce other duties for faculty engaged in
these activities.
C9.3 Teaching
The educational function of a university requires the appointment of faculty who are
effective teachers. The means of evaluating teaching effectiveness include: (1) the
informed judgment of colleagues; (2) the performance of students; and (3) student
opinion of teaching effectiveness. Promotion, tenure, and merit salary increases should
recognize outstanding achievements in teaching. (pp. 57-59)
Perhaps most noticeable is the much greater detail regarding research and what constitutes
research as described by the University of Miami than given to teaching. The discussion of
teaching is almost a passing reference in comparison with the details on research. Note that the
discussion of scholarship also provides a justification for the importance of scholarship as “[t]he
scholarly function of a university requires the appointment of faculty members devoted to
inquiry and research” (p.57). Moreover, note that scholarship is further emphasized as also
essential for effective teaching. However, no such statement is made about teaching as essential
to good scholarship. Thus, the handbook seems to suggest a relationship in which scholarship is
supervenient upon effective teaching.
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It is made clear in the handbook that publication is one of the means by which faculty
members are evaluated, if appropriate to their field of scholarship; otherwise, creative works are
considered instead. Effectiveness in teaching, rather than a series of disjunctive research
opportunities, is determined by a conjunction of colleague evaluation, student performance, and
student evaluation of the professor. Note, however, that no discussion is given to how such
evaluations will be conducted. It is unclear what qualities of teaching will be evaluated by
colleagues. It is also unclear what student performance means. Likely it means student success
on examinations. This may lead to standardization of end of course examinations in order to
provide a means by which to judge faculty success against each other. If student performance
suggests quantifiable achievement on examinations, then the emphasis is again on the
systemsworld. However, student performance may mean student success in the world outside of
college, the ability of students to think for themselves, or evaluation of student-generated
projects, creative works, and their contribution to the body of knowledge. If so, such
performance would suggest a lifeworld perspective on the part of the university.
Some further clarification regarding the role of faculty as constructed by the University of
Miami faculty handbook is achieved by examination of tenure candidate files. In order to earn
tenure, faculty must develop a file containing the following:
1) Teaching evaluation- student evaluations, peer review through classroom visits by
tenured faculty
2) External evaluations- five letters from experts in the field of scholarship
3) Candidate’s statement-written statement of contribution to knowledge of the profession.
(p. 63)
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Notice that firstly faculty members must demonstrate effective teaching. Again, this
effectiveness is determined through student and tenured faculty evaluations. Note also, however,
that the second and third requirements both hinge on the professor’s scholarship. Both require
evidence of the professor’s contribution to scholarship. There seems to be an assumption, then,
that teaching itself is not a contribution to scholarship. While the third requirement may allow for
a professor to assert that she has contributed to knowledge of the profession by teaching the
profession, there seems to be an implicit assumption that to contribute to the knowledge of the
profession means to publish. That focus on publication is further emphasized by the fact that the
candidate’s statement does not require an explication of one’s teaching goals, teaching ethic, or
personal teaching philosophy. The sole focus of the statement is the clarification of one’s
contribution to the field. This quantifiable, utilitarian—and somewhat capitalistic—focus on the
production of tangible contribution falls neatly into the systemsworld epistemology.
Clemson University
The focus of the Clemson University Faculty handbook is largely on the structure of the
university and the makeup of various committees. There is little discussion of the intricacies of
promotion and tenure. The work does, however, provide some information about the means by
which faculty are evaluated. As in previous cases, one can assume that the standards of
evaluation reflect the expectations of the roles performed by faculty. While these roles are then
not inscribed in the most literal sense, they are performance-expectations that fit neatly into an
understanding of faculty roles as understood through organizational role theory.
Thus far, much of the data are best understood and organized through the lens of
organizational role theory. Inscribed expectations through a systemsworld approach as well as

225
performance expectations of actors reflect an understanding of actors as agents in the world who
are given scripts and must act out those scripts within the organizational setting. Note, however,
that symbolic-interactionist role theory is also necessary for understanding the roles as they are
presented through the university handbooks. As in the case with Clemson University, some roles
are not inscribed, but instead are represented or constructed through a defining epistemology that
guides the university. This is to say that while Clemson University does not provide much in the
way of details regarding the inscribed roles of faculty for promotion and tenure, they do provide
a “General Philosophy” that acts as a means by which to understand the symbolic gestures that
generate the faculty roles. Presented below is the General Philosophy of Clemson University.
General Philosophy
Institutions of higher learning are communities of scholars in which faculty gather to
seek, teach, and disseminate knowledge for its own sake rather than for any immediate
political, social, or economic goal. Such institutions are conducted for the common good
and not to further the interests of either the individual faculty member or the institution as
a whole. The attainment of that common good depends upon the free search for truth and
its free expression.
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes. Colleges and universities can fulfill
their missions only when their faculties enjoy the academic freedom to pursue knowledge
without fear of pressure from sources inside or outside their institutions. For this reason,
academic freedom is a right and not a privilege to be granted or withheld. As will be indicated below, however, such freedom carries with it commensurate duties and
responsibilities.
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It is the policy of Clemson University to preserve and defend academic freedom by
vigorously resisting all efforts from whatever source to encroach upon or restrict it. In
policy and in practice, the University and its accrediting agency, the Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools, adhere to the 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP), which has long been recognized as providing reasonable and authoritative
guidelines for American institutions of higher learning. The section on academic freedom
below essentially reiterates the principles set forth in this statement, with some
modification and extension consistent with its intent and with later declarations by the
Association. (p.10)
Notice that Clemson University firstly begins with the assertion that universities exist as
entities in which the actors who comprise it “seek, teach, and disseminate knowledge for its own
sake.” The charge to “seek” knowledge is given primacy, here, and it can be understand that it
means scholarship. Interestingly, however, this particular philosophy preserves the notion that
scholarship can be distinct from research, as the third telos is “disseminate.” One often assumes
that to “disseminate” knowledge means to “teach;” however, Clemson University states teaching
as well. This distinction, then, between “teach” and “disseminate” may suggest that
disseminating means producing knowledge and casting it out into the world for consumption
while teaching means actively participating with students in knowledge inquiry. Thus, it may
well be that Clemson University’s philosophy places learning on the part of faculty first,
(perhaps because such knowledge is a prerequisite for teaching) then requires that faculty teach,
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and then, finally, requires that they share that knowledge with the public at large not for any
political purpose, but only because knowledge itself is intrinsically valuable.
The statement of philosophy then focuses the rest of its efforts on the instantiation of
academic freedom as fundamental to the overall university ethic and telos. The statement, in
some ways, is less a philosophy and more a declaration of independence and of intent. The
General Philosophy states that Clemson University will resist “all efforts” to restrict it. Thus, we
see, again, the emphasis by a university on the importance of academic freedom. This emphasis
was an unexpected result of the analysis of faculty roles. Repeatedly, the documents charge
faculty with the mandate that they should generate a world of free thought and unfettered
learning. The general philosophy of Clemson University may be understood as generating
faculty roles of teaching and research as two expressions of the belief that free thought and
unfettered learning are intrinsic goods entrusted to the professoriate.
Perhaps as a result of its philosophy, the Clemson University faculty handbook provides a
more robust picture of what teaching entails than some of the other handbooks. Consider the
“evidence of student learning” as a multi-faceted tool for understanding faculty teaching as
described by the handbook:
Evidence of Student Learning in Evaluation of Faculty Teaching is an important process
requiring a multi-faceted approach. Research supports the use of multiple sources of
evidence in evaluation, and effective evaluations should include at least three of the
following:
a) Evidence-based measurements of student learning (such as pre- and post-testing or
student work samples) that meet defined student learning outcomes;
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b) Evaluation (by peers and/or administrators) of course materials, learning objectives,
and examinations;
c) In-class visitation by peers and/or administrators;
d) A statement by the faculty member describing the faculty member’s methods and/or a
teaching philosophy;
e) Exit interview/surveys with current graduates/alumni;
f) Additional criteria as appropriate for the discipline and degree level of the students;
and,
g) A statement by the faculty member of methods or philosophy that also describes and
documents how feedback from student rating of course experiences or evaluation
instruments above were used to improve teaching.
The University provides a standard form that meets the minimum requirements of current
research-based practices for student rating of course experiences. This form must be
approved by the Scholastic Policies Committee of the Faculty Senate. Individual
departments and faculty may develop questions supplemental to the University’s
minimum standard questions or employ comprehensive supplemental questions, but the
standard questions are required. (p. 72)
Note, here, the repeated mention of philosophy in the above evaluative construct. Although
“philosophy” as they use it has little in common with the term as we use it in this dissertation, it
does suggest that faculty should be metacognitive in regards to the guiding beliefs that ground
their pedagogy. Faculty should be able to articulate why they do what they do and the teleology
that guides them as teachers. The above evaluative construct allows for both systemsworld and
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lifeworld understandings of faculty as teachers. While there are structured surveys that measure
student success and “evidence-based” measurements using pre-and post-testing, there are also
exit interviews and statements of philosophy that act as qualitative data sets. Simply, to evaluate
a faculty member using the above construct, one would be unable to simply look at a chart or a
set of numbers that represent the effectiveness of her teaching. Rather, one would have to
investigate many forms of representation in order to understand the faculty member’s
effectiveness not just in terms of a set of grades given or a graduate rate, but as a holism of
epistemology, pedagogy teleology and ethics.
In its brief explication of the expectations of faculty in promotion and tenure, faculty
roles are largely defined from a systemsworld perspective. There does not seem to be primacy
given to research over teaching or teaching over research, but the expectations of faculty to do
research are significant. The documents outline the set of teaching expectations as follows:
Teaching
• Identification of course needs and the development of curriculum, plans, course
outlines and educational objectives.
• Incorporation of new knowledge and teaching techniques into course, laboratories,
short courses and other educational endeavors.
• Presentation of subject matter in an effective manner through lectures, discussions,
examinations, etc.
• Motivation of students and establishment of rapport with students to improve the
learning process.
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• Attention to responsibilities such as meeting classes promptly, maintaining office hours
and filling out reports.
• Professional growth and scholarly achievements as evidenced by experience,
educational attainments, commitments to reading and study, productive scholarship and
professional contributions beyond the scope of regular duties.
• Advising of students on academic matters. (p. 91)
Note that the expectations require both that faculty meet clear organizational ends as well as a
vague gesturing towards the import of new knowledge. Teaching, however, is not treated solely
as an industrial enterprise; faculty members, for example, are expected to develop a “rapport
with students to improve the learning process.” So while the understanding of teaching and its
multi-faceted intricacies remains vague, there is allowance here for an understanding of teaching
that includes the lifeworld. The presentation of research expectations is similar:
Research


Identification of specific research projects contributing to priority research needs.



Development of sound research proposals culminating in funding.



Execution of research in competent manner.



Completion of research and reporting of findings in appropriate publications and/or at
professional meetings.



Attention to responsibilities such as providing timely reports, supervision of graduate
students and technicians, and development of research facilities.
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Professional growth and scholarly achievements as evidenced by experience,
educational attainments, commitment to reading and study, productive scholarship
and professional contributions beyond the scope of regular duties. (p. 91)

Two immediate conclusions emerge from analysis of the research expectations: 1) Research is
understood in part as deeply connected to publication and/or the dissemination of knowledge
through professional meetings; and 2) Scholarly achievement is expected to be an integral part of
a faculty member’s participation in the university. Note, interestingly, that “scholarly
achievement” in addition to “professional growth” are emphasized heavily. An emphasis on
“scholarship” would allow for the possibility that faculty could perform their role as researcher
by acquiring knowledge through meticulous and methodological research, but the expectation
here is not only that this acquired knowledge should be disseminated, it should be noteworthy.
Thus, while on one hand the Clemson University faculty handbook presents faculty roles from a
broader lifeworld perspective than other handbooks reviewed here, the handbook also
understands faculty roles as requiring significant and praiseworthy scholastic “attainment.”
Thus, we note that a lifeworld understanding does not preclude an understanding of faculty that
places heavy emphasis on publication. What is perhaps is most significant, then, is the
understanding of a lifeworld focus as one that emerges from the belief that publication should be
conducted for the betterment of the community and due to the intrinsic worth of knowledge while
the systemsworld perspective views publication as a quantifiable means by which to evaluate
faculty.
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Florida Atlantic University
Florida Atlantic University’s handbook is the second shortest of the documents reviewed.
At only 86 pages, the document focuses almost exclusively on delineation of the university
hierarchy. The document explicates the divisions between various campuses, the administrative
structure, and the policies that govern the university. The expectations of faculty are restricted to
a section designated for university policies. The breakdown of that section is below:
INSTRUCTIONAL POLICIES


Academic Calendar



Course Syllabi



Class Meetings



Classroom Requests



Student Attendance



Office Hours



Examinations



Final Examination Schedules



Grades



Posting Grades



Instructions for Faculty to Input Grades



Classrooms



Grade Reviews



Course Evaluation



Academic Program Assessment
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Academic Honesty



Dealing with Disruption



Disruptive Behavior



Threatening Behavior



Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment



Fees for Course Materials and Supplies



Textbooks and Materials



Accommodations for Disabilities (pp. 3-4)

The instructional policies, as they are policies, never discuss teaching philosophy, pedagogy, or
expectations of the faculty as facilitators of free thought. Rather, the discussion of instructional
expectations is restricted specifically to university policy in the systemsworld—expectations of
timeliness, policy on disability, requirements for office hours, and so on. It is unclear what is
expected of faculty as teachers beyond that they should attend class, teach, and meet the legal
requirements expected by the university.
Similarly, the discussion of research is vague. The document presents research in terms
of a basic structure and presents avenues for assistance in conducting research. The document
presents research as follows.
RESEARCH


Faculty Research Programs



Centers and Institutes



Sponsored Programs



Research Integrity
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Use of Human Subjects in Research



Use of Animals in Research and Teaching



Research Accounting



Intellectual Property



Florida Atlantic University Research Corporation



Research Communications (p. 4)

There are no definitions given. Why and how research should be conducted is left outside of the
document. Researchers are expected to conduct themselves ethically and are expected to follow
university policy in conducting that research. They are provided information regarding policies
on human subjects, non-human animal subjects, intellectual property, and other legal issues. As
presented by the handbook, Florida Atlantic University seems to follow a systemsworld model of
the construction of faculty roles. Faculty are expected to perform their roles within a structure
that they must maintain.
This is not to say the university handbook is entirely without teleology or ethical
grounding, only that the discussion of teaching and research themselves are solely discussed
from the systems perspective. Early in the document, there is an expression of teleology through
“mission” and “values.” To quote,
Florida Atlantic University is a public research university with multiple campuses along
the southeast Florida coast serving a uniquely diverse community. It promotes academic
and personal development, discovery, and lifelong learning. FAU fulfills its mission
through excellence and innovation in teaching, outstanding research and creative
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activities, public engagement and distinctive scientific and cultural alliances, all within an
environment that fosters inclusiveness. (p.12)
Here we see an emphasis on the idea that faculty should engage innovating teaching and
“outstanding research.” It is left unclear what exactly such teaching and research entail, however.
The document continues to present its values:
Florida Atlantic University values an academic environment that facilitates intellectual
growth through open and honest expression. The University is committed to excellence at
all levels of the educational and creative experience, to success for all students, and to
development of the capacity to make reasoned and discriminating judgments with respect
for differences and diversity in ideas. Lifelong learning encourages the continual use of
the mind. The University plays a vital role in the life of the surrounding community, in
society, and as an engine for economic development. (p. 12)
The document continues to elucidate a series of values that include community participation and
a significant emphasis on academic freedom, while also focusing on economic and systemsworld
concerns. Thus, we see again the focus on the idea that universities are deeply dependent on
academic freedom. Florida Atlantic University, as stated in its values, also encourages free
thought and creative expression on the part of its faculty and students. The presentation of values
fits neatly into a lifeworld understanding of the university.
There is also the inclusion of a brief mention of annual evaluation. The document
discusses the importance of the annual evaluation for the purposes of promotion and tenure, but
does not include any details regarding the expectations of faculty or how they will be evaluated
other than by tenured faculty and the administration. The document states, “The basic purpose of
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the annual evaluation is faculty improvement in the functions of teaching, research, service and
other duties that may be assigned” (p. 61). Thus, we can conclude that faculty are expected to
perform, effectively, the roles of teacher and researcher, but as to what exactly comprises those
roles, the document remains unclear. One may infer, however, from the university mission and
values, that those roles include innovative teaching, facilitation of knowledge acquisition and
creative work on the part of the students, as well as faculty participation in publication and
contribution to the general body of knowledge.
Temple University
The Temple University faculty handbook is the shortest of all those reviewed here. The
document is only twenty-one pages long. Interestingly, however, a significant portion of the
document is not dedicated to the discussion of hierarchy or organization. Rather, the document
focuses largely promotion and tenure, faculty ethics, and condition of employment. Given the
length of the document itself, it cannot be said that the document discusses those topics in more
detail than the other handbooks, but proportionally, significantly more time is given to them than
in the other handbooks.
The document does not go into great detail regarding the promotion and tenure process.
Basic structure is laid out and then the document details the basic expectations of faculty in a
lifewordly way. Consider the explication of teaching as an expectation for promotion and tenure:
a. Effective teaching has many manifestations. It comprehends classroom instruction and
a broad range of faculty-student relationships. The following are among the traits valued
in the teacher: command of subject, familiarity with advances in the field, ability to
organize material and to present it with force and logic, capacity to awaken in students an

237
awareness of the relation of the subject to other fields of knowledge, grasp of general
objectives, ability to vitalize learning, ability to arouse curiosity toward further and more
independent learning, ability to stimulate advanced students to highly creative work,
maintaining a sufficiently high standard of achievement, and fairness and judgment in
grading. The teacher’s personal attributes such as social graciousness and sense of humor
are also important.
b. The extent and skill of the faculty member’s participation in the general guidance and
advising of students and his or her contribution to student welfare are of importance in
the appraisal of the teacher’s value to the University. (p. 7)
Thus, the document recognizes effective teaching as multi-faceted and deeply embedded in
faculty-student relationships. The document says little about evaluation in terms of
standardization or performance, and focuses on ideas such as “awakening” and “awareness.”
Perhaps most unusually, there is even a brief mention of a “sense of humor” amongst effective
faculty. This presentation then is almost without explication of the system of organization and
evaluation and focuses heavily on the personal qualities of effective teaching that are expected of
faculty. Also important is the inclusion in (b) of student welfare. Student wellbeing is only
mentioned on occasion in any of the other documents in terms of student academic achievement.
The Temple University faculty handbook, however, makes no such distinction. Faculty are
required to contribute to student welfare—one assumes first academically, but not necessarily
solely.
The document similarly addresses faculty scholarship in a way that can be understood as
integrated with the epistemology of the lifeworld. The document states,
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2. Scholarship and Creative Work
a. Research and Publication. In most of the fields represented in the program of the
University, publications in media of quality are expected as evidence of scholarly
interest. Quality of production is more important than quantity. Each of the following is
valued according to its quality and significance: scholarly books, textbooks, reviews,
reports, articles in scholarly and professional journals, and participation in projects of
scholarly interest.
b. Works of Art. In certain fields such as art, music, and literature, distinguished creation
receives consideration equivalent to distinction attained in research. Public recognition as
reflected in professional awards; the assignment of unusual tasks and commissions; the
acceptance of the faculty member’s work in permanent collections or its publication in
leading professional journals; invitations to participate in significant exhibits; and any
other public honor on the local, national, or international scene are valued.
c. Professional Recognition. Demonstrated professional distinction is recognized as a
criterion for promotion. In certain areas as music, drama, and speech, distinguished
performance is considered. The faculty member’s record is scrutinized for evidence of
achievement, leadership, and the development of new ideas. (pp. 7-8)
Thus, again, one sees a similarity between this treatment of scholarship to that of the Clemson
University faculty handbook. Faculty members are expected to achieve distinction in their fields
of expertise, but not necessarily as a matter of publication for the purpose of systemic evaluation,
but for the purpose of participation in the world of knowledge. It is made clear that a qualitative
perspective will be taken when evaluating faculty scholarship: “quality of production is more
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important than quantity.” Regardless of the medium in which the faculty member works, she is
expected to produce work of worth and note by the scholastic or creative community. Thus, one
notes, again, that a lifewordly orientation does not necessitate one in which scholarship is placed
secondary to teaching or undervalued. Quite the contrary: it seems as if Temple University
places heavy emphasis on faculty scholarship and publication as necessary for promotion and
tenure, but specifically because such work meets the fundamental purpose of the University as a
perpetuator of academic freedom.
Note that the Temple University handbook does not present a guiding philosophy,
mission, or set of values. The work is generally, as was the case with the Clemson University
Handbook, made up of clearly inscribed expectations in favor of enunciated expectations. That
does not mean that the university does not have a guiding philosophy or values but, rather, in
presentation of the faculty expectations, much greater emphasis is given to academic freedom.
The document begins, in fact, with this statement on academic freedom:
All members of the faculty, whether tenured or not, are entitled to academic freedom as
set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*,
formulated by the Association of American Colleges and the American Association of
University Professors, as follows:
(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results,
subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties; but research for
pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the
institution.
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(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they
should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to their subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other
aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and
officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be
free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the
community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should
remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their
utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate
restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to
indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.” (p. 1)
Faculty members are given full freedom to research and publish while at the same time are
asked to show “appropriate restraint” and respect the opinions of others. Participation in the
university requires that teachers remain pertinent to the topics relevant to the class itself, but at
the same time there is emphasis on the idea that they should be free from institutional censorship.
They have special obligations which, rather than being restrictive, require that faculty be as
educated, thoughtful, and accurate as possible. Taken in conjunction with the explication of
faculty teaching and researching roles, it seems reasonable to conclude that faculty members are
expected to participate in teaching and scholarship in a way that frees students and the
community in general to think broadly, deeply, and effectively for themselves. Academic
freedom is only curtailed insofar as it should not restrict the learning and free thought of others.
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Of all of the documents reviewed, the Temple University faculty handbook focuses the most on
the lifeworld, perhaps even problematically, to the exclusion of explication of the systemsworld,
as much regarding the intricacies of faculty evaluation is left unclear. What is not left unclear is
that faculty members are expected to be active, meritorious participants in the perpetuation of
free thought and the construction of knowledge of others.
Summary of Data Collected from University Handbooks

These documents in conjunction suggest that, at least for these six universities, both
teaching and research are essential. Teaching is not undervalued, though it is often under-defined
and under-explained. Perhaps because of the complexity of teaching, or out of respect for
individual freedom in the classroom, evaluation of teaching is left vague and generally restricted
to quantifiable evaluative measures such as surveys and student success. Research is clearly a
primary goal of most of these universities and the idea of scholarship, as presented by the
handbooks, which assume faculty publish work or produce creative works that are
acknowledgement worthy and are articulated as inscribed expectations. Heavy emphasis,
however, is given to the import of academic freedom as both a fundamental necessity and as a
fundamental goal of the university through enunciated expectations insofar as those expectations
are written down, but do not act as codified rules. They are stated, but not measured. Faculty
members are expected to be perpetuators of academic freedom both as teachers and as
researchers.
It also seems clear that most of these handbooks describe the role of the faculty in terms
of the systemsworld. The very universities, themselves, are usually presented with a brief
historical narrative and then much more time is given to the actual explication of the
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organization system itself. The evaluation of faculty, as belonging to a well-defined hierarchy, is
also systematized in a way that is most easily quantifiable. While the tenure and promotion
processes remain qualitative to greater and lesser degrees depending on the university—as such
decisions are made by committees—there seems to be evidence that this committee decision
making process is becoming less a discussion of a holism of teaching and research and instead
heavily reliant upon the quantifications of annual evaluations. These evaluations most often
emphasize the importance of research. There seems to be difficulty in articulating exactly how
good teaching should be evaluated, and thus evaluation of such teaching is relegated to vague
gestures towards colleague observation and student evaluations. Research, however, often
receives a good deal more detailed discussion both in regards to what counts as research for the
universities’ purposes and in regards to the ways in which research should be conducted.
It becomes clear that professors are expected to produce work that is recognized as
important by their academic community, but it is unclear if they must be similarly excellent
teachers. This is to say that while “innovation in teaching” and “teaching excellence” are
discussed in some of the documents, there is little discussion of what that means, how it can be
evaluated holistically, and why it is important. Conversely, for most of the handbooks, there is
no question that faculty members must not just publish, but that they must publish in top-level
journals, win awards, and receive acknowledgement from the community. There is far less
discussion of similar excellence in the classroom. The handbooks do not include expectations
such as, our faculty should be “some of the best teachers in the world,” “receive accolades from
the community for their teaching achievements,” or “regularly receive acknowledgement and
praise from students for teaching life-changing classes.” Rather, faculty are expected to engage
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in professional development, display effective teaching, and engage innovation (often through
technology).
There remains, however, an expectation amongst some of the universities that faculty
participate in a mentorship role as teachers. For example, when the requirements of tenure and
promotion of these universities are taken in conjunction with the University of Memphis ethical
statement, an emphasis on faculty members as expert guides is revealed. The brief, but repeated,
mention of faculty as mentors as well as the statement that they should foster free learning both
suggest that faculty members should guide learners without indoctrinating them. Repeatedly
through these documents one sees an emphasis in mentorship through the production of and
participation in knowledge by the students.
In some ways, however, the handbooks do not seem to be in synonymy with the
importance of mentorship that they themselves require. Rather, the focus seems to be particularly
on evaluation of professors by virtue of student performance, on the students having gained
particular knowledge. Little information is given regarding how individual departments should
evaluate students, but there is no mention in the discussion of evaluation of the idea that faculty
should be, at least in part, evaluated on whether or not they foster a “free learning community.”
One sees that the creation of faculty roles by the universities may be in some tension: the
lifeworld epistemologies that guide some of them require that teachers engage in a robust,
community-driven, holistic enterprise of mentorship and free thought facilitation, while at the
same time the means by which those same faculty members are evaluated for their performance
is often heavily limited to systemsworld gauges of effectiveness.
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Faculty Roles as Researchers Constructed by Professional Associations

The next consideration in this document is of professional associations in which professors are
expected to participate. As in the case of handbooks, there are many associations, and not all of
them can be addressed here. Rather, this work will focus on some of those most pertinent to
educational leadership. The work will address those professional associations that are most
recognized by and relied on by faculty, as those associations have the greatest impact on how
faculty members are expected to perform their roles. These associations are specifically research
associations. Questions of teaching expectations and the generation of teacher roles will be
addressed later. These associations will be specifically reviewed for their construction of
researcher roles in order to better understand the way the community constructs the faculty
through the holism of its dialectic.

The American Psychological Association

The first professional association ethical code addressed here is that of the American
Psychological Association (APA). It is APA guidelines for citation that structure this
dissertation. The APA standards guide much of educational leadership and educational research
in general. The full statement of ethical principles of the APA is included in the appendix. The
following principles are articulated by the APA in its Code of Conduct:
Principle A: Beneficence and Nonmalficence
Principle B: Fidelity and Responsibility
Principle C: Integrity
Principle D: Justice
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Principle E: Respect for People’s Rights and Dignity
The document makes it clear that these are general principles rather than ethical standards,
because they are “aspirational” in nature. APA members are expected to be inspired by these
principles rather than view them as obligations.
According to the APA principles, members are expected to aspire to benefiting research
participants. The goal should not just be to do no harm (certainly no intentional harm); it is also
to benefit others. It is important to note that this does not mean that research is justified when it
benefits someone. The principles state that psychologists “strive to benefit those with whom they
work and take care to do no harm” (2010, p. 3). Thus one is unlikely to justify research that does
harm, or does nothing for the participant. Members should aspire to benefit participants, not just
use them to achieve a “greater good.” The principles also state that members should aspire to
work well with each other and develop collegiality. They should strive to be persons of
integrity—thus they should be honest and trustworthy. Justice requires that members strive to
benefit all people who can benefit from their work, and the final principle encourages them to
respect the personhood of everyone with whom they work and everyone who can be impacted by
their work.
Thus, an understanding of researchers and practitioners who are members of the APA
recognizes the importance of research as a form of beneficence. To engage in the improvement
of the world with participants through research means to attempt to benefit as many as possible,
including the participants. This idea echoes the beneficence requirements of the Belmont Report,
a document that moderates all research conducted on human participants in the United States.
The Belmont report, a grounding document for APA guidelines of the treatment of human
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participants (which will be discussed more in depth shortly), requires that research be conducted
with respect for persons, with beneficence, and with respect for justice, which are all
expectations echoed by the APA. Research, thusly, must not be conducted for the sole benefit of
the researcher or one particular group. It should be conducted in a way that is just and brings
benefit to all to whom the research applies; it should also respect the rights and dignity, the
personhood, of the participants. Participants should never be used to the researcher’s end. She
must always recognize that participants are full moral agents entitled to informed consent,
respect, autonomy, and honesty. The conjunctions of beneficence and justice act to push research
beyond just a means by which to gather knowledge; researchers become mandated to conduct
research for the purpose of benefiting as many others as possible.

The Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR).
The APA also follows a series of principles designated Responsible Conduct of Research
(RCR). These principles include “most of the professional activities that are part and parcel of a
research career, as defined by federal agencies” (p. 1). The document is included as an
additional resource on the APA webpage for the code of ethics. It is expected that APA
researchers use the RCR specifically to guide them in conducting research. The ethical
principles discussed above are intended for all members of the APA and psychologists in
particular. The RCR, however, is specifically intended to structure research activity. The RCR
states the following nine principals:
•

Collaborative Science
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Collaborations take place in a variety of forms, including the borrowing and lending of
supplies, resources and equipment between researchers; seeking input from experts in
different disciplines; and partnering with colleagues who have similar backgrounds or
fields of knowledge for fresh ideas and abilities.
•

Conflicts of Interest and Commitments

Conflicts of interests or commitments are not inherently negative; rather, the way in
which the conflict is managed is important.
•

Data Acquisition, Management, Sharing and Ownership

This site is designed as a central location for viewing and retrieving shared data archives
relevant to psychological science.
•

Human Research Protections

Research with human participants plays a central role in advancing knowledge in the
biomedical, behavioral and social sciences.
•

Lab Animal Welfare

APA has supported and continues to support efforts to improve laboratory animal welfare
through the implementation of policies and regulations that both maintain the integrity of
scientific research and sustain the welfare of such animals.
•

Mentoring

Mentoring less-experienced researchers is a professional responsibility of all scientists.
The ultimate goal of the mentor is to establish the trainee as an independent researcher.
•

Peer Review
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Positive peer reviews contribute to increased funding opportunities, academic
advancement and a good reputation.
•

Publications Practices and Responsible Authorship

Although researchers can disseminate their findings through many different avenues,
results are most likely to be published as an article in a scholarly journal.
•

Research Misconduct

Institutions should have procedures in place to investigate—and, when appropriate,
report—findings of misconduct to the Office of Research Integrity (ORI). They should
also have policies that protect both the whistleblower and the accused until a
determination is made. (p. 1)
Note that these expectations are rather lifeworldy in nature. Rather than presenting a set of rules
and procedures, they act as a set of enunciations that guide the process of research. That
lifeworld epistemology is reflected in the inclusion of other persons and their welfare into a
dialectic in which collaboration and mutual respect are desirable.
Each facet of responsible conduct is further detailed by the APA and paraphrased here.
Collaboration, which is an ever-increasing aspect of research, should be well planned and
documented. Researchers should take care to be open and honest with each other, keeping all
researchers fully informed regarding the research process. Conflicts of interest may be inevitable.
However, those conflicts should not be ignored or dealt with in silence. Researchers should seek
outside observation and honestly report conflicts of interest in order to maintain objectivity.
Human research, while invaluable to the acquisition of knowledge, is also capable of great harm.
For that reason, the APA references the Belmont Report as a grounding document for the
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treatment of human subjects. Unlike the charge of beneficence to human participants, the
treatment of non-human animals does not require beneficence. Moreover, harm may be done to
laboratory non-human animals if necessary. However, researchers should endeavor to do as little
harm as possible and seek alternative avenues when possible.
Mentoring is a responsibility of all research scientists, according to the APA. Researchers
and their students should develop an agreement early on, detailing the responsibilities and
structure of their research arrangement. The process should be to the benefit of the student, and
the researcher should prepare the student to go forth and conduct their own research once having
acquired the knowledge provided by their mentor. It is essential that peer-reviewers have the
necessary expertise to provide useful information about the research they review. Impartiality is
essential, and reviewers should seek to be as objective as possible; if they cannot do so, or are
unable to separate themselves from a conflict of interest, they should not act as a reviewer in that
case. Accurate and honest reporting of research is essential and particularly the purview of the
primary author of a research article. It is expected that the researcher be open regarding the
methodology and procedures used, and all those responsible for authorship should be credited for
their work accordingly. Research misconduct occurs when a researcher purposefully fabricates,
plagiarizes, or misrepresents data. This conduct should be reported by any who are made aware
of it, and the consequences can be severe, especially in regards to one’s employment at a
research institution and participation in the APA.
The APA RCR further instantiates the idea that researchers should at the very least do no
harm. Although the imperative for general beneficence may seem less than in the guiding
principles of the APA, it is not. It is important to note this especially because one may read these
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documents and conclude that if one is a psychologist one must be beneficent, but if one is simply
a researcher that uses APA guidelines, one need not be so concerned. Note, however, that the
treatment of human participants directly references the Belmont Report. Although the RCR does
not, itself, discuss beneficence, it directs the reader to the Belmont Report for details regarding
human treatment. As noted previously, the Belmont Report does clearly require both beneficence
and justice. Thus, the APA RCR is making a general statement about researchers that is not
necessarily applied only to APA researchers: good research follows ethical practices, particularly
beneficence.
Interestingly, the RCR also pushes researchers to be outwardly beneficial in two other
ways as well. Firstly, there is the consistent theme of honesty and openness. Researchers should
provide as much information as is relevant to not only their colleges, but to the public. Their
research should be revealing in terms of their own methodologies and provide the means by
which others can reconstruct their work. The work should be published so as to be available and
beneficial to the public. Secondly, researchers are not only encouraged, but almost admonished
to act as mentors. The document makes it exceedingly clear that an essential responsibility of
research is teaching others. Moreover, while that mentorship may be beneficial to the researcher,
it should be conducted with the ultimate goal of enabling the mentored to conduct her or his own
research independently. Thus, we see again a directive that researchers be outwardly focused on
beneficence and lifeworldly values.
The Belmont Report
Some brief discussion of the Belmont Report is warranted, as it governs much—though
not all—of faculty research. The Belmont Report was written as the result of the National
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Research Act (1974). The National Research Act created the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavior Research. The Commission was
charged with identifying basic ethical principles that ground the conduct of research involving
human subjects and developing guidelines for researchers to follow to maintain ethical standards.
The Belmont Report does not make recommendations for administrative action; it is largely
intended to be a statement of departmental ethical policy.
The Report, published in 1979, uncovered three basic underlying ethical principles that
should ground ethical research. I suggest that this effort on the part of the Commission was, in
fact (though not intentionally), a Habermasian one. The Commission was not charged with
“generating” principles; it was charged with determining the underlying principles of ethical
research. The result of this search for basic underlying assumptions that govern our actions
resulted in a lengthy appendix to the Belmont Report that includes the thoughts of experts and
specialists in many fields of ethics and research. This conglomeration of thoughts creates a
dialectic; the result of that dialectic, when analyzed and investigated, is a discourse ethical
understanding of ethical principles that results from uncovering the basic rules that governed the
ethical dialectic. I suggest that, in the same way that one can uncover the basic rules of dialogue
through investigation of dialogue, one can uncover the basic rules of ethics—insofar as they are
an assumed part of our dialectic—through the investigation of dialogue about ethics. This is not
to say something so mundane as that one discovers the ethical beliefs of others through
conversation about ethics, but rather that one can uncover the normative assumptions that govern
how we think about ethics when we discourse about ethics. One may realize that throughout the
dialogue there is just a basic assumption that one should not purposefully do harm. No one may
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directly state that belief in the course of the conversation; that assumption just guides the
dialectic and acts as a basic axiom upon which the conversation rests.
Through a perhaps Habermasian investigation, the Commission uncovered three
principles that govern the way experts think about ethics and research:
1) Respect for Persons
2) Beneficence
3) Justice
Respect for persons, as described by the Belmont Report, incorporates two ethical principles: 1)
We should respect the autonomy of others; and 2) Those who are not autonomous should be
protected. The Belmont Report cashes out respect for autonomy as giving “weight to
autonomous persons’ considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their
actions” (part B, para. 3). Simply, we should not force others to participate in research and we
need to respect their choice not to do so. One should avoid coercive measures, including denying
participants information pertinent to the research project that may have caused them not to
participate in the project if they had known. One may understand this principle of recognizing
the personhood of others in terms of them being more than objects of our research. One should
respect other agents as capable of decision-making processes that deserve our consideration:
“Respect for persons demands that subjects enter into the research voluntarily and with adequate
information” (part B, para. 6). Moreover, if the agent is not autonomous—i.e. a child, a student,
a prisoner and so on—we should protect them rather than use them as an easier means by which
to accomplish our goals. As SoTL research has been a significant consideration in this
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dissertation, it is important to note that SoTL, as it often uses one’s own classroom population,
must be careful not to violate the “respect for persons” principle.
Beneficence is defined in the following way by the Belmont Report: “Persons are treated
in an ethical manner not only by respecting their decisions and protecting them from harm, but
also by making efforts to secure their well-being” (part B, para. 7). The document suggests that
one must go beyond normal obligations when conducting research with participants: one must
firstly do no harm and secondly maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms. This
requirement not only means that researchers must move outward in their scope by virtue of
making sure that their work does good; it also means they must also be forward-looking in
regards to the outcomes of their research. One cannot simply meddle in the lives of others
without considering the impact of the research project on those lives. Moreover, one cannot just
assume that the research is harmless and, thus, not problematic. One must also make sure that
engagement with participants is such that one foresees benefit to participants through their
participation.
Anecdotally, I have noted among some university administration the tendency to assume
that this beneficence need only mean that: 1) The research does not harm the participant; and 2)
Someone, though not necessarily the participant, is benefited. Such an interpretation of
beneficence not only seems intuitively short-sighted, but it also does not take entire set of the
ethical principles espoused by the Belmont Report into account. Respect for persons suggests
that we are aware that others wish to be benefited and often hope that their participation in
research will benefit themselves in some way, if only by virtue of knowing that the information
gleaned through them will help others. Note, though, that to receive this benefit, they must know
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what they are doing. At the very least, the beneficence principle requires that researchers try to
benefit participants, particularly in conjunction with the respect for persons principle, as we
cannot just use participants as means to our ends.
Again, in the case of SoTL, research examples present themselves immediately. A
professor may wish to use a class assignment for research purposes. She hopes to improve her
chances for tenure by publishing the results of the study. She may, for example, teach two
sections of the same class in two different ways but use the same assessments in both classes. In
one class she may use lecture, and in the other a Socratic questioning style. She knows from
previous experience that the students respond better to the Socratic style, but she wants clear
evidence that she can publish. She has no intention of ever telling the students what she is doing
or why she is doing it, so the students are just a ready sample to use for her SoTL research. In
conversation, when asked if she is violating the principle of beneficence, she argued that she is
benefiting many other students through this project. The publication will help improve the
effectiveness of many other teachers in her field. Her rationale is insufficient, though; she
violates, here, respect for persons.
The students are being used solely as a means to the professor’s ends. She is not taking
the students’ autonomy into account, and is thus violating the principle of respect for persons.
She cannot be said to be following the principle of beneficence, either, as she is not “maximizing
the possible benefit.” The same may be said for those who justify research in an institution as
being beneficial for the degree as a whole, though not necessarily beneficial for student
participants. The institution is neither respecting those students’ autonomy if it engages research
using the student population without their consent, nor acting beneficently if it does not seek to
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maximize the benefit to those student participants. Moreover, in such cases, if there is a
population that is being used solely for the purpose of benefiting someone else, regardless of the
impact on them, it is also unjust.
Justice, according to the Belmont Report, requires that benefits be fair in their
distribution. “An injustice occurs when some benefit to which a person is entitled is denied
without good reason or when some burden is imposed unduly” (part B, para. 11). The justice
principle, of course, engages a great deal of complexity. Defining what is equal and unequal, and
what equal treatment means, is often unclear. What is clear is that researchers should endeavor to
equally distribute the potential benefits of research. They should not choose populations, for
example, to benefit from the research simply out of personal preference. The professor in the
example above may choose to engage the Socratic dialectic with the class she likes better,
knowing that they in fact will perform better; in so doing, she is violating the principle of justice.
We must take into account whether or not populations are “being systematically selected simply
because of their easy availability, their compromised position, or their manipulability, rather than
for reasons directly related to the problem being studied” (part B, para. 13) In the case of
research involving students, these concerns seem to be always relevant and should be given
careful consideration.
It is important to note, however, that much of the research that faculty members conduct
does not involve human participants at all. Much research conducted by faculty is, rather, a
creative endeavor involving either the creation of art or the development of articles that rest upon
investigation and analysis of literature, philosophy, history, and the humanities. So it may stand
to reason that the Belmont Report may not apply to those faculty members. The Report,
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however, does reveal much of the ethical grounding that guides our conversations about
research. At its core is not just the idea that researchers should not do harm, but that they should
benefit others. That core assumption applies to all research, regardless of human participation:
the work researchers do should benefit the community in some way.
In many ways the Belmont Report is a systemsworld document. As a document generated
by the government, it details a great deal regarding policy and practice. However, from the very
beginning of the work, it engages lifeworld epistemology through the series of its three
enunciated principles. The ethics described by the Belmont Report cannot be clearly codified.
One cannot say exactly how much beneficence one has shown or the amount of justice that has
been met. Rather, the work requires that researchers focus on a larger picture of their actions and
their impact on the world as well as reflect on their own motivations. One can never know if
another is truly beneficent or simply presenting a spurious image of beneficence in order to gain
trust. It is thus the onus of the moral agent to reflexively examine her own conscience and align
herself with principles such as beneficence. This reflexive act that is mediated by engagement
with the world is a discourse ethical one—one that requires one to mediate the actions of the self
through engagement with the social dialectic of the lifeworld.
The American Educational Research Association
The American Educational Research Association (AERA) is an association specifically
dedicated to research. While it is APA style that is most often used by education in citation and
paper format, it is in the AERA that educational researchers are most likely to have membership.
As perhaps the premier organization in educational research, the AERA has a considerable
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influence over educational research and researchers. Thus, the ethical code of the AERA has a
substantial normative force in education.
The ethical code of the AERA sets forward five principles that guide the action of
educational researchers. These principles, moreover, are the axioms from which the more
specific ethical standards emerge. Thus, the principles that are most fundamental will be
discussed here, as those principles describe not just what one should do, but what kind of person
one should be. One will note numerous similarities to the principles set by the APA, particularly
insofar as the principles act as a set of lifelong guiding values.
The AERA firstly commits itself to “Professional Competence.” According to the AERA,
educational researchers should “adhere to the highest possible standards that are reasonable and
responsible in their research teaching, practice, and service activities” (p. 3). Note that the
preceding statement references the three role requirements of faculty at most universities. Thus,
the AERA code of ethics specifically orients itself to the entirety of the education professoriate.
Competence, then, according to the AERA, is achieved through the consistent growth of the
researcher in her field. She should stay abreast of new information and technologies and remain
at the forefront of education. She must use the competence in ways that accurately represents her
expertise, and never misuse it for personal gain.
The second principle of the AERA is “Integrity.” Integrity to the AERA is deeply
connected to fairness, and thus to justice. Educational researchers should be worthy of “trust and
confidence” (p. 2) Thus, they must not purposefully do harm or jeopardize the welfare of others.
Integrity also suggests that educational researchers do not falsify, plagiarize, or misrepresent
data. They should be transparent in their research practices. To be a person of integrity,
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according to the AERA, all aspects of one’s professional life demonstrate the qualities of
honesty, fairness, and respect. The notion of integrity—to be consistent, stable, and
trustworthy—by definition seems to require that one be trustworthy not just in one area of one’s
life, but in all. If one is only trustworthy when conducting research, but not when teaching, then
one lacks integrity, if the notion includes consistency. Arguably, to be a person of integrity
would suggest that this trustworthiness extends beyond one’s professional life into one’s
personal life, but the AERA does not require this.
The third principle is “Professional, Scientific, and Scholarly Responsibility.” This
standard requires that educational researchers maintain the highest possible standards. In so
doing, those standards include the standards of science as well as of their university. Researchers
must take responsibility for their work. Thus, they must do all they can to make sure that their
work does no harm. Educational researchers have responsibility to each other and are responsible
for the trust given to the domain of educational research. In this way, educational researchers are
a community and must maintain within that community the highest possible standards of
conduct, regulating each other and themselves. In so doing, they review each other’s research
and act as objective judges of that research, even when in disagreement. Researchers must be
willing to consult with other researchers for assistance in research as well as when ethical
concerns arise.
Fourthly, Educational Researchers must have “Respect for People’s Rights, Dignity, and
Diversity.” This principle incorporates both notions of justice and respect for persons. As stated
by the AERA, “Educational researchers respect the rights, dignity, and worth of all people and
take care to do no harm” (p. 3). Researchers have, then, a special obligation to protect
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participants. In respecting diversity, there should be no bias against one group or in favor of
another, and the benefits of research should be distributed among as many participants and
greater community members as possible. This respect for persons requires that participants not
be used solely as a means to the researchers’ ends. It also requires that researchers respect the
fact that others have differing values, attitudes and opinions from their own. Respect for the
dignity of others suggests that educational researchers should not use coercion or force. They
must respect the autonomy of others, even if they disagree in some way with those others. Notice
again the importance of “do no harm” as an emergent imperative from this principle.
The final principle, “Social Responsibility” emphasizes the importance of community.
Community is a notion that is twice underscored through the discussion of grounding ethical
principles of the AERA. Educational researchers are required to be aware of their responsibilities
to the many communities in which they participate, including scientific and professional. They
must make their knowledge public in order to benefit as many as possible. They must “strive to
advance scientific and scholarly knowledge and to serve the public good” (p. 3). Note, here, that
educational researchers are not just under the imperative to do no harm, nor are they only
required to benefit their community; they are required to make public their work so that it is
available to all.
The AERA also provides a list of professional standards that emerge from their guiding
principles. The first standard, “Scientific, Scholarly, and Professional Standards,” is a selfreferential statement that applies to all of the standards. It states, “Education researchers adhere
to the highest possible standards that are reasonable and responsible in their research, teaching,
practice, and service activities. They rely on scientifically, scholarly, and professionally derived
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knowledge and act with honesty and integrity” (p. 3). This first standard clearly emerges from
the first principle stated by the AERA, and as it requires that educational researchers follow the
highest possible standards, guides the formulation of the rest of the standards:
2. Competence
3. Use and Misuse of Expertise
4. Fabrication, Falsification, and Plagiarism
5. Avoiding Harm
6. Nondiscrimination
7. Nonexploitation
8. Harassment
9. Employment Decisions
10. Conflicts of Interest
11. Public Communications
12. Confidentiality
13. Informed Consent
14. Research Planning
Implementation, and Dissemination
15. Authorship Credit
16. Publication Process
17. Responsibilities of Reviewers.
The above is presented very much as part of the systemsworld. The AERA provides clear
guidelines that require that the researcher note her place in the system and the ways in which she
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should and should not engage in that system. Even so, one notes that in every aspect of research
the AERA requires that researchers place the welfare of others before their own professional
success, maintain transparency, respect the autonomy of others, participate fully in the research
community, and distribute the benefits of their work to the largest population possible.
Thus, the principles, unlike the standards, of the AERA are importantly focused on
community in a lifeworldly way. Twice emphasized in the five principles, community plays an
essential role in the research process. Immediately eliminated from the imagination is the picture
of a lone researcher toiling madly for her own unfathomable purposes. Rather, she is part of a
community of researchers who seek to benefit as many as possible through their combined
efforts. Moreover, she is a member of a community of scholars, the scientific community, and
her professional community. Assumed in these principles is the responsibility one has to one’s
communities. The work seems to suggest that by virtue of membership, one takes on
responsibility both for the welfare of those communities, as well as for the impact on others by
those communities. Perhaps because of the power of the scientific community to both do harm
and to sway the public at large, the research community is tasked repeatedly with its
responsibility to others. It must do no harm, as we are reminded by the APA and by the Belmont
Report.
Perhaps most underscored by the ethical principles of the AERA is the notion of respect.
Researchers are tasked with respecting their community, respecting the welfare of others,
respecting differing opinions, respecting their colleagues, respecting the dignity of participants,
and respecting research. Every principle either explicitly or implicitly requires that researchers
respect something. Interestingly, this notion of respect allows for two imperatives: one must
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“take care” to not harm a thing, as well as “be careful of” that thing. To respect research, for
example, requires that one be open and transparent about research and seek to always improve
the body of knowledge, but also that one respect the dangers and power of research to do harm.
Similarly, one who is respectful of the dignity of others does not infringe on that dignity but also
recognizes the importance and power of dignity. Thus, respect is emphasized repeatedly as a
means by which to reduce harm, but also to recognize danger and worth.
This notion of respect may well emerge from the importance in research of avoiding
paternalism, and thus the work lacks clearly codified inscribed expectations. Given the power of
the scientific domains to manipulate the public and the great knowledge collected by its
practitioners, it can be easy to assume one knows what is best for others regardless of their
values, opinions, and beliefs. Instances like the Milgram Experiment, the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study, and the Willowbrook Study all serve as reminders of the harm that can be done by
researchers in the name of knowledge. The confidence that one knows what is best for others or
that one is in a superior position and thus can ignore the autonomy of others has been repeatedly
shown to be a danger faced by researchers. Thus, the AERA does not just require researchers to
do no harm and be beneficent, but also to show respect. They must acknowledge the power and
dignity of others, respect their differences, and acknowledge their worth.
Note, once again, that there is an outwardly-driven standard of beneficence required by
an ethical standard. The AERA standards do not allow researchers to benefit only themselves or
their own community of knowledge. There is a consistent reminder that their work must benefit
the public good. Thus, although the term “beneficence” is not used, beneficence is nonetheless
required. The researchers are required to benefit others through their work and must seek to
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avoid all potential jeopardy to their participants and to society as a whole. Their work must
expand outward and benefit others outside of the research community. As researchers must
respect the dignity and rights of others, they are under the obligation to make good any
assurances of benefit to their participants. One cannot promise participants that the research will
benefit them in order to coerce their participation, knowing that such a benefit is unlikely.
Although the focus of the principles is on the “public good,” the requirement of respect for
dignity of participants also requires that the benefits of research include participants, as they do
not exist solely as a means by which to produce knowledge for others. Participants are
recognized for their dignity as individual agents of worth, as we have seen in the previous
documents as well.
Modern Language Association
Finally, here we will briefly consider the Modern Language Association MLA
“Statement of Professional Ethics.” The MLA statement is included here in order to incorporate
the roles of professors as researchers who do not usually conduct research on participants. One
may find a radically different set of axioms governing an ethical code that does not emerge out
of the Belmont Report, as the others do. The MLA is the association to which many English
professors belong. The citation and style guide is overwhelmingly used by those writing in
English and in many other disciplines. Thus, the MLA has tremendous sway amongst the
professoriate.
The MLA Statement begins with the following preamble:
As a community of teachers and scholars, the members of the MLA serve the larger
society by promoting the study and teaching of the modern languages and literatures. In
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order to embrace this enterprise, we require freedom of inquiry. However, this freedom
carries with it the responsibilities of professional conduct. We intend this statement to
embody reasonable norms for ethical conduct in teaching and learning as well as in
scholarship. (para. 1)
Note that the MLA firstly begins with a statement regarding the scope of research. The members
of the MLA are expected to recognize their responsibility to promote the study of modern
languages and literature as a service to society as a whole. The wording, “the members of the
MLA serve the larger society” assumes that the members are required to serve, to benefit,
society, and the means by which they do so is through the advancement of language and
literature. Note also, similar to the discussion of university handbooks, there is an emphasis on
free inquiry. Yet, the recognition of this free inquiry also brings on responsibility of
“professional conduct.”
The Statement of Professional Ethics holds six premises to be true. To paraphrase,
1) Tenured faculty members are responsible for protecting free inquiry. Faculty
members have ethical obligations to everyone including students, colleagues,
institutions, their communities, the profession, and society.
2) Intellectual integrity. As teachers and scholars, they must responsibly use evidence in
argumentation and maintain fairness in judging the arguments of others.
3) Because the MLA values free inquiry, members should not exploit, harm, harass,
discriminate, or misuse others.
4) Members must respect the free inquiry and diversity of inquiry of others.
5) Teaching and inquiry must respect culture and diversity
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6) Judgment of the usefulness of inquiry should not be used to limit freedom of research.
(para. 2-7)
These statements repeatedly remind members of the importance of free inquiry. However, that
free inquiry should not harm others. Members are also reminded that they have a responsibility
to the welfare of others. In fact, the scope of the MLA premises includes the whole of society.
Thus, despite the lack of human participants, MLA scholars are reminded that they should not
harm others but should use their research in ways that best benefit society.
The MLA also includes descriptions of ethical conduct in teaching and learning and in
scholarship. The descriptions are lengthy lists of expectations for teachers and scholars. These
lists provide a useful picture of the expectations of teachers and scholars, and, thus, of the roles
of teachers and scholars. The lists of expectations are included in the appendix.
The descriptions of ethical conduct in teaching and learning by the MLA include the
requirement that teachers represent the value of free inquiry to their students, evaluate their
students fairly, respect their students’ privacy, provide direction to students, provide continuing
guidance, and provide career counseling to students. Notice that the ethical statement heavily
rests on the idea that teachers are guides. This idea of being a guide through intellectual
development, to free thought, and to a career reminds one of the mentorship required by some of
the handbooks. Teachers, reminds the MLA, guide students for their own benefit. Teachers are
required to help students and never misuse them. The responsibility that teachers have to their
students requires that faculty members always seek to benefit the students intellectually.
Moreover, teachers are required to be objective and fair. They should be just in their dealings
with students, not favoring some over others. Teachers must be unbiased and professional in
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their evaluation of students for the students’ benefit. The aim of teaching appears to be the
production of free thinkers who themselves will be able to mentor others similarly.
The document then continues to list the requirements of ethical conduct in service and
scholarship. The full list is also included in the appendix. The document requires that scholars
assist their institutions, acknowledge their intellectual debts, reflect well on their institution,
judge the work of others fairly, and keep the confidentiality of others. In this section, one sees
once again the importance of integrity in scholarship. Scholars are required to be transparent
regarding where ideas come from, and out of respect acknowledge those who help them. There is
no discussion of whether or not research itself should benefit the community, but there is
emphasis on the idea that faculty members have responsibility to others. Confidentiality must be
maintained, respect for the institution and colleagues must be maintained, and fairness must be
maintained. Thus, in all aspects of the researcher’s life, she must have integrity—she must
maintain respect for others and for her community.
There is a notable difference between the MLA Statement of Professional Ethics and the
others discussed here. The MLA document says nothing about the treatment of human
participants. One can only assume that if an MLA researcher were to include human participants
in her work she must consult with her IRB and would be required to follow the standards of the
Belmont Report as well as of her institution. Despite this lack of discussion, there remains the
heavily-embedded assumption that MLA members should benefit others. Their scholarship, it
seems, must be directed toward the promotion of free thought; members are required that they
serve society as a whole.
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As teachers, members are reminded of the vulnerability of their students and the
importance of mentoring them toward an autonomous state of intellectual excellence. The
highest standards of research and scholarship require that members engage objective and
respectful argumentation. Thus, one sees again the importance of fairness as well as respect.
These are themes found in all of the statements of ethics discussed here: respect, integrity, and
community. Respect is engaged whenever there is discussion of dignity and autonomy. Issues of
intellectual freedom and transparency also evidence the importance of respect, both for
knowledge and for the work of others. The notion of respect carries with it the importance of
doing no harm and never using others selfishly. Integrity is required whenever there is
discussion of the importance of justice, fairness, and objectivity. Integrity is uniformly required,
as all of the ethical codes require consistent ethical action in all parts of one’s professional life.
Integrity assumes that agents are honest and fair. Community emerges in all discussion of social
responsibility, the treatment of institutions and colleagues, and the perpetuation and
dissemination of knowledge and free thought. This notion of community carries with it the
importance of beneficence: one must recognize the importance of others and seek to benefit the
community.
This community focus is most effectively understood as a lifeworld expectation of the
MLA. There is not clear positioning of the professoriate or the precise expectations of its
members as inscribed by their association. Rather, the MLA enunciates the roles and
responsibilities of professors as part of a self-reflective communitarian act.
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Summary of Data Collected from Professional Associations’ Guidelines for Ethical Research
This self-reflective communitarian act is common of all of the documents examined in
section two—likely the tendency of the ethical codes of professional associations to rest upon
lifeworld epistemology—whereas the handbooks in section one were often grounded in
systemsworld epistemology. This is likely the result of the fact that one cannot ground ethics in
the systemsworld. One can ground expectations in a systems way, requiring specific actions in
relationship to the larger system as a whole, but the very notion of ethics expands outward in a
way that requires the consideration of the community in a way that cannot be firmly codified.
One cannot determine the needs of others without engagement with others in communal and selfreflective dialectic, and those needs and responsibilities shift as the individual needs of the
members of the community shift. One, thus, must engage the ethical world from a holistic
perspective that engages agents and their needs, rather than just systems and policy. Thus, the
ethical codes here remain vague in some ways in regards to how, exactly, members will meet
their responsibilities. Members are, instead, asked to be virtuous agents who can use their selfreflexive agency to determine the best course of action.

Faculty Roles as Discussed by Philosophers of Education
This final section will address the perspectives presented by philosophers of education on
the roles of professors and teachers. Four philosophical works will provide a non-institutional
picture of faculty roles. The works discussed previously, in sections one and two of this chapter,
emerged from universities themselves or were generated by associations that meet the scholastic
ends of universities. As a result, despite the goals of universities and professional associations

269
being grounded in the lifeworld, much of the data presented thus far are best understood through
the systemsworld epistemology and organizational role theory. The philosophers discussed
below, however, assist in understanding faculty roles beyond the systemsworld, as roles deeply
embedded in the lifeworld as well.
Kenneth Strike and Jonas F. Soltis (2004)
The first text addressed here, The Ethics of teaching by Kenneth Strike and Jonas F.
Soltis (2004), provides a practical approach to ethical deliberation in the field of education. Of
primary focus in the text is the ability to present means by which teachers may solve ethical
questions pertinent to education. The text takes the time to address some traditional ethical
methodologies such as utilitarianism and deontology, but rests its final consensus on practical
deliberation and community dialectic as the most appropriate means by which for educators to
address questions of ethics in education.
The authors rely heavily upon reflective equilibrium as a motivation and methodology for
ethical deliberation. Note, however, that this reflective equilibrium as discussed by Strike and
Soltis is externalized as community dialectic, rather than relying solely on a Rawlsian tendency
towards internalized reflective equilibrium that needs to engage community dialogue. The
externalizing move made by Strike and Soltis, however, is coherent with Habermas and
discourse ethics. Strike and Soltis wrote,
We see the purpose of ethical deliberation as seeking to achieve agreement on principles
that regulate human action while respecting the equal worth and the interests of all. We
suggest that reflective equilibrium in the appropriate standard for such activity and that
extensive dialogue is a requirement for its achievement. (2004, p. 97)
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It is this “extensive dialogue” that is of the greatest import to Strike and Soltis’ text in addressing
ethical concerns in teaching.
The engagement in the profession of teaching requires a particular focus on the interest of
others. According to Strike and Soltis, professionalism should include service to the community,
in part because it is the community that provides them with the authority to make decisions for
the best interest of individuals in the community:
When authority over decision is transferred to professionals, how are we to be sure that it
is exercised in the interests of the people? The usual response to this question is that
professionals are taught an ethic that emphasizes maintaining professional standards and
client welfare. Thus it is the training of professionals, their initiation into an ethic of
professional responsibility and service, which primarily serves to ensure that
professionals serve the public. (2004, p. 102)
Professors, thus, as professionals entrusted not only with the welfare of individual students, but
with the generation of knowledge and the development of understanding, are under a special
obligation; they must “serve the public.” Moreover, the academy itself is in a particular position
of generating professionals and professionalism, both through the university’s production of
professionals and by virtue of the fact that it is through the university metanarrative that
professionalism in individual fields is defined.
[T]he case for professionalism rested not only on the idea that professionals possess
knowledge that puts them in a position to make good decisions, but also on the belief that
the practice of professionals is governed by an ethic that emphasized professional
responsibility and client welfare. (2004, p. 108)

271
Thus, faculty members are under a special onus to exemplify professionalism, and, if Strike and
Soltis were right, to serve the community as those entrusted, as professionals, with the public
good.
The text, however, does not solely focus on the ethical obligations engendered by
professionalism. Strike and Soltis (2004) focused specifically on the means by which teachers
can meet their ethical obligation through ethical dialogue. That dialogue should not remain
internal. Rather, ethical dialogue that is intended to meet the professional obligation to do public
good must include the public. In so doing, educators internalize themselves as part of the
community and reduce the paternalistic problems associated with Otherness and marginalization:
Dialogue often strengthens community. It can reinforce a sense of common enterprise
and thereby create a sense of membership. Through dialogue the school can be
transformed into my school, its goals into my goals, its activities into my activities. When
decisions are achieved through dialogue, individuals who participate are more likely to
own decisions and to care conscientiously for their implementation. Even when dialogue
fails to achieve agreement, it may foster respect and understanding. (2004, p.110)
This dialogue is driven by the fundamental onus on the teaching professional to do good. Notice,
however, that she is not doing good for them; she is now, through dialectic, through the
Habermasian process of discourse, generating for herself an internality of the other upon whom
the self is now supervenient. This reflective dialectic places the self as indebted to, in need of,
and as generated by the community in which she has become an instrumental piece—a piece that
has been trusted with great responsibility to do good and great potential to do harm.
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In engaging in community dialectic, one seeks—argued Strike and Soltis (2004)—
reflective equilibrium. Again, note the Habermasian ideal: the theorists suggest that one does not
seek solely the equilibrium experienced by a Cartesian self, excised from the dialectical world,
but the equilibrium of a dialectical and symbolic actor who shares in the act of world-making.
These ideas suggest that discussion is essential to ethical deliberation. Ethical
deliberation should be thought of as a social activity conducted cooperatively. The
reflective equilibrium that is sought in ethical dialogue is a social outcome. Persistent
disagreement indicates that reflective equilibrium has not been achieved (2004, p. 113)
As a result, ethical deliberation by teachers
… should be seen as a social and dialogical activity leading to two observations about the
ethical lives of teaching in schools… First, the character of schools in our society
typically makes the ethical reflection that teachers engage in a solitary affair. Teachers
work in self-contained classrooms. There are few forums in schools where it is natural to
discuss ethical issues. Moreover, many schools are hierarchically structured in ways that
interfere with any real dialogical process. As a consequence, teachers are unlikely to have
much opportunity to engage in open and undominated ethical dialogue. (Strike & Soltis,
2004, p. 113)
Note, here, that this first observation may not necessarily apply to the university. Theoretically,
universities are built in order to promote dialogue. Questions of ethics and policy are often under
discussion both in and outside of university classrooms. However, the point regarding hierarchy
remains true in the university system. There are those who are invited to department meetings to
participate in discussions of policymaking and ethics, and those who are not—adjuncts, for

273
example. Whose voice is heard, who is invited into the conversation, and how dissent is treated
is heavily institutionalized and grounded in the hierarchy of the university. It may well be that
there are those who teach in the university system who are not welcome to speak on questions of
policy or ethics by virtue of their low placement in the hierarchy.
Strike and Soltis’ second observation seems especially appropriate to the university
system and faculty roles:
Second, teachers need to be careful in how they think about their own integrity in ethical
decision- making. If one thinks of ethical deliberation as something one does alone, one
may also think of the resulting choices in an uncompromising way… People who draw
this [kind of uncompromising] conclusion run the risk of irreconcilable conflict with
others who may have reflected with equal conscientiousness but reached different
conclusions. (2004, pp. 113-114)
Those who are accustomed to “professing” may find themselves especially in danger of the
pitfalls of uncompromising ethical positions. While one may not be wrong, one may find that
such tenacity is death to dialogue. If one wishes to engage in the development of a communal
reflective equilibrium, one must recognize that ethical decision-making is not something one can
do by oneself for the community. Professors are especially in danger of such uncompromising
views, as it is their very intellectual excellence that has led them to a career focused specifically
oriented towards the development of knowledge itself. Thus, there is a tremendous chance that a
professor has spent much more time thinking about questions (particular meta-level, teleological,
and ethical questions) than those outside of the university. This does not, however, negate the
argument made by Strike and Soltis. The professor’s expertise is exactly why she should engage
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in community ethical deliberation. Her goal is not to develop answers only for herself, but to
develop answers that can be shared for the public good. Doing so, however, requires engaging
the public—both in order to assist the public in developing that knowledge and understanding,
and in order to understand the public good and what that very phrase means and necessitates.
It is through the emphasis on reflective dialectic that Strike and Soltis (2004) developed
their answer to the question, “What is the fundamental aim of teaching?” The development of
knowledge and understanding for the public good as a professional dedicated to that good results
in the conclusion that promotion of dialogue is the fundamental goal of education if education is
a domain oriented to the doing of public good through the generation of knowledge.
In our view, the compelling matter is growth as a moral agent, as someone who cares
about others and is willing and able to accept responsibility for one’s self, as someone
who can engage in open, undominated dialogue with others about a common life and
accept shared responsibility for the group’s life. Promoting this kind of development is
what teachers ought to be fundamentally about, whatever else it is that they are about. We
are first and foremost in the business of creating persons. It is our first duty to respect the
dignity and value of our students and help them to achieve their status as free, rational,
and feeling moral agents. (p.120)
Note that what one sees echoed throughout the various texts analyzed here is the notion of free
agency. The ability and skillsets necessary to engage in free thought that enhances the agent’s
ability to flourish is a key component of education as described by Strike and Soltis (2004). The
promotion of the community’s welfare—beneficence—similarly remains a primary focus of
these philosophers, as it did in much of the work previously discussed. Generation of that
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welfare again takes on the quality of mentorship and the lifeworld through the notion that
teachers should, while respecting the dignity and value of students, help them to achieve a status
as free, rational thinkers. There is no question, then, that the role of teacher as defined by Strike
and Soltis carries with it significant expectations for teachers generated through their community
dialectic. These expectations may not be inscribed, but they are embedded in the cultural
discourse itself—the fact that teachers must guide others to a flourishing state of free thought
emerges from the basic premise that teachers should help produce knowledge in others that
benefits the student as well as the community.
Peter Markie (1994)
Peter Markie (1994), in his edited volume Professor’s duties: Ethical issues in college
teaching, began very much in a philosophical vein: He addresses the most basic definition of
terms.
Professors teach, and the verb is transitive; what we teach is the subject matter and those
to whom we teach it are the students… Teaching produces knowledge, and knowledge is
true belief based upon good reasons. To teach is to guide students through the course
material in such a way that they come to form a series of rationally based true beliefs
with regard to it. (p. 3)
Note that to Markie (1994), teaching is less a matter of generating understanding or free thought,
and more a direction towards the acquisition of justified, true, belief—a fairly common, if not
somewhat antiquated, philosophical definition of knowledge. Interestingly, Markie argued that
teaching itself produces knowledge, rather than scholarship or inquiry. His epistemic picture
seems to be very much a correspondence concept. There is truth, and it is the responsibility of
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teachers to illuminate that truth for students. By virtue of exposing students to the truth, teachers
produce in them a belief that is both true and justified, and thus teaching literally produces
knowledge.
Markie (1994) also noted that it is the responsibility of professors to engender particular
virtuous qualities of character in their students. “Professors also represent certain values. We are
supposed to inspire our students by communicating a vision of intellectual excellence and to help
them acquire the qualities needed to make that vision a reality in their lives” (1994, p. 4). It is
here, then, that we find Markie also emphasized a notion akin to free thought and inquiry. This
free thought, however, is not directed toward a picture of dialectic or communal production of
knowledge, but rather the best means by which to help students guide themselves to the truth.
It is especially important in Markie’s argument that professors engage in scholarship. He
argued that scholarship was essential to the teaching enterprise, not for some “production of
publication” reason, but because scholarship means to be an actual practitioner of the field one
teaches about: “Finally, to be a professor is to be engaged actively in one’s intellectual discipline
in a way that support one’s teaching. To be a professor of philosophy is to be a philosopher, to be
a professor of mathematics is to be a mathematician, and so on” (Markie, 1994, p.4). It is
essential to Markie that professors be both experts and exemplars. Expertise is required for active
participation in the field, and that expertise is consistently improved upon by that same active
participation. Moreover, for students the professor acts as an exemplar in the field; in order to
guide the students to excellence in the field, the professors themselves must model that
excellence and participation. Beyond acting as exemplars, Markie argued that it is the role of
professors to use their participation in their disciplines in a way that improves their pedagogy.
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“…the expectation is not simply that professors actively engage in their disciplines; it is that we
engage in our disciplines in a way that supports our teaching. Professors bring the practice of
their discipline into the classroom” (1994, p. 5). Thus, if she does not practice her discipline, the
professor cannot bring it into her classroom.
Sidney Hook (1994) and Peter Markie (1994)
Not every philosopher in his volume agrees with Markie, however, regarding the import
of active practice in a discipline for professional competence. For example, Sidney Hook (1994)
wrote,
The primary function… of the liberal arts teacher is to help young men and women to
achieve intellectual and emotional maturity by learning to handle certain ideas and
intellectual tools. This requires scholarship, and familiarity with current research but not
necessarily the capacity to engage productively in it. (p.88)
Note the importance to Hook of intellectual guidance. Hook’s notion is a good deal more in line
with the mentorship and lifeworld instantiation of teaching alluded to by some of the other works
analyzed here. In the juxtaposition of Markie and Hook, one sees the dichotomy that categorizes
many of the handbooks reviewed here: On one hand, teaching is a systemsworld enterprise that is
oriented toward a quantifiable production of knowledge and thus one’s own participation in
research helps further establish one’s competence to teach; on the other, teaching is a lifeworld
engagement for the purpose of helping guide others to the most fulfilling participation in their
own lives beyond participation as part of a system.
Hook (1994) argued that there were four basic characteristics of a good teacher as
professor:
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1) Intellectual Competence
2) Patience for the Incompetence of Others
3) Improvisation
4) Knowledge of Human Beings
It is absolutely necessary to be an expert in the field one teaches, according to Hook. One cannot
teach without being competent on multiple levels: not only must one know the field, one must be
competent enough to engage students effectively. Moreover, the professor must be so competent
that she can help guide students to success in the field. Notice, however, Hook moved beyond
the somewhat austere correspondence picture painted by Markie (1994) by continuing on to
describe the qualitative competencies of good teacher from a lifeworld perspective: a good
teacher realizes that students do not know the material as she does and is willing to help guide
them through their experience. She does not believe that the truth is so obvious that students
should simply grasp it. Students must construct the truth for themselves and, thus, good
professors can tolerate and engage disagreement.
The classroom is an ever changing and consistently shifting environment. Thus, the most
competent professors can improvise in regards to shifting pedagogical needs of their students but
in terms of their curricula, as well. A rigid lesson plan may ignore the individual learning needs
of students, and result in class that lacks engagement.
What the teacher must aim at is to make each class hour an integrated experience with an
aesthetic, if possible a dramatic, unity of its own. Without a spontaneity that can point up
the give and take of discussion and a skill in weaving together what the students
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themselves contribute, preparation will not save the hour from dullness. (Hook, 1994, p.
94)
The curriculum, thus, must be flexible to the aesthetic whole produced by the class. The
construction of knowledge, rather than the presentation of knowledge, requires that the teacher
be prepared to go where the class takes her, while at the same time using that impetus to guide
the class to free thought and understanding. The picture drawn by Hook brings to mind the way
sailors use competing winds to their advantage to drive their boats.
Finally, Hook (1994) described teachers as practical psychologists. Being an effective
professor of any subject means to be a studier of students. One must come to know the
motivations in the class and what pedagogical tack will best facilitate learning for that class and
those students. Hook argued that often college teaching is not on the frontier of research. To
teach college courses often means to present information that is well-established and old. Thus,
intellectual vitality cannot always come from scholarship; at times it must come from the new
discovery of old information.
[W]hen a theorem is being derived for the twentieth time or when an elementary point in
the grammar of a foreign language is being explained or when the nerve an old
philosophic argument is being laid bare, [intellectual vitality] lies in experiencing the
situation as a fresh problem in communication rather than one in personal discovery…it
consists in getting the students to reach the familiar conclusion with a sense of having
made their own discovery. (Hook, 1994, p. 95)
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Again, one sees Hook emphasize the importance of knowledge construction. Professors engage
students in a process of free thought that creates its own vitality even if the problems discussed
have, seemingly, already been solved long ago.
This is not to say that the correspondence epistemology of Markie and the coherence
epistemology of Hook are necessarily incompatible in their practical application. Granted, the
result of their deferring epistemologies seems to result in the generation of an age-old opposition
between philosophical models of learning that are behavioristic and constructivist. However,
regardless of the learning model, professors must be engaged with students in an active pursuit of
inquiry. Whether that inquiry is the literal production of knowledge or the constructivist
generation of understanding is not nearly as important as acknowledging the communal and
dialectical core of the teaching endeavor as presented by both models. Good professors engage
learners and must be so competent in both their discipline and in teaching that they can guide
those learners to what are often, for the learner, radical new ideas.
There is more to be said by Markie, however, regarding the enunciated roles of professors
beyond the onus to be good teachers. As somewhat more systems-theoretical in his approach,
Markie—perhaps more than any other theorist discussed here—was very clear regarding
professorial responsibilities. He stated,
…each university, and so each professor, has an obligation to serve the goal of
intellectual advancement and knowledge. Professors in the sciences have an obligation to
guide students to knowledge of true theories in the sciences. Professors in the arts have an
obligation to guide students to knowledge of excellent works in the arts. (p. 23)
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Again, one sees the emphasis on knowledge production and “truth.” Markie, however, is not
unaware of community and the role it can play in education. He also wrote, “Fine teaching,
active scholarship, and regular publishing are ideally connected in each professor’s career:
teaching is informed by scholarship, which is shared with the community of scholars through
publication and presentations at professional conferences” (1994, p.76). Good scholarship
provides a role model for students both in regards to the pursuit of knowledge and to
participation in the particular field being taught.
Theodore Benditt (1990)
The belief that good professors engage in rigorous scholarship is echoed by Benditt
(1990) in Morality, responsibility, and the university. While some may argue that teaching, itself,
generates knowledge and is a form of scholarship, Benditt stated, “Teaching does not absolve
professors of conducting their own research and scholarship” (1990, p. 101) because teaching
cannot be separated from making truth claims (p.102). Because professors are evidencing truth
claims that they hope others will come to believe, they must be foremost advocates of inquiry
into the truth, argued Benditt. He expressed something of a concern that professors will use their
teaching as an excuse to not to make sure that the truth they espouse is in fact true, the result of
which being that “a professor cannot teach conscientiously while escaping the need to conduct
what amounts to a research program” (p.102). Thus, one sees both in Markie and in Benditt
considerable emphasis on the expectation that faculty members should be scholars in the sense
that they should engage in research activity for their consumption and intellectual betterment and
for the purpose of illustrating to their students the best means by which to pursue truth.
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There is an interesting minor correlation insofar as both of the theorists who espouse the
importance of research and publication also describe truth in a correspondence way. While a
coherentist picture allows for scholarship in the classroom with students, even when engaging
age-old ideas, the correspondence theory of truth seems to drive theorists to believe that
professors must be at the forefront of the identification and acquisition of knowledge. This
acquisition of knowledge, however, described by both Markie and Benditt, does not ignore the
importance of teaching. In fact, the importance of scholarship is couched in terms of the
importance of teaching.
…a professor has an obligation to engage in research and scholarship because these are
integral to conscientious teaching. A professor at the very least must make choices about
what set of ideas is most nearly correct and therefore worth teaching, and research and
scholarship are required in making such choices. … Part of the educational enterprise is
to promote growth and development of students. …Therefore, students should be shown,
as part of their education, how knowledge advances, and the best way for professors to do
so is to demonstrate it, to show themselves to student as engaged, in small and
appropriate ways, in the advancement of knowledge. (Benditt, 1994, p. 103)
Thus, research may not necessarily be best understood in the professoriate as an end in and of
itself, but as a servant to effective education. This is not to say that the generation of knowledge
and understanding is not an intrinsic good, but that when one chooses to add to the responsibility
of researcher by electing to take on the solemn duties of the professor, there are significant
additional expectations to do individual good in addition to communal good.
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Kenneth Eble (1994)
Not all theorists are in in complete agreement with Markie (1994) and Benditt (1994).
There are some significant concerns that pressure to publish causes tension between research and
teaching. Kenneth Eble (1994) wrote,
…scholarship must, to some degree, be broken away from the mere doing of, piling up
of, research. As regards the teaching faculty, the mere counting of articles and citation
deserves the hostility it has aroused. What I would ask for is more vigorous and specific
examining of the intellectual activities of a faculty member as they have outcomes in
teaching. (p. 222)
Notice that the quotation above is not in direct contradiction to Markie. Eble did not advocate
against scholarship, just against the needless piling up of publications for no pedagogical
purpose. Like Markie, Eble advocated for research that demonstrates beneficial outcomes for
teaching. He went on to state, “[C]ooperation need[s to] gain a larger place against the present
competitive, free enterprise model. Departments must function as part of the common enterprise
of educating students who are human beings before and after they are engineers, English majors,
or physicists” (1994, p. 223). Simply, the quantifiable, systemsworld approach (particularly
when structuring education as a competitive free market) to publication conflicts with the
“common enterprise of education” that recognizes students as full human agents who both serve
and are served by the community. To conduct research as a means by which to forward one’s
career and present students with a model of excellence in the discipline forgets that students are
whole persons who need to be addressed as whole persons first, suggests the work of Eble and
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Hook. One may become so enamored with the pursuit of knowledge that one becomes
comfortable with leaving students who “just don’t get it” behind.
Eble was passionate in concerns regarding the treatment of research as the primary goal
of scholarship and the professoriate:
I accept scholarship as a necessary part of teaching but please for scholarship broadly
interpreted to be maintained as the word rather than research. Research is surely a
subcategory of the many ways a human mind seeks understanding of the world it
occupies” (1994, p.218).
Eble’s work, thusly, suggests that a lifeworldly view of education should take primacy
over a systemsworldly one, as students should be first recognized as full human persons who
have thoughts, needs, and feelings of their own, before being consumed by the university as
potential doctors, lawyers, and engineers. It is the students’ capacity for a flourishing human life
that must take primacy if research and scholarship are going to serve their most effective
pedagogical functions. Otherwise, the risk becomes that the professor’s research, as well as the
students themselves, become the means to an end of a system that is primarily built to produce
workers—graduating students prepared for work and diminishing the activity of professors to
only those activities that make the system function.
Peter Markie (1990) on Objectivity
In Morality, responsibility, and the university, Markie additionally emphasizes a final
essential duty of professors—objectivity—which causes Markie to be a staunch advocate against
professors being friends with students. Such friendships, Markie contended, potentially interfere
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with a truly invested classroom in which all students are given the best possible chance to learn
and succeed. He stated,
The first premise is the general principle that we are prima facie obligated not to engage
in any activity likely to limit severely our ability to honor our moral obligations…each
professor has a prima facie duty to give all students equal consideration in instruction,
advising, and evaluation.” (1990 p. 141)
To be friends with students is to choose particular students in whom the professor will invest
more than others. Friendship, as understood by Markie, means to have, or choose to have, duties
to a particular person before one’s duty to others. Such primacy of duty to one student over
another would violate his premise that professors are obligated to not limit their ability to honor
their moral obligations. Markie did not argue against friendship between students and professors
because of a cold and uncaring focus on academia, but because such friendships prevent one
from engaging all of one’s students justly and fairly as agents who each deserve the teacher’s
best self.
This question, of care, though, is an important one. One wonders if Markie’s picture is
heavily embedded in the systemsworld understanding of friendship as generated in the rather
individualistic United States, where, as such, being friends with “me” assumes that one must be
willing to do things to benefit me before and above others. This picture, though, is not
necessarily the best picture of care and friendship. It may well be that educators should be
“friends” with all of their students if “friendship” means that the professor is deeply invested in
every students’ welfare. Moreover, that friendship is not a mutual friendship, and need not be. It
is possible for one to care a great deal for something that cannot or does not care in return. To
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teach means that one wants to see one’s students unharmed, successful, and happy. These are all
qualities of friendship, but a non-reciprocal friendship, and the teacher must be as deeply
invested in the uncaring student as in the caring student. Thus, this is not to say that Markie is
wrong in his belief in objectivity, but, rather, that not all philosophers of education agree that
such objectivity precludes friendship, if one does not mean a mutual friendship that requires
special dispensation, unjust obligation, or exclusion of care for others.
Nel Noddings (2005)
Nel Noddings (2005) is one of the premier philosophers in the field of the “ethics of
care,” particularly in conjunction with education. The work discussed here focuses specifically
on teacher responsibilities. In the article, “Caring in Education,” Noddings (2005) addressed the
particular challenges to the role of teacher in the United States because of the U.S. focus on
individualization, which, she argued can impede care relationships. This impediment, however,
is particularly problematic in education, as she argued that care is essential to effective teaching
relationships.
Effective care requires what Noddings termed “engrossment.” This engrossment means
that the “carer” is receptive, he “receives what the cared-for is feeling and trying to express”
(Noddings, 2005, para. 5). This means that a care relationship is more than a “virtue” care
relationship in which one cares about another’s success. One can be a caring teacher, for
example, if one wants her students to do well on their exams. This does not mean, however, that
the students feel as if the teacher cares about them.
When I care, my motive energy begins to flow toward the needs and wants of the caredfor. This does not mean that I will always approve of what the other wants, nor does it
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mean that I will never try to lead him or her to a better set of values, but I must take into
account the feelings and desires that are actually there and respond as positively as my
values and capacities allow. (2005, para. 5)
Note, then, that care is distinguished from concern for another’s ability to succeed. There is a
kind of communication of emotional content; the teacher is invested in the thoughts and needs of
the student.
One wonders, however, why this kind of care is necessary, particularly in light of
Markie’s arguments. Nodding’s argument hinges in the importance of trust in a teaching
relationship. Students who do not trust that the teacher cares about them are less likely to learn.
In the States, however, our individualist picture often interferes with such trust. We find it
difficult to believe that anyone else is genuinely concerned for our welfare.
The relational view is hard for some American thinkers to accept because the Western
tradition puts such great emphasis on individualism. In that tradition, it is almost
instinctive to regard virtues as personal possessions, hard-won through a grueling process
of character building. John Dewey rejected this view and urged us to consider virtues as
“working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces.” (Noddings, 2005,
para. 7)
Notice that this notion of “environing forces” and the idea of relational care falls neatly in line
with the community dialectical picture painted by Strike and Soltis (2004). However, Noddings,
hinging her thesis on Dewey, pushed the notion further: it is through communicative action that
students become virtuous—the educator’s concern for students’ welfare moves beyond their
academic performance, and even beyond them being free thinkers. This idea, though, that we
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learn in communities through invested dialogue and care with others, is not well accepted in the
United States.
The immediate, ruggedly individualistic response is likely to be one akin to, “Hugs don’t
teach Math.” The idea that teachers should be deeply invested in their students beyond their test
scores concerns us. We wonder what insidious motives a teacher may have for caring for her
students. Notice, however, that the concern we expect teachers to show for students only makes
sense in the individualistic mindset when displays of care are not genuinely beneficent. We
understand teachers who want students to do well on tests because those tests reflect well on the
teacher. We understand teachers who want students to do well in class because it is essential that
students learn the material so they can contribute to society. Beyond that, we begin worrying, as
Markie did, about friendship, lack of objectivity, and unfairness, especially with regard to
friendships between teachers and older students who are unlikely to need affection from their
teacher during the school day. Caring, one might argue, does not cause learning, and likely may
just distract from the teacher’s true responsibilities.
Noddings, however, argued against the strawperson treatment of care. She was not
advocating that care accomplishes everything necessary in education: “I do not mean to suggest
that the establishment of caring relations will accomplish everything that must be done in
education, but these relations provide the foundation for successful pedagogical activity”
(Noddings, 2005, para 12). The foundation of successful pedagogy is one built on genuine trust.
Thus, by her view all of the rest of successful teaching requires the care necessary to engender
trust.
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Consider what we ask of students. Even if we leave aside questions of, “How is it
possible to be a genuine mentor without genuine care for the whole person?” we realize that we
ask our students to trust us. We ask them do to work they don’t want to do, learn things that often
are contrary to their intuitions, and believe us when we claim to know the information we share
with them. These requests we make of our students are especially true in the University. These
students are no longer compelled to be in school; they elect to be in school because they believe
the professoriate when it says it can help them. How does one, however, encourage students to
do the work, take the classes, and open their mind to dangerous and counter-intuitive ideas, if
they believe we are only interested in ourselves?
First, as we listen to our students, we gain their trust and, in an on-going relation of care
and trust, it is more likely that students will accept what we try to teach. They will not see
our efforts as ‘interference’ but, rather, as cooperative work proceeding from the integrity
of the relation. (Noddings, 2005, para 9)
Consider the fact that we know that car salespersons don’t care about us, and, in fact, we know
they probably want to take advantage of us. Yet, we are still most likely to buy a car from the
salesperson who is able to convince us that she is really invested in us. Otherwise, if they do not
engender our trust, we are far more hesitant that we are being sold a lemon. How much more so
is that the case for a teacher who sees the student over the course of a semester, or a year?
Teaching requires trust, and it seems that engendering trust in others requires care, or at least the
deception of care.
Additionally, Noddings (2005) again emphasized the importance of dialogue so heavily
emphasized by Strike and Soltis (2004). “[A]s we engage our students in dialogue, we learn
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about their needs, working habits, interests, and talents. We gain important ideas from them
about how to build our lessons and plan for their individual progress” (Noddings, 2005, para 12).
We realize, then, that the process of teaching and learning is one that should be reciprocal.
Perhaps what is most missing from the discussion of professorial roles that is included in
Noddings’ discussion of teaching in general is the idea that teachers should learn from their
students. One would think this would be especially possible and necessary in the university.
Markie, for example, spends a great deal of time discussing the importance of research as a
means by which to inform one’s teaching. What one forgets is that a holistic dialectical kind of
teaching is also an act of learning and scholarship. To quote Noddings, “Finally, as we acquire
knowledge about our students’ needs and realize how much more than the standard curriculum is
needed, we are inspired to increase our own competence” (Noddings, 2005, para. 12). Thus,
Nodding’s work implies that teaching is an effective means by which to grow as a scholar.
In conjunction with the other theorists, Nodding’s picture of teaching drives the
responsibility of teachers to a new high. Teachers become more than mentors, guides, and
exemplary scholars; they become deeply invested care-givers for their students. This does not
indicate a paternal relationship; paternalistic relationships between professors and students may
preclude effective teaching, particularly as it is dangerous to free inquiry and the construction of
knowledge through honest engagement with dissenting opinions. Rather, the relationship is one
in which professors are required to engage their scholarship in a way that informs their teaching
for the purpose of bettering the life of every student. To engage such a significant burden
requires that one must care for two reasons: 1) As Noddings noted, in order to establish the trust
necessary for effective teaching; and 2) Because the amount of effort in terms of scholarship,
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professional development, emotional investment, grading, and other such demands on time and
intellect are so significant that one is unlikely to meet all of the enunciated expectations of
professorship as well as the inscribed responsibilities of professorship without genuine care. It is
that genuine care that engages the fullness of professorship as both part of the systemsworld and
as a lifeworld engagement. To be a professor beyond meeting inscribed systemsworld
expectations means to engage the lifeworld of teaching as well as the lifeworld of scholarship—
an understanding of teaching and scholarship as one deeply embedded in others and community
relationships.
Summary of Findings
The data presented here cover three fundamental portions of the dialogue that constructs
the role of faculty as teachers and researchers: faculty handbooks, codes of ethics of professional
associations, and philosophical perspectives on teacher and professor responsibilities. Thus, one
may now begin the process of integrating the data in such a way as to generate a coherent picture
of professorship. We have established, at least insofar as the roles of teachers are presented by
handbooks, professional associations, and philosophers, that my original hypothesis is not
supported. Research is not given primacy over teaching, at least insofar as the articulation of
inscribed roles in concerned. One wonders, then: Why is there so much documentation that
suggests research is given primacy over teaching, and that professors are placed in the
unenviable position of violating their expectations as teachers in favor of meeting everincreasing demands to produce?
The researcher’s intuition is that the answer lies in the systemsworld and lifeworld
dichotomy, and that dichotomy will be explored further in chapter 5. Established thus far is that
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there are numerous coherent themes that emerge from an analysis of the discourse. One uncovers
the importance of mentorship as both essential to teaching and scholarship, as well as a
consistent belief that free inquiry and free thought are essential to the university and
professorship. Moreover, there is a consistent theme that scholarship should inform one’s
teaching, leading the researcher to consider the possibility that scholarship, in the professoriate,
is supervenient upon teaching, as one’s scholarship should not be self-interested, but consistently
oriented towards the betterment of one’s ability to educate.
The importance of beneficence cannot be over-emphasized in the analysis of these
documents. Repeatedly, it is seen that the acts of research and teaching should be acts that
benefit others and engage the lifeworld of the community actively and with care. Teachers and
researchers must seek diligently to do no harm and, moreover, work conscientiously to benefit
others through the work that they do. Their professionalization is also a kind of yoke that binds
professors to the service of the community, as both teachers who must serve the student
population and as researchers who must serve the entirety of the community. To be a professor
who does not want to help others seems to rest in direct contradiction to many of the embedded
assumptions that are fundamental to our communal construction of faculty roles.
Finally, although there is argument regarding whether or not active participation in a
discipline as a publishing researcher is necessary for being a “good professor,” there is a
consensus that scholarship itself is an intrinsic good that benefits teaching. While there is
disagreement whether scholarship must mean research (and thusly means one is further obligated
to produce knowledge that helps others) or the production of knowledge through learning and
engagement personally and with students in the classroom, there is little disagreement that
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professors must be scholars. They must be experts who can show others more than
information—they must be able to show others what expertise means. There are those who
believe, as Noddings (2005) does, that such mentorship and education can only take place when
one genuinely cares about ones students. To be an expert is insufficient. One must be an expert
who wants to facilitate the flourishing of full human persons.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Summary and Purpose
This chapter addresses the fundamental questions developed through analysis of the data
presented in chapter 4 and will attempt to draw conclusions from those data. Although
preliminary analysis of the data was conducted in chapter 4, the philosophical analysis and then
synthesis of data will take place here in chapter 5. The data—the depictions, descriptions, and
expectations of faculty roles—presented in chapter five will be considered from the Habermasian
frame in order to both understand the presentation of the roles through our intersubjective
generation of human agency and in order to generate a normative construct for future
development of those roles. The primary goal of this chapter, once the roles are understood, is to
generate a “best construct” that reflects the roles in their most coherent, mutually beneficial, and
ethical formulation.
The handbooks, professional association codes of ethics, and philosophical definitions
and explications of faculty roles presented in chapter 4 will be analyzed in order to ascertain their
commensurability, coherence, and interdependence, if indeed any of which are the case. Chapter
4 has already illuminated those connections and consistencies found between the documents,
though they will be reiterated here. Again, in order to apply the principle of charity, effort has
been made to consider the roles, as presented in these various texts and forms, with the
assumption that they are in fact commensurable. This should not suggest to the reader, then, that
the actual instantiation of the roles by universities are similarly commensurable.
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The endeavor, here, is to understand what ways the roles can be consistent in order to
develop a coherent construct undergirded by the teleology of beneficence revealed by the
analysis in chapter 4. If the educational medium is itself grounded in the assumption that
education should be beneficial to students and society, then we must recognize that the same
teleology also guides the normative thrust of this work. Thus, the application of the principle of
charity towards the end of producing a construct that integrates the roles as coherently as
possible while at the same time seeks to produce a construct that is grounded in education as a
beneficent domain. Other potential philosophies of education—that students should be
miseducated for governmental purposes, that women should not be educated, or that education is
in fact bad for learners—may be argumentatively tenable, but violate the grounding assumptions
of our own educational discourse to such a great degree that incorporating them here would
require a radically different understanding of education that would no longer be recognizable as
education, given the grounding presuppositions that emerge from the analysis of our educational
discourse. Rather, as revealed by the analysis of data in chapter 4, education is undergirded by
the assumption that education it is beneficent and seeks to benefit as many learners as possible.
In order to meet these ends, this chapter will firstly address the hypothesis forwarded in
chapter 4. The hypothesis was forwarded that the presentation by the faculty handbooks, in
particular, would place teaching as secondary to research. This hypothesis was forwarded for the
sake of transparency (in order to illuminate and eliminate researcher bias), as well as to maintain
the principle of charity. One goal of the chapter, then, will be to demonstrate that hypothesis as
unsupported. As such, this chapter will begin where chapter 4 left off by considering that
hypothesis and the conclusion reached regarding it in chapter 4.
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The chapter will apply discourse ethics to further unpack the roles of teacher and
researcher and uncover the embedded assumptions that undergird our understanding of those
roles. We will engage Habermasian immanent critique to understand “professor” as constructed
by our conceptual and policy discourse. Further, the researcher will use this social dialectic to
consider if either of the roles—“researcher” and “teacher”—are supervenient upon the other in
order to determine their exact conceptual relationship. Doing so will enable one to consider
possible explanations for tensions that arise when the roles are instantiated and practically-lived,
particularly when the expectations of the roles may be in conflict.
Understanding these possible conflicts will be considered from the perspective of the
lifeworld and systemsworld. As noted already, the data indicate that conflict between the two
roles should not be attributed to an inherent inconsistency between them. Rather, explanation for
the conflict articulated in chapter 1 must be found elsewhere and will likely be found in the
sublimation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld, which is especially problematic, as education
itself is fundamentally a lifeworld engagement.
Finally, the chapter will produce a normative construct, formed both through the
conjunction of the roles in the most coherent way possible and in a way that best instantiates the
fundamental concepts defining those roles. As the embedded assumptions undergirding the roles
of teacher and researcher are revealed, those same embedded assumptions can be used as a
means by which to guide a construct conjoining those roles. The final hermeneutic synthesis,
then, should be one that provides both an insight into the fundamental nature of the roles of
“teacher” and “researcher,” while at the same creating a “best conjunction” that brings those
roles into alignment under the fusion “professor.” I will suggest that an entirely new
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understanding of “professor” is created by this construct that rejects the etymological grounding
of its seemingly symbolically identical homonym.
The Hypothesis
Chapter 4 forwarded the hypothesis that the documents investigated—the faculty
handbooks in particular—would place teaching as secondary to research. This hypothesis was
demonstrably false. The falsity of the hypothesis is especially clear in the case of the
philosophers examined in chapter 4. While some of the philosophers, particularly Markie and
Benditt, argued for the essential nature of research to good professorship, by no means did they
suggest that teaching was unimportant; quite the contrary. The importance of teaching is made
clear by virtue of the fact that Markie and Benditt noted the importance of research in part
because good researching informs good pedagogy. Professors’ research enables them to maintain
excellence in their field; thus, they are able to teach students material that is current and accurate
to the best of their knowledge. Moreover, the professor should be an exemplar to the students of
what it is that members of a particular profession do. Finally, Markie and Benditt argued that the
pursuit of knowledge is itself is an intrinsic good, and good professors model the importance of
inquiry through their own active pursuit of inquiry.
Interestingly, while one would think that the professional associations (which are
primarily focused on research) would emphasize, at least implicitly, research over teaching.
Again, this was not the case; the APA, the AERA, and the MLA seem to recognize that their
members are, in fact, often educators. Thus, they take careful effort to make ethical constraints of
research not only in terms of research, but also in terms of teaching. For example, both the APA
and MLA discuss mentoring. The APA recognized the importance of teaching even for those
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scientists who are not professors, insofar as the APA mandates that they should actively mentor
others in the field. The AERA gestures to the importance of educating in its repeated emphasis
on sharing knowledge with the community. The AERA places special emphasis on sharing
research with as many people as who can be benefited by it. The MLA similarly takes time to
discuss the importance of educating the community, but also specifically discusses expectations
of teachers and the importance of enabling free inquiry in students. Thus, is cannot be said that
even professional research organizations fail to articulate the importance of teaching, and, most
clearly, they certainly cannot be said to approve of any harm done to others for the sake of
research.
Given the research discussed in chapter 1, however, there seems to be some reason to
believe that universities themselves give primacy to research over teaching. As such, that
primacy could evidence itself through the expectations of faculty expressed through faculty
handbooks. The faculty handbooks did, in fact, focus heavily on research, but made no mention
of the importance of research over teaching. Thus, in terms of inscribed expectations, the
handbooks do not place teaching as secondary to research. One wonders, however, if unwritten
enunciated expectations, or hidden expectations, may communicate the primacy of research, and,
to some degree, the handbooks may imply the primacy of research insofar as there is often much
more detail regarding research expectations presented in the handbooks than regarding teaching
expectations. However, the handbooks also regularly mention the primacy of teaching as a goal
of the university, the importance of promoting free inquiry in students, and the active mentoring
of learners by their professors. In discussion of evaluation and expectation, research is often
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discussed in greater detail than teaching, but in discussion of goals, values, and philosophies of
the intuitions, teaching is given a primary position.
The treatment of teaching and research by universities through their handbooks seems to
suggest that evaluation of research may currently lend itself more easily to the systemsworld and
teaching to the lifeworld. Simply, handbooks, themselves, are already predisposed to a
systemsworld epistemology by virtue of the fact that the handbook is intended to articulate the
structure and the hierarchy of the institution. There is no question that most of the handbooks
discussed here dedicate significant pagination to the policies and processes that support and
generate the institutional bureaucracy. Perhaps, then, the handbooks, already embedded in the
systemsworld, often detail the systemsworld requirements of research in greater depth than
teaching simply because research lends itself more easily to tangible and quantitative products.
While the handbooks never note a particular number of publications required for tenure
and promotion, the handbooks seem to articulate the requirements of research in tangible ways:
the handbooks make mention of the importance of “journal publications, book authorship,
creative works, and performances,” all of which can be enumerated. More tellingly, such
quantifiability in terms of publication lends itself more easily to systemsworld expression when
attempting to articulate what “good research” means than when attempting to articulate what
“good teaching” does. Simply, one wonders, how does an institution systematize and quantify
“good teaching?” Of course, the institutions do attempt to do so. The documents quantify good
teaching in terms of student evaluations and “student success and performance.” Perhaps, then,
the fact that the institutions often emphasize teaching excellence as a primary goal, yet underdiscuss what the expectations are, is the result of the difficulty of expressing the lifeworld of
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teaching using systemsworld language. Regardless of the reason, and regardless of their failure
to clearly illustrate balanced expectations, it cannot be said that the institutions value teaching
less than research, at least insofar as articulated in their faculty handbooks.
The Question Emergent from the Failure of the Hypothesis
What becomes, then, a primary question in this dissertation is the question, “Why, then,
does so much research seem to indicate that good teaching is threatened by institutional emphasis
on research?” If the documents reviewed here are reflective of the way faculty roles are
generated by our communal dialectic, then teaching should not be threatened by primacy of
research. The ethical questions raised by the practice of faculty research, particularly by SoTL
research, would be a non-issue. If good teaching were truly the most fundamental goal of the
university and research were truly only used in service of that goal, there would be little
evidence, one would think, that professors would be willing to use students as research
participants in order to promote their own research agenda knowing that it is not in the best
interest of the students. However, as Neill (2008) noted, there has been an increased professor
engagement in “ethical gray areas,” which suggests that there is a tension between teaching and
research that is not made clear in faculty handbooks alone. Thus, despite the evidence presented
in chapter 4, one cannot simply shrug one’s shoulders and suggest, “Clearly, teaching and
research are deeply connected, and there is no tension.” The holism of the dialectic suggests that
the tension is very real.
The answer is likely found through Habermas. The lifeworld at the core of human
existence can be structured and organized, but not reduced to the systemsworld. As the lifeworld
is the essence of human experience, the systemsworld cannot actually replace the lifeworld;
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without the lifeworld, there can be no systemsworld. A problem exists, though: because the
systemsworld is more easily quantifiable and easily fits a system in which human life is also
quantified for purposes of organization and institutional advancement, the systemsworld can gain
social primacy over the lifeworld. We have ample evidence in the U.S. that the institutions that
organize human life focus on the hierarchical and logistical aspects of social participation over
the dialectical and personal ones. Simply, the systemsworld fits, thought does not justify, a
capitalist notion in which persons are treated as “resources” that should be managed and
organized in a way that best suits the organization. Thus, there is reason to believe that a tension
exists between the genuine human need to be an active participant as a person in the lifeworld
and the organizational preference for dealing with human agency in a systemsworld way.
I suggest that part of the way in which systemsworld-oriented organizations and societies
attempt to address the need of persons to live in the lifeworld, yet at the same time the
organization’s preference to engage only in the quantifiable simplicity of the systemsworld, is by
feigning lifeworldly instantiation.
Consider as a simple analogy the requirement that when customers enter certain stores,
the employees are required to greet them. That requirement does not meet systemsworld needs. It
takes time and focus away from whatever organizational activity the employee could be doing in
order to engage a needless, “Hello! Welcome to…” Yet, many companies require that the
employees do so. Why are employees required to do something that distracts them from the
system needs of a company? Likely, the greeting fills a lifeworldly need on the part of customers
to feel welcomed and treated as full persons in the life of the company; because the
systemsworld cannot replace the lifeworld, the human actor does not want to believe—despite
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the obvious evidence that she is nothing more than a wallet to the company—that she is only part
of the systemsworld. Thus, in order to achieve its systemworld ends, the company must
participate—at least superficially—in the lifeworld.
Notice the result, in the example above, when lifeworld participation is grounded in, and
motivated by, systemsworld needs. In the case of the employee who must welcome customers,
she often does so in a distracted way. She is not saying, “Welcome!” because she is genuinely
glad to see the customer; she is doing so because she is required to in order to meet the
systemsworld needs of the company. The customer is likely to respond similarly, or not at all.
Thus, the lifeworld dialectic has never been actually engaged. The systemsworld has only
feigned a lifeworld engagement. Simply, there is reason to believe that because human actors
wish to be treated as full lifeworldly persons, organizations that are embedded in the
systemsworld will feign lifeworldly processes and interactions in order to achieve desirable
actions from actors.
I suggest, then, that part of the seeming discrepancy between the results of the data in
chapter 4 and the theorists discussed in chapter 1 is the result of the fact that organizations like
universities, even if they are embedded in the systemsworld, cannot gain the full participation
they desire from their members without at least feigning participation in the lifeworld. This
accounts for the many actions organizations take that make it appear as if they are deeply
invested in the individual welfare of their members while at the same time taking actions that
they know are not in those same interests. True grounding in the lifeworld, however, would
likely require a community investment and a kind of qualitative calculus of success that would

303
often mean immediate failure in a systemsworld economy competing with those organizations
that wholly structure themselves in alignment with systemsworld values.
Universities, as they are pressured to orient themselves further and further to an economic
system that does not recognize the values of the lifeworld, must also maintain that they serve the
lifeworldly values that led to their establishment in the first place, but survival in a system that
cannot measure the worth of an education of free inquiry, critical thought, and personal growth
requires that the universities take actions in direct contradiction to the lifeworld claims of their
university philosophies, missions, and values. Perhaps it is as simple as this: the university, in
order to continue to draw actual human students and faculty who are oriented to the lifeworld
must espouse the values of the lifeworld, but cannot fully actuate those values without
endangering their positioning in the systemsworld.
In order to justify their value to a public that demands accountability in terms of student
performance on standardized examinations, conferral of degrees that promote employment in
high-paying jobs, and high “customer satisfaction” as displayed by faculty evaluations and
“ratemyteacher.com,” universities must require that faculty take actions that are, in fact, in
contradiction to a holistic education focused on student flourishing regardless of monetary gain.
Moreover, as evidenced by the common U.S. assumption of “a happy life” as synonymous with
“great personal wealth,” one can see that as the populous becomes further and further acclimated
to the synonymy of personal lifeworld success with quantifiable financial systemsworld success,
universities begin orienting their faculty handbooks to definitions of teaching and teaching
success in ways that focus on standardized systemsworld values. The conflict arises because they
must also claim to promote free thought— by definition, free thought cannot be standardized.
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Thus, perhaps there is a contradiction between the practical lived experiences of professors who
report a tremendous tension between their teaching and research expectations and the
presentation of faculty roles by university handbooks.
Regardless, the falsity of the hypothesis suggests that, at least as they are presented by
institutional documents, the roles of teacher and researcher need not be inconsistent. It is true
that due to the fundamentally student-driven onus of teaching, if research were given primacy in
faculty expectations, an immediate incoherence may arise—if faculty are expected to give
primacy to publication, they may have good reason to use their students as research subjects,
resulting in role conflict. Similarly, if teaching is given primacy, role conflict may arise if faculty
are unable to meet the primary demands of their teaching load while at the same time being
expected to publish. Interestingly, however, although some institutions may seem to focus more
one role than another, there is good reason to believe, given the data, that even in those
institutions that heavily emphasize publication, it is expected that the research benefit students.
Thus, as both teaching and researching are expected to be teleologically grounded in
beneficence, as became clear in chapter 4, they share a consistent grounding. As such, this
chapter, having discussed the failure of the hypothesis and its implications, can now begin the
work of developing an understanding of teacher and research roles such that a coherent, and
normatively grounded, construct conjoining the roles can be developed.
Habermasian Immanent Critique of the Data
To conduct immanent critique of the data analyzed in chapter 4 means to engage the
works self-reflexively from the perspective of their own domain-presentations. Thus, the works
are examined using their own axiomatic claims as the foundation for identifying the
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consistencies—and perhaps inconsistencies—that construct, from the perspective of each work,
particular domains of understanding. Key to this analysis is identifying the embedded
assumptions that structure the dialogue. These embedded assumptions may be understood to
some degree as enunciated expectations insofar as they are fundamental to the dialogue (they
could be made clear, but need not be articulated or inscribed). Similarly, the embedded
assumptions may also be understood in terms of logical inference. For example, assumptions
may act in conditional ways, suggesting that a series of inscribed expectations logically
necessitates a particular embedded assumption to ground those expectations. The goal in this
section, then, is to complete the work begun in chapter 4—to understand the expectations both
articulated and silently embedded into our social dialogue that generate faculty roles.
Much of the discussion of the works in chapter 4 is best understood through the
perspective of organizational role theory: understanding the roles as presented by the handbooks
is often a matter of considering issues of organization and inscribed roles. This is not true for all
of the documents discussed in chapter 4, however. Within the handbooks, statements of
philosophy and codes of ethics are often better understood in a symbolic-interactional way that
enables one to consider the embedded expectations that are not stated explicitly, yet are clear
implications of the inscribed role expectations.
Markie notably discusses professorial roles in a very systemsworld way that is best
understood through organizational role theory. Professors have responsibilities to
organizations—both as institutions and as communities—and those responsibilities can be
clearly inscribed and enunciated. Professorial roles fall neatly into a hierarchy of responsibilities
and duties from a Markiean perspective. However, neither organizational role theory nor
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symbolic-interactionist role theory allows for a multiple-perspective consideration of these
various works as different voices within the same community dialectic. Organizational role
theory would require reduction of the roles discussed to a kind of hierarchy, understanding
faculty as actors performing organizational scripts, and symbolic interactionist role theory would
incorporate the Mead-like frame of actors as participating with each other in a role-making
symbolic event. To bring the two together, and view the entirety of the conjunctions of the work
as an act of discourse, requires a new perspective of role theory—community-dialectical role
theory—that understands actors as active participants in their own rolemaking and in the
rolemaking of others through a multifaceted dialectic that incorporates both organizational
structure and symbolic interaction.
Community-dialectical role theory enables us to do more than investigate the roles of
actors in organizations or examine the interactions of those actors as generators of scripts and
perspectives: it enables us to conjoin disparate epistemologies of human agency to create a
robust picture of the role expectations. Simply, organizational role theory enables the
understanding of faculty handbooks, symbolic-interactionist role theory enables the
understanding of the codes of ethics as they are symbolically mediated cultural constructs,
discourse ethics enables us to understand the philosophers who discourse about education, and it
is in community-dialectical role theory in the Habermasian-grounded epistemology that these
disparate perspectives can be conjoined into a dialectical holism.
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Figure 5. The Habermasian Conjunction of Disparate Perspectives into a Dialectical Whole.
This is all to say that this immanent critique will move beyond the immanence of individual
documents, each of which is grounded in a different ontological and epistemic understanding of
role-making, into the immanence of domain generated through the conjunction of different kinds
of documents,. This section, then, will briefly revisit the presentation of roles by each document,
consider the implications of each domain, and then consider the dialectic produced by their
conjunction.
The faculty handbooks discussed in the first section of chapter 4 largely focus on the
bureaucracy of their corresponding universities. There is a heavy systemsworld emphasis, as the
universities dedicate significant pagination to the organizational structure and the placement of
faculty within that structure. The handbooks, given that evidence, exist largely for the purpose of
maintaining the system-generated organization by the interaction not of persons, but of roles in a
hierarchical structure. Thus, there is minimal discussion of teaching and the expectations of
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teaching within that structure. Teaching expectations are, in most cases, relegated to those
sections that articulate the requirements for promotion and tenure. Similarly, research is also
most often discussed in those sections of the handbooks dedicated to promotion and tenure.
There is, however, more lifeworldy mention of teaching and researching in the statements of
philosophy and value in the documents.
The University of Memphis does emphasize teaching excellence and research excellence.
The handbook discusses mentoring as an integral part of teaching, and it is expected that
professors mentor students at all levels. There is a heavy systemsworld emphasis on research and
scholarship as publication. Faculty are expected to publish and forward knowledge in their
domain. They are expected to collaborate for the betterment of their urban, regional, state,
national, and global communities. In so doing, faculty should seek knowledge and produce
knowledge.
Oklahoma State University detailed the expectations of research less than the University
of Memphis and the University of Miami. Teaching, although expectations are left
underdiscussed, is considered “the primary duty of instructional faculty.” Similar to the
University of Memphis, there is emphasis of mentorship as an expectation of faculty. Although
scholarship is somewhat underemphasized in the handbook, the faculty’s social responsibility to
knowledge is articulated. Faculty should seek and state the truth and they must develop their
scholarship in order to do that. Faculty are expected, as teachers, to promote the free pursuit of
knowledge. The expectations of teacher roles are made most clear in the appendix on
professional ethics. Interestingly, the handbook seems to treat scholarship and research as
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synonymous and, thus, as reducible to the systemsworld, while at the same time treating teaching
as a scholarly activity that produces knowledge.
The University of Miami, much like the University of Memphis, places emphasis on
faculty as devoted to scholarship and research. Teaching is not a kind of scholarship, whereas in
the case of Oklahoma State University, it may be inferred from the language of the document
that teaching is so essential to the university goal to produce knowledge, that teaching is a
scholarly activity, though not necessarily scholarship. The University of Miami, however, is
clear regarding the importance of publication. The Faculty must publish, or the equivalent in
their field, in order to be successful. This handbook, in particular of those discussed here, fits
neatly into the systemsworld frame.
The Clemson University faculty handbook clearly articulates that faculty should seek,
teach, and disseminate knowledge. As such, the Clemson University handbook—more than the
other handbooks—allows for the possibility of distinguishing between scholarship, teaching, and
publication. Whereas the other handbooks often allow for a conflation between scholarship and
publication, in particular, Clemson seems to suggest that seeking knowledge may be different
from disseminating knowledge, and to disseminate knowledge does not necessarily mean that
one is engaged in teaching. There is heavy emphasis on academic freedom both on the part of the
faculty and in terms of promoting free inquiry in the students. Of particular interest, there is a
more lifeworldly approach to teaching evaluation in the Clemson University handbook than in
the other handbooks through the use of a holistic portfolio… Moreover, similarly lifeworldly,
Clemson emphasizes the importance of scholarship for the betterment of the community, a theme
that begins to emerge across the handbooks along with teaching as mentorship.
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The Florida Atlantic University faculty handbook returns to a systemsworld approach,
particularly in the discussion of faculty expectations. Faculty expectations are specifically
oriented to the rules and requirements of faculty in terms of grading, timeliness, and attendance
procedures. However, the mission and values presented by Florida Atlantic University are
lifeworldly; they emphasize community, inclusiveness, recognition of diversity, and excellence.
Again, the theme of academic freedom emerges through this handbook and is further
underscored in the handbook by the valuing of “honest expression” and “lifelong learning.”
The Temple University handbook, more than any of the other handbooks discussed here,
presents itself through a lifeworld epistemology. The handbook emphasizes the development of
caring relationships with students as essential to teaching role. Similar to other lifeworld values
of the other handbooks, there is discussion of free learning, though in the case of Temple
University, there is more proportional time given to the responsibilities of professors to promote
critical thought, creativity, and inquiry. Of particular lifeworldly interest is the fact that Temple
University is the only institution to mention the importance of a sense of humor and
“awakening” amongst their faculty. It is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to quantify and
systematize a teacher’s ability to have a sense of humor or promote awakening. In order to
promote student awakening scholarship is couched in terms of faculty responsibility to
perpetuate academic field and advancing knowledge.
From the handbooks one can infer that teaching is integral to the purposes of the
universities discussed here. To a greater or lesser degree, these universities expect teachers to be
excellent, though they are unclear what “excellence” means. In many cases, excellence is
measured through systemsworld thinking (student evaluations and performance on
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examinations), but some institutions engage a more robust notion of excellence as a matter of
enabling lifelong learning and awakening. Shared amongst almost all of the institutions, often at
the forefront of their missions, is free inquiry and academic freedom. The institutions seem to
position themselves as bastions of discussion and discourse in which ideas can be engaged
without fear of censorship.
One can also infer from the handbooks that while teaching is often evaluated in a
systemsworld way, there remains an expectation that teaching be deeply invested and carerelated. The emphasis on mentorship, academic advising, and investment throughout the
handbooks suggests that, at least in terms of inscribed roles, teachers should invest in students as
persons not simply as receptacles for professor knowledge. Thus, faculty should be available to
students as resources for academic and professional development. To ignore a student who asks
for assistance in application to graduate school, for advice in pursuing a career in in the
professor’s field, or for help with academic struggles is to fail to meet the expectations of the
handbooks. The teacher must demonstrate care for students by investing in each student as a
person with genuine potential to participate in the world of inquiry.
Similar themes emerge from analysis of the guidelines for researchers established by
professional associations. The APA requires that researchers be beneficent, collaborative, honest,
open, and invested in their communities. Furthermore, researchers must actively participate in
mentorship. The Belmont Report similarly requires beneficence and justice, as well as
investment in others as autonomous persons. Moreover, researchers must engage in research in
ways that benefit as many in the community as possible. The AERA requires competence,
integrity, and social responsibility. In requiring integrity, the AERA requires that the research be
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worthy of trust by virtue of seeking to do no harm. Social responsibility, as is the case with the
APA, requires that the researcher engage the community in a beneficial way reminiscent of the
justice criterion of the Belmont Report. The MLA, which engages little, if any, research with
human participants, also requires an active focus on the benefit the research can do for society.
Moreover, the MLA values free inquiry, a value regularly espoused in the faculty handbooks,
and aligns itself with the APA with an emphasis on the importance of mentorship.
Thus, the analysis of our community dialectic as inscribed through documents produced
by universities and professional organizations reveals the expectations that professors be mentors
who promote free agency through the development of lifelong learners with passion for free
thought and intellectual inquiry in order to best promote the welfare of the community and to
bring the whole of humanity to greater understanding of the world. Those Habermasian themes
of mentorship, free thought, and community are at the core of the inscribed expectations of
teachers. I suggest that this mentorship notion, itself, is a care-laden concept that requires
professors to invest in their students as full and autonomous persons deserving of respect. Thus,
embedded deeply into the lifeworld of teaching is the belief that those who teach should benefit
the student, the community, and our understanding of the world because they care. There is, of
course, also a systemsworld of teaching which requires that faculty follow the rules and
procedures established by their organizations, but those systemsworld processes, as Habermas
contended, are supervenient upon there being a teacher who is already sufficiently invested in the
students, in the university, and in the community that such fundamental expectations can be
taken for granted.
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I suggest, revealed by a Habermasian immanent critique, that the danger of the
systemsworld is not the fact that it is organizational. Quite the contrary: organization is wholly
necessary for an effective university system. It is, rather, that because the systemsworld cannot
account for or evaluate the lifeworld, that the lifeworld can be forgotten and taken for granted
because lifeworld assumptions are so embedded, so tautologically assumed, that they can be
forgotten. In the case of invested professors who care deeply for their students and for the
generation of knowledge and understanding, one assumes that the professor should have those
qualities; thus, the concern becomes evaluation of those qualities that may not come so naturally
and are far more easily evaluated and observable. In the same way that one assumes that a
rational agent engages in a conversation because she truly does want to communicate, she wants
to understand and to be understood (otherwise there would be no point in her participation in the
first place), we may well assume that those who elect to engage in teaching care, because care is
so fundamental not just to the role expectations of teachers, but to the definition of teaching
itself.
Concerningly, however, the deep embeddedness of such assumptions does not
sufficiently maintain the truth of those definitions if the lifeworld becomes secondary to the
systemsworld. The necessary organization and structuring of the systemsworld becomes the focal
point of evaluation, measurement, and judgment of value, and the grounding assumptions that
generated the need for the system in the first place become forgotten and, perhaps, even cast
aside. The inscribed expectations of professors—for example, that they produce a certain
percentage of students with a certain range of scores on end-of-course evaluations, produce a
certain number of published articles, and participate in a certain number of university
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committees—become the focus, if only because they are inscribed, far easier to evaluate, and
quantifiable. Inscribing the fact that the university requires all of this in order to make sure that
the faculty member is an active scholar who engages the world of knowledge with students in a
way that better enables them to participate in a world of free thought with respect and dignity for
their personhood because she cares about them and the community would be both onerous and,
one would hope, unnecessary, as it is assumed that this is the person she is by virtue of electing
to be a professor in the first place. Thus, the lifeworld of the professoriate becomes sublimated to
the systemsworld not because the lifeworld is unimportant but because it is assumed and difficult
to quantify.
The expectations of the professoriate articulated by the philosophers examined in chapter
4 further underscores the importance of understanding faculty as firstly lifeworld participants.
Beneficence, a non-quantifiable, qualitative requirement that one do a hazily defined “good,”
again immediately appears, as discussed by Strike and Soltis (2004). Community similarly
immediately emerges, both an enunciated and inscribed expectation. Moreover, Strike and Soltis
dug far more deeply into the lifeworld of the professoriate in their emphasis on the importance of
community dialectic for the solving of ethical problems in teaching. Teachers should engage in
dialectic for the purpose of solving problems. This problem-solving capacity need not be
restrained to immediate applied ethical problems that emerge in the world of teaching, but it is a
cornerstone of inquiry itself. Thus, scholarship emerges as a dialectical process, a kind of
community engagement, through Strike and Soltis, which incorporates many voices for the
beneficent purpose of helping all agents generate understanding.
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Srike and Soltis (2004) seemingly suggested that it the onus of the teacher to be not just
an active participant in a dialectical and community epistemology, but a beneficent guide through
the process of that inquiry. Note that I say here a beneficent guide through the process of inquiry
rather than a beneficent guide to the truth. Free inquiry is likely hindered by the professorial
belief that one has truth and others should believe it. Rather, the emergent assumption of
teaching from analysis of the handouts and the ethical guidelines is that free inquiry is something
mentors enable and foster rather than define and demand. One sends students out into the world
with the ability to find or generate truth, rather than with the truth itself. To assume that one has
truth is likely to result in one’s unwillingness to engage students in an active process of
communal learning—a process deeply embedded in an understanding of professors as scholars
who themselves are constantly and consistently seeking to learn more.
Markie’s correspondence theoretical approach to teaching is perhaps more sympathetic to
an understanding of professors as disseminators of knowledge. Professors have a duty to produce
knowledge, and they do so by bringing students to the truth. The “having” of truth, then, is
knowledge. This production of knowledge is of such fundamental import to Markie’s work that
professors must do nothing to endanger that production. Thus, one sees the importance of justice
as a theme emerge again, as professors must be objective and provide all students with equal
access to truth. The professor, as the exemplar in her field of study, must be a scholar in order to
provide a true example to the student of what it means to be a participant in that discipline. Even
so, note that this more correspondent notion of truth still places the professor in a position of
mentorship and guidance. She must use every tool at her disposal to help students achieve truth.
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Moreover, Markie did not necessarily say that professors are keepers of the truth. If
professors are scholars, that means that they remain actively invested in finding the truth. Their
job, then, is to be scholars with their students. And thus, something of an equivalency emerges
from a correspondence truth understanding of professorship and a coherentist truth
understanding of professorship—both understand professors as learners who themselves have
developed their own excellent inquiry to the point where now their pursuit of knowledge and
understanding can include guiding others through their own trials of inquiry. Embedded in this
understanding of professorship is a normative strand—that because they have the ability, and
because knowledge is so very valuable and beneficial to the community, professors should assist
others in their pursuit of learning. Moreover, even if that normative push fails, it remains true
that robust and holistic learning is more likely to occur in dialectic with others; thus, the
professor, if she truly is invested in understanding, is rationally mandated to engage others in a
learning dialectical process, if only to forward her own development and understanding.
The repeated theme of community, then, emerges from an immanent critique of the
philosophical work: Strike, Soltis, and Markie can be understood as proponents of both
knowledge as essential to community and the obligation of teachers to serve the community.
Similarly, Noddings’ work can be understood in a communal way. The production of trust
through care in order to develop a classroom environment of beneficent learning is a
communally-embedded notion. Embedded in Noddings’ work is the presupposition that one
should want to benefit the community, and thus one will endeavor to engender the trust
necessary to do so. That teachers should care, I suggest, is an inscribed expectation for teachers
in line with Noddings’ care ethic in order to maximize learning, but there is also the enunciated
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expectation, embedded and assumed through her discourse, that a teacher has an obligation to her
students and it is through her recognition of that obligation that she gains the students’ trust—
because the students recognize the teacher has that obligation as well. In other words, to couch
Noddings only in terms of caring about students in order to maximize learning potential does her
work a disservice; she reveals, implicitly, the teacher as a servant to the community of learners
who have opened themselves to her and the tremendous harm she can do, because they believe
her when she tells them that she is there to help and that what she is teaching can and will benefit
them. While she says little about research, one cannot escape the community obligation
engendered by those who can do research. Repeatedly through these documents one sees the
requirement that those who teach share as much beneficial knowledge as possible with others,
and, thus, Noddings may be read as one who also, particularly as she is a scholar herself,
supports the notion that professors should publicize their knowledge to the benefit of the
community.
Something of a tension does arise between theorists like Hood and Benditt, who
disagreed regarding the requirement that professors conduct research. Benditt argued that
professors must conduct what amounts to a research program in order to exist as an exemplar in
her field for her students. Hood, however, argued that the nature of free thought is such that the
professor engages scholarship by virtue of creating knowledge with the students. While Benditt’s
correspondence picture requires that faculty engage research in order to constantly validate the
truth claims they espouse, Hook argued that intellectual vitality does not require research, but
rather active discovery, which may occur in the classroom as well as in the laboratory. Thus,
once again, one sees a potential tension between teaching and research. Note, however, that it is
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not a tension between the importance of teaching and the importance of research. Rather, it is a
tension between whether or not good teaching can take place without engagement in research on
the part of the professor.
Scholarship as a Dialectical Holism
This tension between the two thinkers, however, may not be incommensurable. I
suggest—and am supported by Eble (1994)—that the problem is one that results from the lack of
distinction in terms. Habermasian critique enables us to unravel the terms and their meanings as
revealed by the discourse, and to reconstruct them coherently, given the axioms grounded by
their own dialectical domain generation. Recall that Eble wrote, “I accept scholarship as a
necessary part of teaching but please for scholarship broadly interpreted to be maintained as the
word rather than research. Research is surely a subcategory of the many ways a human mind
seeks understanding of the world it occupies” (1994, p.218). Thus, the Hook-Benditt tension may
be resolved by understanding scholarship as a broader term that incorporates both research and
teaching.
If scholarship is the active engagement in the world of inquiry and knowledge in order to
produce understanding, then teaching is a form of scholarship. Teaching is a process for which
the teleology is understanding and the form is inquiry—professors ask questions and suggest
answers and provide guidance in the inquiry investigations of their students. Thus, teaching is a
scholarly activity. Research, similarly, is scholarship if to do research means to engage the world
through inquiry in order to understand. Researchers ask questions, produce potential answers and
investigate the tenability of those answers through dialectic with the community of scholars and
through application of their thoughts and theories to the world. Thus, again, we see a teaching
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role subsumed under scholarship. That professors should be good scholars is a given, as both the
role of teacher and the role of researcher are forms of scholarship.
That teachers must know the truth seems unnecessary, but that they must be scholars, that
they must understand scholarship, that they must understand how to pursue knowledge,
particularly knowledge in the domain they teach, seems to be of the utmost import. While there
are numerous reasons it would be unreasonable to assert that teachers must “have” truth, as what
we “know” is often spurious and revisable, it is not unreasonable to assert that they should be
excellent scholars insofar as they understand how to pursue knowledge, how to investigate
meaning, how one may attempt to distinguish between truth and falsity, and how to establish at
least tentative truth claims within the defining confines of a particular intellectual domain. Thus,
it is possible that, as scholars, teachers do research yet do not necessarily publish.
This is all to say that a discourse analysis of the works presented in chapter 4 reveals that
research and publication are not necessarily the same thing. The understanding of scholarship
revealed above, embedded in the very ways we think about and dialogue about professorship,
suggests that to publish means to do a particular thing with the information produced through
research. The systemsworld definition of research as requiring publication ignores the
lifeworldly embedded axiom that research is published not for publication sake but for the
benefit of others and to broaden our communal understanding of the world. Thus, to do research
means to engage in inquiry, to try to understand through active and rigorous investigation, and to
publish means to present that understanding.
Publication, however, should not be relegated to only the dissemination of that
understanding through a few highly respected journals read by very few members of the

320
populace. If publication in those highly respected journals results in the dissemination of that
understanding to other experts who then use that knowledge to benefit the community and share
that knowledge with the community, then the requirements of the codes of ethics discussed here
are met. If, however, that knowledge stays locked in the journal and is read only by a few other
professors, then it does not meet the normative requirements of the codes of ethics guiding
researchers discussed here.
The problem of doing as much good as possible, interestingly, places the humanities in a
potentially different position that many of the sciences. A medical practitioner may publish in a
highly respected journal read by a very small percentage of the populous. That small percentage,
however, uses that knowledge in a way to benefit the community at large in immediate and
significant ways. The English professor who publishes her work on Samuel Beckett cannot make
the same claim to the general good done by her publication if her work in a top tier journal is
read by a few who will similarly read and cite her work only to publish in the same journal.
Would she be better able to meet her publication responsibility by discussing that idea in
community seminars, writing layperson-accessible texts that summarize her idea, or holding
literary debates on campus? Given that even the systemsworld-oriented handbook recognized
that different academic domains may have different means of publication—music and
performance for example—even within the world of literature, there are different means by
which to “publicize” one’s work.
The question of whether professors are doing enough to bring their understanding to the
community is a good one, though beyond the scope of this project. Perhaps something of a
mediating realization, however, is that by continuing to participate in inquiry through academic
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publication, the professor is also participating with her peers in a rigorous process of
argumentation and idea building that propels them all to greater excellence as scholars, and thus,
potentially propels them to greater excellence as teachers, and, thus, though the journal
publication may not reach as many people, it does still do significant intellectual and pedagogical
good. Either way, what we come to realize is that publication can take on numerous forms, and,
thus, the guiding frame for that publication should be scholarship, insofar as the normative force
of scholarship is the betterment of one’s understanding and the understanding of others.
What I am suggesting here is not new and is far more thoroughly discussed by Ernest L.
Boyer (1990) in his Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professorate. Boyer was
similarly motivated to understand scholarship, particularly in the professorial context, because of
“competing obligations” that are emerging in universities. I contend, further, that these
competing obligations, as discussed in chapter 1, are beginning to result in role crisis for some
professors who find themselves torn between conflicting—not just disparate—expectations.
Boyer developed the distinction between various forms of scholarship as the scholarships of
discovery, integration, application, and of teaching (p. 16). “Scholarship of discovery” is that
scholarship that produces new knowledge and is that to which I am referring when I discuss
research. Scholarship of integration is “serious disciplined work that seeks to interpret, draw
together, and bring new insight to bear on original research” (p. 19). This dissertation itself may
be an example of “scholarship of integration.” Much publication, particularly in the humanities,
falls into this form. “Scholarship of application” seeks to understand the ways knowledge can be
applied to benefit the community, and, in many cases, actively does so. Research in the field of
education often falls into this category.
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[T]eaching begins with what the teacher knows. Those who teach must, above all, be well
informed, and steeped in the knowledge of their fields. Teaching can be well regarded
only as professors are widely read and intellectually engaged….great teachers create a
common ground of intellectual commitment. They stimulate active, not passive, learning
and encourage students to be critical, creative thinkers, with the capacity to go on
learning after their college days are over. (pp. 23-24)
To redefine teaching as a scholarly practice, then, is not a new idea, and, suggested Boyer, is
grounded at least as far back as Aristotle. I suggest, then, that engaging the lifeworld of the
professorship requires evaluating professors not in terms of publication, but in terms of
scholarship.
Although far more cumbersome than simply evaluating professors based on journal
publication, understanding professors as scholars in a full and robust sense requires the
possibility that some professors—by virtue of their dynamic activity with their students—are in
fact meeting their scholarly expectations. Consider a professor who is actively engaged in
community projects with her students. Such “community learning” may be something she does
not have the time to write about and publish in a journal. However, she and her students spend a
significant amount of time engaging the community in ways that bring knowledge to the
community as well as result in growth and learning on the part of the students and the professor.
We would be remiss to suggest that she is not a scholar: she is an active scholar engaged in the
scholarship of application. Moreover, the potential response, “She is not meeting her research
responsibility, because although her research may be beneficent, it is unjust as its benefits are
localized to that one community,” is inconsistent with our patience with and the encouragement
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of professors who publish in small but highly respected journals in their own obscure fields of
endeavor.
The field of philosophy, for example, is proportionally small. I believe, for example, my
own publication on the treatment of disability by Samuel Beckett in three of his short stories is
important. While I hope it is read, I do not delude myself in the belief that even if I were to
publish it in a highly respected journal in philosophy or English, that it would have a significant
impact on even my home community of Jacksonville. I would be content, however, knowing that
the understanding I attempted to generate benefited some who will use that knowledge to benefit
others, who will do similarly, and so on. I would be mistaken, however, if I believe that my
publication in that journal makes me a scholar of greater import or greater impact than the
community-action scholar who engages the homeless community of Jacksonville, Florida. To
quote Boyer (1990),
We need scholars who not only skillfully explore the frontiers of knowledge, but also
integrate ideas, connect thought to action, and inspire students. The very complexity of
modern life requires more, not less, information; more, not less participation. If the
nation’s colleges and universities cannot help students see beyond themselves and better
understand the interdependent nature of our world, each new generation’s capacity to live
responsibly will be dangerously diminished. (p. 77)
Thus, I suggest that a more inclusive dialogue regarding scholarship and professorship is not just
warranted by virtue of the potential benefits to knowledge and human life, but also because the
very grounding of scholarship as revealed by our dialectic is one that suggests scholarship is not
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publication, but the engagement in active inquiry for the production of understanding to the
benefit of as many possible.
Synthesis: The Normative-Beneficence Teleology of Teaching as a Care
This understanding of scholarship and teaching in a correspondence theoretical way is
consistent with community-dialectical role theory as defining of professor as a holistic scholar,
not creating a dichotomy. While creating greater distinctions and relying on Boyer to better
understand the different kinds of scholarship has proved incredibly valuable, it is important to
note, at the same time, that what is occurring here is a Hegelian synthesis, a collapsing of
distinctions at the same time as a recognition of the ways in which concepts, through thesis and
antithesis, propel each other towards new understanding. Teaching and scholarship are
integrated, not two different roles. That realization is perhaps the most important revelation
gleaned from our Habermasian investigation. Perhaps, yes, they exist in a supervenient
relationship, but it is complex and interwoven. Teaching is a kind of scholarship, yet, at the same
time, scholarship in the professoriate is supervenient on teaching insofar as being a good scholar
emerges from the requirement that one be a good teacher. I recognize that the preceding
statement leads to a series of objections, most obviously, “What of the researcher who does not
teach?” I suggest that there is no such thing. To write, to engage others in the dialectical
intercourse of prose, is to provide others with the potential to gain greater understanding of the
world. It is one’s prose, one’s ability to coherently communicate with others, which determines if
such publication is simply dissemination or if it is teaching. Yet, even that understanding of
teaching and dissemination may not be sufficient to distinguish between those who publish as
teachers and those who just publish.
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Perhaps the difference between dissemination and teaching may be couched in Noddings’
understanding of teaching as a care-driven endeavor. Those who disseminate do not care all that
much, but those who teach do care. It may be only intention that truly, at its core, makes the
difference. “What of all of the evidence that good teaching also involves…?” one may reply and
fill the blank with one of an innumerable pedagogical recommendations for effective teaching
(from wait time, to 1-3 positive feedback, to aligned instruction, and so on). To that question, I
say that anything with which we can fill the blank evidences the teacher’s caring, as she is
endeavoring to find a best practice that benefits students. Caring is not a “best practice”; it is an
affective state, a status of being that requires a complete commitment to that which is cared
about. We have not been able to find one final and simple answer to the question of, “How can
we teach most effectively?” because there is no one answer to the question. There are too many
different kinds of knowledge and too many different kinds of learners to say, “All good
education requires this particular pedagogical device.” However, we can say with fair
confidence, if Noddings is correct, that good education requires care and is defined by it, and
when we find an effective strategy used by a teacher it is also synonymously used by a teacher
who has struggled to find a strategy that works for her with those particular students—in other
words, she cares.
What emerges, then, from this project is a kind of “dialogical care ethic.” Nodding’s
concept of the care ethic when shaped by discourse ethics suggests that the best means by which
to generate the outcome of care, assuming that one who cares wishes to benefit the other, is to
engage in a holistic dialectic in order to produce understanding of the other through reflective
voicing. In the same way that one requests that research participants review interview transcripts,
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review conclusions, and suggest improvement to one’s research, one should, when engaging care
relationships with others seek to voice them, benefit them, through an act that is not just selfreflective, but is guided by the other. The product of such a beneficent dialectic is an
understanding that is greater than the sum of the solipsistic positionings of the agents trying to
understand. Perhaps inexpressible in literal language, one comes to understand the other in way
that may be best analogous to metaphor. The “what-it-is-likeness” of the other’s experience
cannot be reduced to the utterances of the “understanding” other, but the dialectical act, the
process itself, produces an understanding that, if only for a brief moment, fuses the horizons of
the engaged agents who seek dialogue for beneficent aims.
To then answer the question, “What should a professor do with this knowledge?”
becomes “She should engage in robust dialectic, particularly with one’s students.” The
separation between faculty and students often may seem insurmountable. The production of
understanding, though, seems to require that one engage one’s student not only in dialectic for
the production of knowledge on the part of the student, but for the purpose of producing
understanding with a teleology of beneficence. The critical pedagogue would then be under the
onus to seek to understand her students through dialectic because she cannot assume that her
professorship alone is sufficient to determine what is in the best interest of the students.
Education through a dialogical care ethic becomes a manifold epistemology—a series of
outwardly spiraling redefinitions of what is best educational practice through a holistic, and yet
singular, rich engagement with each student in a fusion of horizons.
What one should do, then, is recognize that the understanding one seeks cannot be
expressed through dissertation, but must be individually reached. I cannot profess to know what
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one takes from this experience, exactly. Nor can I divine the readers’ context or understand her
original positioning. I can only suggest that each professor, if she seeks to end role ambiguity,
engage in a self-reflective, critical-etymological journey through dialectic with others. To ask
one’s students, “How do you define professor?” is not a wholly insane proposition. If we are to
serve our students, why is it that we let our institutions define our role, rather than those whom
we can do the most harm and those who have placed their trust in us? My intuition is that such
dialectic will lead many educators to a realization of servant leadership, to an understanding of
one’s role as not one of mastery but rather of service. We serve the students, and thus, we must
engage them in our ethical discourse if we wish to truly generate an understanding of how we
can best instantiate our roles as educators.
Thus, perhaps, the core assumption, before we can understand any other expectations of
teachers, is simply the assumption of caring; one researcher may publish her numbers and not
care about the impact her work will have on her publication’s intended audience, while another
does the exact same thing but does care, and I suggest that the ontological status of those
seemingly equivalent actions is radically changed by the intent, converting the latter into a
“teacher.” Moreover, because the second researcher cares, if the intention argument is
insufficient to make my case, there is good reason to believe that she will continue to struggle to
find ways to make those data do good. She will not be satisfied with that one moment of
publication; she will apply and pursue that data and their consequences to the greatest possible
good, thus leaving us with the ever-present evidence of effectiveness that our systemsworld
approach to the world demands of us and, again, find herself defined as a teacher, as one
dedicated to beneficence.
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To apply Kögler’s (2012) work on Otherness and self-identity, one may consider an
analogy between the self-reflective creation of identity through recognition of Otherness and the
generation of the definition of education through our intersubjective social consciousness as
necessitating beneficence. Thus, I suggest, we cannot understand teaching as teaching without
understanding it as teleologically beneficent—not only for Habermasian reasons concerning the
nature of discourse and the generation of terms through discourse, but because as students, our
recognition of the Other as teacher presupposes our own existence as student for whom the
teacher seeks to do good, and as teachers the recognition of the Other as student presupposes
one’s existence for the purpose of benefitting students.
The Habermasian frame further provides guidance in the teleology and normativity of
this chapter, particularly insofar as reflection on the data reveals that both the roles of teacher
and researcher throughout the various role presentations in multiple documents assert the
importance of beneficence. I will argue that this reflection rests the importance of beneficence on
the necessity of the lifeworld. In other words, one need not feel that an illicit move has been
made by virtue of allowing the teleology of beneficence to guide the development of the
construct, as the embedded assumptions revealed through analysis of the works suggest that
benefiting others is essential to our very understanding of teaching, education, and research.
Though, perhaps, teaching could be defined differently, the role expectations embedded into the
very dialectic that constructs the roles of “teacher” and “researcher” are infused with the idea
that teaching, and thus the research supervenient upon it, should do good.
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The Decoupling of Teaching and Scholarship
Problematically, the systemsworld approach bifurcates the scholar as teacher and
researcher, perhaps in order to make evaluation easier, but leaving open the question of the
researcher’s obligation to students. If she is separate from “teacher,” this separation causes role
conflict between the roles of beneficent teacher and prolific teacher. As the data demonstrate,
however, that bifurcation is not rational: it is not emergent from examination of the
presuppositions that ground professorship and does not best met the community obligations,
research obligations, or teaching obligations of professorship. There are numerous ways the
holism of a professor as a generator of knowledge with students could be instantiated. The
question of how one may effectively evaluate that holism in a qualitative way would likely be a
massive research undertaking on its own.
What suffices for this project, however, is the realization that as one attempts to uncover
the assumptions that lead to the teaching-research tension established by the discussion in
chapter 1, one comes to recognize the problems of the attempt to separate teaching and research
from scholarship for systemsworld purposes. Note, for example, how such thinking could misuse
philosophies discussed here. Markie and Benditt, in particular, could be misused to justify the
trend of looking down at K-12 teachers from the ivory tower: if being a good scholar cannot
include being an excellent teacher as a generator of knowledge, than any teacher who is not
conducting a research program is not a scholar. This idea, though, that teachers are not scholars,
is particular to the West, and, I argue, the result of the demands of the systemworld to make
evaluation and quantification easier.
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The systemsworld approach—particularly the capitalistic approach to agents as
quantifiable goods who can be used to the benefit of the economy—has resulted in a hierarchical
perspective not just of teaching and research, but of dialectic as well. Notice, for example, that
the argument being constructed here allows for the possibility that teaching and research need
not be understand hierarchically. If, however, the discourse of capitalism, of “betterness than
others,” is the foundational form of discourse used to produce understanding in a society, then
the members of that society will not be able to conceive of disjunctions, of Derridian binaries,
without Othering one member of the set in favor of another.
The very structure of our thought requires that we view every distinction, every binary, as
one that must have a more important and a less important; thus, the bifurcation of teaching and
research, must—given the capitalist discourse of U.S. society—result in placing one over the
other. Given the systemsworld preference of U.S. capitalism, it only stands to reason that the
more quantifiable “research” will emerge as the preferred, and “teaching” will become the
othered—a distinction I believe we see borne out in society as researchers are generally
considered erudite and are well respected, while teachers (particularly in k-12) are often treated
as the incompetent disseminators of the knowledge generated by their far more competent
colleagues (“Those who can, do. Those who can’t, teach.”).
Perhaps the only treatment for such a problem is greater inclusiveness and the
reintegration of teaching and research. Perhaps, if universities truly wish to continue to promote
the values they espouse in their handbooks, despite the cumbersome systemsworld
consequences, they should eliminate the distinction between teaching and research and instead
discuss “scholars.” The Habermasian inclusion of all voices for the generation of knowledge is a
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lifeworldly value that grounds the very free thought espoused by universities. Without it,
universities are redefined, as Slevin (2001) described, as diploma markets. To quote Boyer
(1990), however,
The aim of education is not only to prepare students for productive careers, but also to
enable them to live lives of dignity and purpose; not only to generate new knowledge, but
to channel that knowledge to humane ends; not merely to study government, but to help
shape a citizenry that can promote the public good. (p. 78)
Such communal and holistic dialectic, however, is increasingly interpreted as communist in the
States. The constant undergirding belief that competition makes all things better, and that
improvement always means that one must be better than another, does not allow for the
possibility that learning can take place communally and that all students should benefit from it.
Yet, our demand that research be just and benefit everyone causes a role conflict for us. We want
teachers who do the best they can to teach equally, so we standardize both curriculum and
evaluation, doing a disservice to the lifeworld realities that each person learns and flourishes
differently and that an effective, caring teacher does what she can to aid her students in these
quests. This is all at the same time that we ground our definitions and dialectic in the idea that
there must always be a winner. Thus, policy initiatives like “Race to the Top” take place. The
very notion of “Race to the Top” is capitalistic—students compete for resources and those
institutions that provide the best education win those resources, as they have evidenced their
superiority by producing winning students. Yet, at the same time, what teacher in her right mind
actually wants her students to compete for the basic necessities for their success? The idea that
some students get “to the top” suggests that other students do not get to the top. What purpose is
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served by rewarding these successes, given that the reasons other students lose the “race” may
include abuse, poverty, lack of resources, mental disability, and so on?
Our supposedly just society is in tension with itself, and that tension is borne out in the
dichotomy we have produced between “teacher” and “researcher,” which is resulting in role
crisis for those professors who wish to be amazing teachers while at the same time meet the
competing demands that they produce tangible research. To use Habermas’ terminology, there is
an “uncoupling” of teaching from research, and of teaching and research from scholarship. This
traumatic uncoupling of roles that are dependent on each other both ontologically and
normatively occurs because of the default assumptions that undergird U.S. discourse—that there
must be a distinction, that scholarship cannot be a holism, and that we must be evaluate those
individual components in quantitative ways that demonstrate a benefit not to people but to the
economy, to the system.
This uncoupling discussed above mimics the uncoupling Habermas describes when
discussing the ways in which the systemsworld may begin to drive the lifeworld. The agents
engaged in the horizons of the lifeworld are left devoid of meaning and understanding, as that
which gives their lives purpose is placed second to systemsworld drives.
To quote Habermas (1985),
On this plane of analysis the uncoupling of system and lifeworld is depicted in such a
way that the lifeworld, which is at first co-extensive with a scarcely differentiated social
system, gets cut down more and more to one subsystem among others. In the process,
system mechanisms get further and further detached from the social structures through
which social integration takes place. As we shall see, modern societies attain a level of
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system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are connected
with one another via delinguistified media of communication: these systemic mechanisms
– for example, money – steer a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from
norms and values, above all those subsystems of purposive rational economic and
administrative action that, on Weber’s diagnosis, have become independent of their
moral-political foundations. (p.154)
Where, once, agents participated in a lifeworld of work and generated meaning through it which
resulted in the accomplishment of the goals of the systemsworld (those quantifiable and
necessary ends that themselves do not have meaning), now they pursue the quantifiable ends as a
means by which to produce meaning. Anecdotally, I have noticed this phenomena when
engaging students with the question, “What do you want to do with your life?” This question is
uniformly answered with, “I want to be happy.” Upon probing students to explain what will
make them happy, they will most often, “Making money and having a good job.” Notice that not
even the secondary lifeworldly value of “having a good job” gains primacy over the
systemsworld functional value of money. It is the quantifiable, yet vacuous, meaning provided
by money that they seek, because they have been taught that it provides happiness.
The idea that one should pursue a flourishing life, which may or may not involve making
money, is absurd to my students. This is a phenomena described by Habermas (1985):
The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering media means an
uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts. Media such as money and power
attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-rational attitude toward calculable
amounts of value and make it possible to exert generalized, strategic influence on the
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decisions of other participants while bypassing processes of consensus-oriented
communication. Inasmuch as they do not merely simplify linguistic communication, but
replace it with a symbolic generalization of rewards and punishments, the lifeworld
contexts in which processes of reaching understanding are always embedded are
devalued in favor of mediasteered interactions; the lifeworld is no longer needed for the
coordination of action. (p. 183)
Students no longer need robust and rich human concepts to justify action or to generate meaning.
To ask my students what a story is about always results in a description of the plot. Students do
not answer the question with, “It is about love” or “It is about the nature of human existence.”
The stories they read are reduced to their necessary, yet meaningless, systems components, the
actions and events—the functional components of the work. As Habermas contends, perhaps this
shift is necessary and productive, insofar as it enables modernity. The decoupling of the system
and the lifeworld produces a freedom for the system that enables much greater efficiency, while
at the same time enabling the system to reach back into the lifeworld and marginalize it.
Thus, my engagement with my students has revealed to me the deep decoupling
described by Habermas of the lifeworld from the systemsworld. Students do not read to gain
meaning, to understand life, or to better understand themselves; they do so to ingest a plot that
they can regurgitate for systemsworld ends. The question of, “Yes, but what does this all mean?”
has become absurd and unnecessarily cumbersome in a world—a systemsworld—in which such
qualitative concerns only slow down the functional capacities of the system: getting grades,
graduating, and finding work that will hopefully result in having the money they so hope will
make them happy.
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Note that the lifeworld and the systemsworld are both essential. There is only a question
of supervenience: “Which should drive the other?” If the lifeworld drives the systemsworld, then
the structures, hierarchies, quantifiabilities, and systems are oriented towards the generation of
meaning, for the purpose of creating value and generating flourishing human lives. When the
systemsworld drives the lifeworld, meaning is forgotten because it is unnecessary for describing
the functionality of a system. In the case of the university, one need not discuss student
“awakening,” as Temple University does, if the systemsworld drives the lifeworld; “awakening”
becomes evidenced through student success on quantifiable measures, and shortly the purpose of
the entire endeavor is forgotten in favor of the functions which are recognizable by a
systemsworld epistemology.
We can sum up by saying that tendencies toward bureaucratization are represented from
the internal perspective of organizations as growing independence from elements of the
lifeworld that have been shoved out into systems environments. From the opposite
perspective of the lifeworld the same process presents itself as one increasing
autonomization, for areas of action converted over to communication media and
systemically integrated are withdrawn from the institutional order of the lifeworld. This
constitution of action contexts that are no longer socially integrated means that social
relations are separated off from the identities of the actors involved. (Habermas, 1985,
p.311)
While this separation allows for inclusion and distance from lifeworldly power, the lifeworld
drives the systemsworld, the awakening of students may be the primary goal, and numerous
forms of evaluation are used to evidence that awakening, while at the same time, it is recognized
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that only through our intersubjective dialectic that this “awakening” can be communicated.
Moreover, it cannot be enumerated in a functional way. It can be described through metaphor
and expressed through narrative, but the experience of it is a qualitative state that we can only
hope and trust our dialogue can communicate to some degree. Without the narrative that gives
purpose to our systemsworld actions, “[t]he objective meaning of a functionally stabilized nexus
of action can no longer be brought into the intersubjective context of relevance of subjectively
meaningful action” (Habermas, 1985, p.311). If the intersubjective context of self-making and
meaning-making through authentic human interaction is the ontological nexus of our university
life, then whatever teleology emerges will be grounded in human flourishing. Simply, if the
lifeworld drives the systemsworld of the university, a goal such as “awakening,” despite the
numerous necessary quantifiable and systemsworld oriented measures used to evidence it, is
never forgotten.
One sees, then, something of a correlation between the sublimation of the lifeworld to the
systemsworld and the sublimation of teaching to research. Teaching is a lifeworldly form of
scholarship that engages other actors in a holistic dialectic in order to develop communal
understanding. Research often takes on the systemsworld connotation of a quantifiable process
of producing information for consumption by the public. Teaching and research, like the
lifeworld and the systemsworld, are both essential. They depend on each other; they are
symbiotic. Good teaching requires knowledge—the production of knowledge, the pursuit of
knowledge—both in regards to the specific discipline being taught and in regards to the
knowledge of pedagogy for best educating students. Research, similarly, requires teaching, as it
must be expressed and shared with others. The consumption of knowledge by the public requires
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that it be taught, even if only in the most narrow sense of being shared. More broadly, research
as understood through our communal dialectic as evidenced by the codes of ethics of
professional associations discussed in this dissertation, is wholly grounded in teaching. Simply,
the drive to be a good teacher necessitates the drive to be a good researcher. Thus, being a good
researcher is similarly contingent on being a good teacher, because teaching drives the need for
research. This mutual interdependence that cannot rationally be uncoupled mimics the
interdependence of the lifeworld and the systemsworld.
It is important to note that an understanding of Habermas suggests that the uncoupling of
the lifeworld and the systemsworld is not necessarily bad, insofar as it is productive, and entails
modernity. Moreover, the freedom from social identity itself allows for engagement with the
lifeworld that is impossible without reflection on the lifeworld through the systems perspective.
Consideration of the potential analogous relationship constructed here, however, gives one pause
in regards to Habermas’ own perspective of such decoupling. Given the damage done to
education and to the notion of educator when such decoupling becomes more than a useful
heuristic device, perhaps review of the decoupling of the lifeworld and the systemsworld is
similarly, and innately, harmful. It may well be that our observation of the damages done in
education by the numerous systems segregation—teaching from scholarship, research from
teaching, the lifeworld of scholarship from the systemsworld of research, and so on—is only the
result of the commodification greed that seems to motivate most—if not all—social systems in
the world. I suggest, however, that the decoupling may act as an evacuating device: to view the
lifeworld through the systemsworld is to view it through a lens that cannot grant meaning. Thus,
the primacy of the systemsworld in the States has evacuated what should be the dialectical
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productivity of modernity of meaning. Meanwhile, to view the systemsworld through the
lifeworld perspective is to infuse it with meaning, perhaps even inaccurately so, yet such
meaning-making is necessary for human purpose-making and understanding.
In the same way in which the unchecked and un-reflected uncoupling of the lifeworld and
the systemsworld is damaging, so is the uncoupling of teaching and research. The colonization of
the lifeworld of teaching by the systemsworld has ramifications that reverberate far beyond
concerns for the role crisis experienced by the professoriate and into the policymaking that
determines the treatment of students by an institution.
For a public domain such as the schools, the analogous demand for deregulation and
debureaucratization meets with resistance. The call for a more strictly pedagogical
approach to instruction and for a democratization of decision-making structures is not
immediately compatible with the neutralization of the citizen's role; it is even less
compatible with the economic system-imperative to uncouple the school system from the
fundamental right to education and to closecircuit it with the employment system. From
the perspective of social theory, the present controversy concerning the basic orientations
of school policy can be understood as a fight for or against the colonization of the
lifeworld. (Habermas, 1985, p. 371)
Moreover, in the context of teaching and research, when it is the systemsworld that drives the
lifeworld, meaning is lost and the horizons of the lifeworld diminish, and when it is research that
drives teaching, the value of knowledge and the value of students can be forgotten in favor of the
demand that as much knowledge be produced as possible. This knowledge production would no
longer be understood even in Markie’s correspondence sense of justified true beliefs acquired by
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students, but instead as marks and statistics on paper of interest. When teaching drives research,
students are not in danger of misuse by professors because it is never forgotten that the value of
research is to benefit students and the community. Conversely, when the systemsworld of
research drives the lifeworld of teaching, professors may lose sight of the value and meaning that
established the need for research in the first place.
Praxis
This correlation between the lifeworld-systemsworld and teaching-research pairs of
course treats this particular understanding of research as a functional producer of information.
This understanding of research, however, should not be confused with “scholarship.” I suggest
that scholarship is a lifeworldly endeavor invested in numerous values such as the worth of
knowledge, understanding existence, producing purpose, and the establishment of meaning.
Thus, it may be possible to reduce one’s understanding of teaching to a systemsworld
“dissemination” and find a similar correlation and series of problems that arise when the
systemsworld of “teaching dissemination” drives the lifeworld of scholarship. The reduction of
teaching to a systemsworld dissemination is more difficult because of the Habermasian
assumptions that undergird teaching and care. I mention it, however, because, as the U.S. system
is becoming increasingly systemsworld-oriented, such a reduction may be taking place and
merits further research.
Particularly, one realizes that the popularity of online education, particularly mass-online
education, may result a sublimation of scholarship to a dissemination, or diploma-market, end.
Thus, the reduction of the import of good scholarship found in many schools that are under
increasing pressure to graduate students for quantifiable purposes may be understood as the
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result of decoupling teaching from the lifeworld of scholarship. Moreover, this understanding
may explain why such a decoupling has already taken place in the k-12 system. Because teaching
is not recognized as scholarship and because k-12 teachers are under greater and greater pressure
to produce students who can perform certain functions on standardized exams, and graduate
students regardless of any concerns for the students’ whole educational welfare, fewer and fewer
primary and secondary school teachers live in the lifeworld of scholarship. This is not to say that
they do not exist in the horizons of scholarship as a teaching enterprise, but one does note that as
the demand and respect for scholarly activity diminishes, teachers seem less and less motivated
by education and knowledge and are more and more motivated by quantifiable ends such as pay
and student pass rates.
Consider for example, anecdotally, my shock at how many teachers simply show movies
during the last week of high school. My own students were incensed that I continued to work
with them for educational purposes; we continued to teach and learn. The rationale behind my
colleagues’ behavior seemed to waver between fatigue and the fact that there were no more
exams for the students to take—thus further embedding in the students’ minds that, despite our
claims to the contrary, that it really is only the exams that matter. Once having completed the
exam, there is no more reason to learn. I suggest that this reduction of the worth of learning is
due to the sublimation of scholarship to the systemsworld of dissemination, an activity that is
now confused with teaching. It also explains why students who do poorly and are in danger of
not graduating high school may still be granted a diploma by removing them from their
nonacademic courses, removing them from the courses that are not necessary for graduation, and
removing them from the course that they do need to graduate (most often English 4) so that they
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can complete the “course” using a computer program. Having done so, the student demonstrates
that sufficient information has been disseminated and a high school diploma can be conferred.
This is all to say that the role of teacher and the role of researcher are, to use Biddle’s
terminology, interdependent. We can parse the definitions out in many ways, but if they are both
forms of scholarship, each definition is only a single perspective of a greater whole that cannot
actually be broken apart without evacuating the components of meaning.
The normative implications for faculty roles then begin to emerge and praxis reached—
the theoretical becomes embodied, and in this case the embedded suppositions become the
driving normative force of applied ethical action. The foundational necessity of the lifeworld and
the supervenience of the systemsworld upon it creates a series of rational normative implications
for the roles of teacher and researcher. If the systemsworld cannot drive the lifeworld without the
evacuation of meaning of the lifeworld, and there is an analogous connection between the roles
of teacher and of researcher, then researcher roles cannot drive teacher roles. This is simply
evidenced, again, by results such as researchers using their own students for research purposes to
the detriment of their students. If the professor is driven by a systemsworld perspective of
researcher, and the lifeworldly value of the students is lost or forgotten, then harm may be done
to the students, and the very purpose of teaching is lost.
The foundational nature of the lifeworld results in a series of foundational axiomatic
presuppositions that ground the lifeworld of teaching and of scholarship. Teaching, as the
intersubjective dialectic analyzed through chapter 4 indicates, must


include all voices



be oriented toward the welfare of the community
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be beneficent—oriented towards doing good selflessly for individuals, and



foster free thought and inquiry.

To eliminate any of these is to create a definition of teaching that is contradictory to the very
essence of what we mean when we say “teacher.” To understand teaching as lifeworldly is then
to recognize teaching as dependent on research but also that which drives research, as is
evidenced by the codes of ethics established by professional associations discussed here.
Teaching, in the epistemology of the lifeworld, is, I suggest, best understood as “caring
scholarship.” One may engage in scholarship without care, but one may not do so and be a
teacher. The very impetus for teaching is care, and that care is absolutely essential for the
effectiveness of the teacher, and for maintaining the lifeworldly beneficence embedded in our
notion of teacher. Thus, there are many ways to engage scholarship, but when done so with care,
one is doing so as a teacher.
One may reply, “But if scholarship includes scholarship of discovery, then that would
assume that one is teaching even when one reads something of interest.” I am willing to assent to
that proposition without losing any of the meaning or power of the idea of caring scholarship.
One can be a teacher of oneself, and there is a great deal of Eastern philosophy that supports the
notion that finding enlightenment often requires silencing external voices. Moreover, one is
engaging with a teacher through the act of caring about the knowledge. Even if the
“disseminator” of the information was not a teacher, and did not care, the reader, through the act
of caring, turns the work into a teaching work; she creates for herself a teacher in the same way
that Marcel Duchamp looked at a snow shovel and turned it into art, not by changing the snow
shovel, but by changing perspective. The disseminator is thus transformed, perhaps unwillingly,
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into a teacher—the intersubjective roots of agency and selfhood go far deeper than a prima facie
understanding of meaning-making through conversation, but reach into the rich earth of the
plurality of voices generated by minds that understand themselves as Self and Other. We are
reminded of Mead and the heart of symbolic interactionism, that the world is generated through
our dialogical interpretation of symbols, our social definitions of reality. It is the perception that
is key to the construction of meaning, and it is our perception, though communally defined, that
grounds our world creation.
It is essential to remember that it is through our intersubjective dialogue that we voice
others. That voicing brings with it tremendous power, as well as danger. That power is the power
to experience a work of art and its intention in ways never intended by the artist, who now
“speaks to you” in a radically new way. The artist is voiced, and the intersubjective dialogue
continues, as we seek to include others and their perspectives. This Habermasian
intersubjectivity is at the heart of professorship. Through both the act of teaching and the act of
research, the professor reaches out into the world to both share and acquire knowledge and
understanding. She voices her students in order to empathize with them, recognize their needs,
and provide the right mentor for them, and she voices the often long-dead scholars who share
new insight with her through her prose.
Her own publication is a teaching act, driven by care for the community in order to meet
the needs of others. Recall the rational result of the dialectical logic of discourse ethics:
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects that general observance can
be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests, and the consequences
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are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation. (Habermas, 1985,
p. 65)
The understanding of the caring scholar as one who engages the multiplicity of voices, the
chorus that constructs the lifeworld in order to facilitate the production of meaningful human
agency, is grounded in the course conclusion of discourse ethics—that all affected, and I suggest
all potentially affected, matter. Caring scholarship is a way of meeting the Habermasian
principle of universality in order to understand the needs of others, to give them a place in the
dialectic through research (perhaps through interviews, perhaps through reading, perhaps through
observation), and it is an attempt to provide for them the scholar’s own voice, to be voiced by
them in order to either meet with their approval or become subject to their correction.
This work is such a voicing. It is my attempt to both voice numerous other theorists,
while at the same time sharing my own voice for the purposes of bringing the work of Biddle,
Noddings, Habermas, and the others into our communal dialectic, while at the same time
opening myself to the corrections of others who find flaws in this rationality or who determine
the norms prescribed to be invalid because I have not taken into account the needs of all.
The final synthesis must take into account Habermas’ own potential failure to include all
voices as indicated by Honneth. The production of identity, through Honneth’s theory of
recognition, requires that we not only engage others in dialectic but that we seek to recognize our
own dependence on the recognition of others for the formation of the self. Our identity formation
through our communal dialectic is not just a matter of engagement in others in rational discourse;
it is the recognition of our collective interdependence on the Other for our very existence. As
argued by Kögler, it is the agency of the Other that allows for our existence as an Other through
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the exchange of perspectives. Thus, the conjunction of professor roles as established through the
dialectical analysis here suggests that professors do not just voice their students, do not just
recognize their students, but they exchange perspectives with their students and with the
community that constructs their identity as professors. That perspective exchange, that shared
voicing, enables the professor to empathize with and care for the students more effectively, but
also enables her to understand how she is experienced and created not just by her students but by
the communal dialectic and the Others who construct and recognize her—hence the dependence
and obligation engendered through the act of professorship.
Like all agents, professors are dependent on others for identity formation. That identity,
however, takes on additional obligations, as it includes the scholar roles of teacher and
researcher. A professor is formed as an advocate for knowledge, a mentor for students, a
producer of understanding. She is required, by the very definitions that bind her, and the agents
who create her, to do good for the community as a scholar, and thus as a teacher and as a
researcher.
The result of the conclusions reached here is a radical reconstruction, a new etymology of
professorship. The construct of professor, informed by the presuppositions revealed by the
reviewed text that professors promote free thought and inquiry, respect all voices, and follow a
teleology of beneficence oriented toward the welfare of the community, results in an
understanding of professor grounded in robust care—care for students, care for knowledge, care
for colleges, care for the institutions that promote free thought, and care for the many
communities not only in which she participates, but for which she has the potential to do good.
The new etymology bursts a Derridian understanding of the professor as “one who professes”
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and replaces it with a notion that remains outwardly engaged, but grounded in lifeworldly
intention. She who professes, she who disseminates, is vulnerable to the uncoupling of the
lifeworld from the systemsworld; she is vulnerable to the colonization of the lifeworld by
systemsworld functional values because she is not necessarily professing for a narrative. Our
linguistic constructs need not have correlation between their signifier and their signified,
between the speech act and the concept to which it refers. Thus, I propose critical etymology—
the revisioning of language to meet critical theoretical ends. By “critical etymology” I gesture
toward Paulo Freire (1970) and Habermas simultaneously. Freire’s 1970 Pedagogy of the
Oppressed generates the construct of “critical pedagogy” by conjoining the pedagogical act with
the passion-driven intellectual freedom production of critical theory in action. Thus, education,
by Freire’s, and other critical pedagog’s, lights was an action that should be grounded in helping
student uncover the hidden meanings, authorities, and frameworks that generate their
epistemology, thereby enabling students to recognize marginalization, manipulation, and both
obvert and subtle acts of control.
Critical etymology, like critical theory and critical pedagogy, engages examination of the
intersubjective dialectic that produces constructs while also engaging the perspective that critical
pedagogy, vis-à-vis Freire, should be a constructive engagement driven by a teleology of
beneficence—to engage research that itself seeks to better the lot of the marginalized. So by
“critical etymology” I mean to conjoin the Derridian deconstructive act of term analysis with a
normative intersubjective beneficent enterprise. To engage in critical etymology is to both seek
to define and redefine terms that 1) produce better understanding in the context of our
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hermeneutic dialectical frame and 2) produces normative definitions—“should” definitions that
can acknowledge “this is not what term x does mean, but this is what it could and should mean.”
If “professor” is defined through the conglomeration of faculty handbooks, the role is one
largely best described as a series of institutional responsibilities. To deconstruct the term
suggests that professors “profess.” There is little to suggest, then, that, in tandem, these two
definitional understandings of professorship move beyond the systemsworld and engage the rich
intersubjectivity of the lifeworld. Simply, that a professor should care, foster learning, and
engage in an interdependent dialectic of knowledge building with students is relegated to
connotative implications and associations of the term “professor.” Problematically, our
understanding of “professor” leads to tremendous role ambiguity. Professors are denotatively
defined in one way, but connotatively defined in others. Professors find themselves most clearly
defined through the systemsworld of their institutions while, potentially, motivated to teach for
lifeworldly motivations. Let us redefine professorship, then, untether it from its systemsworld
groundings, and ground it once again in the lifeworld—ground it in a notion of scholarship that
is inclusive, holistic, free, and most importantly, beneficent. Simply, let us engage in a critical
theoretical act, an act of critical etymology, and take hold of our definitions and mold them for
the purpose of generating the best possible social outcome. If it is language that constructs the
world, there is no reason to ignore the power one has to shape the world through language.
This notion of critical etymology hinges on more than a kind of post hoc prima facie
understanding of speech acts as reflecting the world. Rather, what is proposed here is a
redefining, and thus re-constructing, of the world hinged upon declarative speech acts and
performativity. To redefine oneself, for example, as “American” in order to exit British rule, is to
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do more than provide a new name to an old object; it is to generate an entirely new construct.
Constructs, recall, are not physically instantiated; their construction hinges on our social
interaction, and it is through that symbolic mediation and dialectic that they are created and
destroyed. We are reminded of our previous discussion of Hacking’s discussion of social
constructs. As such a construct, the formulation developed here not only describes an existing
reality—the construction of “teacher” and “researcher” as generated through our embedded
presuppositions—but also constructively produces a new integrated reality of existing faculty.
The construct is a radical, yet backward-looking, reconstruction of a physical instantiation in the
world: faculty members. I suggest that those agents, however, who also participate in the
construct “professor” while simultaneously being the construct “professor” should encompass
“teacher” and “researcher” roles through the mediating concept of “scholarship” as the praxis
correlated term to professor thus alleviating much role ambiguity for a beneficent purpose.
“Professor,” thus, is not just redefined, nor is it just deconstructed; it is re-constructed, critically,
to the end of benefiting the agents who co-create its reality, instantiation, and meaning.
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CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS, SUGGESTIONS, AND REFLECTIONS
Summary of Concerns and Analysis Established in Previous Chapters
In the case of philosophical analysis it is often appropriate to go a step beyond the
summarization of findings. Philosophy, as a self-reflective enterprise, requires of the thinker that
she consider the implications of her ideas for others as well as for herself. Thus, this work
warrants a sixth chapter that itself specifically focuses on the “What now?” that results from the
findings discussed previously. Not only does the self-reflective gesture act as additional means
by which to establish credibility, it acts as further demonstration of the very hermeneutic
inclusive dialectic discussed throughout the dissertation. Simply, this final chapter seeks to
include the reader in the communicative positioning of the author in such a way that both
acknowledge the author’s phenomenal epistemology while acknowledging the externality of the
reader to that positioning. I seek to include you in what, hopefully, becomes less a didactic
statement of my own thoughts and more a dialectical engagement with other minds.
This work has attempted to understand the conjunction of faculty roles of “teacher” and
“researcher” as well as generate a best construct for the generation of those roles. The
dissertation has, firstly, established the developing tension between the roles of faculty as
“teacher” and as “researcher.” An increasing number of articles engage the role conflict between
the two, particularly as constructed by post-secondary institutions. Conflicts range from ethical
concerns about the misuse of students for SoTL research to the reduction of quality research and
institutional pressure to graduate more students. These tensions seem to be the result of
conflicting societal, economic, and academic pressures that require institutions to hold the
professoriate to greater accountability by requiring faculty to publish more and demonstrate their
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worth through significant and quantifiable publication while professors receive pressure from
institutions to fail fewer students, teach more, and focus on the practical endeavor of bringing as
many students to educational institutions in order to maintain funding. The result of these
tensions highlights the need for more research concerning the consequences of dividing teaching
and research and pitting them against each other, as well as for establishing what the best vision
for the conjunction of faculty roles should look like.
Review of the literature established that there is significant development in sociological
and philosophical understandings of roles. The work of Bruce J. Biddle has established role
theory as a mainstream model for understanding humans as actors who participate in and
perform societal scripts. The theoretical models for role theory, however, remain divided and
often are limited to particular perspectives of human interaction, noticeably leaving out the
importance of dialectic and community in the understanding of script performance. In light of the
development of communitarian and hermeneutic understandings of identity formation, this work
forwards a new perspective on role theory—“community dialectical” role theory, a conjunction
of organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory. Community-dialectical role
theory understands human actors as engaged in numerous roles established through numerous
community constructs, each of which providing inscribed, enunciated, and covert scripts that
govern human action while at the same time understanding those actors as developers of the
scripts of the Other through symbolic interaction through the holism of social dialectic. Thus, the
dissertation established “role theory” as the theoretical framework and “community-dialectical”
role theory as the conceptual framework.
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In identifying the best methodological means by which to answer the research questions
posed by the dissertation, it was established that it would need to first delve into the most basic
understandings of roles as generated by social definition and discourse. Thus, the method of
“philosophical analysis” was determined to be the best means by which to develop understanding
of roles while at the same time generating a construct that could be applied to the generation of
those roles and a means by which to reduce role ambiguity both in terms of those who seek to
understand faculty roles. It was also determined to be the best means by which to reduce the very
role ambiguity potentially experienced by those in the professoriate who find themselves, as
agents manifested through the symbolic interactions that generate their role expectations, defined
in a multiplicity of conflicting ways. Due to the fact that philosophical analysis is an underdiscussed research methodology in educational leadership, the dissertation both justified and
demonstrated the use of philosophical analysis in chapter 3.
The dissertation explored what “philosophical analysis” means and established that there
is a history of educational work that uses philosophical methodology. That work, however, often
limits itself to conceptual analysis, focusing solely on the rigorous development of and
understanding of definitions. After the linguistic turn, however, a broader understanding of
philosophy is possible: philosophy is not limited to being a tool for definition, but is also the
holistic lived-experience of rigorous inquiry. Thus, discourse ethics and hermeneutic
understandings of human experience through engagement in the robust social dialectic that
comprises human life was determined to be the best means by which to pursue this research
project. Discourse ethics enabled the researcher to both investigate the presuppositions that
axiomatically ground and generate faculty roles while at the same time providing a framework
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for developing a normative construct that can guide institutional formation of those roles and
reduce the role ambiguity that results, conceptually, from the tensions generated by the
systemsworld and lifeworld when placed in irrational opposition.
In order to engage a robust picture of faculty roles the dissertation engaged in a
philosophical document analysis. A series of texts including faculty handbooks, professional
association ethical codes, and philosophical writings on professorial responsibilities were
analyzed. As these works were analyzed, a series of themes emerged. Perhaps most obvious was
the disjunction between the tendency of the handbooks to engage a systems-approach to the
presentation of roles and the tendency of the philosophical documents to engage the lifeworld
perspective. The handbooks often focused on hierarchical and organizational necessities of
institutional life, spending very little time understanding faculty in terms of broad relationships
with each other, the institution, and the students. Interestingly, however, they tended to engage
the lifeworld when discussing the mission, values, and philosophies of the institutions. Still, the
longer documents, in particular, did little to exhibit that concern for those lifeworldly values in
the actual inscription of faculty expectations.
The importance of lifeworld values, however—as presuppositions that regulate the
generation of faculty roles—became even clearer when the handbooks were considered in
conjunction with the professional codes of ethics. The codes of ethics inscribe the requirements
of beneficence, free thought, and community engagement as essential to the role of the professor.
When reflecting on the handbooks, one finds that expectations of mentorship, the promotion of
free thought, and responsibility are similarly presuppositions espoused, particularly in the values
statements of the universities. These themes were further emphasized by the philosophers
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considered in chapter 4 who, without exception, had extremely high standards of the
professoriate as both invested teachers and scholars. The sole tension between them was concern
for the definition of scholarship—as requiring journal publication or as a broader engagement in
the world of knowledge and inquiry. The data do establish, however, that the construction of
faculty roles through these documents does not give researching prominence over teaching. The
documents present the two roles as deeply integrated and mutually interdependent—as roles that,
through their conjunction, act to continually better each other thus eliminating much role
ambiguity.
To speak to the individual leaders who guide an institution, my home institution of the
University of North Florida, for example, would be to suggest to them that reconceptualization
and reframing of the organizational philosophy might be warranted. By this, I do not mean that
the mission statement or the philosophy as stated by the university are themselves flawed.
Rather, I suggest that to engage in a discourse analysis of the actual behaviors of the university
may reveal that the institution does not, as it claims, place students first. Moreover, it may be
acting in tension to its own primary research goal of adding to the general body of knowledge by
virtue of losing focus on the very purposes of research themselves. Simply, review of UNF
would encourage its leaders to examine whether the institution has placed systemsworld goals
first under the assumption that the institution’s admirable lifeworldly goals are met through the
systemworld aims. In the same way that a high school may mistakenly place standardized test
scores as more important than the holistic education of its students for their flourishing under the
assumption that success on the standardized test is indicative of that flourishing, UNF may find
that emphasis on quality control, quantifiable teacher evaluations, numbers of research
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publications, retention, and graduation rates place secondary the most significant lifeworld goals
for which the institution exists—the benefit leaners and through that benefit contribute to the
knowledges that themselves serve humanity.
If, for instance, the university is disinclined to categorize students as “a vulnerable
population” due to the fact that such a categorization may make quality control more difficult
insofar as a vulnerable population should not be subject to an institution’s research aims, it has
lost direction and now acts contrary to its core purpose. –The result of which is likely to be
faculty members who experience role ambiguity, cognitive dissonance, and career
dissatisfaction, and they may be unsure why. Similarly, students may express that they feel
manipulated and used by the institution. They may feel that despite the claims of the university,
they are not placed first, and that they are savvy enough to know that such claims are only
another manipulation used to accomplish university ends. Thus, the findings here encourage
university leaders to engage in deep self-reflection regarding the very nature of their enterprise,
to engage in robust dialectic with both the students and faculty, and to reexamine whether or not
the institution is in fact that which it claims to be. Research suggests, though not necessarily at
UNF, that faculty are experiencing such tension and ambiguity to greater and greater degrees as
discussed in chapter 1. The goal of institutional leadership, to at least some degree, should be to
resolve role tensions and role ambiguity.
Philosophical analysis of the data suggests that the role of faculty is in a tension that must
be resolved before further role conflict divides the construct “professor” further. It is unclear
why, given the data, there seems to be an increasing tension between the two roles, particularly
the tendency to subjugate the role of teacher to that of researcher, but it may be due to an
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analogous relationship between the pair “teacher” and “researcher” and the pair “systemsworld”
and “lifeworld.” The systemsworld and the lifeworld are mutually interdependent, but the system
may “colonize” the lifeworld when needed to organize the lifeworld and understand the lifeworld
through the clear and efficient systemsworld lens obfuscates the necessity of the lifeworld as the
driving force behind the generation of the system in the first place. The lifeworld values that
generate the system may be so assumed as to be, at times, forgotten, in addition to being complex
and difficult to quantify for economic aims. Regardless, what is most fundamental is the
realization that, like the systemsworld-lifeworld dichotomy, the distinction between teacher and
researcher is purely heuristic. Even more than the systemsworld and lifeworld understandings of
human life, the roles of teacher and researcher are mutually dependent and inseparable,
particularly when one understands “researcher” to mean scholar.
Scholarship is a necessity of teaching, and is at its best when, like the systemsworld, the
lifeworld drives its instantiation. Scholarship, as more robustly defined in this dissertation, takes
on the lifeworldly characteristics of dialectical inquiry and production of knowledge through
participation with the community. Thus, there may be reason to believe that the production of
knowledge through effective teaching in the classroom may, itself, qualify as scholarship. This
gives us reason to conclude that institutions that emphasize scholarship as essential to the role of
the professor should engage a more holistic and qualitative evaluation format for understanding
their faculty as scholars. While perhaps messier and less efficient, such evaluation would better
capture a robust understanding of the scholarship of their faculty while at the same time
maintaining the primacy of the lifeworld of inquiry as a driving force behind the existence of the
university. To do otherwise is to potentially lose the philosophical foundations of the institution
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to the systemsworld perspective of management and organization, thus divorcing the university
from the very scholarly values it seeks to uphold. To investigate the roles of the faculty from the
discourse ethical and hermeneutic frames is to reveal the professor as best defined as a “caring
scholar.”
The definition of “teacher” is far too broad when understood through the context of the
lifeworld to omit active and invested researchers from our understanding of “teacher.” Perhaps
they are not in a classroom, but neither was Socrates, and to require that teaching be understood
in such a limited way is to once again allow systemsworld efficiencies to dictate the values that
are best driven by the lifeworld. The caring scholar, then, is a perspective of professor that
understands her role as one of beneficence driven by care, free and rigorous inquiry, and respect
for and participation in the community. This understanding of professor not only emerges from
the examination of the presuppositions that govern our dialectical understanding of professor, but
emerge logically from an understanding of the Habermasian principle of universality: all voices
must be included in the dialectical understanding of the professor, who, in order to ensure this,
must be invested in the welfare of those voices, and through her scholarly engagement seeks to
both understand and benefit those voices. This final stage of redefinition of the term “professor,”
I term “critical etymology”—the defining of terms both through the investigation of the most
basic dialectical axioms that govern our term-making while at the same time purposefully
driving that term-making in a way as to better society. This critical etymology, I believe,
emerges directly from discourse ethics as both a means by which to develop understanding
through the investigation of the assumptions that govern our discourse and a means by which to
engage the world ethically and logically through the inclusion of all voices.
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Limitations of the Study
The limitations of this study are largely empirical. Although empirical data are analyzed,
no experiment is conducted, and understanding is generated largely through logical analysis and
engaged discourse. Thus, we cannot make any substantive conclusions regarding the actual
instantiations of faculty roles by universities, nor can we articulate how faculty feel about those
roles or live them. We are limited to an understanding of the roles as generated through analysis
of a limited section of our social discourse. The work is primarily focused on construct
development, and, as such, is itself a theoretical model that may be used by other works in order
to understand how faculty roles are lived and actualized. As a theoretical model, the construct
developed here carries with it the limitations of any theory and should be evaluated based on its
conceptual merits. Thus, the work of Thomas Kuhn (1977), here, is used to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of the developed construct and the understanding of faculty as “caring scholars.”
Kuhn articulated the following criteria for evaluation of theoretical models in science:
1. Accurate: The theory is grounded in empirically sufficient observations and
experimentation.
2. Consistent: The theory is internally consistent and externally consistent with our other
theories
3. Broad Scope: The consequences of the theory extend beyond its original intention
4. Simple: The theory is a simplest explanation; it does not multiply unnecessary variables
5. Fruitful: The theory reveals new phenomena or relationships between them.
Kuhn’s criteria demonstrate, again, that the greatest limitation of this work is empirical
experimentation. The work is grounded in a great deal of observation, however. Numerous
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documents were reviewed and analyzed. Thus, although the work is not lacking in empirical
grounding, the true test of its validity will be the application of the theory to lived world of
faculty roles. Whether or not theorists determine the construct developed here to be sufficient for
the explanation of their own observations cannot yet be determined. The work has specifically
sought to produce a construct that is both internally consistent and consistent with the dialectical
presuppositions that ground our role making. The work has sought to resolve unnecessary
inconsistencies between the roles of teacher and researcher, as there need not be any. As the
work is grounded in the embedded assumptions that generate faculty roles, the work is externally
consistent.
Implications of the Study
The scope of the work is yet to be determined, yet there seems to be good reason to
believe the work extends beyond the formation of faculty roles in post-secondary institutions.
The work likely has implications for the evaluation of and importance of scholarship amongst k12 teachers, the understanding of researchers as teachers, and the use of philosophical analysis in
educational research. The work has sought simplicity insofar as it has identified the common
grounding axioms that emerge through an analysis of our discourse. In the redefinition of
professor as “caring scholar,” the work seeks to ground professorship in the most fundamental
lifeworld values possible without the inclusion of extraneous variables that, themselves, can be
addressed through consistent application of the construct. Upon reflection, I do believe the work
to be fruitful, though that conclusion is better determined by other theorists. It does, at least, shed
light on our communal understanding of and generation of faculty roles. Thus, using Kuhn’s
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criteria, the work does appear to, within the limitations of philosophical analysis, address those
limitations and provide a functional construct that itself can be evaluated and used to evaluate.
Implications for Theory Development
There are tremendous implications for theory development as a result of this dissertation.
There are numerous theoretical models that have been proposed by the author that themselves
may be revised, expanded, criticized, and rejected. The notions of community-dialectical role
theory, philosophy as a lived experienced of inquiry, professor as defined as “caring scholar,”
and critical etymology are all themselves grounding for the development of theories that either
rely upon those notions as constructs or axioms or ground themselves in the rejection of those
concepts. Regardless, the work provides rich ground for other theorists to do significant work in
developing their own models in response to the ideas forwarded here.
Implications for Research
The implications for research are significant. The work challenges the systemsworld
model of research and forwards instead a lifeworld epistemology of research that understands
researchers as invested scholars—as teachers. The work challenges the systemsworld trend
toward the use of students as participants in research—their work in particular—without their
knowledge and consent. It reminds researchers that the very grounding of their enterprise is
beneficence itself, and that if research uses others as a means to an end and does not seek to
better the welfare of the community, as well as the participants, it is inherently flawed. The work
challenges researchers to accept the heavy mantle of teacher in their work so that they are
themselves reminded that care should be a primary drive behind human inquiry. The lust for
knowledge is well-respected in this document, but we must remind ourselves, as Habermas did,
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that it is the inclusion of voices in our dialectic that makes such dialogue possible in the first
place. If our research is not inclusive, if it does not participate in the community, it is at odds
with the very core of what it means to be a scholar.
Implications for Leadership, Policy Formulation, and Implementation
As a dissertation completed within a department of educational leadership, it is important
to note its implications for leadership. Of course, prima facie, the answer is obvious: “teachers
are leaders; therefore this work applies to leaders insofar as they are teachers.” Such an answer,
however, glosses over the depth of the discourse ethical construct and its implications for
leadership. What kind of leaders are teachers? Moreover, what are the implications for
administrators and leaders in education who do not, at least as we commonly define it, teach? I
will consider below that a way to frame this question is to understand teaching and those who
participate in the teaching enterprise through administration as engaged in what our embedded
assumptions reveals to be “servant leadership.” Simply, to analyze our dialectical framing of
teaching reveals that teaching is a kind of service—it seeks to benefit those who are taught. In
service to students, teachers act as mentors (as the analysis of university handbooks has
repeatedly revealed) guiding students on paths that the teachers themselves have already begun
to clear. Thus, both serving and leading are implicit and embedded in our most basic dialectical
understanding of teacher, and those who administrate cannot administrate effectively without
recognizing that service is the goal and leading is the means.
Servant leadership as discussed by Robert K. Greenleaf (1991) described the servantleader as a “servant first” (p. 13). The desire to lead, or perhaps the necessity of it, emerges from
the desire to serve. According to Greenleaf, servant leadership “begins with the natural feeling
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that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings on to aspire to lead. That
person is sharply different from one who is leader first, perhaps because of the need to assuage
an unusual power drive or to acquire material possessions” (p. 13). The goals of the servant
leader, therefore, are to benefit those whom they serve, rather than themselves. Greenleaf
suggested that the best test for such leadership was to ask,
Do those who are being served grow as persons? Do they, while being served, become
healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants?
And, what is the effect on the least privileged in society; will they benefit, or, at least, not
be further deprived? (pp. 13-14)
Thus, Greenleaf suggested, the best means by which to ascertain if one is in fact a servant leader
it to examine impact one has on followers and all stakeholders.
Greenleaf’s criteria clarify a potential tension created by those totalitarian leaders who
seem to benefit their own people. Perhaps through that leader’s actions, the national will of the
people is enacted, though Greenleaf suggested that one must also take into account the least
privileged in society. The impact on other stakeholders, even outside of the scope of one’s
“official” leadership capacity matters. Without stating it as such, Greenleaf’s work gestures
towards the inclusion of the Other.
The implications, then, for this work on our understanding of educational leadership is to
recognize that the professor, as a teacher, is defined at her conceptual core as a servant leader.
The implication of service, however, goes beyond serving students in the case of professorship,
as the previous works discussed here also suggest that the professor has role obligations to
knowledge and to her community. Thus, as a leader she remains a servant to her students, to
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knowledge, and to the community. That service is verbalized through the university faculty
handbooks and the philosophies of thinkers like Markie and Noddings as descriptions of the roles
that should be played by faculty. Discourse analysis suggests that service defines professorship,
and perhaps this is where some tensions and role ambiguity for professors lie. If professors are
treated as if they are better and more important than the students, or if, implicitly or explicitly,
professors are encouraged to place their research (and thus their own prestige and the prestige of
the university) above the welfare of the students, then the professor fails to be a servant both to
the students and, I contend, to knowledge itself.
Publication for the purpose of tenure, prestige, and institutional obligation is not service
to discourse, understanding, or even to some vague notion of truth. It is service to ends that can
compromise the integrity of one’s research. Hastily written articles published out of desperation,
requirement, and greed are far less likely to engage the deep, diligent, and highly reflective
inquiry that best helps promote human understanding. Furthermore, such a shift in focus away
from service to students and their community engages the students as subjects rather than
participants in professors’ research projects as well as decreases the likelihood of a truly robust
and engaged communicative action between students and teachers as builders of knowledge
together. What is lost is the idea of the servant leader, according to the discourse-ethical
framework, which transforms the leader into someone who empowers the other, who is both
leader and servant, who is willing to exchange the roles between all participants so as create the
conditions for building a truly shared and rational community. Caring scholarship is lost; one
cares less about student welfare, generative understanding, and community welfare and more
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about systemsworld bureaucratic ends for the perpetuation of an institution and a career that may
no longer serve the primary ends of education.
The obligations that define professorship suggest that Greenleaf’s criteria may be an
effective means by which to ascertain the effectiveness of a professor as servant leader as well as
of an institution insofar as it promotes, enables, and actualizes service. One only need ask oneself
if the professor or the institution in fact benefit students and the community robustly and
holistically; conferral of degrees is insufficient. Consider the fact that Thomas Jefferson would
not allow the conferral of degrees at the University of Virginia. He believed them to be
pretentious and argued that truly devoted learners would learn to better themselves regardless of
a degree. The tendency of institutions to justify their actions by the belief that “students are
benefited by the conferral of a degree, and to increase the prestige of the degree is to increase
that benefit” moves away from our own deeply embedded understanding of the import of
educational pursuits—that education itself is valuable. Learning is essential to flourishing. I
would like to suggest the ever-increasingly contentious proposition that students are more
benefited by learning than they are by degrees. This is not to say that institutions should not be
concerned about taking students’ money without providing a genuine benefit. This may, rather,
suggest that at its core education is harmed insofar as it becomes profit-seeking.
To educate for the purpose of money, to charge students, compromises the intrinsic value
of education. The educational act becomes a capitalistic exchange wherein if students cannot
make their money back, their education has been a waste. The simple solution, conceptually, is
to make post-secondary education free. Thus, even those students who exit their institutions
without high-paying jobs have not financially indebted themselves for “no reason.” One wonders
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if institutions will, for much longer, be able to continue to justify their worth beyond degrees. As
general education requirements are cut, humanities eliminated, and students rushed through their
degree programs, one wonders if our institutions of “higher-learning” can continue to justify
such a lofty (and rather offensive to k-12 institutions) label. Perhaps “institutions of the fewest
number of years possible in order to attain a degree that will make you money” would be a better
descriptor.
This document, then, promotes the idea that service is one of the most effective means by
which to evaluate the effectiveness of a professor and of educational institutions. However, even
to recognize teaching as a kind of servant leadership is insufficient for understanding the full
depth of the implications of this work for leadership; reflection on teaching as a kind of service
in which one places the needs of others in primacy over one’s own needs (particularly as those
whom are served are a vulnerable population) is insufficient, as one still wonders, “How do the
findings reflect on leadership in general?”
The answer to the question, “What are the implications for this work on leadership?”
emerges when one reflects on the fact that leadership, itself, can be understood from either a
systemsworld or a lifeworld perspective not unlike professorship. Simply, more positivist notions
of charismatic leadership like those explored by Max Weber (1922/1958) place the systemsworld
as primary. Other concepts of leadership such as servant leadership and authentic leadership
engage the idea that at the core of the leadership construct is the imperative to do good and to
help those who are led. Thus, the same tensions that challenge the university challenge the very
notion of leadership. If the prevailing notion of leadership is one grounded in the idea that one
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should serve the system rather than the lifeworld a conceptual crisis arises because the core
motivation for leadership is placed as secondary to systemworld aims.
In saying this, one recognizes that the world seems motivated by systemsworld leaders.
Greenleaf argued that, “we live in the age of the anti-leader, and our vast educational structure
devotes very little care to nurturing leaders or to understanding followership” (1991, p. 4). Both
research and anecdotal experience seem to suggest that we desire charismatic, powerful leaders
who will place the good of the system over individual needs. Certainly the shift in linguistic
understanding of The United States from These United states after the Civil War suggests that
our general social impetus is towards unification and our glorification of leaders often hinges on
their ability to sacrifice the needs of some in order to maintain, for example, “The Union.” While
in the case of The United States the preservation of the Union had the tremendously beneficial (if
not unintended) consequence of ending legalized slavery in the United States, other examples of
the willingness of the population to embrace “unity” and charismatic leaders do not always end
so happily. Napoleon, in particular, was so beloved for his power of unification that after both
failure and exile the French people were willing to follow him once again into disaster.
The above is noted because it is a natural counter to the claim that leadership is, at its
core, oriented toward doing good and service. To engage in a brief analysis, however, reveals
that the underlying assumptions that motivate followers are beneficence-based, as they are
oriented towards their well-being. Those who follow even inauthentic transformational leaders
such as Hitler and Napoleon presumably do so because they believe it is in their own best
interest, however much their true interest may either be distorted (as with racism or other
abhorrent ideologies). The rise of nationalism in Europe during the Enlightenment only adds
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credence to that claim. The very nationalism that would become twisted into fascism had its
origins in the French revolution and German social philosophy. Thinkers such as Herder (1784),
Fitch (1807) and Hegel (1820/1991) constructed arguments based on observation and reason to
suggest that there were in fact groups of individuals that are best understood as a unity for their
own well-being. The arguments of Fitch and Herder noted the ways in which location and
language both function to generate a “family” of people. To quote Herder (1784),
Nature brings forth families; the most natural state therefore is also one people, with a
national character of its own. For thousands of years this character preserves itself within
the people, and, if the native princes concern themselves with it, it can be cultivated in
the most natural way; for a people is as much a plant of nature is a family, except that it
has more branches. Nothing therefore seems more contradictory to the true end of
governments than the endless expansion of states, the wild confusion of races and nations
under one scepter. An empire made of a hundred peoples and 120 provinces which have
been forced together is a monstrosity, not a state-body. (p.152)
Those families of people, then, are themselves best understood as a unified group which is
benefited by the preservation of the larger whole, suggested Herder. What one comes to realize is
that there is a philosophical undercurrent that informs our understanding of leadership and
followership.
G. W. Friedrich Hegel’s work, famously, brought the more simplistic arguments of Fitch
and Herder into the philosophical realms of metaphysics and epistemology. While today we
cannot follow this metaphysics of a trans-individual super subject, the state, his understanding of
history and language rightly suggested that unification of a people transcended any physical
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understanding. To be a rational individual agent, according to Hegel, was to understand the
whole as necessary and as a rational incarnation of the summation of shared, unified wills. The
Geist, spirit (or mind) that emerges, though not a physical entity, is the spirit that moves history,
the collective will that results from the reasoning of many minds through time. To quote Hegel
(1820/1991),
The state is the actuality of the substantial will, an actuality which it possesses in
the particular self-consciousness when this has been raised to its universality; as
such, it is the rational in and for itself. This substantial unity is an absolute and
unmoved end in itself, and in it, freedom enters into its highest right, just as this
ultimate end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals [die Einzelnen],
whose highest duty is to be members of the state. (1820/1991)
The rational will of the substantial unity, then, is actualized by the emergent leader who may be
described as the Geist personified. In our context, which is defined by the intersubjective
communicative theory of discourse ethics, the leader’s role transforms from a charismatic leader
to move masses, to one who empowers the agents to become rational participants in the shared
construction of the state as community.
The fact that the human animal seems most motivated to follow powerful, aggressive,
and often violent leaders is not evidence against the claim that leadership is grounded in
beneficence and the search for one’s well-being, only that it is grounded in the belief in the
rightness of personal beneficent teleology. The rationalizations that justify conquering,
subjugating, or murdering others do not contradict the claim that leaders should be beneficent;
they just add evidence to our belief that leaders should benefit us. It would be wholly irrational to
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follow a leader who one believes will do one harm. So, at its conceptual core, leadership is
grounded in beneficence. Otherwise, the very idea falls apart—i.e. Whatever a leader does, she
had better benefit me, otherwise she will not have me as a follower. Yet, again, according to
discourse ethics, the highest form of rationality is to understand that we have to develop the
rational capabilities of agents, in our case the students, such that they can discern charismatic and
fascist leaders form those that enable a democratic self-government, as Jefferson, for one, had in
mind.
I suggest, then, that this normative core of beneficence is at the heart of many social
tensions experienced by leaders today. The motion described by Gilligan of an ever-widening
sphere of care and interest places many contemporary leaders in an untenable position. While at
one time to be an industry leader may have meant only that one need benefit one’s stockholders,
it is becoming increasingly difficult for leaders to maintain such narrow focus. The very idea of
expanding beyond stockholders to stakeholders expressed the communal and care-based
principle of expanding leadership such that everyone’s voice is heard, that everyone is led to
realize their potential and receive the fullest ‘benefits’ from their education.
Historically speaking, what one comes to realize is that leadership has always been
grounded in beneficence, or at least in its promise for some, and as the world becomes
increasingly aware of the personhood the Other, leaders are expected to have broader and
broader spheres of interest and a greater and greater capacity to maximize the benefit for many
disparate persons. Such a positioning is already difficult, as the Hegelian unity may be untenable
when the groups themselves are so diverse as to not share interests. (Note, however, that seeking
such shared interest remains desirable, as those who do not may well find themselves at war due
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to conflict of interests; discourse ethics and our application of its principles to teaching and
research as servant scholarship are meant to promote a culture in which shared interest can be
rationally determined by means of mutually respectful deliberation.) The deepest challenge,
however, becomes the realization that in a capitalized system of commodification, leaders are
expected to espouse and maintain systemsworld values while at the same time meeting the
lifeworldly requirement that the hopes, dreams, and personal interests of the individual agents
represented by that leader are simultaneously pursued and respected.
The implications, then, for this work on Educational Leadership, then, is twofold: 1)
Educational leaders leader are often either teachers or their role is to facilitate teachers in
teaching and, thus, they are either servants to students, knowledge, and the community or they
are servants to service. The findings here reveal that teachers and administrators have been
placed in a conceptually untenable position that need not be so. Simple readjustment of our
notions such that the lifeworld is given primacy would go a long way to resolve those tensions.
2) Leadership, as a generalized construct, has at its conceptual core the assumption of
beneficence. As leaders are mandated to benefit ever growing and ever more disparate
populations, that teleology of beneficence must be maintained if the leader is to accomplish her
aims, maintain her position, and maintain the integrity of the leadership notion. What is revealed
here is that leadership itself is now suffering from the ever-increasing focus on the systemsworld
and its bureaucracies as more important than the individual purposes and goals that result in the
generation of the systemworld to actualize those goals in the first place. We claim that
systemsworld leadership means the charismatic herd-following mass-oriented ‘leader,’ whereas a
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servant leader ‘leads’ by empowering the agents involved in the community as a diversified yet
shared unity.
Primarily, the work has sought to produce a construct that itself may be used to evaluate
our instantiation of the professoriate. Rather than solely evaluating the professoriate through a
systems perspective (graduation rates, failure rates, performance on surveys, and publication),
the work proposes a holistic evaluation model based on the lifeworld of the professoriate.
Professors should be understood and evaluated for their ability to engage and promote the
lifeworld of learning, and such evaluation requires the inclusion of qualitative as well as
quantitative measures. More importantly, such understanding requires that one view the
professoriate and our evaluation of professors from a holistic perspective—the qualitative should
not be reduced to the quantitative for efficiency and organizational purposes. Understanding the
roles of professors requires a robust dialectic, inclusive of the communities that they serve. The
implication, then, for educational policy is significant: this work requires of institutions a
significant revision on their instantiation of professor. Not only should evaluation practices be
revised to include lifeworldly values and evaluative measures, but the university should be
challenged to replace the notion “researcher” with the notion “scholar” as a means by which to
include the many different forms of research in which a scholar may participate.
This work’s implication for practice is largely reflective and personal. The thrust of this
work requires that practitioners of research and teaching reflect on themselves and whether or
not they genuinely engage in their practice for beneficent, scholarly, and community-invested
reasons. In the end, the ability of a university to actually determine if a professor is genuinely
invested in the lifeworld of learning is impossible. One can only seek to observe the
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consequences of one’s actions, which is already a systemsworld investigatory perspective, in
order to infer that one does or does not hold the values espoused by the institution. While the
consequences of the actions of an agent or an organization are rather telling in regards to their
intentions, they do not enable the observation of the intentions themselves. For this reason,
robust engagement in discourse is imperative. Professors must remain active in discourse, both
inside and outside of the realm of academic publication. Their investment in communal dialectic
regarding their own roles and the instantiation of those roles will play a determining role in the
creation of “professor” into the future.
Suggestions for Future Research
How do professors understand their roles as teacher and as researcher?


How do university administrators and leaders understand the roles or teacher and
researcher?



How do students understand the roles of teacher and researcher?



What measures do universities use to evaluate professors participation in the lifeworldly
values of their institutions?



How do university IRB’s address the potential problems emerging of the use of student
work in SoTL research?



Are the actual instantiated roles of faculty as teacher and researcher commensurable?



How do faculty understand “care” and its relationship to professorship?



Does role ambiguity in the professoriate produce cognitive dissonance, role stress, and
role strain?
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Reflections on the Study
The final component of this project enables the author to do three things: further ensure
credibility through a reflexive process that enables transparency and true dialectic with the
reader, share his own thoughts on the construct developed, and present final conclusions. Such a
final reflection should provide a brief insight into the mind of the researcher, providing the
reader with an opportunity for full engagement and the ability to reproduce the reasoning that
results in the conclusions drawn through this work by virtue of participating in a moment of
identity-sharing through dialogue with the author.
This work has been an opportunity for me to investigate a concern that has grown more
and more pressing as I have spent the last 17 years as a post-secondary student. I have been a
student at the University of North Florida, now, for the greater part of my life. While the
university has afforded me the most amazing opportunities of my life, I have also become rather
jaded regarding the educational enterprise, and I have a cynicism that has only gotten worse as I
began teaching in high school. While I find that many of the educators I know are willing to
recognize the problems caused by students—largely as a result of student apathy, ignorance, and
laziness—I see little done to address the problems emerging from educators themselves.
Perhaps only because I have come to know more about universities as I stay longer at my
own institution, I feel as if I have seen a greater willingness on the part of educators and, more
often, policy makers to do students harm. So in pursuing this project, my main concern was to
look at a small portion of one tension that I experienced myself, and found an-ever increasing
body of research to support—disengagement on the part of professors in favor of their research
projects. I recall one well-respected professor once telling me that “pedagogy” was a term used
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by the Education Department to avoid having to do real work. I recall also once being told by
another professor not to work on a research project with someone because that person “only had
an EdD.” In many ways, my experience has been one of dismissal and disregard in the academy
for education—which, given the mission of the university itself, is fascinating.
My years have presented me with numerous professors who seemed to have little
engagement with their students, and I often wondered how it was that professors could actively
do so much harm to their students. Once, as an undergraduate student, I had a professor say to a
classmate and me something derogatory, homophobic, and accusatory all at the same time. That
same professor still receives scathing criticisms on his student evaluations, yet his tenure protects
him. I have seen, on the other hand, deeply invested professors who I came to love treated with
tremendous disrespect and ushered out of the university for numerous reasons, but most tellingly
because they do not publish enough, or do not publish in a way that is respected by their
institution. Of course, as only a student, I do not see behind the scenes. So I do not know what
other facts play a role in the institution’s treatment of its faculty, but even so, my heart goes out
to them.
Even as an adjunct, I never saw behind the scenes because, despite the deeply inclusive
nature of the chair of the department I worked for, the university itself does not provide adjuncts
with a voice. I was voiced only by my chair, and had he not seen fit to include adjuncts in faculty
events, it simply would not have been so. I remain grateful to him to this day. Yet, the actions of
the faculty I have known, who are truly invested in their students, stand out to me, and that fact I
find concerning. Deep concern, deep inclusiveness, the willingness to do whatever is necessary
for those to whom we, as teachers, have committed our lives, should be the rule, not the
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exception. It was for this reason that I chose the members of my committee that I did. These
members are not only experts; they are faculty members who I could say from personal
experience were always willing to help their students. We have not always agreed on what is best
for students, and I can honestly say that I have been in severe arguments with everyone on my
committee before and during my dissertation, both academically and sometimes, personally. Yet
they have never given me reason to believe that they would not do what they believed was in my
best interest as a student and as a person. They, I believe, are often the exception, and if I were to
take a guess often find themselves at odds with an educational system that is becoming more
corporatized and market-driven. So, I wanted to know what distinguished the best professors I
know from the many I have experienced who seem at odds with themselves, with their students,
or with education.
At its heart, I think this dissertation demonstrates that there need be no division between
the scholar and the teacher. My goal in pursuing this project was not to demonstrate the
converse, though I hope that it has. My understanding of professors as researchers was an image
of research that distracts and distances one from the on-the-ground, in-the-mud battle that is
teaching. I was wrong. Our systemsworld perspective of research left me with a
misrepresentation of the role of scholarship in professorship, and I do not believe that I am the
only person who had been deceived by the systems perspective that is coming to dominate the
university system. I have come to believe through my research that good teachers are always
good scholars, by definition, and that the attempt to disentangle the two can only do harm to the
lifeworld of learning.
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Reflecting on this work, I am in some ways concerned that it too clearly reveals my own
positioning regarding care and education. I am deeply sympathetic to care theory, and wonder if
I can justify basing education on care even without my own personal belief systems. Discourse
ethics alleviates this concern, at least to a degree, due to its high level of objectivity and
grounding in logic. To ground one’s ethic in logic may seem, at times, counterintuitive due to the
highly affective perspective we take to ethics, but often yields the most intuitive results. It is not
uncommon to criticize ethicists who seek to gain ethical insight through logic; they are accused
of doing so due to a lack of emotional content, virtue, or care. Yet, thinkers like Kant, Rawls, and
Habermas make demands of us that are not only extensive, but reasonable. It may well be that
the human inclination to ground our ethical positions in intuitions and feelings primarily acts as a
means by which to enable us to do what we want and justify it in a way we find most pleasing,
which establishes a weaker foundation for ethics than objective rationality does.
Then, as it is the case that I am deeply concerned for the welfare of students, particularly
at the hands of universities that tend to treat those students as wallets to be cleverly parted from
their dollars, it is important that the conclusions I reach are not simply indicative of that concern.
My own bias, my belief that the university system is quickly becoming a tool of marginalization
rather than a force to combat it, may be wrong. Nevertheless, my intuition is that, fifty years
from now, the privatization of the university system at the hands of those who seek a profit will
be largely complete. By this, I do not mean that the private educational management companies
will control all universities; that seems unlikely, and too obvious. Rather, I mean that our social
system will continue to push the universities further and further toward the goal of producing
producers.
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The university system will function largely, if not solely, as a means by which to massproduce relatively literate workers who can engage in an economy of information. The
institutions, themselves, will no longer truly promote free inquiry, lifelong learning, or deep
critical and skeptical thought. Engagement in the humanities will give way to the need to
“educate for work.” Literature will become an unjustifiable course offering when compared with
composition, and composition will be considered at its best when it prepares students to write for
employers. In fact, there are likely those who would read this paragraph itself (though I doubt
they would be willing to suffer through the care-theoretical philosophical “mumbo-jumbo” that
is the rest of the dissertation) who would articulate the exact opposite point. They would suggest
that we do a disservice to students if we do not prepare them for work, and the lifeworldly
question, “But does that mean we are preparing them to live?” would be seen as a needless
complexity, and equivocation that is best left to be determined at home in a holy place.
I think that the professors, as they have come to believe that survival requires a job, just
like everyone else, will allow themselves to be pushed further and further away from the
lifeworldly values that brought them to scholarship in the first place. They will find themselves
conceding more and more to the systemsworld in order to “survive” in a system that cannot, by
its very definition, understand the value of what they do and who they are. Then, the universities
will die. The human drive for full, flourishing agency will likely never end, but we seem, at least
in the States, content to pretend that we are flourishing and to pretend that others care. Our
demand that our universities are worthless unless we exit them with the ability to become
wealthy will eliminate the drive for full and robust learning from education.

377
This dissertation, itself, is just a shout into the void. We can theorize as much as we like,
but we cannot change the fact that human beings are willing to trade lifeworldly investment in
themselves for panem et circenses. We wish to be entertained and fed. Perhaps after the collapse
of the university as we know it, centuries from now, there will be another resurgence of learning
from the dark. Perhaps humanity will find itself despondent as it gropes around helplessly for
meaning and once again recognize the import of the high energy state of learning for the purpose
of producing agency. That time is not now, however. We are observing the close of the age of
Enlightenment here in the U.S., if indeed we ever had one. Our greed is such an easily
manipulated vice that we now allow others to educate our children into a system of
indoctrination, marginalization, and meaningless work. In the end, I believe that “scholars who
care” is a laughable notion in a society in which the systemsworld cannot quantify or recognize
the value of care, or even the value of scholarship beyond the production of goods and power.
Thus I will conclude in the following way: Through this discussion of faculty roles, there
is an essential component of the professoriate that has not been discussed: service. The reason for
this omission being that the role of service, the role of “servant,” is no longer essential to
professorship. Faculty members are pushed to teach, and pushed to publish, but they are not
pushed to serve. True, they are required to participate on committees, but that is a dramatically
evacuated systemsworld picture of service. Reading carefully, one might note that it may well be
the lack of stewardship that allows for the uncoupling of teaching from scholarship in the first
place. The idea that educators are servants—servants to students, servants to knowledge, servants
to the community—has been lost to the idea that they must demonstrate service to the institution
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by performing a functional committee role. I conjecture that it will become harder and harder to
find institutions that allow community service to count for tenure and promotion as time goes on.
Yet, it is that idea of service that is at the heart of caring scholarship, and, I believe, at the
heart of education. It is the belief that, first and foremost, we are servants to others in need of our
help that drives scholars to do the most good they can—to share their knowledge with others for
no other reason than because it is the right thing to do. If, perhaps, when we hood our doctors
and promote our professors, we considered those acts not just ones of celebration and merit, but
of yoking, acts of solemn assimilation into a lifetime of service to a cause far greater than our
individual selves, we could return our universities to their own best selves as servants to learners
to the end of enlightening everyone.
Epilogue
As a final thought, it is important to note that little has been said about the implications of
the shift in faculty roles for the roles of students. These two roles, however, are deeply
intertwined. We cannot have one without the other—they act as a Derridian binary and define
each other. Thus, shifts in faculty roles will significantly impact student roles. By my lights the
shift in faculty roles as further defined solely in terms of the systemsworld has series and
somewhat dystopian implications not just as consequences for students, but for the roles students
play. As students become ever increasingly the servants of the intuition, meant to feed its need
for funding as an ever replenishable supply of paying bodies the students take on a sacrificial
quality.5

5

Here then we engage a kind of philosophical “thought experiment” both using discourse ethics and role theory to
ask ourselves, “If faculty roles become x then what do the roles of students become?” We cannot know for sure
what the consequences will be, but the implications of our sublimation of the professoriate to the systemsworld
rather than to the lifeworld are ominous indeed.
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I am reminded of Rene Girard’s (1977) Violence and the Sacred. Most eloquently, Girard
described the deep need humanity feels for violence. The text suggests that the act of human and
animal sacrifice was a means by which to mitigate and meet human demands for violence in a
justifiable way. This is to say that the sacrificial act is deeply embedded in society as a construct
and as a means by which to keep peace within society. Of course, today we believe we have
moved beyond such things. It isn’t hard to see, though, that we have developed other forms of
outlet for violence, like our criminal justice system. We do not reform criminals so much as
punish them; rather than creating prisons that are communally engaged, educative, kind, and
supportive for the purposes of rehabilitation, we send people to prisons that are repressive,
miserable, overcrowded, underfunded, and abusive.
As soon as the judicial system gains supremacy, its machinery disappears from sight… In
the case of sacrifice the designated victim does not become the object of vengeance
because he is a replacement, it is not the “right” victim. In the judicial system the
violence does indeed fall on the “right” victim; but it falls with such force, such
resounding authority, that no retort is possible. (Girard, 1977, p. 22)
I think, though, that there are other more subtle metaphors and outlets for our desires to seek
retribution and revenge, and one may well be our students and schools.
Ever increasingly, it seems we become more comfortable in universities with placing
students on the metaphorical sacrificial alter. We are willing to use their work without their
knowledge for institutional advancement; we know that many of them will fail and do little or
nothing to prevent those failures; we use them for athletic teams that do them bodily injury,
interfere with their studies, and provide no support once they can no longer play. There is
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something to be said about the old stereotype of the professor who tells students to look around
at the students next to them, because those people will have failed by the end of the semester.
How is that failure, though, not the failure of the professor as well? I believe because on some
level we have constructed an understanding of student and teacher that makes the student a
deserving sacrificial victim to the university. Those who fail are offered up as evidence of rigor
and institutional integrity. The need for violence has been economized into a need for “quality
and verifiable evidence of practical and useful production” on the part of the university.
Likely the “student as sacrificial victim” metaphor seems almost absurdly extreme and
unfair. Consider, though, that Girard wrote,
The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its own violence; it prompts the
entire community to choose victims outside itself. The elements of dissention scattered
through the community are drawn to the person of the sacrificial victim and eliminated, at
least temporarily, by its sacrifice. (1977, p. 8)
The number of students who fail, and the pride we seem to take in that failure, suggest that some
need is met by that failure. Moreover, even in those cases in which professors are pressured to
pass students, often at the expense of learning suggests that we are willing to sacrifice the
students’ long term welfare for an immediate societal aim of mass producing a competent and
willing work force. Thus as cuts are made to humanities and students are pushed through the
system at the expense of knowledge of self and society, their very lifeworlds are sacrificed to
meet the demands of the systemsworld.
What I am suggesting, however, is not so much a physical instantiation of sacrifice, but a
psychological and metaphorical one. I am suggesting that the motion to systemsworld and away

381
from the lifeworld leaves us with both the ability and the need to generate Others to which harm
can be directed. Contemporary society does not allow for random violence, nor does it likely
even acknowledge the harm done in constructing persons as purely systemsworld entities.
Nevertheless, the harm is there. Our hopes, dreams, passions, and purposes are unfulfilled,
ignored, and perhaps even reviled by a system that values production and makes commodities
out of humans.
I cannot help but wonder if this is how our post-secondary institutions have come to
generate the students as potential sacrificial victims. They are an unregarded other. Even when
we seek to maintain passing rates, it is not out of love or care, but out of a need to justify
institutional worth. It may well that many professors and even the institutions themselves have
come to resent the student-Other who comes to the institution often ignorant and lazy. I recall
once a professor confiding in me that a student had angered him and that he was going to
“crucify” the student. Institutionally, I have observed a similar phenomenon: a tendency to direct
harm towards students who can do nothing to stop that harm. Perhaps by electing to be in the
program in the first place we see them as willing sacrifices.
The concern is that it is hard to care for a sacrifice. It, the sacrifice, must be kept at a
distance. It must be an Other, perhaps even a loved and respected other for its willingness to be
sacrificed, but an Other nonetheless. But if we allow retribution to be taken out on students, how
can we be said to be caring scholars? Students appear to be becoming simply a means to an
end—a means by which to achieve our own institutional and professional goals. Most
worryingly, the sacrificial act becomes a means of absolution. Simply, when our students fail
miserably, leave the classroom crying, or are used for some research or institutional aim, we do
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not have to feel guilty. It was a willing sacrifice and their loss is economized into a greater
societal gain at the expense of their lifeworld and ours.
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APPENDIX

APA Code of Ethics, Principles
This section consists of General Principles. General Principles, as opposed to Ethical Standards, are aspirational in
nature. Their intent is to guide and inspire psychologists toward the very highest ethical ideals of the profession.
General Principles, in contrast to Ethical Standards, do not represent obligations and should not form the basis for
imposing sanctions. Relying upon General Principles for either of these reasons distorts both their meaning and
purpose.
Principle A: Beneficence and Nonmaleficence
Psychologists strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm. In their professional actions,
psychologists seek to safeguard the welfare and rights of those with whom they interact professionally and other
affected persons and the welfare of animal subjects of research. When conflicts occur among psychologists'
obligations or concerns, they attempt to resolve these conflicts in a responsible fashion that avoids or minimizes
harm. Because psychologists' scientific and professional judgments and actions may affect the lives of others, they
are alert to and guard against personal, financial, social, organizational or political factors that might lead to misuse of
their influence. Psychologists strive to be aware of the possible effect of their own physical and mental health on their
ability to help those with whom they work.
Principle B: Fidelity and Responsibility
Psychologists establish relationships of trust with those with whom they work. They are aware of their professional
and scientific responsibilities to society and to the specific communities in which they work. Psychologists uphold
professional standards of conduct, clarify their professional roles and obligations, accept appropriate responsibility for
their behavior and seek to manage conflicts of interest that could lead to exploitation or harm. Psychologists consult
with, refer to, or cooperate with other professionals and institutions to the extent needed to serve the best interests of
those with whom they work. They are concerned about the ethical compliance of their colleagues' scientific and
professional conduct. Psychologists strive to contribute a portion of their professional time for little or no
compensation or personal advantage.
Principle C: Integrity
Psychologists seek to promote accuracy, honesty and truthfulness in the science, teaching and practice of
psychology. In these activities psychologists do not steal, cheat or engage in fraud, subterfuge or intentional
misrepresentation of fact. Psychologists strive to keep their promises and to avoid unwise or unclear commitments. In
situations in which deception may be ethically justifiable to maximize benefits and minimize harm, psychologists have

395
a serious obligation to consider the need for, the possible consequences of, and their responsibility to correct any
resulting mistrust or other harmful effects that arise from the use of such techniques.
Principle D: Justice
Psychologists recognize that fairness and justice entitle all persons to access to and benefit from the contributions of
psychology and to equal quality in the processes, procedures and services being conducted by psychologists.
Psychologists exercise reasonable judgment and take precautions to ensure that their potential biases, the
boundaries of their competence and the limitations of their expertise do not lead to or condone unjust practices.
Principle E: Respect for People's Rights and Dignity
Psychologists respect the dignity and worth of all people, and the rights of individuals to privacy, confidentiality, and
self-determination. Psychologists are aware that special safeguards may be necessary to protect the rights and
welfare of persons or communities whose vulnerabilities impair autonomous decision making. Psychologists are
aware of and respect cultural, individual and role differences, including those based on age, gender, gender identity,
race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language and socioeconomic status and
consider these factors when working with members of such groups. Psychologists try to eliminate the effect on their
work of biases based on those factors, and they do not knowingly participate in or condone activities of others based
upon such prejudices.
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MLA Ethical Code

Statement of Professional Ethics
Preamble
As a community of teachers and scholars, the members of the MLA serve the larger society by
promoting the study and teaching of the modern languages and literatures. In order to embrace
this enterprise, we require freedom of inquiry. However, this freedom carries with it the
responsibilities of professional conduct. We intend this statement to embody reasonable norms
for ethical conduct in teaching and learning as well as in scholarship. The statement's governing
premises are as follows:
1. The responsibility for protecting free inquiry lies first with tenured faculty members, who may
be called on to speak out against the unethical behavior or defend the academic freedom of
colleagues at any rank. In addition, faculty members have ethical obligations to students,
colleagues, and staff members; to their institutions, their local communities, the profession at
large, and society.1
2. Our integrity as teachers and scholars requires the responsible use of evidence in developing
arguments and fairness in hearing and reading the arguments of both colleagues and students.
3. As a community valuing free inquiry, we must be able to rely on the integrity and the good
judgment of our members. For this reason, we should not








exploit or discriminate against others on grounds such as race, ethnicity, national origin,
religious creed, age, gender, sexual preference, or disability
sexually harass students, colleagues, or staff members
use language that is prejudicial or gratuitously derogatory
make capricious or arbitrary decisions affecting working conditions, professional status,
or academic freedom
misuse confidential information
plagiarize the work of others2
practice deceit or fraud on the academic community or the public

4. Free inquiry respects variety in the modes and objects of investigation, whether traditional or
innovative. We should defend scholarly practices against unfounded attacks from within or
outside our community.
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5. Our teaching and inquiry must respect our own cultures and the cultures we study.
6. Judgments of whether a line of inquiry is ultimately useful to students, colleagues, or society
should not be used to limit the freedom of scholars to pursue their research.

Ethical Conduct in Teaching and Learning
1. Teachers should represent to their students the values of free inquiry.
2. At the outset of each course, teachers should provide students with a statement on approaches
to the course materials, on the goals of the course, and on the standards by which students will be
evaluated.
3. Teachers should offer constructive and timely evaluation of students' work and specify the
times and places when teachers are available to consult with students.
4. Teacher-student collaboration entails the same obligation as other kinds of research. Teachers
and students should acknowledge appropriately any intellectual indebtedness.
5. Teachers whose research in any way includes students as subjects must make clear the
obligations, rewards, and consequences of participation.3
6. Teachers, in devising requirements for written work and oral discussion, have an ethical
responsibility to respect both students' privacy and their emotional and intellectual dignity.
7. Teachers should keep confidential what they know about students' academic standing,
personal lives, and political or religious views and should not exploit such personal knowledge.4
8. Teachers must provide unbiased, professional evaluation of students seeking admission to
graduate study or applying for financial support.
9. Teachers should provide direction to students, especially graduate students; should respect
their scholarly interests; and should not exploit them for personal or professional ends. Teachers
should not expect students, graduate or otherwise, to perform unremunerated or uncredited
teaching, research, or personal duties.
10. Teachers working with teaching assistants have a special responsibility to provide them with
adequate preparation, continuing guidance, and informed evaluation.
11. Teachers must weigh the academic performance of each student on its merits.
12. In overseeing and responding to the work of graduate students, whether they are in courses or
at the thesis or dissertation stage, advisers should periodically inform them of their standing in
the program.
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13. Before graduate students begin searching for jobs, advisers and teachers should provide them
with adequate and timely counseling and should be prepared to write honest and constructive
letters of recommendation. Advisers or teachers who doubt their ability to evaluate a student
fairly should decline the task of furnishing such a letter.

Ethical Conduct in Service and Scholarship
1. Scholars in positions of leadership should assist their institutions in devising and
implementing policies and procedures that promote a positive working and learning
environment.
2. A scholar who borrows from the works and ideas of others, including those of students, should
acknowledge the debt, whether or not the sources are published. Unpublished scholarly material
— which may be encountered when it is read aloud, circulated in manuscript, or discussed — is
especially vulnerable to unacknowledged appropriation, since the lack of a printed text makes
originality hard to establish.
3. Scholars should ensure that their personal activities in politics and in their local communities
remain distinct from positions taken by their universities or colleges. They should avoid
appearing to speak for their institutions when acting privately.
4. As referees for presses, journals, and promotion and tenure committees, scholars should judge
the work of others fully, fairly, and in an informed way. A scholar who has any conflict of
interest or is so out of sympathy with the author, topic, or critical stance of a work as to be
unable to judge its merits without prejudice must decline to serve as a referee or reviewer. A
scholar with a personal relationship that prevents an unbiased evaluation should turn down an
invitation to serve.
5. Referees should discharge their tasks in a timely manner; they should decline invitations
whose deadlines they cannot meet. Undue delay in review or publication justifies submission to
another outlet, provided the first editor is informed.
6. Members of review committees must keep confidential all information about individuals,
departments, or programs under evaluation.
7. Faculty members planning to resign an appointment should give timely, written notice of this
intention in accordance with institutional regulations. Until the existing appointment ends, they
should not accept another appointment involving concurrent obligations without the permission
of the appropriate administrator.

Conclusion
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This document focuses on the ethical obligations of members of the modern language profession.
A common understanding of such obligations will enable us to exert appropriate restraints in
exercising our responsibilities as scholars, teachers, and students and to promote ethical behavior
in our departments and institutions.

History
"Statement of Professional Ethics" was adopted by the Delegate Assembly in 1991 and published
in Profession 92. Earlier drafts were prepared by an ad hoc committee of the MLA appointed by
the Executive Council in 1987, following a Delegate Assembly recommendation that such a
committee be designated to "study professional ethics and provide MLA-endorsed guidelines"
("Professional Notes" 382). The committee members who prepared the statement were Barry
Gaines, University of New Mexico; Lawrence Poston, University of Illinois, Chicago (chair);
Roslyn Abt Schindler, Wayne State University; Mario Valdes, University of Toronto; and Louise
Vasvari, State University of New York, Stony Brook.
This original statement was substantially revised in 2004 by the Committee on Academic
Freedom and Professional Rights and Responsibilities, whose members were Carla Freccero,
University of California, Santa Cruz; Lisa Justine Hernández, Saint Edward's University; Sue
Hintz, Northern Virginia Community College; Genaro M. Padilla, University of California,
Berkeley; Andrew Parker, Amherst College (chair); and Gema Peréz-Sánchez, University of
Miami.

Notes
1

When a faculty member's fulfillment of ethical obligations is reviewed, care should be taken
that it, like other subjects of evaluation, is not arbitrarily or capriciously judged. Any actions that
may lead to the nonrenewal of an appointment, to the dismissal of a tenured faculty member, or
to other such sanctions should be pursued in accordance with generally accepted procedural
standards. See especially the "1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure"
of the American Association of University Professors, endorsed by the MLA in 1962 and
augmented with interpretive comments in 1970, and the related AAUP "Recommended
Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure."
2

In this statement we adopt the definition of plagiarism given in Joseph Gibaldi's MLA Style
Manual: "Using another person's ideas or expressions in your writing without acknowledging the
source constitutes plagiarism.... [T]o plagiarize is to give the impression that you wrote or
thought something that you in fact borrowed from someone, and to do so is a violation of
professional ethics.... Forms of plagiarism include the failure to give appropriate
acknowledgment when repeating another's wording or particularly apt phrase, paraphrasing
another's argument, and presenting another's line of thinking" (6.1; see also Gibaldi, MLA
Handbook, ch. 2). It is important to note that this definition does not distinguish between
published and unpublished sources, between ideas derived from
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colleagues and those offered by students, or between written and oral presentations.
3

Such relationships impose on researchers a special responsibility to guard the students involved
from such abuses as breach of confidentiality and research-related harm. Scholars should inform
themselves of and observe institutional regulations and guidelines on the use of human subjects
in research.
4

Teachers should familiarize themselves with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99). As explained in the section of the United States
Department of Education's Web site devoted to the act, FERPA is "a Federal law that protects the
privacy of student education records. The law applies to all schools that receive funds under an
applicable program of the U.S. Department of Education. FERPA gives parents certain rights
with respect to their children's education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or
she reaches the age of 18 or attends a school beyond the high school level" (Family Educ.
Rights).
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